Tax knowledge and tax compliance determinants in self assessment system in Malaysia by Palil, Mohd Rizal
 
 
TAX KNOWLEDGE AND TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
IN SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEM IN MALAYSIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
MOHD RIZAL PALIL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
Birmingham Business School  
The University of Birmingham  
 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. 
The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work 
are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by 
any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of 
the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
   ii
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Self assessment system (SAS) has become the key administrative approach for both 
personal and corporate taxation in developed countries including the USA, UK and 
Australia. This approach emphasises both the taxpayers’ responsibility to report their 
income and the need for them to determine their own tax liability. Central to the 
motivations of self assessment system introduction is an increase in the efficiency of tax 
collection for the tax authority; however, of more vital importance is the need to enable 
this without having an unacceptable detrimental effect on the other key characteristics of 
a well-designed tax system (equity, wider administrative efficiency etc).  This requires 
the development of public awareness of tax laws, and improvements in voluntary 
compliance. According to prior studies on this topic one of the main facilitating factors in 
achieving these aims is the development of the level of tax knowledge among taxpayers. 
The objective of this study is to investigate how facilitating factors interact in the 
development of a suitable SAS focusing in particular on the role of tax knowledge. To 
explore the interaction in the real setting the country of Malaysia is used as a case tax 
system for this study. This country is due to chosen its fairly recent introduction of SAS 
enabling a specific focus on changes brought about by the move to a SAS with as little 
time for ‘noise’ creating factors as possible that may result from longer implemented 
SAS. It also enables a study of this topic in the context of a developing country where 
many of the prior studies in this area have had in the context of developed countries. This 
study focuses on the level of individual Malaysian taxpayers’ knowledge and explores 
how tax knowledge levels influence tax compliance behaviour in a new SAS. Data was 
collected through a large scale national postal survey resulting in 1,073 responses. Five 
stages were used to facilitate the analysis. Stage 1, using the t-test and ANOVA, focuses 
on the characteristics of taxpayers’ knowledge including gender, ethnicity, educational 
level and income level. Stage 2 attempts to describe the relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance using multiple regressions. Stage 4 examines taxpayers’ 
compliance determinants more widely than tax knowledge. Nine variables were tested in 
Stage 4. Control variables were added in both Stage 3 and Stage 5 in order to assess 
whether the inclusion of control variables significantly affects tax compliance behaviour. 
The results suggested that tax knowledge has a significant impact on tax compliance even 
though the level of tax knowledge varies significantly among respondents. The results 
also indicate that tax compliance is influenced specifically by probability of being 
audited, perceptions of government spending, penalties, personal financial constraints, 
and the influence of referent groups. Results of this study answer such questions as which 
various taxpayer characteristics of tax knowledge affect compliant behaviour. The results 
of this study can inform policymakers on the extent to which tax knowledge is important 
in a self assessment system and in what ways it can affect compliance. It also provides an 
indicator for tax administrators of the relative importance of tax knowledge in assisting 
with the design of tax education programmes, simplifying tax systems and developing a 
   iii
wider understanding of taxpayers' behaviour. This study contributes to current global 
literature in this field of the relative importance of tax knowledge in affecting tax 
compliance, as well as exploring the factors that make people pay taxes in a self 
assessment system, and discusses methods of increasing voluntary compliance. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a general introduction to the subjects addressed in this thesis and 
provides a summary of the following content and key research outcomes. This chapter 
begins with the definition of tax, an explanation of brief the importance of tax in a 
country, as well as principles and objectives of tax. Research objectives, problems 
statements, the significance of the study and the outline of the thesis are also discussed in 
the latter part of this chapter. Each element of this chapter is then expanded upon and 
developed more fully in subsequent chapters (as outlined in section 1.8). 
 
Taxation is one of the important elements in managing national income, especially in 
developed countries and has played an important role in civilized societies since their 
birth thousands years ago (Lymer and Oats, 2009: 1). Tax is defined as ‘a compulsory 
levy, imposed by government or other tax raising body, on income, expenditure, or 
capital assets, for which the taxpayer receives nothing specific in return’ (Lymer and 
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Oats, 2009: 3). However, not all payments to government are considered tax payments: 
for example, charges, tolls and other levies are paid to obtain a specific service and are 
not strictly tax payments.  
 
Adam Smith in his book ‘The Wealth of Nations’ which was published in 1776 suggested 
that a tax system is based on certain basic principles, namely equity, certainty, 
convenience and efficiency. Lymer and Oats (2009: 42) and Barjoyai (1987: 76) briefly 
defined the principles as follows: 
 
Equity means a tax system should be fair among individuals and taxes should be levied 
based on taxpayers’ capacity. Horizontal equity means that taxpayers with the same 
income or wealth should pay the same amount of tax (tax burden) while vertical equity 
means that taxpayers with high income (capacity) should pay higher tax (tax burden).  
 
Certainty is defined as a taxpayer knowing his or her tax liability and when and where to 
pay the tax. It relates to the simplicity of the tax systems so that the taxpayers are easily 
understood and capable of calculating their tax liability.  
 
Convenience relates to how people pay their taxes or engage with the tax system. For 
example, people more conveniently pay tax by it being deducted at source rather than 
paying a large amount of tax annually (Lymer and Oats, 2009: 50). The introduction of 
electronic filing is another example of a facility provided by the tax authority to ease the 
method of filing tax returns. 
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Efficiency refers to how the tax authority collects the tax revenues and can be divided into 
two subsections: administrative efficiency and economic efficiency. Administrative 
efficiency refers to the costs involved when collecting tax revenues. The more a tax costs 
to administer, the less of the money raised is available to the government to spend. The 
administrative cost should be as small as possible to achieve desirable economic 
efficiency (Lymer and Oats, 2009: 55). Economic efficiency referring to tax should not 
interfere with the working of the markets. For example, the introduction of a new tax or 
increase on the tax rates should not distort or affect taxpayers’ behaviour (i.e. from 
compliant to less compliant).    
 
 
The main objective of imposing certain taxes on the public is to generate revenues for the 
government for public expenditure (Singh, 1999; Shanmugam, 2003; Lymer and Oats, 
2009: 2). However, there are other functions of taxes as suggested by Lymer and Oats 
(2009: 2) including to reduce inequalities through a policy of redistribution of income 
and wealth so that income gap between the rich and the poor is not as significant. Tax 
systems are also designed for social purposes, such as discouraging certain activities 
which are considered undesirable and protecting the environment. For instance, the 
excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco are (at least partly) exercised to decrease 
consumption and thus encourage a healthier lifestyle. Taxes are also expected to ensure 
economic goals through the ability of the taxation system to influence the allocation of 
resources including transferring resources from the private sector to the government to 
finance the public investment programme, the direction of private investment into desired 
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channels through such measures as regulation of tax rates and the granting of tax 
incentives. In addition, import duties could be used to protect local industries from 
foreign competition. This has the effect of transferring a certain amount of demand from 
imported goods to domestically produced goods.  
 
Taxes can be classified into two main types: direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes mean 
the burden (incidence) of tax is borne entirely by the entity that pays it, and cannot be 
passed on to another entity; for example, corporation tax and individual income tax. 
Indirect taxes are typically the charges that are levied on goods and services 
(consumptions) (Barjoyai, 1987: 77), for example VAT (Value Added Tax), sales tax, 
excise tax and stamp duties. Indirect taxes are not levied on individuals, but on goods and 
services. Customers indirectly pay this tax in the form of higher prices. For example, it 
can be said that while purchasing goods from a retail shop, the retail sales tax is actually 
paid by the customer. The retailer eventually passes this tax to the respective authority. 
The indirect tax actually raises the price of the goods and the customer’s purchase by 
paying more for that product. Unlike indirect tax, direct taxes are based on 'ability to pay' 
principle but (by being very obvious to the taxpayer) they sometimes work as a 
disincentive to work harder and earn more because that would mean paying more tax 
(Mansor, Tayib and Yusof,  2005). 
 
One of the main reasons why the government imposes taxes is to generate income to 
manage the economy and redistribute resources. In 2007, tax collection as percentage of 
Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in developed countries like the United States of America 
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(US) and the United Kingdom (UK) were 28.33% and 36.6% respectively (average 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 2006 
were 35.9%)  (OECD, 2009).  For developing countries, like Indonesia and Malaysia in 
2008, the tax collection as percentage of GDP were 13.35 and 15.3% respectively 
(average Asian countries 22.5%) (Asian Development Bank, 2009). The importance of 
tax systems as a major revenue source in a country is undeniable (Slemrod, 1989), these 
statistics have evidenced that tax revenues are one of (if not the) main income source for 
many governments throughout the world but to maximize tax collection and minimize tax 
evasion among taxpayers is difficult to achieve in practice (Allingham and Sandmo, 
1972). 
 
A number of measures have been implemented by many countries in order to increase the 
revenue collection; this includes the change of the assessment system used by many 
countries for direct taxes from direct assessment to self assessment systems (SAS).  Many 
countries have shifted to SAS for individuals, for example Sri Lanka (1972), Pakistan 
(1979), Indonesia (1984), Australia (1986-87), Ireland (1988), New Zealand (1988) and 
the United Kingdom (1996-97). In relation to the efficiency principles discussed earlier, 
objectives supporting the change to SAS were to increase voluntary compliance, reduce 
tax authorities’ burden of assessing tax returns and increase tax collection efficiency 
(reduce tax collection costs) (refer Table 2.1).  However, a research question therefore 
now arises related to this switch to SAS namely did the changes to a SAS achieve a 
desirable increase in the rate of voluntary compliance and succeed in reducing tax 
collection costs (increase efficiency)?   
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The main difference between direct assessment and SAS is that in direct assessment, it is 
the taxpayers' statutory duty to declare all the necessary particulars pertaining to their 
income and expenses for that particular year of assessment and submit the necessary 
returns together with all required supporting documents to the tax administrator. It is then 
the tax administrator’s duty to assess all tax returns and issue a notice of tax stating the 
tax liability.  However, under SAS, the tax authority’s responsibilities, particularly on 
assessing the tax return and determining tax liabilities, has been shifted to taxpayers.  For 
example, a taxpayer has to ensure that all income is accurately declared and calculate the 
tax payable, an expense is deductible before making a claim in his or her return.  
 
The change to SAS has raised  issues linked to the competency, honesty, capability and 
readiness of taxpayers to receive the burden of calculating and assuring the accuracy of 
the tax returns. For example, under the direct assessment, it is assumed that individual 
taxpayers might not possess the sufficient knowledge to compute their tax payable but in 
SAS, tax knowledge is vital as an insufficient level of tax knowlegde may result in 
inaccurate tax returns and and therefore computation of tax liability (Eriksen and Fallan, 
1996; Loo, 2006). 
 
Previous tax compliance studies linked to direct assessment have been conducted in many 
developed countries; for example, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Lewis (1982) 
suggested that taxpayers were likely to comply if the probability of being audited was 
high. However, in direct assessment, probability of being audited is not the only factor 
affecting tax compliance among the taxpayers. There are other factors such as age (Spicer 
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and Lundstedt, 1976), gender (Vogel, 1974), level of income (Mason and Lowry, 1981), 
income source (Wahlund, 1992), and perceptions of equity and fairness (Harris, 1989) 
that impact the compliance behaviour (Chapter 4 discusses the factors that affect tax 
compliance in detail). Are these variables still relevant and important in SAS and do the 
findings from developed countries like the US, Australia and New Zealand suggest the 
same results will occur if the study is conducted in developing tax regimes? 
 
It is believed that the significant changes (changing to SAS) in tax administrations could 
produce better administrations, more focus on tax audit and investigations (rather than tax 
returns processing, and assessment creation) and reduce collection costs and time 
(Shanmugam, 2003; Kasipillai, 2000). However, there is limited published researches 
studying the implications of and the introduction of SAS, particularly in exploring 
taxpayers’ behaviour (Loo, 2006). Therefore, this study attempts to provide empirical 
evidence regarding these issues in a SAS regime to add to this research literature. 
Moreover, this study focuses on the influence of tax knowledge on compliance behaviour 
and the determinants of tax compliance in SAS in Malaysia by using individual taxpayers 
as the respondents. The reasons why individual taxpayers in Malaysia are chosen as a 
focal point of study is discussed in 1.3. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENTS 
 
One of the main barriers in implementing SAS is achieving acceptable levels of voluntary 
compliance (and thus tax collection efficiency), which typically involves many factors 
used in combination with each other such as fines, audit probability, tax rates, 
knowledge, attitude, norms and fairness (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008). Findings of 
some prior research has indicated that in SAS, taxpayers tend to comply less as compared 
with direct assessment (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998).  This could  happen due to 
unintentional non-compliance especially in the early years of the introduction due to 
factors such as lack of familiarity with the new system, or general limited knowledge of 
tax issues where such knowledge was not required and has to be obtained somehow. In 
Malaysia, SAS was implemented starting from year of assessment 2004, for individual 
taxpayers replacing a direct assessment system known as the ‘Formal System’. SAS is 
essentially an approach whereby taxpayers are required by law to determine their taxable 
income, compute their tax liability and submit their tax returns based on existing tax laws 
and policy statements issued by the tax authorities. A notice of assessment is not issued 
under SAS. The tax return furnished by the taxpayer is deemed to be a notice of 
assessment. Cornell (1996: 12) defined ‘self assessment’ as ‘do it yourself’ in which 
taxpayers have to understand, interpret and apply tax laws to their own situation.  
 
In contrast, under a direct assessment system (using Malaysia’s the Formal System as an 
example), tax returns would be subjected to a detailed technical scrutiny by the Inland 
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Revenue Board Malaysia (IRB). The spirit of SAS is to educate taxpayers and make them 
aware of their tax responsibilities (IRB, 2006; Kasipillai, 2000). Hence, assuming that 
taxpayers are adequately conversant with the tax legislation, guidelines, ruling and 
administrative procedures, unlike under the Formal System the Inland Revenue Board 
(IRB) would not assess all tax returns and issue notices of assessment. However, a 
detailed technical scrutiny through tax audits can still be implemented randomly. 
 
In the year of assessment 2003, a year before SAS implemented for individuals, the IRB 
had assessed 98.65% of the tax return (IRB Annual Report, 2003). Under the Formal 
System, the compliance behaviour of the taxpayers in terms of accurately completing the 
tax returns (declaring all incomes and deductions) is easier to detect because the 
taxpayers are required to submit some relevant documents such as evidence of income 
from employment, dividend vouchers and other receipts as proof for deductions. 
However, in SAS, the taxpayers do not need to submit such documents (other than 
dividend vouchers for tax rebate purposes). Moreover, in SAS, the tax authority heavily 
relies on taxpayers’ honesty during their completion of the tax return. Hence, in this 
context, tax compliance is an important issue for both administrators and taxpayers so 
that total tax collections are accurate and finally could ‘reduce the tax gap’ (Mohani, 
2001: 187). 
 
Therefore, judging from the significant difference in terms of the mechanism of SAS 
particularly in filing processes (no supporting documents attached), assessments (no 
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detailed scrutiny assessments) as well as an issue of the competency (tax knowledge), it 
is believed that these significant changes (to a SAS) could potentially make tax 
knowledge much more important factor when ascertaining the accuracy of tax returns and 
therefore more directly affect the tax compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers.  
 
1.3  OVERVIEW OF MALAYSIA AS A COUNTRY AND WHY MALAYSIA IS 
SELECTED IN THIS STUDY? 
 
 
Malaysia is a federation that consists of thirteen states and three federal territories in 
Southeast Asia with a total land of 329,847 square kilometres (127,355 sq. miles) and the 
population stands at over 27 million (Department of Statistic Malaysia, 2008). The 
country is separated into two regions—Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Borneo—by 
the South China Sea. Malaysia borders Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and the 
Philippines. Malaysia's head of state is the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (The King) and the 
government is headed by a Prime Minister. The government is closely modeled on the 
Westminster Parliamentary System. The largest ethnic groups in Malaysia are the 
Malays, Chinese and Indians (Department of Statistic Malaysia, 2008). Malays who make 
up about 65% (Department of Statistic Malaysia, 2008) of the population are the 
predominant group with Chinese (22%), Indians (9%) and other ethnic groups (4%) 
making up the rest. Islam is the official religion but all other religions such as 
Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism are freely practised. Malaysia is a federal 
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constitutional elective monarchy (further details on Malaysia as a country can be found in 
Chapter 3). 
 
Tax systems in Malaysia were introduced by the British into the Federation of Malaya in 
1947 and were based on Heasman’s Report (Singh, 1999:138). Initially, the Income Tax 
Ordinance 1947 was gazetted as the main act but subsequently reformed and replaced by 
Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA) which took effect on January 1, 1968. Currently, ITA 1967 
continues to be the main act to govern direct taxes in Malaysia, particularly corporate and 
individual income tax.  
 
The Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri or the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) is the tax authority 
which administers direct taxes in Malaysia. Other than income taxes, the IRB is also 
responsible for administering, assessing, collecting and the enforcement of real property 
gain taxes, petroleum taxes and stamp duties. Royal Malaysian Customs (RMC) is the 
government agency responsible for administering the nation’s indirect tax policy. The 
core business is to collect tax and in line with that, RMC’s vision is to be a respected, 
recognized and a world class Customs Administration.  
 
There are a number of factors that make Malaysia important for our study of tax 
compliance disciplines especially in a self assessment system. One of the most important 
factors is that Malaysia recently introduced SAS in year of assessment 2004 for 
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individual taxpayers and therefore has been operational now for five tax years, giving 
appropriate time to explore the extent to which developments of tax knowledge and 
changes in compliant behaviour are visible, resulting from this change of tax 
administrative approach. SAS for companies was first introduced in 2001 and this was 
followed by business, partnership and cooperatives in 2003. The IRB therefore has now 
experience of nine years of companies’ SAS (year of assessment 2001 to 2009). The 
effectiveness of the SAS has been positive since its implementation. Tax collection from 
companies has increased at an average rate of 12.78% per year (IRB Annual Report, 
2002). The legislation, tax services and education and the enforcement of the law are 
important elements which have led to the improvement of tax collection for companies.  
 
Loo (2006: 284) also suggested that there is a need to explore the effectiveness of SAS 
from various perspectives after several years of implementaion especially in terms of tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. She also recommended a comparison between 
Malaysia and European countries as vital to enhance Malaysian tax administration.  
 
In addition, other factors help to make Malaysia an interesting context in which to study 
tax compliance. These include the fact that it is a complex multi-racial and multi-faith 
country, enabling us to contribute new evidence to the tax compliance literature where 
previous studies evidenced that ethnicity and religion have a significant impact on 
compliance (see Loo, 2006; Mohamad Ali, Mustafa and Asri, 2007; Devos, 2005; 2008). 
Malaysia also provides an ideal opportunity for comparative analysis with previously 
developed countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Australia and OECD 
 13
countries. Despite similar capitalistic economies, structural tax differences do exist 
between Malaysia and other countries (particularly UK and the US) that make Malaysia a 
significant country to study. For instance, the personal tax rates structure in Malaysia is 
effectively a progressive tax: rates stand at 1%  to 27% (refer Table 3.2) which are lower 
than those countries1 The tax rates are usually changed in a yearly budget which is 
presented by the Minister of Finance. There is no capital gain tax and  inheritance tax  
imposed in Malaysia except for the real property gains tax which is enacted by Real 
Property Gain Tax 1976. Interestingly, although Malaysian tax systems were largely 
based on British tax systems, all taxpayers are required to complete tax returns every year 
(IRB, 2008) while in the UK lodgement of tax returns is not something everyone has to 
do (Lymer and Oats, 2008; 43; Her Majesty’s Revenues and Customs (HMRC), 2009).  
 
Also, a number of previous authors suggest that significant cross cultural differences 
exist between countries that can affect tax compliance in different ways in these 
jurisdictions (Hofstede, 1980; Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan, 2000; Mohamad Ali et.al., 
2007). It is therefore important to study tax compliance in a wide variety of countries to 
enable development of appropriate compliance models for those countries (i.e models 
demonstrated to be applicable in country A may or may not be equally applicable in 
country B) and to add to general knowledge on tax compliance issues.  Like the United 
States and other western jurisdictions, tax compliance represents a significant problem in 
Malaysia particularly in the self assessment system (Kasipillai, 2000; Mohani, 2001; 
Kasipillai, Aripin, and Amran, 2003; Shanmugam, 2003; Loo, 2006).  
                                                     
1 UK – 1% - 40%, US – 1% - 35% and Australia 1% - 45% as at year of assessment 2009. 
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Therefore, choosing Malaysia as a focal point, this study contributes to the tax 
compliance literature by investigating the extent to which western developed country tax 
compliance dimensions can be shown to also exist in an Asian developing country setting 
denoted in a study of Malaysia as well as to generate general principles of taxation and 
general conclusions of global general tax administration.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH  OBJECTIVES 
 
‘Knowledge about tax law is assumed to be important for preference and attitudes 
towards taxation. There is little research that explicitly considers how attitude towards 
taxation is influenced by specific knowledge of tax regulations’ (Eriksen and Fallan, 
1996: 387). The research done by Eriksen and Fallan demonstrated the importance of tax 
knowledge in a tax system, especially in a SAS. They suggested that fiscal knowledge 
correlates with attitudes towards taxation and that tax behaviour can be improved by 
better understanding of tax laws. A recent study by Kirchler et. al. (2008) also 
emphasizes that tax knowledge in individual taxpayers is also positively related to tax 
compliance (in line with Wahlund, 1992; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Park and Hyun, 2003, 
refer Chapter 4).  
 
It has been stated and has long been discussed in tax compliance literature that there are 
many factors affecting tax compliance, with knowledge being a major influence 
especially in SAS. While previous literature is continuously contributing to new 
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development on tax compliance research, this study attempts to enrich the existent 
literature by providing a clearer picture and a holistic view of Malaysian individual 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour in SAS. It does this by providing the most 
comprehensive published study of individual taxpayers in Malaysia undertaken to date. 
This will in turn enable us to provide some wider comments applicable beyond the 
Malaysian situation at least where similar situations to that found in Malaysia can be 
found .  
 
Individual taxpayers are the main subject of this study and are particularly important in 
understanding tax compliance particularly in a self assessment system (DasGupta, Lahiri 
and Mookherjee, 1995; Wallschutzky and Singh, 1995; Kasipillai, 2000; Mohamad Ali 
et.al., 2007). Firstly, compared to corporate taxpayers, individual taxpayers are inclined 
to self-complete tax returns rather than engaging a tax agent (Trivedi, Shehata and 
Mestelmen, 2004). Since self assessment systems require a high level of tax knowledge, 
self completion among less knowledgeable taxpayers could lead to unintentional non-
compliance behaviour and could increase tax gaps effects (Mohani, 2001; Riahi-
Belkaoui, 2004).  
 
Secondly, compared to other sources of taxes (i.e petroleum tax, corporate tax and stamp 
duties), the nature of operation and administration of personal income tax in Malaysia is 
complex (for example all taxpayers must file tax returns annually unlike in some SAS 
e.g. the UK), is time consuming and incurs relatively high costs of collection for the tax 
authority compared to other forms of taxation (IRB Annual Report, 2006). It also requires 
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relatively complex procedures so that the IRB can manage all individual taxpayers 
effectively (both for assessment and for collection of income taxes) (Kassiplillai, 2000). 
As such it can be said to be critical for the personal income tax system to be as efficient 
and effectively operated as possible to directly, and significantly, affect overall levels of 
efficiency in the complete tax system. The details can be found in Chapter 3. 
 
Thus, judging from these factors, it is reasonable to study individual taxpayers’ 
compliance as the main subject of this thesis because of the greater likelihood that tax 
knowledge differences between taxpayers will influence their level of compliance. 
Therefore, the main objective of this study can be divided into the following sub-
objectives: 
 
1. to obtain  a comprehensive overview of the tax knowledge of individual 
Malaysian taxpayers. The study will focus on measuring the individual tax 
knowledge and the focal point is on personal income taxes which are enacted in 
Section 4 of the Income Tax Act 1967, the regulations about the classification of 
income, deductions, relief and rebate; 
2. to investigate and analyse taxpayers’ compliance behaviour in the SAS in 
Malaysia. This objective provides the factors that impact tax compliance in SAS; 
and 
3. to provide a comparison of Malaysian taxpayers in the SAS with selective other 
countries – for example the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, 
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and other OECD countries to draw more general 
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conclusions about what the Malaysia situation can reveal about SAS in both 
developed and developing countries. 
 
In order to accomplish the above objectives, the specific research objectives of this study 
are therefore as follows in the context of the Malaysian SAS in operation at the time of 
this research: 
 
1.   to determine the characteristics and the level of tax knowledge of individual 
taxpayers;  
2. to examine the association between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour; 
3. to identify the determinants of tax compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers; and 
4. to analyse and compare  the Malaysia with other countries (i.e the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Australia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and other OECD countries in 
terms of individual’s tax compliance under self assessment systems). 
  
The study is therefore produces empirical evidence addressing the following questions 
under these research objectives: 
 
i) Do Malaysian taxpayers have better tax knowledge under the SAS compared 
to the previous Formal System? In the Formal System, tax knowledge is not  
compulsory and necessary for the taxpayers in order to file their tax returns. 
All they need to do is simply complete the personal detail information in the 
tax return and submit the return with relevant documents to the IRB. Then the 
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IRB will calculate the tax liability for the taxpayers. In the Formal System, the 
responsibility of calculating the tax liability falls to the IRB but in the SAS, 
the responsibilities has been fully shifted from IRB to the taxpayers. Thus, to 
fulfill these responsibilities, the taxpayers must have sufficient tax knowledge 
in order for them to complete the tax return and calculate their tax liability 
accurately. 
ii) What categories of taxpayers are the most knowledgeable and least 
knowledgeable? 
iii) Does tax knowledge affect tax compliance? 
iv) What are the factors affecting tax compliance attitudes? 
v) How does the Malaysian system compare to other developed or developing 
countries globally for SAS compliance? 
 
Further details and elaboration of the research objectives as well as hypotheses 
development resulting from these research questions are discussed in Chapter 5 – 
Research design and methodology. 
 
The results of this study suggest empirical evidence and provide indicative improvement 
strategies for the tax authority by studying the inherent weaknesses of the current 
enforcement system and give some evidence on the holistic model of Malaysian 
individual taxpayers behaviour.  Since this study will emphasize the importance of tax 
knowledge and the influence of this knowledge on the behaviour of taxpayers, the results 
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could provide new insights to the IRB (and other tax authorities) in designing the tax 
education programmes and the sampling design for audit purposes.  
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The mission of SAS set by the Malaysian Government is to collect taxes in an efficient 
manner which mean at the lowest costs (time and money), to improve compliance and to 
institute effective enforcement through prevailing legal procedures (IRB Annual Report, 
2006). In order to accomplish that mission, the three fold objectives are (IRB Annual 
Report, 2006): 
 
1) to assess and collect the correct amount of revenue as provided under the law in the 
most effective manner and at a minimum cost; 
2) to instill public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax system; and  
3) to encourage voluntary compliance. 
 
Judging from those objectives, in order to accomplish the first objective specifically and 
the whole objectives generally, it can be argued that tax knowledge is one of the most 
important variables that should be emphasized (refer 4.2). However, it is not likely that a 
simple relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance will exist; knowledgeable 
taxpayers do not necessarily comply (Collins, Milliron and Toy, 1992). Since Malaysian 
tax laws and policies, especially for individuals, are always amended during the yearly 
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budget presentation by the Minister of Finance2, tax knowledge either gained through 
formal or informal courses dates quickly. For example, if there are changes in income 
classifications, deductions, relief and tax rates, it means that past years’ knowledge can 
be considered as obsolete. In fact, as it may be unclear to the taxpayer what information 
is out of date they may even be considered to be at a disadvantage to those with less tax 
knowledge.   
 
Tax knowledge also affects the taxpayers’ attitude towards the accuracy of the tax return 
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Kirchler et. al., 2008). In addition, research on measuring the 
level of tax knowledge in Malaysia is insufficient. Furthermore, no studies have been 
done to investigate the level of tax knowledge among individual Malaysian taxpayers 
post SAS introduction, factors that affect the characteristics of the taxpayers themselves 
that contribute to the level of tax knowledge. Since there is no formal tax education being 
given in secondary school or at the higher level except for accounting students3, it can be 
presumed that the majority of taxpayers are relatively tax illiterate. This was adequate 
under the Formal System but is arguably no longer so under a SAS. The question is: why 
do we need to investigate their characteristics as we already know that they are relatively 
tax illiterate and therefore identifying those characteristics will have little relevance? 
Actually, the introduction of SAS for individuals in other countries such as Sri Lanka 
(1972), Pakistan (1979), Indonesia (1984), Australia (1986-87), Ireland (1988), New 
Zealand (1988) and the United Kingdom (1996-97) has illustrated that taxpayers quickly 
                                                     
2 The national budget presentation used to be presented in Parliament by the Finance Minister on each last 
Friday in October. However, starting from 2003, the presentation is on each last Friday in September. 
3 As for diploma and bachelor levels, the accounting students are required to undertake at least two taxation 
papers. 
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become more aware of their tax obligations (Kasipillai, 2000) as the new systems are 
introduced. This study indicates that most taxpayers will try hard to improve their tax 
knowledge and keep up to date on changes of tax policy every year once a SAS is in 
position.  
 
There are limited published research studies completed in Malaysia regarding income tax 
compliance. For example, one is concerned with tax ethics and taxpayers attitude (Sabri, 
1993); one is concerned with the analysis of aspects of Malaysian income tax system that 
promote tax avoidance amongst taxpayers (Wallschutzky and Singh, 1995); one is 
concerned with personal income tax non-compliance (Mohani, 2001) and the other one is 
concerned with the competency of Malaysian salaried individuals in relation to tax 
compliance under SAS (Loo and Ho, 2005). However, only the last of these studies 
concentrated on SAS because at the time of the prior studies, SAS for personal taxpayers 
had not yet been implemented.  
 
In addition to these studies, a study conducted by Loo (2006) attempted to investigate and 
compare the taxpayers’ behaviour in Formal System and SAS. However, Loo’s (2006) 
scope of study was limited to comparing taxpayers’ attitudes toward taxation and used a 
quasi experiment and a case study approach.  
 
This study therefore extends research in this area by focusing on post SAS introduction- 
after five years of implementation which is argued is a reasonable enough period of time 
to evaluate the initial achievements of SAS. Loo’s study (based on a case study and a 
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quasi experiment) also did not attempt to investigate the level of tax knowledge among 
individual Malaysian taxpayers according to key demographic factors other literature has 
argued may have a significant influence on their tax behaviour such as religion, ethnic, 
social class, level of income and geographical location throughout Malaysia which prior 
studies from other countries have suggested could be contributory factors of tax 
compliance. Moreover, Loo’s study also investigates the level of tax knowledge very 
shortly (one year only) after the implementation of SAS in year of assessment 2004.  
 
Most importantly, this study also responds to some important calls made by Eriksen and 
Fallan, (1996); Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, (1998); Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan 
(2000) and Richardson and Sawyer (2001) to contribute some evidence in tax compliance 
literatures: 
 
“no study has been done to investigate which parts of tax knowledge have 
the greatest effect on attitude toward taxation. Experiments with different 
types of courses could provide new understanding.” 
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996: 399). 
 
“there is a need for more empirical and institutional research within 
jurisdictions outside the United States.” 
(Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998: 856) 
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“ future research can explicitly measure and model structural variables 
such as tax rates and progressive versus propotional tax systems…” 
(Chan, Troutman and O’Bryan, 2000: 99) 
 
“no research has examined the link between these dimensions (tax rates, 
probability of audited) and compliance behaviour.”  
(Richardson and Sawyer, 2001: 182) 
 
Also, unlike Mohani (2001), Kasipillai and Abdul Jabbar (2003), Loo and Ho (2005) and 
Loo (2006), this study is unique due to involving a complete, nationwide national survey 
which can provide valid, reliable and suggestive results that are not geographically 
limited to enable this study to analyse whole-of-country wide results.  
 
The SAS for individuals was first implemented in year of assessment 2004 which means 
that the taxpayers had to complete and submit their first SAS tax return no later than 30th 
April 2005. Loo’s (2006) time frame for the second stage of data collection (post test) 
was in April to July 2005 which is a few months after the taxpayers submitted their first 
self-completed tax returns.  Within this time frame, it may be arguable that many 
taxpayers were not as fully aware of their full responsibilities in completing the tax 
returns compared to the previous system. For those taxpayers who were not fully aware 
of the changes in the system, they potentially treated the tax return as usual (as in Formal 
System). It is expected that within this study’s time frame (five years after SAS was 
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implemented), the taxpayers’ knowledge and awareness of tax laws will have 
significantly increased compared to Loo’s research findings and could be reasonably 
considered to have reached a stable plateau of development of SAS specific knowledge 
making this a suitable point to extend Loo’s work. Further, the questionnaire that was 
developed by Loo (2006) in examining the compliance behaviour among the subjects was 
directly referring to specific tax knowledge questions; she did not use  hypothetical 
situation questions in order to examine the propensity of the subject to comply with tax 
laws. For example, (p. 132) compliance among the subjects was measured by Yes/No 
questions whereby (for taxable income) ‘yes’ indicated that the subject had ‘complied’, 
‘no’ indicated ‘non-compliance’ and ‘not sure’ indicated ‘unintentional non-compliance’. 
For questions on reporting exempted income, the measurement of compliance would be 
‘yes’ to indicate ‘over complied’, ‘no’ to indicate ‘complied’ and ‘not sure’ to indicate 
‘unintentional non-compliance’. This study will use separate questions in order to 
examine the level of tax knowledge and the tax compliance behaviour (hypothetical 
scenarios) to attempt to provide a richer exploration of compliance behaviour. 
 
One of the major contributions of this study is to assist the IRB in developing their tax 
education system and tax audit judgments in SAS. The findings of this study will give 
indicators to the tax administrator in terms of the level of tax knowledge and the 
characteristics of taxpayers’ compliance behaviour in assisting the IRB to accomplish the 
three fold objectives of SAS, including impacts on voluntary compliance among the 
taxpayers, especially for individuals.  
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The result of this study will contribute to tax literature not only in Malaysia but also 
internationally by enabling both a comparison of the Malaysian system with other more 
established self assessment systems, but will also provide pointers for development of tax 
compliance in any developing countries’ use of such tax administration systems.  
 
1.6 RESEACH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
 
This study was conducted through a national mail survey which was carried out between 
June and August 2007. After piloting the survey on a group of 23 lecturers and 
professionals in various sectors and other lay people (non-tax specialist) to improve the 
validity, reliability, and to refine the questions, a total number of 5,500 mail surveys4 
were distributed to individual taxpayers selected at random from telephone directories 
throughout Malaysia. In ascertaining the quality of the results and responses from the 
respondents, this study follows the timing of disseminating the survey as suggested by 
Song and Yarbrough (1978) who timed dissemination of their survey questions in the 
United States in the months of July and August - a few months after taxpayers there had 
gone through the annual process of filing the federal and state incomes tax returns. This 
period was selected because it was argued that the data would be least likely to be biased 
by any exaggerated and critical feelings about the tax system that could likely be 
hightened by the filing period. In Malaysia, the equivalent ideal time in the annual tax 
                                                     
4Two batches of dissemination involved, 3,000 and 2,500 surveys disseminated in each batch. The time gap 
is approximately two weeks between both batches. 
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cycle to disseminate the survey is between May and September and hence our survey was 
conducted within this window5. 
 
The questionnaires were divided into four main sections, namely Section A- tax 
compliance determinants hypothetical questions; Section B – tax knowledge; Section C – 
tax compliance determinant direct questions and Section D – respondent background. 
Section A and C were developed based on Kogan and Wallach (1964), Troutman (1993) 
and Chan et. al. (2000) while Section B was developed based on Section 4 (a) to (f) of 
Income Tax Act 1967 as well as studies conducted by Harris (1989); Eriksen and Falllan 
(1996); Loo (2006); Loo and Ho (2005).  
 
To facilitate the data analysis process, five stages were involved; 1) Stage 1 – examining 
the level of taxpayers’ knowledge and the profile of respondents; 2) Stage  2 – to explore 
the association between various aspects of tax knowledge (independent variables) and tax 
compliance based on hypothetical and direct questions; 3) Stage 3 – to explore 
association between tax knowledge  and tax compliance with the addition of control 
variables; 4) Stage 4 – to identify the factors that impact upon tax compliance behaviour 
by using both hypothetical and direct questions; and 5) Stage 5 – to identify the 
determinants of tax compliance with the addition of control variables. Data was analysed 
predominantly by t-test, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), multiple regressions 
                                                     
5 The due date for individual taxpayers to submit tax returns is 30 April (but sometimes extended to 31 
May) every year. 
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and stepwise multiple regressions. The details of research design and methodology are 
described in Chapter 5 – Research design and methodology. 
 
1.7 SCOPE OF STUDY 
 
As mentioned in 1.4 – Research objectives, the main aim of this study is to examine the 
level of taxpayers’ knowledge and compare these with relevant tax compliance 
determinants. Knowledge about tax laws is limited in this study to Section 4 of Income 
Tax Act 1967 (ITA) (individual income tax) while tax compliance determinants are 
limited to nine variables6 that prior literature indicates as likely to be the core 
determinants. 
 
 
1.8 THESIS CONTENT 
 
The remainder of this thesis contains of seven further chapters. The next chapter (Chapter 
2) discusses self assessment in detail including the objectives, principles, problems of 
implementation, issues and comparisons between developed and developing countries 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, OECD and Australia. International 
comparisons between Malaysia and other countries’ self assessments are also included in 
this chapter. Chapter 3 reports the historic background of Malaysia income tax system 
                                                     
6 The details of the variable are discussed in Chapter 5 – Research design and methodology 
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and outline the various types of tax in Malaysia. In the last part of Chapter 3, a series of 
measures taken by the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) to enhance the operation of SAS 
during and since its implementation are described in detail. A review of the existent 
literature relating to the research objectives of this thesis, such as the importance and 
implications of tax knowledge and factors affecting tax compliance, are discussed in 
Chapter 4. Research design and methodology for this study is outlined in Chapter 5. The 
outline of data collection methods (including sampling frame, survey procedure, the 
respondents and measures to increase response rate), questionnaire design and variables 
measurement, the nature and development of the survey as well as technique of analysis 
and relation with research questions are comprehensively discussed in Chapter 5. This 
chapter also explains the research hypotheses and five stages utilised to address the 
research questions. Chapter 6 discusses the findings and results. The detail about survey 
responses and statistical tests (descriptive analysis, t-test, one-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) and stepwise multiple regressions) are included in this chapter. The results 
related to research questions and previous findings are also discussed in Chapter 6.  
Chapter 7 specifically discusses the results in relation to previous literature and provide 
some comments on a comparison of the results found in this study with that reported in 
other countries while the conclusions, limitations and future research directions of this 
thesis are discussed in the final chapter (Chapter 8). The policy implications, 
contributions to the body of knowledge as well as recommendations are also discussed in 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS– PRINCIPLES, ISSUES AND 
ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the nature of self assessment systems (SAS) in detail including 
their objectives, principles, the comparisons between systems in operation and the 
issues of operation. The self assessment system has been widely implemented in 
developing and developed countries. While common principles exist for SAS, each 
country has experienced their own problems and issues while implementing self 
assessment which require different solutions. There are many factors that need to be 
taken into account in order to minimise and solve the issues that have arisen. The 
early part of this chapter discusses self assessment in general i.e. the declared 
missions and objectives intended for self assessment systems by various tax 
administrators as well as the principles that underpin its technical application. This is 
then followed by a discussion of the administrative issues in implementing self 
assessment systems successfully. Comparison among countries currently using SAS 
for tax purposes is discussed in the latter part of this chapter. 
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2.1 MISSION AND OBJECTIVES OF SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
 
Several tax administrations in both advanced and developing countries have adopted a 
self assessment system for tax filing purposes. These countries include, Sri Lanka 
(1972), Pakistan (1979), Indonesia (1984), Australia (1986-87), Ireland (1988), New 
Zealand (1988) and the United Kingdom (1996-97). As for the United Kingdom, the 
first self assessment tax forms were issued in April 1997 and by 1999, the self 
assessment system was fully implemented. These self assessment returns were 
originally sent to the self-employed, business partners, employees and pensioners 
(Lymer and Oats, 2008). Although many countries have turned to self assessment 
systems, some key countries like Singapore7, Belgium, Luxembourg and France8 
remain with direct assessment systems. Table 2.1 indicates years of SAS introduction 
for companies and individuals in various countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
7 www.iras.gov.sg 
8 www.oecd.org and www.pwc.com  
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Table 2.1: SAS introduction in countries across the world 
Countries Company Individual 
Sri Lanka9 1972 1972 
Pakistan10 1979 1979 
Indonesia11 1982 1984 
Australia12 1986/87 1992 
Ireland13 1988 1988 
New Zealand14 1988 1988 
United Kingdom15 1999 1996/97 
United States16 1913 1913 
Japan17 1947 1947 
Malaysia18 2001 2004 
 
 
SAS in the US was established as early as 1913 for both companies and individuals 
(United States Department of Treasury, 2009). The introduction of SAS in the US was 
implemented by the advent of the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution 
which modified the apportionment requirement in 1913, and since then income tax 
has become one of the primary means of funding the Federal Government. (Ando, 
Blume, and Irwin, 1985). The main objectives of SAS in the US at that time were to 
                                                    
9 Inland Revenue of Sri Lanka, 2009 
10 Federal Board of Revenue  Pakistan 2009 
11 ‘Direktorat Jenderal Pajak’ 2009 (The Directorate General of Tax of Indonesia) 
12 Australian Tax Office, 2009 
13 Irish Tax and Customs, 2009 
14 Inland Revenue of New Zealand, 2009 
15 Lymer and Oats (2008: 341). 
16 Unites States Department of Treasury, (2009). 
17 NTA (2009); Kimura (2006).  
18 IRB Annual Report (2004) 
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increase tax efficiency (collection) and instill awareness among taxpayers of funding 
federal expenses (Eissa, 1996). Since 1913, the operation of SAS in US is premised 
and primarily underpinned by ‘voluntary compliance’ (Unites States Department of 
Treasury, 2009). 
 
Australia Tax Office (ATO) declared that their mission and objective for introducing 
a SAS for individuals was to give taxpayers greater equity and fairness, increased 
certainty, and simplicity (ATO, 2009). Major changes to the way tax was assessed for 
individuals were introduced in Australia through the Taxation Laws (Self Assessment) 
Act 1992 (ATO, 2009). The introduction of SAS in Australia placed a greater 
responsibility on the taxpayer to assess their own tax debt or refund. Previously, 
taxpayers submitted an income tax return containing information from which the Tax 
Office prepared an assessment of the taxpayer’s taxable income and tax payable. The 
assessment was made by making any necessary adjustments to the taxpayer’s 
calculation of taxable income. A notice of assessment was issued indicating the tax 
refund or the amount payable and the due date for payment. 
 
Self assessment for both companies and individual taxpayers (including inheritance 
tax)  was first introduced in Japan in 1947 (Kimura, 2006). A developing conflict 
between taxpayers and the tax authority, perceptions of fairness and equity as well as 
inefficiency of the tax system led to the need for a tax reform (the introduction of 
SAS) in Japan in late 1940s (Shoven, 1989). The declared objectives of Japan’s self 
assessment system are establishing a relationship of trust between taxpayers and the 
tax authority, efficient tax administration and also to act as a symbol of agreement 
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with postwar democratic thought (Kimura, 2006). In addition, the mission of SAS in 
Japan is to raise the rate of appropriate tax filings and payments through taxpayers’ 
cooperation (Ishi, 2001). Japan’s mission and objective was initially emphasised as 
‘cooperation and trust between taxpayers and the tax authority’ (Ishi, 2001: 43). In the 
beginning of SAS, the tax authority faced a low level of tax literacy among taxpayers 
and poor management of the tax system generally (Ishi, 2001). However, in the last 
two decades, the tax authority has identified that issues such voluntary compliance 
and ex-post tax audit have become key tools necessary to accomplish the SAS 
objective (Kimura, 2006).    
 
SAS in Canada was first introduced in 1985 as it was considered as’ the most 
economical and efficient way to collect income tax’ (Loo, 2006: 41). In the early 
stages of the introduction of SAS, taxpayers felt that the tax system was too complex 
(Loo, 2006: 41) and this discouraged taxpayers from filing tax returns voluntarily. 
They also perceived that fairness and equity was no longer applicable in the SAS 
(Canada Revenue Authority (CRA), 2009). However, after several years of operation, 
taxpayers are well aware of their responsibilities and these issues (fairness and lack of 
knowledge) have been gradually resolved (CRA, 2009).  
 
In the UK, self assessment for companies commenced for the accounting period 
ending after July 1999, while for individuals it began in the 1996/97 tax year (Lymer 
and Oats, 2008: 20). The objective of SAS in the UK, like other countries both 
developed and developing, was to make the tax system simpler, easier and fairer to 
taxpayers, to make it possible for the Inland Revenue to accept the Statement of 
Accounts without further review, and to allow taxpayers to pay the right amount of 
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taxes at the right time without intervention by the Inland Revenue (IR) (Loo, 2006).  
In addition, SAS was expected to allow taxpayers to understand and to have more 
control over their own tax problems and, eventually, to open up ways for further 
reforms aimed at simplifying, unifying and improving the system of personal taxation, 
especially in relation to customer services, through greater co-operation between 
taxpayers and the IR (James, 1996, Brodie, 1999: Lymer and Oats, 2008).  
 
As for Malaysia, the mission of SAS set by the Government is to collect taxes for the 
nation at minimum cost, to improve compliance, and to institute effective 
enforcement (Kasipillai, 2000; IRB Annual Report, 2001; Loo, 2006). In order to 
accomplish this mission, a three fold objective was established:  
 
1) to assess and collect the correct amount of revenue as provided under the law 
in the most effective manner and at a minimum cost; 
2) to instill public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax system; and  
3) to encourage voluntary compliance.  
 
Judging from the mission statement and operational objectives of the IRB, the 
implementation of a self assessment tax system in stages, commencing with 
companies in 2001, can be seen as a step towards improving the functioning of the 
Board. Increased voluntary compliance can only be achieved if taxpayers perceive the 
tax system to be equitable (Harris, 1989).  Past studies have indicated that a SAS will 
improve efficiency and productivity of the tax administrative system (Sandford and 
Wallschutzky, 1994; James, 1996). A survey by Mustafa (1997) revealed that 
Malaysian taxpayers perceived SAS to be a significantly better tax system than the 
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Formal System. Table 2.2 summarises the missions and objectives of SAS in some 
countries across the world. 
 
Table 2.2: The missions and objectives of SAS in some countries across the 
world. 
Countries SAS main mission and objectives 
United States To increase tax efficiency (collection) and instill awareness 
among taxpayers of funding federal expenses (Eissa, 1996).  
Australia To give taxpayers greater equity and fairness, increased 
certainty, and simplicity (McKerchar, 2007; Australian Tax 
Office (ATO), 2009). 
Japan To establish a relationship of trust between taxpayers and the 
tax authority, efficient tax administration and to serve as a 
symbol of agreement with postwar democratic thought 
(Kimura, 2006). In addition, the mission of SAS in Japan is 
to raise the rate of appropriate tax filings and payments 
through taxpayers’ cooperation (Ishi, 2001). 
United Kingdom To make the tax system simpler, easier and fairer to 
taxpayers; to make it possible for the Inland Revenue (IR) to 
accept the Statement of Accounts without further review, and 
to allow taxpayers to pay the right amount of taxes at the 
right time without intervention by the IR (HMRC, 2009) 
Canada To encourage voluntary compliance, to simplify the tax 
systems and to increase taxpayers’ knowledge about tax laws 
(CRA, 2009). 
Malaysia To collect taxes for the nation at minimum cost, to improve 
compliance, and to institute effective enforcement 
(Kasipillai, 2000; IRB Annual Report, 2001; Loo, 2006). 
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2.2 PRINCIPLES OF SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS 
 
Based on the declared missions and objectives of self assessment from various 
countries who have adopted the system to date, it seems that voluntary compliance, 
administrative efficiency and improving fairness and equity are the key motivating 
factors for introduction of SAS.  Loo (2006) also claims that, in general, the reasons 
for implementing SAS are to simplify the tax collection system and increase voluntary 
compliance. Therefore, in order to convert this system into a meaningful tax 
mechanism compared to the previous system (direct assessment), the principles of 
operation must be created and implemented so that the SAS can be operated 
efficiently. 
 
The mechanisms of operation of a SAS are significantly different from the direct 
assessment system, whereby the administrative burden of tax is at least partly shifted 
to taxpayers. From the positive perspective, this should encourage taxpayers to 
become more responsible, honest and to up to date with current tax regulations by 
forcing them to engage more directly with their tax computations process. In contrast, 
some taxpayers may have  a negative reaction by using the nature of SAS to 
manipulate their tax returns19 (decrease voluntary compliance) and/or employ tax 
agents (James, 1996; Hasseldine and Hansford, 2003) who in turn can affect their tax 
declaration levels either negatively (from a tax revenue perspective) e.g. by advising 
them of tax deductions (for example) they may otherwise not opt to take, or 
potentially positively by increasing the quality of returns that would  otherwise be 
made in error.  
                                                    
19 For example under report income and over claim deductions which make the tax liability less. 
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To reduce the possibility of taxpayers manipulating their tax returns, the tax 
authorities are likely to implement an enhanced investigation policy such as 
increasing tax audits and tax assessments, but these actions, if applied extensively, 
will in effects eventually turn the SAS back into the old direct assessment system. The 
more tax assessment required by the tax authorities, the less benefit results from a 
move to self-assessed for tax return.  Therefore, the tax authorities have to determine 
the appropriate operation of SAS and exercise the principles of SAS by ensuring the 
taxpayers’ and  tax authority’s responsibilities are balanced, thereby minimising any 
tax assessment they have to perform so that SAS can  genuinely reduce tax 
compliance costs and increase administrative efficiency as well as developing  public 
voluntary compliance. 
 
Based on Table 2.2 above, it can be concluded that the main objective of SAS is to 
encourage voluntary compliance and efficient tax administration and to make the tax 
system simpler and fairer. Principles are defined as the rules or theories that 
something is based on (Barjoyai, 1987) and these principles become the main 
underpinning regulations to accomplish the objectives of SAS (Mohamad Ali et. al., 
2007). Based on the ‘Canons of Taxation’ introduced by Smith (1776), the central 
principles of taxation which relate to SAS are equity, certainty, convenience and 
efficiency (Samson, 2002: Lymer and Oats, 2008).  
 
2.2.1 Equity  
 
The introduction of SAS must be seen to be fair in its impact on all individuals and it 
must not affect taxpayers’ horizontal and vertical equity. Equity in SAS is specifically 
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developed via suitable tax administration being used, particularly in respect of filing 
accurate and timely tax returns. SAS does not affect taxpayers’ ability to pay directly 
but might affect ability and accuracy of filing. Thus, all levels of taxpayers should 
have the same capabilities, knowledge and opportunities to file tax returns accurately.  
 
2.2.2 Certainty 
Taxpayers need to be fully informed about when, where, and who should pay taxes 
and what amount of tax should be paid (the incidence of tax). Lymer and Oats (2008) 
again suggested that any financial transaction should be known in advance to achieve 
full certainty. In SAS, clear and certain rules should be disseminated to taxpayers 
sufficiently in order to minimise ‘grey areas of the law’ and misinterpretation. For 
example, in the UK the HMRC Code of Practice provides details about the 
information that taxpayers can expect in order to help to reduce uncertainties20. 
 
2.2.3 Convenience and efficiency 
 
The tax administrators should not only focus on their convenience but must also 
consider taxpayers’ convenience particularly in terms of tax regulations, filings, 
assessments, payments, administration and costs of administering the tax system 
(Sandford, 1993). The taxpayers’ costs associated with the operation of SAS are 
normally called ‘compliance costs’ (Pope and Abdul Jabbar, 2008). The SAS should 
provide a simple tax system and tax returns. These would facilitate taxpayers in 
understanding tax systems and encourage them to easily file tax returns correctly. 
                                                    
20 See  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/leaflets/c11.htm 
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This could be aided through continuous education programmes administered in 
various ways, for example through pamphlets and mass media.  
 
Since tax can affect taxpayers’ behaviour in many ways, the SAS also has to be very 
convenient from taxpayers’ perspective (James, 1996; Lymer and Oats, 2008: 51) for 
example clear payment structures and appropriate forms of payment (e.g. including 
online BGC transfer).  
 
Moreover, the SAS should be more efficient to administer than the direct assessment 
system in relation to tax costs incurred by the tax authority (creating tax returns, 
assessments, chasing the evaders, educating taxpayers etc.).  The administrative costs 
should be as little as possible to achieve desirable economic efficiency. 
 
Therefore, it is suggested that these principles are very important and become the 
main factors in achieving SAS’s goals particularly. Equity, certainty and convenience 
should be taken into account in designing SAS. The following section describes the 
key issues in self assessment systems. 
 
2.3 KEY ISSUES IN SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
 
In this section, the key issues of operating a SAS are discussed. This section focuses 
on four key issues amongst those that may affect any particular SAS based on what 
literature in this area has previously focused upon, namely tax education and tax 
knowledge, the simplicity of the system and tax audits, fines and penalties. SAS has 
been widely practiced and the number of countries which adopt SAS is expected to 
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grow over time. Each country has its own laws and regulations in implementing an 
SAS. Some countries practice the fiscal year basis while other countries may practice 
current year basis. In line with information technology developments, many countries 
(for example, the UK and Malaysia), have moved toward electronic filing21 which, 
from a tax administrators’ perspective, is more user-friendly and, most importantly, 
could save costs (time and money - printing, paper, postage etc.) for all parties.  
  
It is noted that each country inevitably has its own issues and controversies upon 
implementing SAS. The following are some issues that should be addressed and 
continuously monitored in order to accomplish SAS objectives. In addition to these 
issues, there are also various tax compliance issues in SAS. This issue will be 
addressed extensively in Chapter 4 and become the core focus of the remainder of this 
thesis.  
 
2.3.1 Tax education and tax knowledge 
Specific tax education programmes for taxpayers have been implemented in most 
SAS countries including the US (including via online education22), Canada and the 
UK. Tax education can constitute any informal or formal programme organised by the 
tax authority or independent agencies by which to facilitate taxpayers in completing 
tax returns correctly and also to cultivate awareness of their responsibilities in respect 
                                                    
21 In Malaysia, E-filing was first introduced in 2003 and is an online system introduced by IRB that 
allows taxpayers to submit tax returns online, which is an alternative to the usual manual form 
submission. It is not compulsory current but eventually it will become so seems likely.   
22 IRS in collaboration with professional agencies has developed an online education platform known 
as ‘Understanding Taxes’ (see http://www.irs.gov/individuals/students/index.html ). This website 
assists taxpayers on how to file their tax returns and resolve issues arising in relation to their tax 
matters.  
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of the tax system (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; IRB Annual Report, 2006; McKerchar, 
2007).  
 
Various programmes in the US, including the Public Information Programme, were 
introduced to educate school children, small business owners and other self-employed 
individuals. Through workshops or in-depth tax courses, instructors provided training 
on filing tax returns, starting a business, recordkeeping, preparing business and 
personal tax returns, self-employment tax issues, and employment taxes (IRS, 2009). 
The Taxpayers Advocate Service is an independent organisation within the IRS and 
was introduced to assist taxpayers who are experiencing economic hardship, who are 
seeking help in resolving tax problems that have not been resolved through normal 
channels, or who believe that an IRS system or procedure is not working as it should 
(IRS, 2009).  
 
In Australia, the ATO launched a programme called ‘Teaching Tax with Tax Files’ in 
1998 to educate school children aged 9 – 12 (ATO, 2009). It is an innovative 
multimedia tax education kit which comprises of an interactive CD-ROM and a hard 
copy which provides schools with extensive, up-to-date information about tax. This 
programme is expected to educate the school children to be aware of where 
government money comes from and what it is used for, the responsibilities of a 
taxpayer, and should develop their understanding of the role of taxation in a society 
(e.g the connection between tax and services such as hospitals, roads and schools) 
(ATO, 2009). 
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In the UK, the HMRC introduced various education programmes including 
continuous events throughout the year during weekends and school holidays. These 
included drama, story telling, art and craft activities and drop in sessions, workshops, 
tours, the handling collection, live demonstrations and competitions (HMRC, 2009). 
The number of people participating in formal and informal learning organised by 
HMRC directly in 2005/6 was 18,021 (HMRC, 2009) - this represents a 29 per cent 
increase on target for the year. The coverage of the education programmes was not 
simply for tax filing per se, but additionally on tax morality, tobacco, alcohol, drugs 
and black market smuggling (HMRC, 2009). 
 
Countries such as the US, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, the UK and 
Malaysia have all been implementing a continuous tax education for taxpayers and 
children (as future taxpayers). Apart from these programmes to educate taxpayers 
directly and instill public awareness regarding tax matters, various countries such as 
the USA, the UK and Australia also have developed interactive websites, 
disseminated leaflets together with tax returns, opened call centres, created 
advertisements or supplied reminders via television and radio (e.g. to remind 
taxpayers of deadline dates for filings).  
 
In addition to tax education, knowledge about tax laws also plays a major role in 
determining taxpayers’ compliance behaviour (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). Therefore a 
step ahead, for example continuous education programmes and effective monitoring 
mechanisms must be taken into account by tax authorities to ascertain that taxpayers 
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have a good and reasonable knowledge and understanding of tax matters. However, 
the awareness and attitude of the taxpayer himself is more important since the 
effectiveness of tax education depends on the readiness, acceptance and honesty of 
taxpayers. Further details regarding tax education programmes in various countries 
are discussed in section 2.4 and Chapter 3. 
 
2.3.2 Simplicity of the system 
 
The second key implementation issue discussed in this study is the simplicity of the 
system. Silvani and Baer (1997) outlined the importance of the fact that a tax 
authority should have a simple tax return system from a taxpayer’s point of view. A 
tax authority might assume its tax return is simple and easy to complete but it may not 
be so from the taxpayers’ point of view. Therefore, before the final and actual version 
is delivered to taxpayers, it would be normal to put the forms through a series of 
‘pilot’ tests to validate that the tax return is simple and easy to complete. (For 
example in the UK, refer to 2.4.1 (b)). Evidence suggests that uncomplicated tax 
returns play a major role in improving tax compliance (Silvani and Baer, 1997). 
Although tax knowledge and the simplicity of tax returns have a different impact on 
compliance (see Kirchler, 2008), it is noted that a taxpayer with low tax knowledge 
may be able to file the tax returns accurately provided the tax returns are simple, 
clearly explained and consistent23.  
 
                                                    
23 The current year of tax returns should be the same as the previous one or at least largely the same. 
This can encourage taxpayers to file their tax returns correctly. 
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Over an extended period, research focusing on complexity of a tax system in SAS has 
reported that there is an association between complexity and compliance, but the 
extent of the association remains in part uncertain.  Some research has found positive 
association between complexity and non-compliance, whether intentional or 
unintentional (e.g. see McKerchar, 2002; Ritsema, Thomas and Ferrier, 2003; 
Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008) while others have found that the impact of complexity 
on compliance varied with the characteristics of individual taxpayers; such as income 
level, education level, perceptions of fairness and equity and the opportunity to evade 
(e.g. see Slemrod, 1989).  In contrast, Clotfelter (1983) evidenced that when the level 
of complexity increased (for non-business taxpayers in the case of this study) it 
significantly increased non-compliance among taxpayers.  The reason behind this 
finding was because business taxpayers were more likely to seek advice from tax 
practitioners as complexity rose; hence the issue of complexity appeared to be 
significant to them.  
 
It has also been argued that simplifying tax laws in SAS might encourage compliance 
among taxpayers as they might more easily interpret and understand the law and the 
tax structure, and so possibly be better able to declare their income and compute their 
own tax liabilities correctly (Baldry, 1999).  However, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) 
assert that simplifying the tax system (and therefore generating simpler tax returns) 
implicitly might not be an effective deterrent to tax evasion because taxpayers may 
not necessarily consider a complex tax system to be unfair. Forest and Sheffrin were 
unable to identify any relationship between complexity and perception of unfairness 
and concluded that while simplifying the tax law would not automatically improve 
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compliance, many taxpayers perceive that tax systems are always complex and 
become a burden to them (Forest and Sheffrin, 2002). 
 
Although Forest and Sheffrin suggested that the impact of the simplicity of the tax 
systems in SAS were insignificant, however, the main feature of SAS is self-
completed tax returns which require a high degree or at least a reasonable level of 
simplicity because taxpayers come from various levels of backgrounds, education, 
income and most importantly levels of tax knowledge. In helping taxpayers to 
complete their tax returns accurately, the tax authority should supply simple but 
sufficient tax systems. 
 
2.3.3 Tax audits and audit probability 
 
The third key issue of SAS operation is setting and operating a suitable tax audit 
system. A tax audit is an investigation made by the tax authority in order to verify the 
accuracy of tax returns and attempt to detect non-compliance behaviour and activities; 
audit probability is defined as the number of tax returns assessed (audited) divided by 
the number of tax returns received  (Shanmugam, 2003; IRB Annual Report, 2006; 
Kirchler, 2007). In SAS, the question ‘to what extent should tax audits be 
implemented?’ remains unsolved, as an absolute SAS supposedly requires minimum 
tax audits (Loo, 2006). Furthermore, there is a conflict between direct assessment and 
SAS in terms of tax audits (Mohani, 2001) whereby in direct assessment, all tax 
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returns are subject to thorough scrutiny while SAS does not require any direct 
assessment as the responsibility is shifted to taxpayers for all assessment.  
 
The importance of tax audits on tax administration and compliance has long been 
discussed and evidenced by previous research findings which suggested that tax 
audits are important in both SAS and direct assessment systems. For instance, 
Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) found that the probability of tax audits positively 
affecting compliance is weak. An experimental study by Slemrod, Blumenthal and 
Christian (2001) revealed that threatening taxpayers with ”close examination” 
increased tax compliance only for low and middle-income earners. In addition, tax 
audits and audit probabilities found low negative effects of audit rates on evasion 
especially where precise percentage information on audit probabilities was given 
instead of simply indicating high, middle and low probabilities (Spicer and Thomas, 
1992). Conversely, Friedland et. al.  (1978) reports that imprecise information 
increases compliance while non-experimental studies (surveys) found both significant 
and non-significant low positive relationships between tax audits and audit 
probabilities and tax compliance (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Spicer and Lundsted, 
1976). Again, Andreoni et. al. (1998) argued that the probability of being audited has 
little effect on compliance. They also concluded that psychology variables mediate the 
subjectively perceived probabilities. Nevertheless, prior audit experiences also have 
low impact on compliance. One explanation is that prior audits may not turn out as 
badly as is feared by taxpayers (Andreoni et.al., 1998).  
 
Judging from previous studies (i.e. Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008; Andreoni et.al., 
1998; Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Spicer and Lundsted, 1976), although tax audits 
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had a low significant impact on compliance, however it is still vital in determining tax 
compliance behaviour and therefore, further research in this area in a SAS setting 
(particularly in tax audit variables) is needed. 
 
2.3.4 Fines and penalties 
 
The fourth key issue to organizing a SAS discussed in this chapter is the use of fines 
and penalties to aid tax collection mechanisms. Taxes are compulsory but fines are 
avoidable. As with tax audits, penalties and fines also appear to play a significant role 
in the success of SAS. In a SAS, taxpayers are also faced with a more difficult tax 
compliance task when compared to a direct assessment system. Since SAS is heavily 
reliant on the honesty of taxpayers and is also not subject to complete scrutiny or 
assessment by the tax authority, the execution of penalties is important compared to in 
a direct assessment systems. A possible explanation for this is that very few taxpayers 
will be likely to be involved with tax audits, and so penalties and fines take on a 
critical behaviour-influencing role in helping to improve tax compliance.  
 
Despite anecdotal evidence that penalties and fines are important in SAS, empirical 
studies on the extent of their impact has not yet found a clear correlation (e.g. see 
Kirchler, 2007; Kirchler et. al., 2008.) Some studies have showed that penalties have 
a larger impact on compliance than the probability of being audited (i.e. Fisher et. al., 
1992). Tax compliance also significantly increased with higher penalties but not with 
audit probability in the study by Friedland, Maital and Ruternberg (1978). In contrast, 
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other studies have shown that fines and penalties are not related at all to compliance; 
even though they were able to confirm that the probability of being audited is related 
to compliance (e.g. Webley, Robben, Elffers and Hessing, 1991).  
 
Various arguments arise regarding the impact of fines and penalties on tax compliance 
in SAS to explain this lack of a clear impact relationship. For example, fines that are 
too low could be perceived as an indicator that the authorities are weak and unable to 
control non-compliant taxpayers, thereby undermining trust among honest taxpayers 
and leading to a lack of encouragement to comply with tax law in SAS. Furthermore, 
fines that are inappropriate because a taxpayer has made a mistake resulting from 
vague or overly complex tax laws would weaken the perception of retributive justice 
and encourage tax evaders to try harder to regain their losses incurred by those fines.  
 
In conclusion, these four the key issues namely tax education and tax knowledge, the 
simplicity of the tax system, use of tax audits and penalties and fines have received 
more attention from previous researchers in SAS than any other issues that may effect 
efficient operations. Although there are some other issues in administering a SAS, 
these other issues were not extensively researched by previous authors and are 
therefore not discussed in this section. In addition to these issues, there are also tax 
compliance issues in SAS which are addressed in Chapter 4. The next section 
discusses the implementation of SAS in various tax regimes. 
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2.4 HOW SELF ASSESSMENT IS OPERATED IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
 
This section provides an overview of the SAS for individuals in various countries. In 
order to distinguish operations among them, this section is divided into two parts: 
developed and less developed countries. As for developed countries, an analysis is 
made for the US, the UK, Japan and a collective of OECD countries while Sri Lanka 
and Cambodia represent the less developed countries. All countries were chosen 
because they have some similarities with the Malaysian tax system, which is to be 
used as the focal context for this research in terms of filings, assessments, operations, 
tax audit and investigations procedures and scope of charge of personal income tax.  
The Malaysian tax system is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3 as a key justification 
of analysis in this thesis. 
 
2.4.1 Developed countries 
 
This section discusses how SAS has been implemented in developed countries such as 
the USA, UK, Japan and the OECD countries as one group. 
a) United States 
The roots of the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) started during Civil War in 1862 when 
President Lincoln and Congress created the position of Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue and enacted an income tax to help bear war expenses. In 1913, Wyoming 
approved the 16th Amendment (this is part of the United States Constitution which 
allows the Congress to levy an income tax without apportioning it among the states), 
providing the three-quarter majority of states necessary to amend the Constitution. 
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Also, in 1913, the substantial ‘growth’ of the number of taxpayers, the limited time 
frame to assess all tax returns, the shortage of human resource and the need to 
increase the efficiency of tax collection, meant that the IRS required all taxpayers to 
assess their own tax liabilities and to send in their returns together with their payments 
of tax.  
 
In 1918, during World War I, the top rate of the income tax rose to 77 percent to help 
finance the war effort. It dropped sharply in the post-war years, down to 24 percent in 
1929, and rose again during the Depression. During World War II, Congress 
introduced payroll withholding and quarterly tax payments. The IRS reorganised itself 
to closely resemble the private sector model of organising around customers with 
similar needs (IRS, 2008). Since 1913, taxes have been imposed on a full self 
assessment basis. However, a series of tax reforms have taken place since the 
introduction of SAS.  These reforms have included various improvements to the tax 
administration in general in order to develop public awareness of the system, increase 
voluntary compliance and improve the convenience of payment and efficiency of 
collection.  For example, in July 1940, a withholding tax system (i.e. deduction of tax 
at source) was introduced by the Income War Tax Act (1940) (Lent, 1942).  In the 
1940s, wage-earners were assessed half-yearly on the basis of their earnings as 
reported by their employers for each half-year, ending in April and October 
respectively.  The annual returns then had to be filed in September or October by 
employees (Lent, 1942).  The introduction of withholding tax created a protest from 
wage earners (who claimed that the system was  unfair), with problems in record- 
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keeping as well as the perceived level of tax burden. The adoption of withholding tax 
was found to be particular unfavourable among certain taxpayers (Lent, 1942).  
 
Later, in 1953, the Bureau of Internal Revenue was replaced by the Inland Revenue 
Service or IRS (IRS, 2008). Although tax administration developed following this 
change, tax compliance issues were not fully resolved.  In order to further dissuade 
taxpayers from avoiding taxes, the Tax Reform Act (1969) was introduced (IRS, 
2008). After World War II, the income tax base was converted from a narrowly-based 
tax which affected some 8 million taxpayers to a broadly-based tax which affected 
about 70 million taxpayers (Cohen, 1966).  In the 1970s, SAS was viewed with 
national pride and seen as a great advantage to the American tax system (Cohen, 
1966; Smith W, 1970).  Even without direct enforcement activities, 97 per cent of 
total revenue collected was derived from self-assessed taxation while the remaining 
three per cent was collected by direct enforcement (Caplin, 1962).   
 
The US tax administration’s policy was focused on three main goals, namely; seeking 
more reasonable and responsive interpretations of the tax laws; providing a better 
service to American taxpayers and continuing a vigorous enforcement programme to 
discourage and deter tax abuse (IRS, 2008). On top of these objectives, the IRS also 
attempted to speed up and improve the resolution of tax cases; to streamline the 
management of refund cases; to perfect audit procedures and to strengthen tax 
procedures. In May 2000 a new taxpayer compliance measurement project entitled the 
‘National Research Programme’ (NRP) was launched to replace the Taxpayer 
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Compliance Measurement Programme (TCMP) (Mills, 2004).  The main difference 
between the audit approach under TCMP and NRP was that NRP auditors appeared 
‘more friendly’ by requesting ‘reasonable substantiation’ for income and deductions 
claimed by taxpayers.  The objectives of NRP were wide-ranging and included the 
provision of compliance data, determination of the compliance rate on voluntary 
reporting and the improvement of IRS operations by providing specific information 
about non-compliance. 
 
In order to aid compliance in the SAS, various education programmes such as the 
‘Public Information Programme’, ‘Free Tax Return Preparation For You by 
Volunteers’, ‘Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program (VITA)’, ‘Tax Counseling 
for the Elderly (TCE)’, and ‘Military Personnel and Their Families Get Free Tax 
Help’ are being implemented in the US (IRS, 2008). The tax returns and instructions 
have been simplified and problems encountered by taxpayers, especially in relation to 
the type and colour of return, were identified through national surveys.  As a result, 
different taxpayers are issued with different forms and instructions to accommodate 
their needs and ease the process of filing tax returns (IRS, 2008). 
 
Previously, instead of preventing tax compliance, the IRS had taken steps to ensure 
that its employees meet their tax filing and payment obligations in order to 
accommodate the statement by the Commissioner of the IRS which emphasised that 
internal enforcement begins at home (IRS, 2008). Although SAS has been 
implemented in the US for a very long time (nearly a century since 1913), compliance 
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issues still remain important and continue to be a major focus to be addressed by the 
IRS (IRS, 2009).  
 
The USA also has a significant amount of revenue that remains unreported and 
unpaid. In 2005, the IRS estimated this gross tax gap to be approximately $345 
billion. After subtracting revenue obtained through enforcement actions and other late 
payments, the IRS estimated the net tax gap to be approximately $290 billion. These 
estimates, which remain the most recent estimates available (IRS, 2009), were 
conducted using data collected in the tax year of 2001 and before (IRS, 2009). For the 
purpose of estimating the tax gap in the USA, the IRS identified three forms on non-
compliance activities, namely underreporting (not reporting one’s full tax liability on 
a timely-filed return); underpayment (not timely paying the full amount of tax 
reported on a timely-filed return); and non-filing (not filing required returns on time 
and not paying the full amount of tax that should have been shown on the required 
return) (IRS, 2009: 3). 
 
Table 2.3 to 2.6 summarise some significant data in relation to the US tax system, 
including filings, compliance rates and tax gaps, underreporting estimations for 
individuals and tax collection by types. 
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Table 2.3: Individual filing in US 2008 
 2007 
 
2008 
 
Change 
Total Receipts 140,188,000 156,297,000 11.50% 
Total Processed 140,023,000 156,053,000 11.40% 
     
E-filing Receipts:    
  Tax Professionals 57,420,000 62,959,000 9.60% 
  Self-prepared 22,559,000 26,927,000 19.40% 
    Total 79,979,000 89,886,000 12.40% 
     
Web Usage:    
  Visits to IRS.gov 216,952,000 351,191,000 61.90% 
Total Refunds:    
  Number 105,879,000 107,569,000 1.60% 
Amount 
 
 
$246.02 billion 
 
 
$261.32 billion 
 
 
6.20% 
Average refund $2,324 $2,429 4.60% 
     
Direct Deposit Refunds:    
  Number 61,581,000 66,460,000 7.90% 
  Amount 
 
$166.24 
 
$181.28 
 
9.10% 
  Average refund $2,699 $2,728 1.00% 
    
E-filing rate 57% 58%  
Source: IRS 2009 (http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=184855,00.html) 
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Table 2.4: United States’ compliance rates and tax gap 2008 
Activities USD$ 
(billion) 
Non-filing 27 
Underreporting:  
    Individual:  
        Underreport non-business income 56 
        Underreport business income 109 
        Overstated deductions,   adjustments, 
exemptions and credits 
32 
Underpayment 33 
  
Noncompliance rate (NCR)  16.3%  
  
Tax compliance index is 4.4724  
Source: IRS 2009 (http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf) 
 
Table 2.5: United States- Individual income tax gap underreporting estimates 
2008 
Type of income or offset Tax gap $b NMP # 
Total underreported gap 197 18% 
Underreported income 166 11% 
   
Wages, salaries, tips 10 1% 
Interest income 2 4% 
Dividend income 1 4% 
State income tax refunds 1 12% 
Alimony income * 7% 
Pensions and annuities 4 4% 
Unemployment compensation * 11% 
Social security benefits 1 6% 
Capital gains 11 12% 
Other income 26 64% 
 
* Less than $0.5 billion 
# NMP – Net Misreporting Percentage 
Source: IRS 2009 (http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf) 
                                                    
24 Based on Riahi-Belkaoui (2004: 138). Tax compliance is measured based on a scale from 0 to 6. A 
high score indicates higher compliance. 
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Table 2.6: United States: Internal revenue collections by type of tax, fiscal years 
2007 and 2008 
Gross collection $’000 
  
2007 2008 
  
Type of tax 
  
United States, total 2,691,537,557  2,745,035,410  
      
Corporation income tax 395,535,825  354,315,825  
Regular 394,666,355  353,548,654  
Tax-exempt organisation business income tax 869,471  767,171  
 
Individual income tax  1,366,241,437  1,425,990,183  
Income tax withheld 928,632,327  970,654,194  
Other  437,609,110  455,335,989  
 
Employment taxes 849,732,729  883,197,626  
 
Estate and gift taxes 26,977,953  29,823,935  
Estate 24,557,815  26,543,433  
Gift 2,420,138  3,280,502  
 
Excise taxes 53,049,612  51,707,840  
Source: IRS 2009 (http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=171960,00.html)  
 
b) United Kingdom 
 
The income tax in the United Kingdom began in the 1790s at a time when the British 
were faced with continuous warfare with France. Resource concerns led to taxation 
innovations in both countries. William Pitt (The Younger), the Prime Minister at that 
time is credited the father of income tax in the UK. He introduced ‘Triple 
Assessment’ in 1798 and then expanded to a general income tax in 1799 with more 
focus on property-based income tax such as tax on rentals and house value (Lymer 
and Oats, 2008).  
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In 1944 a new income tax system was introduced known as pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) 
where an employee received his or her salary and wages after tax deduction. Taxation 
at source had long been a core principle of the UK’s tax system, with its use in 
income tax collection commencing in 1803 in addition of Pitt’s income tax system.  
This system has contributed to the government in terms of improvement in cash flow, 
reduction in bad debts, ease of taxpayers’ payments of weekly or monthly taxes, 
thereby preventing large annual payments at the end of the tax year (Lymer and Oats, 
2008). In 1965, two new taxes were established: corporation tax and a real property 
gain tax called capital gains tax. Capital gains tax aimed not to increase revenue 
significantly but to decrease non compliance and increase equity among taxpayers. In 
1984, inheritance tax was introduced to replace capital transfer tax which was 
launched in 1975. 
 
The self assessment system in the UK was first introduced in 1996/97 (Lymer and 
Oats, 2008: 341). The introduction of the SAS in the UK was driven by three main 
reasons (Barr, James and Rest, 1977: 1-3). Firstly, the costs of administration had 
risen steadily over the years since the 1970s. The Board of Inland Revenue reported 
that the cost of collecting taxes during 1974-75 was about £200 million- most of this 
being used for staff salaries (p. 1). In 1976, the Inland Revenue had employed nearly 
81,600 staff, an increment of 7,000 staff compared to in 1975 (and the number had 
increased to 90,000 by 1978). Moreover, ‘the cost of administering individual taxes 
averaged 1.75% of the net revenue collected’ (Barr et. al., 1977: 2). This percentage 
was high compared with that in the USA, particularly as the number of staff was 
thought to be comparable with those in the UK. This was partly because the USA’s 
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tax system is simple (in terms of tax allowance) with emphasis on extensive use of 
computers. In contrast, ‘Britain placed more emphasis on equity between taxpayers, 
using a complex system of individual reliefs and allowances, and made greater efforts 
to collect all tax payable’ (Barr et. al., 1977: 2). 
 
Secondly, the debate of tax credits in early 1970’s has also led to the introduction of 
SAS. The existence of a reduced-rate band for low income earners would result in 
many year end adjustments as the amount of tax withheld each week would not add 
up exactly to the total tax due for the whole year. Consequently, tax administration 
could not cope easily with many year end adjustments and therefore, the tax credit 
scheme could not easily incorporate a reduced rate band (Barr et. al., 1977:  2). 
 
The third reason was, in relation to the costs of administration, the discussion of local 
government finance culminating in the Report of the (Layfield) Committee of enquiry 
required some 12,000 additional civil servants in the 1970s to administer the tax 
collections. This significant increment would reflect the additional cost of 
administrations due to the increase in workload during that time (Barr, et. al., 1977: 
2). 
 
Taking into account the consequences of the cost of administrations, the flexibility of 
the structure of marginal tax rates and the feasibility of the local income taxes, the 
Committee suggested that there was a need to propose a new system, the self 
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assessment system, to overcome these problems. Thus, the introduction of SAS in 
1996/97 for individuals in the UK was made in the hope of increasing the efficiency 
of tax administration and collections. 
 
Currently, apart from individual income taxes, various taxes are applied in the UK, 
namely inheritance tax, national insurance contributions, stamp duties, and other 
smaller duties overseeing the national minimum wage rules and student loan 
repayments (HMRC, 2009). Previously, these taxes were managed by the Inland 
Revenue (IR) while Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE) administer taxes like 
customs duties and excise charges (i.e. on petrol), landfill tax, the climate change 
levy, insurance and air passenger duties, VAT and any other taxes not managed by the 
IR (HMRC, 2008) However, since 2005, the HMCE and IR have been combined and 
renamed Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) with almost all taxes in the 
UK being managed by this body. 
 
The objective of SAS in the UK, as in all developed and developing countries, was to 
make the tax system simpler, easier and fairer for taxpayers, to make it possible for 
the Inland Revenue to accept the Statement of Accounts without further review, and 
to allow taxpayers to pay the right amount of taxes at the right time without 
intervention by the IR. On top of this, SAS permits taxpayers to understand and to 
have more control over their own tax problems and, eventually, should open up ways 
for further reforms to simplify, unify and improve the system of personal taxation, 
especially in relation to customer services through greater co-operation between 
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taxpayers and the IR (James, 1996, Brodie, 1999). It was reported that the UK 
administrative cost was much higher than Canada and Australia (Loo, 2006) and the 
cost of collection for the self-employed was 3.7 times higher when compared with the 
cost for the employed (Thompson and Teviotdale, 1999).  Table 2.7 represents annual 
receipts in the UK, Table 2.8 represents number of individual taxpayers and Table 2.9 
represents income tax receipts from year 2002 to 2008. 
 
Table 2.7: United Kingdom- HMRC annual receipts  £million (1) 
 
(1) The figures in the table are equivalent to cash receipts as measured in producing HMRC's 
accounts subject to relevant adjustments. (The accounts moved to an accruals basis for the 
2004-05 Trust Statements.) For some taxes, there are differences from the figures published 
by the Office for National Statistics, which reflects payments into the Consolidated Fund. 
 
(2) Figures for income tax treat payment of the personal tax credits as negative tax to the extent 
that the credits are less than or equal to the tax liability of the family. Payments exceeding this 
liability are treated as public expenditure. This approach is consistent with the presentation 
adopted by the Office for National Statistics in National Accounts, HM Treasury and OECD. 
Personal tax credits are therefore being treated in line with international accounting 
conventions so as to distinguish between negative tax and public expenditure. 
 
(3) The split of receipts between income tax and national insurance contributions, and therefore 
each of these series individually, should be interpreted with caution. Most PAYE payments by 
employers now combine the two. A provisional split has to be estimated with corrective 
adjustments made later when employers' end of year returns have been received and 
processed. These corrective adjustments are recorded in the period when they are made and 
not cast back to the date of the original payment. 
 
(4) Figures for national insurance contributions are net of personal pension rebates paid directly 
from the National Insurance Fund to personal pension providers. They also include estimates 
Year Total 
HMRC 
Income 
tax      
 (2, 3) 
National 
Insurance 
Contributions 
(3, 4) 
 
Capital 
gains 
tax     
(5) 
VAT Corporation 
tax  
(6) 
2003-04 343,864 113,968 72,457 2,225 69,275 28,077
2004-05  371,075 122,920 78,098 2,283 73,058 33,573
2005-06  397,912 130,481 85,522 3042 72,856 41,829
2006-07  423,659 143,327 87,273 3,813 77,360 44,308
2007-08  451,053 147,324 100,410 5,268 80,599 46383
2008-09 (7) 447,075 151,190 97,664 4,910 82,557 44,836
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of the amounts deducted by employers in respect of payments to employees of statutory sick, 
maternity, paternity and adoption pay. 
 
(5) Figures exclude tax on capital gains made by companies which is included under corporation 
tax. 
 
(6) The figures are net of the negative tax element of the tax credits. Directly payable tax credits 
are classified wholly as public expenditure. Any tax relief due to the enhanced expenditure 
(i.e. amounts in excess of 100 per cent of the expenditure) which offsets liability to 
corporation tax is classified as negative tax. This approach is consistent with the presentation 
adopted by OECD. 
 
 
Source: HMRC 2009 (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_receipts/table1-2.xls) 
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Table 2.8: United Kingdom- Numbers of individual taxpayers (thousands) 
 
 All 
Lower 
(1) or 
"Savers" 
(3) 
Basic 
(4) 
Higher 
(5) 
Males 
(6) 
Females 
(6) Under 
65's 
and 
State 
Pension 
Year taxpayers 
starting 
(2) rate rate rate   65's over Age (7) 
  rate         
           
           
2003-04 28,500 3,220 730 21,600 2,960 16,100 12,400 24,500 3,950 4,700 
2004-05 30,300 3,570 833 22,500 3,330 17,000 13,300 26,000 4,250 5,110 
2005-06 31,100 3,190 1,170 23,100 3,590 17,600 13,500 26,900 4,160 5,100 
2006-07 31,500 3,210 1,270 23,200 3,770 17,800 13,700 27,200 4,320 5,270 
2007-08 31,900 3,190 1,460 23,400 3,870 18,000 13,900 27,400 4,500 5,470 
2008-09 30,600 348 1,410 25,300 3,640 17,500 13,100 26,600 4,070 5,000 
 
 
(1) From 1993-94 until 1998-99 a number of taxpayers with taxable income in excess of the lower rate limit only paid tax at the 
lower rate. This was because it was only their dividend income and (from 1996-97) their savings income which took their taxable 
(2) In 1999-2000 the starting rate replaced the lower rate. Taxpayers with a marginal rate at the 10% starting rate from an extra £1 
of earnings from 1999-2000 until 2008-09 when the starting rate on earnings was removed. 
(3) Taxpayers with a marginal rate at the 20% lower rate for savings income or the 10% ordinary dividend rate from an extra £1 of 
earnings. Before 1999-2000 these people would have been classified as lower rate taxpayers. 
(4) Taxpayers with a marginal rate at the basic rate from an extra £1 of earnings.       
(5) Taxpayers with taxable income above the higher rate threshold.       
(6) We have withdrawn information on the number of taxpayers by marital status in Table 2.1. The marital status indicator in the 
Survey of Personal Incomes has been unreliable for the vast majority of individuals under the age of 65 since 2000-01. 
(7) State Pension Age defined as males aged 65 years and over and females aged 60 years and over.     
 
Source: HMRC 2009 (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_receipts/table2-1.xls) 
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Table 2.9 – United Kingdom- Income tax receipts:  analysis by type £ million 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. Self assessment has been used to collect tax direct from individuals, trusts and estates from the tax year 1996-97 (1997-98 for tax on their income from most 
partnerships). For each tax year, a first Payment of Account (POA) is due on 31 January of that year, based on the previous year’s liability. A second POA is due on 31 
July, and the balance of liabilities on the next 31 January. (However many taxpayers do not have to make any POAs). Thus, receipts in 1996-97 comprised only first 
POAs (which, for 1996-97 only, were restricted to the previous year’s liabilities on incomes from sole trades, property and untaxed investments). Net receipts in a year 
also include late payments in respect of earlier years and are also net of repayments made, mostly to those for whom deductions at source exceeded their total liability. 
2. Money paid via the self assessment covers income tax, capital gains tax and Class 4 national insurance contributions. A statistical algorithm is used to attribute net SA 
receipts between these three components. However this algorithm does not yield reliable figures for receipts and repayments for each component, so only a net series for 
income tax is shown here. 
Source: HMRC 2009 (http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax_receipts/table2-8.xls) 
  Year 
     2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08
Receipts other than self assessment 99,695 107,381 114,992 121,852 133,129 135,269
of which:               
  PAYE   94,243 101,389 108,699 113,894 124,799 126,760
  Assessed income tax 231 183 194 174 173 208
  Tax deduction scheme for interest (TDSI) 2,122 2,092 2,266 2,969 3,124 4,134
  Other tax deducted at source 1,160 1,081 1,188 1,400 1,744 1,564
  Other receipts 1,938 2,637 2,645 3,416 3,290 2,603
Self Assessment, net of repayments 1 16,059 15,772 17,141 18,077 20,306 22,443
Repayments other than self assessment 2 -6,247 -9,185 -9,213 -9,450 -10,108 -10,388
                  
Total net receipts  109,507 113,968 122,920 130,480 143,327 147,323
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Compliance issues remain important in the UK tax system. Tax administrators in the 
UK face some difficulties from the perspective of tax practitioners: a study carried out 
by Hansford (1999) revealed a number of problems, particularly in relation to 
procedures arising from the implementation of SAS. The following issues were 
highlighted: 
i) Many problems were encountered in completing the Statement of 
Accounts, in response to which the IR acknowledged the need to make 
improvements (Smith D., 1999).  Although the IR proposed that the 
Statement should be similar to that of the ‘credit card statement’, in 
practice, this was still incomprehensible (Brodie, 1999);   
ii) The SAS restricted the practitioners’ access to well-trained IR staff 
(Hansford, 1999; William, 1999);   
iii) Inconsistent practices at the IR due to the restructuring of Tax Service 
Offices and Tax District Offices with the reduction in staff and their 
inconsistent training; 
iv) Software-related problems  during the introduction of electronic lodgment 
of tax returns, and 
v) In relation to electronic filing, tax practitioners faced difficulties when 
lodging tax returns themselves  because they needed a digital signature 
from their clients. This led to an increase in costs incurred by practitioners.   
Not withstanding tax compliance concerns, other related issues also emerged, such as 
the simplicity of tax returns. Since SAS is fully reliant on taxpayers, the tax returns 
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were quite difficult to complete.  Many taxpayers perceived that the tax system itself 
was too complex, difficult to understand and the terminology used was unfamiliar to 
taxpayers (Hansford, 1999; Brodie, 1999; Hinks, 2000).  For example, taxpayers 
might get confused between ‘tax allowance’ and ‘tax credit’ as well as ‘relief’ and 
‘deductions’. To help overcome this confusion the tax authorities have engaged in a 
variety of activities to help educate taxpayers in the details they need to know in order 
to be tax compliant. This has widened the development of ‘Tax Aid’. This 
organisation is a registered charity established in 1992 to provide free tax advice and 
assistance to individuals in financial need. Brodie (1999) found that some 
improvements have been identified, for example, taxpayers who sought considerable 
help in 1997 and 1998 were able to complete their own tax returns without much help 
in 1999.  In contrast, Brodie (1999) also reports that the returns were not good enough 
to accommodate the different taxpayers’ needs, especially those that frequently 
shifted from the ‘employed individual’ status to ‘self-employed’ status. 
 
Since 2000, the number of taxpayers using e-filing has increased and the online 
service provided by the HMRC has also improved (Lymer and Oats, 2008). Also, the 
HMRC have initiated measures to increase taxpayers’ confidence and ease of 
administration: for example, ‘Working Together’ is a partnership where the main 
agent representative bodies focus on improving all areas of HMRC operations for the 
benefit of agents, advisers and their clients. It provides a forum to raise operational 
issues or problems that have been identified by HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
or the representative bodies, either at a national level or through local Working 
Together groups (HMRC, 2009). 
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Despite a variety of measures taken to increase compliance and raise awareness of tax 
obligations among taxpayers in the SAS, the HMRC also suffered significant direct 
tax losses in 2007. A report called ‘Developing Methodologies for Measuring Direct 
Tax Losses’ published online in 200725 showed that the main types of losses were due 
to non-payment from individuals and large business entities, the use of avoidance 
schemes to reduce tax liabilities, the informal economy and individuals who had not 
issued a return (p. 7). The report suggested that in 2002, 13% (£2.5 billion) of tax due 
by those subject to self assessment was lost. This figure is equivalent to, and was 
estimated to be, £17.6 billion in 2007 (Murphy, 2007 - the estimation is based on 
extrapolating the average tax lost on direct taxes and those taxes that probably behave 
like them and applying this to 2007/08 HMRC data.).  
 
It has long been argued by the UK tax authorities that in spite of the numerous 
problems faced by practitioners and taxpayers, the objectives of SAS have been 
significantly accomplished (Brodie, 1999).  Although there were some difficulties, 
taxpayers and practitioners have cooperated well with SAS (James and Nobes, 2000: 
37).  The UK government has benefited from SAS with improved administration of 
income tax, making assessment easier, efficient, straightforward, encouraging 
taxpayers to disclose all income voluntarily and bringing their tax affairs up to date. 
SAS has also brought about technological innovation (e-filing), instilled public 
awareness through education programmes, publicity and branding and consultation 
with external bodies (Hinks, 2000;  HMRC, 2008).  
 
                                                    
25 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2007/mdtl-direct.pdf 
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In conclusion, tax development in the UK from World War II to the current date has 
undergone significant tax reform. However, after twelve years of operation (since 
1996, refer Table 2.1), SAS continuously faces problems, difficulties and challenges 
which need to be taken into account by tax authorities. The explosion in information 
technology (e.g. wireless networks) as well as taxpayer’s behaviour in reaction to the 
technology enhancement, inflation rates and the economic situation mean that there 
are very likely to still be future changes to the outcome of any SAS regulations and 
laws currently implemented. The economic environment is dynamic and agile – tax 
systems must be equally so. Therefore, the legislation, and particularly the fiscal 
policies, must be in line with government objectives to fulfill people’s needs and 
maintain public perception on equity and fairness. In an economic situation where 
prices are increasing and living costs are high, people tend to comply less with tax 
laws. 
.  
c) Japan 
 
Tax administration in Japan has gone through various reforms to improve its 
standards.  The introduction of the self-assessment system was the particular 
highlight of tax administration reform after World War II (Kimura, 2006). SAS in 
Japan was first introduced in 1947 to replace the direct assessment system. However, 
1868 saw the beginning of modernisation for Japan. At that time they received the 
majority of their tax revenues comprised mostly of land tax and liquor tax.  Income tax 
was first introduced in Japan in 1887.  In 1940, corporate tax was separated and became 
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independent from income tax law. The taxes on income have now replaced land tax as the 
main sources of tax revenue in Japan (Kimura, 2006). 
 
At the inception, a direct assessment system was implemented. In 1947 at the end of 
World War II, the self-assessment system was applied to all the major sources of tax 
revenues26. The introduction of SAS was a massive transformation in the taxation method 
and it was the start of a series of major tax administration reforms in the post-war era.   
 
In the initial days of introduction, the tax authority was worried about winning the 
trust of taxpayers and there were many alterations to the process before the system was 
considered to be operating smoothly (Ishi, 2001; Kimura, 2006).  In the period following 
the end of World War II, inflation was running at more than 100% per annum in Japan.  
Since the existing taxation system was based on the previous year’s income, it was 
no longer possible to secure the necessary tax revenue in the hyper-inflationary 
environment. A decision was taken to adopt a new system under which taxpayers would 
calculate and file their own income for the current year. This issue notwithstanding, 
another driving factor supporting the move to SAS was the incapability of the revenue 
staff in dealing with increasing number of taxpayers.  This was due to a sudden flow in 
the number of people who had to pay tax because the inflationary economy was 
creating many more taxpayers as tax thresholds failed to keep up with inflation. The 
following are some of the main problems arising in the early stage of SAS in Japan 
(Kimura, 2006): 
 
• Problems detecting individuals running their own businesses. 
                                                    
26 At that time taxes involved were individual income tax, corporate tax and inheritance tax. 
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• Individual income tax has a minimum taxable income threshold, making it more 
difficult to identify those with tax obligations.  
• Many sole proprietors and family-owned small and medium corporations found it 
was difficult to adapt to the new system, and many did not even keep accounting 
books.  
• The actual amount of tax paid was less than the amount budgeted for by the 
government. 
• Tax officers were making assessments without any clear basis through which to 
meet the target, resulting in the public further losing trust in the tax authority. By 
1948, many anti-tax protests were staged in various parts of Japan. Some had led 
to threats and violence against tax officers.  In some cases, petrol bombs were 
flung into tax offices and homes of tax executives. 
• The difficulty in terms of filing and collection. 
 
Since many problems arose with the existing tax administration system and the 
nation’s trust of the tax authority deteriorated, it was thought that a more specialised 
tax administration organisation was needed. Therefore, in June 1949, to preserve 
trustworthiness, the National Tax Agency (NTA) was established as a separate body 
from the Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance to focus on tax assessment and 
collection.   
 
The emergence of NTA has proved to be a successful move in preserving the 
credibility and supremacy of the tax authority. They have elevated the sense of moral 
duty toward tax.  Efforts were made to further inform taxpayers about the tax system 
and to provide advice for those requiring assistance; they also focused on human 
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resources development including improved staff training, promotion of bookkeeping 
and accounting records and proper tax filing and also received important support from 
tax associated bodies in the private sector and Certified Public Tax Accountants 
(CPTAs). 
 
In Japan, as in the USA and the UK, ensuring compliance via tax audits and fines is a 
common approach to improving tax collection. In order to preserve people’s trust in 
the system and their belief that tax is applied equally, and to maintain their motivation 
to file and pay taxes correctly, it is essential that those who try to avoid tax, be dealt 
with firmly, sometimes by making them the focus of prioritised tax audits. Tax 
collection had also become a major obstacle, whereby it operated in an extraordinary 
environment where delinquency rates were more than 40% (Kimura, 2006). 
Prevention of non-compliance and prompt addressing of new delinquency therefore 
became the focus. While calling upon taxpayers to pay tax in time, automatic debiting 
of tax against their bank accounts was also implemented.  As a result, delinquency 
rates fell significantly and collection operations started to improve. 
 
In order to ensure that taxpayers are capable of fulfilling their tax returns, various 
measures have been implemented by the NTA including public relations, tax 
consultations and tax education. Various tax education programmes have been 
designed by NTA including lectures on taxes, preparing and distribute tax guidance 
materials and also organising writing contests particularly for school children (NTA 
Annual Report, 2008). On top of these, in order to facilitate schoolchildren to find, 
learn, think of, and solve their tax problems, the NTA has set up ‘Tax Space Euno’- a 
tax game which encourages students to solve their tax matters. (NTA Annual Report 
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2008). E-Tax (e-filing) was also introduced to facilitate taxpayers in filing procedures 
as well as allowing payment of tax liabilities via online banking and an ATM 
connected system called Pay-easy. Since January 2008, taxpayers who file tax returns 
via e-Tax have been given a 5,000 yen (£35) tax rebate (limited to the amount payable 
for that year).  
 
Table 2.10 demonstrates the number of individually filed tax returns, Table 2.11 
represents examinations of self assessed income tax and Table 2.12 represents Japan’s 
tax evasion in 2007. 
 
Table 2.10: Japan- Number of individual tax returns filed fiscal year 2006 
 
 ‘000 
persons 
Total population 127,770
Workforce 63,820
Number of tax returns filed 23,620
Refunds 12,690
Tax payments 7,770
Income earner category: 
   Business income 1,500
   Other income 5,970
   Real estates 1,090
   Employment 2,640
   Others 2,240
 
Source: National Tax Agency of Japan (NTA) Annual Report 2008, 
http://www.nta.go.jp/foreign_language/2008e.pdf page 48. 
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Table 2.11: Japan- Examinations of self assessed income tax fiscal year 2006 
Field examination Number of 
cases 
 
(‘000) 
Total 
understated 
income 
 
Million yen 
Understated 
income per 
case 
 
Thousand 
yen  
Total 
additional 
tax 
revenue 
collected 
 
Million 
yen  
 
Additional 
tax 
revenue 
collected 
per case 
 
Thousand 
yen  
Special general* 63 533,700 8,460 99,500 1580
Focusing ** 183 328,100 1,800 15,300 80
Brief contract *** 549 54,800 100 9,500 
 
20
Total 795 916,600 10,360 124,300 1,680
 
Notes: 
* Focus examination of the malicious taxpayers. 
** Short term examination to grasp understated income. 
*** Correction of tax return errors by speaking with the taxpayers by telephone or by asking the 
taxpayers to visit the tax office. 
 
Source: National Tax Agency of Japan (NTA) Annual Report 2008, 
http://www.nta.go.jp/foreign_language/2008e.pdf page 49 
 
 
Table 2.12: Japan- Tax evasion fiscal year 2007 
Cases 
conducted 
Cases 
closed 
Prosecutions Total 
tax 
evasion 
 
Million 
yen 
Tax 
evasion 
per case
 
Total tax 
evasion 
(In 
prosecuted 
case) 
Tax 
evasion 
per 
prosecuted 
case  
  Million yen 
220 
 
218 158 35,300 162 30,900 195 
 
Source: National Tax Agency of Japan (NTA) Annual Report 2008, 
http://www.nta.go.jp/foreign_language/2008e.pdf page 49 
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Self-assessment in Japan has gradually become accepted by the public as the basis for 
the stable tax revenue that is required for running the nation. Now it has firmly taken 
root they are preparing for the next challenges of  the 21st century. The basic 
principles and objectives of SAS have remained unchanged. However, as the system 
shifts into the 21st century there are many developments in the environment 
surrounding tax administration in Japan, such as the information technology (IT) 
explosion, globalisation, the declining birthrate and the ageing of the population. The 
number of taxpayers has risen and cases of tax assessment and collection are getting 
more and more complex and difficult. To overcome these problems, the Japanese tax 
authority have set up five basic themes for tax administration, namely taxpayer 
service, ensuring compliance, the use of  IT and streamlining operations, the role of 
tax accountants,  and human resources development (Kimura, 2006). 
 
In conclusion, the history of the Japanese tax administration particularly in SAS is 
seemingly a series of steady steps taken to strengthen tax audits, increase tax 
collection and preserved fairness and equity as well as other activities to ensure 
compliance. A steady effort to work on the basics such as developing human 
resources, instilling public awareness and educating taxpayers have also proved very 
important. The victory in implementing SAS in Japan has not come about overnight - 
strong co-operation between the tax authority and taxpayers is the main ingredient.  
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d) The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Countries as a Group 
 
The self assessment system is widely practiced in the OECD countries and around 
half of OECD countries (refer Table 2.13) have implemented a self assessment system 
for personal income taxation (OECD, 2007).  In contrast, for the other OECD 
countries, the system of tax administration is based on administrative direct 
assessment. Tax administration practices across OECD countries demonstrate a 
variety of issues and problems and therefore, taken collectively, provide a 
comprehensive review of the majority of tax administration issues faced when using 
self assessment systems. This section therefore builds on the specific cases of the 
USA, the UK and Japan already explored in detail above in order to widen the review 
of the administration of the self assessment system. 
 
Out of thirty members of the OECD, tax administrations have evolved into a variety 
of institutional arrangements however, in the majority of cases there are unified and 
semiautonomous bodies with a broad range of powers. They are mainly responsible 
for tax administration that report directly to their respective governments. In many 
OECD countries, a separate body for the collection of tax and social contributions and 
revenues bodies has been given a considerable degree of autonomy to carry out and 
administer their own tax systems (OECD, 2007). The evolution from autonomy27 to 
semi autonomy28 administration as well as the integration of tax collection among a 
large number of OECD members has increased taxpayers’ confidence in the tax 
                                                    
27 Autonomy – A broad range of powers that are mainly responsible for tax administration and 
collections without government intervention (OECD, 2007). 
28 Semi autonomy - A broad range of powers that are mainly responsible for tax administration and 
collections with government intervention particularly in developing policies (OECD, 2007). 
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administrations and  their perception of equity and fairness of the tax systems (OECD, 
2007). On top of this, the change from autonomy to semi autonomy has also increased 
the efficiency of the tax system by means of efficient use of resources, lowering 
administration costs29 and lowering taxpayers’ compliance costs (Barrand, Harrison 
and Ross, 2004). In addition, the steps taken by most of the OECD countries in using 
the self assessment system has increased taxpayers awareness, knowledge and 
compliance gradually, particularly within three to five years after the introduction of 
the SAS (OECD, 2007). Table 2.13 illustrates summary details countries that use a 
SAS across OECD countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
29 E.g. Typically they help eliminate duplication of core functions require fewer staff and exploit 
economies of scale in human resource management and training, lower infrastructure costs in office 
telecommunication network and elimination of IT duplication development and maintenance costs. 
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Table 2.13: SAS for individual in OECD countries and  tax administration 
arrangements 
OECD 
countries 
Compulsory 
filing annual 
returns? 
Type of revenue 
body 
Collect 
most 
social 
security 
Performs 
custom 
function 
Performs 
other 
non-tax 
role 
Australia Yes Unified semi  
autonomous body 
Not 
applic. 
No Yes 
Canada Yes Unified semi 
autonomous body 
with board 
Yes No Yes 
Hungary Yes Unified semi  
autonomous body 
Yes No Yes 
Ireland No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
Yes Yes Yes 
Italy No (if only in 
receipt of 
employment 
income and 
no 
deductions) 
 
Semi  autonomous 
body 
Yes No No 
Japan No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
No No Yes 
Korea No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
No No No 
Mexico No (if 
income is 
less than 
$300,000 and 
interest less 
than 
$100,000) 
 
Unified semi  
autonomous body 
No Yes No 
New 
Zealand 
No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
Not 
applic. 
No Yes 
Poland Yes Multiple 
directorate in 
MOF 
No Yes No 
Slovak Rep. No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
No No Yes 
Spain Yes Unified semi  
autonomous body 
No Yes Yes 
UK No Unified semi  
autonomous body 
Yes Yes Yes 
USA Yes Unified semi  
autonomous body 
with board 
Yes No Yes 
           * MOF – Ministry of Finance 
          Source: OECD (2007) pag. 28. 
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In terms of personal income tax, the vast majority of countries rely on ‘withholding at 
source’ arrangement for the collection of tax revenue, in respect of salary and wages.  
Taxpayers are also required to file their tax returns annually under the self assessment 
system, so the filing methods vary across countries. The period of time taken to 
finalise tax liabilities and make a final payment  (if total tax payable is more than total 
tax credits (deductions at source) also varies across countries from as low as three 
months up to eleven months from the date the tax returns are due (refer Table 13 in 
OECD, 2007: 67).  
 
The implementation of SAS in more than 60% of the OECD countries has produced 
significant reforming of the tax administration of these countries especially in terms 
of improving overall taxpayer compliance  with tax laws and efficiency (early 
collection of tax revenue, an expanded and better targeted audit programme and 
through reducing the incidence of disputed assessment) (OECD, 2007). In order to 
further improve their SAS, some OECD countries encourage tax authorities to pre-fill 
tax returns to assist taxpayers in meeting their return filing obligations. This pre-filled 
tax return programme has been implemented in the Nordic region (i.e. Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) and more recently in Chile and Spain (OECD 
2007: 61) and has shown benefits for both taxpayers and tax revenue bodies including 
a substantial reduction in taxpayers’ burden; greater certainty for taxpayers in 
claiming their deductions and calculating their tax liabilities;  an improved image of 
revenue bodies; faster processing of the tax returns; quicker refunds and minimised 
unintended errors made by honest taxpayers (OECD, 2007).  
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A variety of special education programmes have also been designed across OECD 
countries to educate their taxpayers in respect of their responsibilities and updating 
their tax knowledge and regulation in a particular year of assessment. Since filing 
annual tax returns is not compulsory in all OECD countries (refer Table 2.13), 
therefore, in countries where personal taxpayers are required to file annually, these 
measures are particularly important to ensure the filing procedures are fully complied 
with. In these cases taxpayers are provided with a tax guide to assist them in 
understanding tax laws and in certain cases tax assistants are provided to assist 
taxpayers in completing their tax returns.  
 
Taxpayers are also being given ample time to file their tax returns in the self 
assessment system, for example in Canada and Korea, taxpayers have four and five 
months respectively to submit tax returns (OECD, 2007: 71) after the financial tax 
year ends.  
 
As a measure to increase tax compliance (and perceptions of fairness and equity) and 
instill public awareness of their tax responsibilities in line with the self assessment 
system, all OECD countries imposed a penalty (interest) on tax not paid on time.  
Certain countries impose failure-to-file penalties or additional tax liabilities or may 
apply rates of tax liability to the delayed period (i.e. Denmark, Greece, Portugal and 
USA) (OECD, 2007: 85).  
 
 
 
 79
Although more operations are becoming computerised, salary is the single largest cost 
item for tax administration functions in 2003 and 2004 in all OECD countries because 
the revenue body’s mission is to collect revenues by enforcing tax laws, not to make 
government expenditures. Salary ratios in 2004 are in the 60-90 per cent range of total 
tax administration cost in two thirds of OECD countries while others hit the 50-60 per 
cent range. As illustrated in Table 2.15 and 2.16, cost of collection ratios (i.e. the ratio 
of administrative costs/tax revenue collections), which are widely used internationally 
to draw conclusions on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of revenue bodies, 
vary substantially across countries, in part due to factors unrelated to efficiency and 
effectiveness. Notwithstanding the little amount of revenue collected by those 
functions, compared to total staff usage, tax audit and verification activities are 
important measures for compliance management purposes. 
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Table 2.15:  OECD Self-assessed Countries - Aggregate Administrative Costs for Tax Administration Functions (2004) 
(All amounts in millions of local currency, unless otherwise stated) 
Aggregate 
administrative costs 
for all tax functions 
(incl. salaries)  
Total salary costs for 
tax functions  
Salary costs/aggregate 
administrative costs 
(%)  
Total IT costs  IT costs/ aggregate 
administrative costs 
(%)  
COUNTRY  
     
 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004 
Australia  2,299.9  2,438.9  1,466.2  1,528.8  63.8  62.7  412.0  420.5  17.9  17.2 
Canada /1  3,164  2,946  n.avail.  n.avail  - - 366  370  11.6  12.6 
Hungary  n.avail  71,143  n.avail.  52,587  - 73.9  n.avail.  n.avail.  - -
Ireland/1  337  365  246  266  73.0  73.0  31  38  9.3  10.4 
Italy  1,864  2,275  956  1,155  51.3  50.8  107  116  5.7  5.1 
Japan  723,221  717,627  568,620  569,512  78.6  79.4  73,258 /1  70,079 /1  10.1  9.8 
Korea  879,651  949,234  579,627  641,733  65.9  67.6  47,508  58,056  5.4  6.1 
N. Zealand  289  310  168  188  58.1  60.6  67  68  23.1  21.9 
Poland/1  2,837  3,789  1,783  2,526  62.8  66.7  n.avail.  n.avail.  n.avail.  n.avail. 
Slovak Rep.  2,381  2,572  1,520  1,641  63.8  63.8  530  391  22.2  15.2 
Spain  1,086  1,149  730  768  67.2  66.8  69/1  70/1  6.3  6.1 
UK /1  3,140  3,146  1,866  1,871  59.4  59.5  430  529  13.7  16.8 
USA  9,400  9,760  6,850  7,120  72.9  72.9  1,560  1,600  16.6  16.4 
 
Source: OECD (2007) page 108. 
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Table 2.16: OECD Self-assessed Countries - Comparison of Aggregate Administrative Costs to Net Revenue Collections  
COUNTRY  Administrative costs/ net revenue collections  
(costs per 100 units of revenue)  Abnormal or unusual factors likely or known to influence reported ratio  
 2000 2001    2002 2003 2004  
Australia  - 1.06  1.07  1.05  1.05  
Canada  1.07  1.08  1.20  1.33  1.17 Removal of customs functions to separate agency at the end of 2003; costs and 
revenue bases for 2003  
      and 2004 exclude customs.  
Hungary  1.45  1.23  1.35  n.avail.  1.14 Revenue base includes social contributions.  
Ireland  0.81  0.90  0.95  0.91  0.86 Costs include customs operations; revenue base includes social contributions and VAT on imports.  
Italy  n.avail.  n.avail.  n.avail.  0.42  0.52 Costs exclude substantial tax fraud work carried out by Guardia di Finanza (tax 
police). 
Japan  1.42  1.54  1.66  1.67  1.58 Relatively low tax burden; revenue base excludes separately-collected social 
contributions; substantially  
      reduced administrative workloads due to design features of tax systems- refer 
to main body of text. 
Korea  0.80  0.85  0.85  0.82  0.86 Substantially reduced administrative workloads due to tax systems design 
features -refer to main body of text. 
Mexico  1.47  1.20  1.19  1.21  1.17 Ratio is slightly overstated as cost element includes overheads for customs.  
N. Zealand  0.89  0.90  0.87  0.83  0.81  
Poland  1.54  1.50  1.78  1.95  2.62 Costs and revenue base include customs operations; revenue base excludes 
social contributions.  
Slovak Rep.  1.30  1.43  1.46  1.45  1.26 Revenue base includes VAT on imports but not social contributions or some 
income tax refunds.  
Spain  - 0.81  0.78  0.83  0.82 Revenue base includes customs administration and VAT on imports.  
UK 1.02  1.06  1.11  1.04  0.97 Revenue base includes national insurance contributions while cost base includes all staff of national  
      contributions agency.  
USA  0.43  0.46  0.52  0.57  0.56 Revenue base includes social contributions; no national VAT . 
Source: OECD (2007) page 110-111. 
82 
Table 2.17: OECD Self assessed Countries - Comparison of Registered Taxpayer 
Populations 
   Number of active registered Relative indicators 
taxpayers (million)  
COUNTRY 
Number 
of 
citizens 
(mlns) 
Labour 
Force 
(mlns) 
Personal 
income 
tax 
(PIT) 
Corporate 
income 
tax (CIT) 
Value 
added 
tax 
(VAT) 
Registered 
personal 
taxpayers/ 
labour 
force (%) 
/1 
Employees 
generally 
file annual 
returns 
       
Australia 20.1 10.2 17.04 1.05 2.4  167.1 Yes 
Canada  31.9 17.2 23.3 1.5 2.2 /4  135.4 Yes 
Hungary 10.1 4.1 4.4 0.39 1.9  107.3 Yes 
Ireland 4.0 1.9 1.99 0.111 0.236  104.6 No 
Italy  57.6 24.4 n.avail. n.avail. n.avail.  - No 
Japan  127.7 66.4 46.14 /4 2.74 /4 2.13 /4  69.5 No 
Korea  48.1 23.4 2.2 0.34 4.0  9.4 /2 No 
Mexico  104.0 42.6 8.3 0.6 6.3  19.5 No /4 
N. Zealand  4.1 2.1 5.1 0.40 0.62  242.9 No 
Poland  38.2 17.3 28.26 0.37 1.857  163.4 Yes 
Slovak Rep.  5.4 2.7 0.51 0.13 0.13  18.9 /2 No 
Spain  42.7 20.2 37.6 1.1 2.9  186.1 Yes 
UK 59.8 29.4 28.5 0.7 1.8  96.9 No 
USA  293.6 148.6 222.5 10.5 n.applic.  149.7 Yes 
Source: OECD (2007) page 112. 
 
2.4.2 Developing countries 
 
 
Having analysed the SAS of the USA, the UK and Japan, and reviewed the key features 
of other developed OECD countries earlier in this chapter, this section discusses the use 
of SAS in developing countries. It includes the cases of Cambodia and Sri Lanka as 
examples of two developing countries that are currently engaged in using SAS. These are 
chosen to illustrate cases of relatively (apparently) successful SAS implementation 
(Cambodia) and one facing more problems (Sri Lanka) with their use of SAS -  although 
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it is acknowledged that wide varieties of tax and SAS design can be found amongst 
developing countries. 
 
a) Cambodia 
 
Initially, the tax authority of Cambodia was known as the Tax Department. It was re-
established in 1981 with capacity of less than 200 officers and the first branch was in 
Phnom Penh with five more offices in other locations. The tax system was first 
introduced in 1982 formerly known as Official Assessment (also called the Pure 
Estimated Regime of Taxation). Like other countries implementing this system, 
Cambodian taxpayers were simply required to declare their income in a tax return and 
furnish all relevant documents to support this claim. Then, tax officials assessed and 
calculated the aggregate income and the estimated profit (for a business entity).  A notice 
of assessment would then be issued to the taxpayers and payments were made to tax 
office cashiers. In 1994, a new system, called the Self Assessment System was introduced 
to replace Official Assessment (Eang and Seiha, 2006). A further tax reform occurred in 
1997 whereby a new Law on Taxation was introduced to accommodate regulations 
regarding profit tax, salary tax, VAT, excise tax, withholding tax, and associated 
administrative rules and procedures.  
 
The implementation of SAS in Cambodia was undertaken in stages. Before 2000, SAS 
was applied only in Phnom Penh. A year later it was extended to 5 provinces and by 2003 
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a total of 16 provinces (out of 24 provinces) were involved. The tax system was reformed 
to conform with the country’s transition to a market economy.  
 
A comprehensive reform of Cambodia’s tax system started in February 1997 (Asian 
Development Bank, 2008). Revenue mobilisation was the key element in the 
Government’s fiscal strategy. To achieve the targeted increase in the revenue, the 
Government acted on two fronts: putting in place the structural elements of a modern tax 
system and strengthening the administrative capacity to collect taxes (Asian Development 
Bank, 2008).  
 
The main objective of SAS in Cambodia is to increase the efficiency of tax collection 
(Eang and Seiha, 2006). Several measures have been taking place to strengthen collection 
including clear strategic management (vision, mission, plans); clear organisational 
structure; controlling of large taxpayers (with a focus on auditing, filing on time, payment 
and debt); methods of direct assessment (calculations, payments and penalties); providing 
good taxpayer service and tax audits (good taxpayer services will promote voluntary 
compliance by improving taxpayer understanding and confidence in the tax system); 
introducing better quality technology for assessment, collection, and audit and, finally, 
employing  professional staff, (well-trained staff, with integrity).  
 
In the Cambodian self assessment system, employers also have to make monthly 
declarations and payments no later than the 15th day of the succeeding month and there is 
no annual return for personal taxpayers. Tax deducted monthly by the employer is 
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deemed to be the amount of tax liabilities for the year of assessment 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008). 
 
Like other SAS countries, voluntary compliance remains the issue with the SAS. The 
compliance rates are relatively low in Cambodia30. Several measures have been planned 
and undertaken by the tax authority to minimise non-compliance behaviour. The 
strengthening of tax auditing to detect non-compliance taxpayers has been aggressively 
implemented, a measure in which tax officials conduct general audits on selected 
taxpayers all over the country. In 2005, around 1,000 large and medium taxpayers were 
audited which resulted in more than KHR400 billion (£643,956.00) being collected (Eang 
and Seiha, 2006).  Continuous staff training has also been conducted in line with tax 
audits to enhance the credibility and performance of the tax officials and thereby 
developing taxpayers’ confidence and exposure to current tax laws. On the other hand, 
the Cambodian tax authority is also facing a number of problems with SAS; many 
taxpayers file tax returns with loss results for many years which in turn reduces tax 
collections, limits their capacity and places a strain on human resources (i.e. tax auditors) 
(Eang and Seiha, 2006; Cambodia Annual Economic Review, 2004). Lack of guidelines 
for processing tax audits, limitation of receiving information between related offices and 
lack of equipment to support audit plans  has to be tackled wisely so that the objectives of 
SAS are achieved (Eang and Seiha, 2006).  
                                                    
30 Riahi-Belkaoui (2004: 138) suggested that among Asian countries, Cambodia has the lowest tax 
compliance index (3.12) compared to other countries such as Malaysia (4.34), Thailand (3.41), Japan (4.41) 
and Philippines (3.83). Tax compliance is measured based on a scale from 0 to 6. A high score indicates 
higher compliance 
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In terms of information technology, Cambodia is facing some problems due to lack of 
resources (Economic Institute of Cambodia, 2009). The significant cost incurred by IT 
development not only relates to purchasing equipment but also to after-sale costs such as 
software, technical support and staff training. Therefore, a well-designed computer 
system is a useful device for a tax administration, and when used effectively can reduce 
the cost of operations, improve efficiency of controls, and assist taxpayers in complying 
with tax legislation. Limited internet access throughout Cambodia has also become a 
major barrier to tax administrator’s attempts to implement SAS easily, effectively and 
successfully in the way it is typically used in developed countries now. Statistics show 
that internet coverage was at approximately 6,000 out of total population of 12,573,580 
(0.05%) in the year 2000. This number significantly increased to 44,000 out of the total 
population of 15,507,538 (0.3%) in 2007 (International Telecommunications Union, 
2008). 
  
In conclusion, although Cambodia is a less developed country, it demonstrates the spirit 
necessary to excel in its tax administration. Thus the administrator is consistently 
implementing procedures to realise the country’s SAS objectives. Introducing E-service, 
the internet, posting tax information on the website, producing and providing more tax 
guides and information brochures, improving the process of response answering 
inquiries, providing more seminars, making more use of media including TV, radio and 
newspapers, improving relationships with tax agents as well as increasing interaction 
with community groups are some prominent steps taken by the administrator to enhance 
the efficiency (Eang and Seiha, 2006; Economic Institute of Cambodia, 2009).  
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Tax and compliance costs remain a crucial obstacle to a systematic modern tax system 
(Vanderbruggen, 2008) and encouraging compliance is an important element in enabling 
taxpayers to achieve some degree of satisfaction in response to what they pay (tax). The 
Tax Department (TD) claimed that taxation must first and foremost be predictable and 
clear so as to not impede business and investment (Asian Development Bank, 2008). In 
Cambodia, the transparency of the tax system would greatly benefit from educational 
programmes on tax regulations, clarifying or establishing the official administrations. 
However, the TD is facing problems in improving tax systems in Cambodia i.e a 
procedure providing “rulings” (for which there is an existing legal basis) would 
dramatically improve the predictability of the tax system.  In addition, an independent 
and efficient tax dispute settlement system would contribute much to the clarity and 
predictability of the tax  system in order for the Cambodian tax system to become “fair 
and equitable” in accordance with the prevailing international legal principles on the 
subject; further, in order  to empower businesses, an independent judicial or quasi-
judicial procedure must be implemented to settle disputes (Vanderbruggen, 2008). Table 
2.18, 2.19 and 2.20 illustrates Cambodia’s tax revenue as a percentage of GDP compared 
to other countries, the number of taxpayers and corporate and personal tax revenue. 
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Table 2.18: Cambodia -Tax Revenue as a Percentage of GDP, 
 (2005-2007) 
 
 
 
    Average 
3 years 
Countries 2005 2006 2007 % 
New Zealand 32.7 33.2 na 33 
Brunei 33.1 30.3 na 32 
Australia 25.5 25.3 25.0 25 
Sri Lanka 13.7 14.6 14.2 14 
Malaysia 15.4 15.1 14.8 15 
Japan 10.3 10.6 na 10 
Taipei, China 9.3 9.2 na 9 
Cambodia 7.4 7.6 10.2 8 
India 7.5 8.5 9.2 8 
 
Source:  Based on Asian Development Bank (2008) page 219 and 222. 
 
 
 
Table 2.19: Cambodia – Number of taxpayers in 2007 
 
 
Group of taxpayers 2006 2007 
Companies 17,287 18,387 
Individuals and partnerships (employees) 234,655 254,232 
 
 
Source: Based on Asian Development Bank (2009). 
 
 
 
Table 2.20: Cambodia – Corporate and personal tax revenue  2006 - 2007 (KHR 
million) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Ministry of Finance and Economy Kingdom of Cambodia (2009). 
 
 2006 2007 
   
Total Tax Revenue (including 
other tax revenue) 
465,645 487,989 
    Corporate tax 278,299 280,877 
    Personal tax 152,876 158,342 
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b) Sri Lanka 
 
Income tax in Sri Lanka was first introduced in 1932. Income tax administration was 
mainly governed by the Income Tax Department (ITD) which was established in the 
same year and now ITD is known as Department of Income Tax, Estate Duty and Stamps 
(the Department). The vision is “to be a taxpayer friendly tax administrator delivering 
excellent service to the tax paying public, with well trained and dedicated staff” (Inland 
Revenue Sri Lanka, 2008) while the mission is “to collect taxes under the law by 
encouraging voluntary compliance, and to enhance public confidence in the integrity and 
efficiency of tax systems by administering tax and related legislation fairly, uniformly 
and courteously and thereby facilitate and foster a beneficial tax culture” (Inland Revenue 
Sri Lanka, 2008).To realise both vision and mission,  strategic goals were also outlined 
which were “to improve voluntary compliance with the tax laws through programmes 
which encourage and assist that and detect those who do not comply and, where 
necessary, take appropriate corrective action” (Inland Revenue Sri Lanka, 2008). Judging 
from its mission, and strategic goals, ‘compliance’ and ‘corrective action’ appear to be 
important goals in administering tax in Sri Lanka.  
 
The tax system in Sri Lanka can be classified into five main categories, namely income 
taxes (charged on current year basis), value added tax, debit tax, betting and horse racing, 
economic service charges and taxes on international trade; the system is based on self 
compliance. There are three methods of tax payment in Sri Lanka, namely: 1- 
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Monthly Tax Deductions from Regular Profits31; 2) Tax on Tax on Lump-sum-payments 
(e.g. bonus etc.) and 3) Rates for the Deduction of Tax from Once-and-for-All Payments 
(Terminal Benefits)32 (Inland Revenue Sri Lanka, 2008). 
 
Under SAS, taxpayers are encouraged to comply with their tax obligation by declaring 
accurate income especially casual income, pay the correct amount of tax as well as alert 
the authorities on due dates. In order to overcome non compliance, higher penalties and 
aggressive tax audits are imposed. Table 2.21 summarises the development of the tax 
system in Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
31 Regular profits from employment include (Inland Revenue Sri Lanka 2008) : 
(i) Wages, salary, commission, overtime pay, traveling allowances and other allowances, fees, pension or 
such other profits from employment that arise or accrue in such pay period. 
(ii) Payment on housing, conveyance, medical bills, insurance policies, electricity, telephone bills and 
entertainment, etc. 
(iii) Any such payment or benefit provided by the employer to a member of the family or any other 
person. 
 
32 The amounts of the One-and-for-All Payments to which this table applies are (Inland Revenue Sri Lanka 
2008): 
(a) Retiring gratuity up to a ceiling of: 
     (i)  Rs. 1,800,000; or 
     (ii) The product of average monthly salary for the last three years and the 
           number of completed years of service; which ever is higher; 
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Table 2.21: Tax development in Sri Lanka 
 
Year  Activities 
1941 - Excess Profits Duty came into operation 
1948 - Profits Tax was introduced replacing Excess  Profits Duty 
1950 - Signed the first Double Tax (Relief) Treats by Ceylon with UK 
1958 - 
Kaldor Commission Proposals  
Taxation of Capital gains 
Wealth Tax 
Expenditure Tax 
Gifts Tax 
Named the Department as Department of Inland Revenue 
1961 - 
Introduction of surcharge on income tax,  
National Development Tax, Rice Subsidy Tax,  
Surtax, a Tax on Registration of Business and  
Professions and a Sales Tax (Last for 2 days only) 
1963 - Establishment of first Regional Office in Jaffna. Introduction of Business Turnover Tax under Finance Act 11 of 1963. 
1964 - The first tax amnesty 
1971 - 
Compulsory Savings Levy came into operation 
PAYE scheme was introduced.  
Capital Levy was introduced 
1972 - Introduction of the Self Assessment Scheme. 
1974 - The Department of Inland Revenue was re-structured.  Inland Revenue Service was established 
1979 - Introduced current year basis taxation (79/80) 
1983 - Introduction of Rehabilitation Levy 
1985 - Abolished Estate Duty and Gifts Tax 
1986 - Introduction of Withholding Tax on interest 
1988 - Implementation of the “Imputation System” of Company Taxation. Imposition of Betting and Gaming Levy. 
1991 - Devolution of Turnover Tax on whole sale and retail to Provincial Councils. 
1992 - 
Introduction of Withholding Tax on Specified Fees.  
Commenced Automation 
Introduce Defense Levy (NSL) 
1998 - Introduction of Goods and Services Tax (in place of Turnover Tax) 
2002 - 
Introduction of Value Added Tax 
(by abolishing Goods and Services Tax and National Securities Levy) 
- Abolished Stamp Duty and introduced Debits Tax 
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2004 - Economic Service Charge was introduced 
2005   Introduced Share Transaction Levy and Social  Responsibilities Levy. 
  
Source: http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.lk/ 
 
 
According to Table 2.21, the self assessment system was first introduced in 1972 which 
means that Sri Lanka has been experiencing 36 years of operation of a SAS. However, 
the triumph of SAS does not rely on how long it has been implemented: various factors 
play significant roles in relation to a SAS victory.  Table 2.22 summarises the number of 
taxpayers in Sri Lanka in 2004. 
 
Table 2.22: Sri Lanka – Number of taxpayers in 2004 
 
 
 
Group of taxpayers  
Resident companies 26,344 
Non resident companies 315 
State corporations, statutory boards and state 
owned institutions 
71 
Individuals and partnerships (employees) 338,551 
 
Source: Inland Revenue Sri Lanka (2008).  
 
 
The total collection of revenue for the year 2004 amounted to Rs.164.8 billion (£855 
million) (Inland Revenue Sri Lanka, 2008) which represents a growth of 18.5% over that 
of 2003. When the revenue collection under each type of tax is compared with the 
corresponding estimates, it is seen that the targeted revenue collection in relation to every 
type of tax, except income tax, has been achieved. Table 2.23 represents Sri Lanka’s tax 
revenue, percentage of GDP and cost of collection from 2006 to 2008.  
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Table 2.23: Sri Lanka – Tax revenue, percentage of GDP  and cost of collection– 
2006 - 2008 (Rs. million) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Estimation 
 
Source: Based on Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report (2007) page 119.  
 
 
 
Although the SAS has been in operation since 1972 in Sri Lanka, Dissanayake (2009) 
claimed that the system was only suitable for implementation in developed countries but 
not for Sri Lanka. He also claimed that only 3% out of approximately 250,000 tax returns 
were audited every year and that 97% of tax returns remained unaudited. The tax 
authority relied on the self-assessed tax returns, with no detailed auditing carried out. The 
Inland Revenue Commissioner also asserted that tax audits or assessments would be 
exercised if it was felt that an additional tax could be generated due to lack of human 
resources. Principally, individual taxpayers should be audited every three years at least. 
As a result, the Sri Lanka tax authority are suffering an increment in tax collection default 
due to inefficient tax audits and tax collections (Dissanayake, 2009). According to the 
Annual Report 2008 published by the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, the default tax in 2007 
 2006 2007* 2008* 
    
Total revenue 
As a per cent of GDP 
 
477,834 
16.3 
599,817 
16.9 
750,741 
18.0 
Tax revenue 
As a per cent of GDP 
 
428,378 
14.6 
540,929 
15.2 
677,259 
16.2 
Non tax revenue 
As a per cent of GDP 
 
49,455 
1.7 
58,888 
1.7 
73,482 
1.8 
Cost of collection per Rs100 
 
.63 .32 .30 
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is over Rs. 158 billion (£828 million).- a 69.7 per cent increase in default taxes over the 
figure for year 2000 due to improper tax collection procedures and lack of specially 
trained task force (Dissanayake, 2009). 
 
The Inland Revenue Commissioner also admits that the main problem for the successful 
implementation of SAS is lack of human resources. For example, since 2007, 118 (out of 
approximately 750) tax officials have left due to lack of job satisfaction - graduates who 
are recruited as tax officers, have no promotion prospects. They remain tax officers until 
they retire. Despite no future prospects, the burdens of the job also become another factor 
explaining why many tax officials have left. On average, a tax official has to assess 800 – 
1,200 tax returns every year (Dissanayake, 2009). Consequently, the tax authority must 
train new tax officials more frequently, which is costly. 
 
SAS in Sri Lanka appears to be far from being a success (Dissanayake, 2009) unless 
some measures are taken by the tax authority. A continuous education programme should 
be implemented to cultivate awareness among taxpayers particularly highlighting their 
responsibilities as taxpayers (Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual Report, 2008). In 
addition, the government should focus on human resources development as well as 
offering more opportunities (career enhancement) to tax officials so that they would have 
more motivation to work. A user friendly website, as has been introduced in many 
developed countries (e.g. the UK, the USA and Australia) should be developed to offer 
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information which is related to tax matters or as a platform for taxpayers to file their tax 
returns and make a payment (e-filing).  
 
c) Malaysia 
 
Tax in Malaysia was introduced by the British into the Federation of Malaya in 1947 and 
was based on Heasman’s Report (Singh 1999). Initially, the Income Tax Ordinance 1947 
was gazetted as the main act but this was subsequently reformed and replaced by Income 
Tax Act 1967 (ITA) which took effect on January 1, 1968. During that time, ITA 
consolidated the three acts of income taxation namely Sabah Income Ordinance 195633, 
Sarawak Inland Revenue Ordinance 196034  and Income Tax Ordinance 194735. 
Currently, ITA 1967 is the main act to govern direct taxes in Malaysia including 
corporate and individual income tax. The Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri or the Inland 
Revenue Board (IRB)36 is the tax authority which administers direct taxes in Malaysia. 
Other than ITA, the IRB are also responsible for administration, assessment, collection 
and enforcement of real property gain taxes37, petroleum taxes38 and stamp duties39. 
Royal Malaysian Customs (RMC) is the government agency responsible for 
administering the nation’s indirect tax policy. The core business is to collect tax and in 
                                                    
33 Applicable to Sabah only. 
34 Applicable to Sarawak Only. 
35 Applicable to Peninsular of Malaysia only. 
36 It is under the Ministry of Finance. The Inland Revenue Board Act 1995 established on March 1, 1996 to 
replace Inland Revenue Department (IRD). 
37 Real Property Gain Tax 1975. 
38 Petroleum Act 1967. 
39 Stamp Act 1949. 
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line with that, RMC’s vision is to be a respected, recognised and world class Customs 
Administration (www.customs.gov.my).   
 
The introduction of self assessment basis of taxation involved a substantial shift of 
responsibility on to the taxpayers in terms of their compliance obligations. SAS was first 
introduced in 2001 for companies and 2004 for personal taxpayers and the IRB have now 
experienced nine years of companies’ SAS (2001 to 2009). The effectiveness of the SAS 
has shown a positive effect since its implementation. In year 2002 to 200640, tax 
collection from companies has increased at an average rate of 12.78% per year (2006 
RM30.5/£5.35 billion; 2005 RM28.1/£4.93 billion; 2004 RM24,6/£4.63 billion 2003 
RM23.1/£4.05 billion – IRB Annual Report, 2006). The legislation, tax services and 
education and the enforcement of the law are some important elements which led to the 
improvement of tax collection for companies.  The computer system for handling the 
corporate taxation was fully developed and has been in use since 1 January 2003. Under 
SAS, the IRB would be involved in an expanded programme of checking and verifying 
tax returns on a post-assessment basis, particularly by way of tax audits and the 
implementation of a penalty system to enforce compliance with tax law. These would 
allow revenue officials to 'inquire into returns' in the six years that follow the filing 
period. They would also be able to demand a taxpayer to produce records that they may 
'reasonably require' for them to verify. From 1990 to 1996, it was reported that 
approximately twenty to thirty per cent of the returns filed were not assessed by the IRB 
(Kasipillai, 1998a, 1998b). In 2003, although nearly 3.5 million tax returns were 
                                                    
40 Latest IRB report covers until year 2006. 
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assessed, they represented only 67 per cent of returns lodged (IRB Annual Report, 2003). 
For individual taxpayers in the first year of SAS (2004) the IRB collected 
RM9.471/£1.75 billion as compared to only RM7.572/£1.32 billion in the preceding year, 
in which the Formal System had taken effect (IRB Annual Report, 2006). Further details 
of SAS in Malaysia are discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.5 SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS – AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
 
After discussing how SASs are operated in different tax regimes in the previous section, 
this section summarises SAS operations among countries including the general tax 
administration, the number of registered taxpayers, administrative costs and the measures 
taken to increase compliance. Extra developed countries (e.g. Canada and Australia) and 
developing countries (e.g. Pakistan and Bangladesh) are add to the summary to expand its 
scope further from the more detailed analysis found earlier in this chapter. 
 
2.5.1 General tax administration 
 
 
Table 2.24 illustrates a comparison between developed and developing countries in 
relation to general tax administration. 
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Table 2.24: SAS – Comparison among developed and developing countries (year of 
assessment 2007 otherwise stated) 
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Income tax 
authority 
IRS CRA NTA CBR NBR IRD ATO HMRC TD ITD IRB 
First introduced 1913 1917 1947 1979 1981 1980s 1986 1996 1994 1972 2001 
Basis of return FY 
(p) 
FY CY 
(ai) 
FY 
(z) 
FY FY (j) FY 
(f) 
CY 
(i) 
CY FY CY 
Tax audit / / / (d) / (x) / (x) / / / /  / 
e-filing / /    / (o) / /   / 
Penalties / / (e) / / (y) / / / / / / 
Taxpayers’ 
Compliance  
M M ST W W M M M W  
Public rulings (ad) (ae)  / (af) / / / (ac)   / 
Time limit for 
audit review 
(years) 
3-6(h) 6 (h) (d) 5  4 (h) 2-
4(h) 
1-5 5 2 6 (h) 
Taxpayer 
retained records 
(number of 
years) 
(ag) 6 (ah) (ah) (ah) 7 2-5 5 3 4  
Centralised 
collection 
  /   /  / / / / 
Notice issued  /     /     
Personal tax 
rates % 
10 – 35 
(Federal) 
 
15 – 29 
(Federal) 
5 - 
40 
7.5 - 
35 
0 - 
25 
12.5 - 
38 
0 - 
45 
0 - 40 5 - 20 5 - 
35 
5 - 
29 
Compliance 
rates index 
(2004)# 
4.47 3.77 4.41 na na 5.00 4.58 4.67 3.12 na 4.34 
Personal tax 
revenue as % of 
GDP  
9.0 11.7 4.4 12.3 9.7 14.6 12.2 10.2 10.2 14.2 14.8 
 
Notes:  
/ = Applicable to certain countries  
FY=fiscal year  
CY=current year 
 ST=compliance rate is high  
M=compliance rate is average 
W=compliance rate is low 
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 (d) applicable to ‘white return’ taxpayers (which is used only by the smallest taxpayers and/or 
corporations (Gillis 1989)  
(e) active 
(f) 1 July-30 June  
(h) unlimited time limit if taxpayers found to have committed tax fraud, however in UK for the similar 
offence, the time limit is 20 years and 10 month 
(i) depends on the accounting year end  
(j) 1 April-31 March 
 (o) for registered tax agent only/ir file for employer  
(p) not necessarily calendar year  
(x) not significant 
(y) little and inconsistent 
(z) financial year  
 (ac) more of Statement of Practice  
(ad) non-binding guidelines  
(ae) non-binding technical interpretation practices 
(af) one advance ruling for non-resident issued recently 
(ag) so long as the contents of records are material  
(ah) not available  
(ai) calendar year 
# Based on Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) – higher index, higher compliance, maximum index is 6.00 
 
Source: Based on Loo (2006: 63); IRB Annual Report (2005); OECD (2007); Asian Development 
Bank (2008). 
 
 
As seen in Table 2.24, many countries such including the USA, the UK, Cambodia and 
Sri Lanka have implemented e-filing as an alternative method whereby to file tax returns. 
Japan, the UK, New Zealand and Australia have among the highest personal income tax 
rates recorded while New Zealand and the UK recorded the highest tax compliance index 
across the countries. 
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2.5.2 Registered taxpayers 
 
 
Table 2.25 illustrates a comparison among developed and developing countries in relation 
to registered taxpayer populations. 
 
 
Table 2.25 : Comparison of Registered Taxpayer Populations 
 
   Number of active registered  Relative indicators  
taxpayers (mlns)   
COUNTRY  
Number 
of 
citizens 
(mlns)  
Labour 
Force 
(mlns) 
Personal 
income 
tax (PIT)  
Corporate 
income 
tax (CIT) 
Value 
added 
tax 
(VAT)  
Registered 
personal 
taxpayers/ 
labour 
force (%) 
/1  
Employees 
generally 
file annual 
returns  
Australia              20.1        10.2  17.04  1.05  2.4   167.1  Yes  
Belgium               10.4          4.6  6.0  0.5  0.6   130.4  Yes  
Canada                 31.9        17.2  23.3  1.5  2.2   135.4  Yes  
Denmark                5.4          2.9  4.6  0.15  0.4   158.6  Yes   
France                 60.2         27.4  34  1.2  3.6   124.3  Yes  
Germany             82.5         40.0  27.9   1.0  5.1   69.8  No   
Greece                 11.1           4.8  10.72  0.62  0.93   223.3  Yes  
Hungary              10.1           4.1  4.4  0.39  1.9   107.3  Yes  
Japan                 127.7         66.4  46.14  2.74 /4  2.13    69.5  No  
Korea                  48.1         23.4  2.2  0.34  4.0   9.4 /2  No  
Malaysia             28.0          12.1 3.5 0.98 n.applic.  28.0 Yes 
Netherlands        16.3           8.4  7.14  0.65  1.07   84.9  No  
N. Zealand            4.1           2.1  5.1  0.40  0.62   242.9  No  
Spain                  42.7          20.2  37.6  1.1  2.9   186.1  Yes  
Sweden                9.0            4.5  7.1  0.45  0.91   157.7  Yes  
Switzerland         7.4             4.4  n.avail.  n.avail.  0.31   - Vary   
UK                    59.8           29.4  28.5  0.7  1.8   96.9  No  
USA                293.6         148.6  222.5  10.5  n.applic.  149.7  Yes  
 
Notes: 
 
/1. This indicator may exceed 100% for a variety of reasons e.g. requirement for a tax registration before 
having to file a tax return, taxpayers who are not members of the labour force (e.g. investors), registrations 
required for non-tax purposes, old/ inactive registrations. 
/2. Most employees in these countries are not required to file an annual return; however, employers in 
these countries are typically required to report details of income paid and tax withheld along with a 
relevant identification number for each employee. 
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Sources: OECD (2007:124) (OECD in Figures: Statistics on Member Countries (2005, 
Supplement 1), country survey responses, 2005 World population data sheet, CIA world fact 
book): IRB Annual Report (2006). 
 
 
 
As seen in Table 2.25, the USA recorded the highest number of individual taxpayers across the 
countries with 222.5 million taxpayers, followed by Japan, Spain and the UK. However, in terms 
of percentage of the total populations, Spain recorded the highest ratio with 88%, followed by the 
USA (76%), the UK (47%) and Japan (36%). Other countries such as Korea, Denmark and 
Malaysia recorded the lowest numbers of individual taxpayers in the range of less than five 
million. 
 
2.5.3 Unpaid taxes 
 
Table 2.26 illustrates a comparison among developed and developing countries in relation 
to unpaid tax in 2002 – 2004. Based on Table 2.26, it appears that Belgium, Greece, 
Mexico and Portugal had among the highest incidences of unpaid taxes from 2002 to 
2004 ranging from 38% to 55% while developed countries such as the USA, France, 
Germany, Netherlands and Japan recorded the lowest incidences of unpaid taxes over the 
years.   
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Table 2.26: Selected Data on Unpaid Taxes 2002 - 2004 
 Total year-end gross debt  
(incl. disputed debt) /  Debt cases  
Debt 
cases on  
net annual revenue collections (%)  COUNTRY  
     2002              2003               2004 
finalised in 
2004 
(000’s)  
hand at 
end-2004 
(000’s)  
Australia  9.3  8.5  8.1  1,474  1,497  
Austria  - 14.1  12.7  n.avail.  102  
Belgium  35.8  39.9  38.7  n.avail.  1,740  
Canada  8.3  8.7  9.0  531  794  
France  7.1  6.7  5.9  929  399  
Germany  5.3  5.3  4.8  n.avail.  3,788  
Greece  25.6  31.4  42.8  368  836  
Hungary  12.3  11.5  13.4  197  192  
Japan  5.6  5.1  4.4  1,866  4,370  
Korea  3.0  2.7  3.6  n.avail.  704  
Mexico  47.0  49.6  55.4  1,970  1,738  
Netherlands  2.9  3.4  3.0  n.avail.  250  
N. Zealand  6.1  6.7  6.2  456  256  
Poland  11.8  10.8  11.0  n.avail.  n.avail.  
Portugal  41.5  44.6  51.3  639  2,473  
Slovak Rep.  - 49.5  33.0  n.avail.  n.avail.  
Spain  7.9  7.8  7.8  3,625  2,142  
USA  5.9  6.1  6.2  12,580  26,429  
 
 Source: OECD (2007) page 120. 
 
2.5.4 Efficiency and administrative costs 
 
 
Table 2.27 illustrates a comparison between developed and developing countries in 
relation to aggregate administrative costs for tax administration functions in 2004. 
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Table 2.27: Aggregate Administrative Costs for Tax Administration Functions (2004) 
(All amounts in millions of local currency, unless otherwise stated) 
 
Aggregate 
administrative 
costs for all tax 
functions (incl. 
salaries)  
Total salary costs 
for tax functions  
Salary 
costs/aggre
gate 
administrat
ive costs 
(%)  
Total IT costs  IT costs/ 
aggregate 
administrati
ve costs (%) 
COUNTRY  
   2003           2004     2003           2004 2003   2004    2003        2004   2003    2004 
Australia  2,299.9 2,438.9 1,466.2 1,528.8 63.8 62.7  412.0 420.5 17.9 17.2 
Canada   3,164 2,946 n.avail. n.avail - - 366 370 11.6 12.6 
Japan  723,221 717,627 568,620 569,512 78.6 79.4  73,258 70,079 10.1 9.8 
Malaysia 6,767 6,432 5,543 5,987 81.9 98.0 3.76 4.75 0.05 0.07
N. Zealand  289 310 168 188 58.1 60.6  67 68 23.1 21.9 
UK   3,140  3,146  1,866 1,871 59.4 59.5  430 529 13.7 16.8 
USA  9,400 9,760 6,850 7,120 72.9 72.9  1,560 1,600 16.6 16.4 
 
                                Source: OECD (2007) page 110; IRB Annual Report (2004). 
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Table 2.27 indicates that in 2004, the UK recorded the lowest ratio of salary 
costs/aggregate administrative costs (SA) compared to other countries with 59.5%, a 
mere 0.01% increase from the previous year. Other countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand also recorded low SA ratios with 62.7% and 60.6% respectively in 
2004. The table also demonstrates that two Asian countries, Japan and Malaysia 
recorded the highest SA ratios, particularly Malaysia with 98% in 2004. The table 
also demonstrates a negative relationship between (SA) and IT costs/aggregate 
administrative costs (IA). Countries with high IA would have had low SA, for 
example New Zealand and Australia recorded among the highest IA and the lowest 
SA. 
 
 
2.5.5 Measures to promote compliance 
 
 
As discussed in Table 2.2, one of the main objectives of SAS is to promote 
compliance among taxpayers. Therefore, this section discusses the measures taken by 
SAS countries to increase compliance including enforcement and penalties, tax audits 
and tax education. 
 
 
2.5.5.1 Enforcement and penalties  
 
 
Table 2.28 illustrates a comparison between developed and developing countries in 
relation to enforcement, penalties and interest for non-compliance. 
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Table 2.28: Enforcement, Penalties and Interest for Non-compliance 
 
 Offence 
 Failure to file returns 
on time 
 
Failure to pay tax on 
time 
 
Failure to correctly 
report tax liability 
 
United 
States 
5% penalty for each 
month (or part of a 
month) during which 
there is a failure to file 
any returns, up to 
25%. 
Interest accrues from 
the return due date, or 
extended due date 
 
½% of the tax not paid, 
for each month (or part 
of month) it remains 
unpaid up to 25%. The 
rate increases to 1% per 
month where the 
account is in field 
status, and reduces to 
¼% where taxpayer 
enters into a payment 
agreement and makes 
payments in a timely 
way. The failure to file 
penalty is reduced by 
the amount of failure to 
pay penalty. 
 
The penalty ranges from 
20% to 75%, according 
to the seriousness of the 
offence. Interest on the 
penalty amount 
accrues from the return 
due date, or extended 
due date. Interest on the 
tax deficiency starts 
from the return due date 
without regard to 
extensions. 
Underpayment interest 
on the tax is in addition 
to the interest on 
penalty. On the penalty, 
interest accrues from the 
date of the notice and 
demand or the 
assessment date of the 
penalty. The interest rate 
on the underpayment 
varies according to the 
type of return. For 
individual returns the 
current rate is 7% 
(compounded daily), and 
for corporate it is 9%. 
 
Canada 5% of unpaid tax, plus 
extra 1% for each 
month of delay. 
 
Interest calculated 
according to average 
yield of 90 day 
Government of Canada 
Treasury Bill plus 4%. 
 
Penalty ranging up to 
50% according to the 
seriousness of the 
offence. 
 
Japan Penalty of 5% for 
voluntary filing: 15% 
filing as a result of tax 
audit. 
 
Until the date when two 
months have elapsed 
from the date following 
the specific due date for 
tax payment, either 
7.3% per annum or 
official discount rate on 
November 30 of the 
preceding year plus 4%, 
whichever is lower. 
Administrative sanction 
of 10-40% according to 
seriousness of offense. 
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After the date when two 
months have elapsed 
from the date following 
the specific due date of 
tax payment 14.6% per 
annum. 
 
New 
Zealand 
Penalty ranging from 
$NZ 50-500, 
according to the size 
of the taxpayers’ net 
income. 
 
Late payment penalty 
imposed at rate of 5% of 
tax payable, 
compounding at an 
additional 2% of unpaid 
tax and penalty for each 
subsequent month. 
 
Administrative sanctions 
ranging from 20% (not 
taking reasonable care) 
to 150% for serious 
evasion/fraud. For 
criminal evasion 
offenses, a fine of up to 
$NZ 50,000 or 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 5 years. 
 
Australia One penalty unit for 
up to 28 days late; 
each unit valued at 
$A110. Penalty 
increased to two and 
five units for medium 
and large taxpayers 
respectively. 
 
General interest charge 
imposed—calculated as 
the monthly average 
yield of 90-day 
Accepted Bank Bills 
plus 7% (daily 
compound). 
 
Penalty tax ranging from 
25% of tax payable (for 
failure to exercise 
reasonable care) to 
50/75% (for reckless or 
deliberate acts). Plus a 
general interest charge. 
 
United 
Kingdom 
PIT- fine of £100 is 
due if filed late; 
additional fine of £100 
if not filed within 6 
months of due date; 
further fine of 100% of 
tax due if not filed 
within one year; and 
further 
penalties possible 
 
Interest is due on all tax 
paid late at a variable 
rate. A surcharge of 5% 
is payable on any 
unpaid tax after 28 days 
from due date; a further 
5% surcharge is payable 
if still unpaid after six 
months. 
 
Additional tax up to 
100% of tax payable, 
according to the 
seriousness of the 
offense. 
 
Malaysia 10% of the total tax 
payable subject to a 
minimum of RM 300 
and a maximum of 
RM 5,000. 
60% of tax payable plus 
10% for every repeated 
offence but the total 
penalties increased are 
subject to a maximum 
of 100%. 
Fine minimum 
RM1,000, maximum 
RM10,000 plus a penalty 
of double the amount of 
tax which has been 
undercharged. 
 
Source : OECD (2007) page 95 and 96; IRB Annual Report (2005). 
 
According to Table 2.28, there are two types of penalties imposed due to failure to file 
tax returns across the countries. Countries such as the USA, Canada, Japan and 
107 
Malaysia impose a penalty percentage between 5% to 10% of the total tax payable, 
while New Zealand, Australia and the UK use the real value of money, for example 
New Zealand would have charged $NZ50-500 depending on taxpayer’s net income. 
Taxpayers who under report income would be charged with a penalty range from 20% 
to 75% according to the seriousness of the offence in the USA, Canada and New 
Zealand. A serious enforcement also implemented in New Zealand to under reporters 
is imprisonment of up to 5 years. 
 
2.5.5.2 Tax audits 
 
Table 2.29 illustrates a comparison between developed and developing countries in 
relation to tax audit activities in 2004. 
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Table 2.29: Tax Audit Activities in 2004 
(All monetary values in millions of national currency unless otherwise indicated) 
 
 
Tax audit activities (2004)   
COUNTRY  
Number of  
audits  
completed  
Value of  
assessments  
Value of  
collections 
on  
these  
assessment  
Value of  
assessments  
/total net 
revenue  
collections 
(%)  
Australia 94,530  4,870  2,873  2.27  
Greece  36,046  3,229  n.avail.  8.80  
Hungary 391,143  121,589  36,719  1.95  
Iceland  1,001  1,139  n.avail.  0.38  
Ireland  16,321  549.6  527.7  1.29  
Italy  228,337  101,138  n.avail.  23.27  
Mexico  66,428  3,763  n.avail.  0.49  
Netherlands 62,000  2,854  n.avail.  1.99  
New Zealand  31,500  785  n.avail.  2.07  
Spain  801,352  5,817  n.avail.  4.13  
Sweden  7,553  3,199  n.avail.  0.27  
Switzerland 9,100  n.avail.  387.5  n.avail.  
Turkey  153,881  11,398  n.avail.  11.28  
UK  439,349  2,559  n.avail.  0.69  
USA  261,000  20,099  13,145 /2  1.16  
 
Source : OECD (2007) page 116.  
 
Based on Table 2.29, Italy, Spain, the UK, the USA and Turkey registered among the 
highest number of audits undertaken in 2004. Spain recorded 801,352 audits 
throughout the year followed by the UK with 439,349 audits which derived EUR5.8 
billion and £2.5 billion respectively. Other countries such as Iceland, Sweden and 
Switzerland recorded low audits with less than 10,000 audits in 2004. Italy (Sweden) 
recorded the highest (lowest) percentage in terms of value of assessment/total net 
revenue collections with 23.27% (0.27%).  
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2.5.5.3 Electronic filing 
 
Table 2.30 illustrates a comparison among developed and developing countries in 
relation to the usage of electronic filing in 2004.                                                                                      
 
 
Table 2.30: Use of Electronic Services in Taxpayer Service Delivery 
 
 
 Electronic filing take-up 
rates in 2004 (%)  
COUNTRY Personal   Corporate    VAT 
  income        tax           
Australia 80 88 36 
Canada  48 1.5 11 
Finland  - 1 35 
France  4 26 2 
Germany  7 - 19 
Greece  4 - 51 
Hungary  2.5 3.4 6.1 
Iceland  86 99 16 
Ireland 62  18 13 
Italy   100 100 100 
Japan  n.avail. n.avail. n.avail. 
Korea  43 92 50 
Malaysia 19 23 n.avail. 
Netherlands 69 n.avail. - 
N. Zealand  56 67 9 
Norway 37 47 38 
Portugal  24 100 83 
Spain  23 17 21 
Sweden  15 - 3 
Turkey  30 72 70 
UK  17 1 0.2 
USA  47 1 n.applic. 
 
Source: Based on OECD (2007) page 129, IRB Annual Report (2004). 
 
 
Table 2.30 demonstrates that Italy, Iceland and Australia recorded the highest usage 
of electronic filing in 2004 for individual taxpayers. Interestingly, all personal 
taxpayers in Italy filed their tax return electronically while the majority of taxpayers 
(more than 50%) in Australia, New Zealand, Iceland and Netherlands chose to file 
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electronically. In contrast, in countries like France, Germany and Greece, the usage of 
electronic filing among individuals was low in 2004, at less than 10%.  
 
 
2.5.5.4 Tax education 
 
Table 2.31 illustrates a comparison among developed and developing countries in 
relation to tax education in 2007. 
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Table 2.31: SAS – Tax Education in Developed and Developing Countries (Year 
of Assessment 2007 Otherwise Stated) 
 
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
C
an
ad
a 
Ja
pa
n 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
N
ew
 
Z
ea
la
nd
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
 
C
am
bo
di
a 
Sr
i L
an
ka
 
M
al
ay
si
a 
Measure to 
promote 
principles of 
compliance: 
 
 
/ (q) 
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/ 
 
 
/ (k) 
 
 
/ (g) 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
 
 
/ 
Public 
relationship 
/ / (u) / /  / (l) / /  / / 
Tax 
education 
/ (r) / /   / / / / / / 
Taxpayer / (r)  /   / / /  /  
School 
children 
/ (r)  /   /  /    
Consultation / (s) / /   / (m) /     
Telephone   / /   /   /   
Facsimile  / /         
Etc (a) / (t) /    / (n) / (a)     
Guidance and 
exam/ tax 
pack 
/ (r) / (v) / / 
(aa) 
  / /   / 
Counseling   / (c) / 
(ab) 
       
Notes:  
/ = Applicable to certain countries  
 (a) other forms such as advance rulings 
 (c) at time of tax return filed 
(g) compliance programme 
(k) compliance model  
(l) working with community, family assistance  
(m) online consultation for SME 
(n) email 
 (q) NRP (National Research Programme)  
(r) mainly online education 
(s) taxpayer advocate service  
(t) in CD-rom 
(u) community volunteer Income Tax Programme to help tax-filer 
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(v) income tax and benefit package 
 (aa) service pack or brochures  
(ab) when returns with error and possible evasion 
 
Source: Based on Loo (2006), page 63; OECD (2007); Asian Development Bank 
(2008). 
 
 
Many countries, as seen in Table 2.31 have implemented a variety tax education 
programmes, for example, the USA, Japan, New Zealand and the UK have provided 
tax education to their school children. In addition, the majority of the countries in 
Table 2.31 except Pakistan and Bangladesh also have been educating their taxpayers 
via various programmes such as leaflets, information through television, radio and 
newspapers and websites. Other methods such as through telephone and facsimile also 
have been implemented in Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Cambodia in order to 
disseminate tax information to taxpayers.         
 
2.6  SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEM – A CONCLUSION  
 
In this chapter, the self assessment systems in both selected developed and developing 
countries has been discussed, including the missions and objectives (of SAS), 
principles, the problems of implementation,  as well as how SAS is practiced in a 
variety of tax regimes. Many countries have shifted from direct assessment to SAS for 
good reasons. Our review from both developed and less developed countries 
(discussed in 2.3), evidences that the key reasons for shifting to SAS is to increase 
efficiency41, allow taxpayers to declare income and calculate tax liabilities accurately 
                                                    
41 This means collecting high amount of taxes at the lowest costs for the tax authority. 
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and to speed up tax collections that ease government cash flow. A number of 
strategies to achieve effective SAS have been discussed: instilling public awareness in 
current tax laws, emphasising fines and penalties, increasing tax audits, and education 
programmes for school children (i.e. in the US) are among popular and effective ways 
used to maximise the effectiveness of SAS regimes. Central issues such as tax 
education and tax knowledge, the simplicity of the system, use tax audits and role for 
fines and penalties are among the main issues (other than compliance) that need to be 
resolved to achieve effective SAS operation. In addition, in keeping with current 
development in technology, there is a general move towards electronic filing as part 
of SAS in these countries. The next Chapter (3) discusses how SAS is implemented in 
Malaysia in detail as the core case used in subsequent chapters to explore particular 
research questions and provides comparisons among countries also illustrated at the 
end of the chapter. 
  
 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
MALAYSIAN TAX SYSTEM 
 
 
This chapter discusses the tax system and its administration in Malaysia, particularly 
focusing on how this relates to individual income tax. The background description of the 
country of Malaysia, its tax administration and types of taxes that form its fiscal system 
are discussed in the early part of this chapter. The details of individual income tax, 
including definition, classes of income, the formula to derive the amount of income tax 
payable and the penalties for non-payment are also elaborated upon. After discussing in 
detail other SAS tax regimes in the previous chapter, the later part of this chapter 
discusses the self assessment system  in Malaysia, highlighting the revenue impact on 
national income, a comparison between the previous Formal System (direct assessment) 
and SAS as well as the role of IRB in attaining SAS’s goals.  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION TO MALAYSIA 
 
Malaysia consists of thirteen states and two federal territories. Geographically, it is 
divided into two main areas known as the Peninsular of Malaysia and Borneo Island 
which includes Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan (more commonly known as East Malaysia). 
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Peninsular Malaysia is separated from the states of Sabah and Sarawak by the South 
China Sea. As seen on Figure 3.1, to the north of Peninsula Malaysia is Thailand while its 
southern neighbour is Singapore. 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of Malaysia and its states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.malaysia-maps.com 
 
Sabah and Sarawak are north of Indonesia (Kalimantan) in Borneo while Sarawak also 
shares a border with Brunei. With the land area of 329,758 sq km and a total population 
of 27.5 million, the largest ethnic groups in Malaysia are the Malays (65%), Chinese 
(23%) and Indians (9%)42 (Department of Statistic Malaysia, 2009). In Sabah and 
Sarawak, there are a number of ethnic groups, each with their own unique culture and 
                                                    
42 Other ethnics are 3%. 
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heritage including Iban, Kadazan, Dusun, Bajau etc. Malays who make up about 65% of 
the population are the predominant group, with Chinese, Indians and other ethnic groups 
making up the rest. Islam is the official religion but all other religions including 
Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism are freely practised. Malaysia is a federal 
constitutional elective monarchy. The federal head of state of Malaysia is the Yang di 
Pertuan Agong43 (the King) and the Head of Government is the Prime Minister. The 
system of government in Malaysia is closely modelled on that of the Westminster 
parliamentary system, a legacy of British colonial rule. Since independence in 1957, 
Malaysia has been governed by a multi-party union known as the Barisan Nasional44. 
Information about the geography, states and territories of Malaysia is central to this study 
because the analysis and results in Chapter 6 highlight the findings with respect to 
different states (refer section 6.5.2.5 and Table 6.11). 
 
 
 
3.2 TAX ADMINISTRATION 
 
Tax in Malaysia was introduced by the British into the Federation of Malaya in 1947 and 
was based on Heasman’s Report (Singh, 1999). Initially, the Income Tax Ordinance 1947 
was gazetted as the main act but was subsequently reformed and ultimately replaced by 
the Income Tax Act 1967 (ITA) which took effect on January 1, 1968. At that time, the 
                                                    
43 The Yang di-Pertuan Agong is elected to a five-year term among the nine hereditary Sultans of the Malay 
states; the other four states, which have titular Governors, do not participate in the selection.  
44 Barisan Nasional is an anchor ruling party which comprises of three largest race-based parties — the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) — each of which is sectarian in nature, though officially supporting 
racial harmony. 
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ITA consolidated the three acts of income taxation that had been enacted in 1947 and 
subsequently namely Sabah Income Ordinance 195645, Sarawak Inland Revenue 
Ordinance 196046  and Income Tax Ordinance 194747.  Before the formation of 
‘Malaysia’ in 1963, it was formerly known as ‘Tanah Melayu’48 which excluded Sabah 
and Sarawak. However on 16 September 1963, after inclusion Sabah and Sarawak, 
Malaysia emerged with thirteen states and two federal territories49.  Currently, the ITA of 
1967 is the main act to govern direct taxes in Malaysia including corporate and individual 
income tax. The Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri or the Inland Revenue Board (IRB)50 is 
the tax authority which administers direct taxes in Malaysia. Other than the ITA, the IRB 
is also responsible for administration, assessment, collection and enforcement of real 
property gain taxes51, petroleum taxes52 and stamp duties53. Royal Malaysian Customs 
(RMC) is the government agency responsible for administering the nation’s indirect tax 
policy. The core business is to collect tax and, in line with that, RMC’s vision is to be a 
respected, recognised and world class Customs Administration (www.customs.gov.my).   
 
 
                                                    
45 Applicable to Sabah only 
46 Applicable to Sarawak Only. 
47 Applicable to Peninsular of Malaysia only. 
48 It is a Malay language which means ‘Malay Land’. Tanah Melayu consists of eleven states and one 
federal territory.  
49 The states are Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, Johor, Pahang, 
Kelantan, Terengganu, Sabah and Sarawak while the federal territories are Federal Territory of Kuala 
Lumpur and Federal Territory of Labuan. 
50 It is under the Ministry of Finance. The Inland Revenue Board Act 1995 established on March 1, 1996 to 
replace Inland Revenue Department (IRD). 
51 Real Property Gain Tax 1975 
52 Petroleum Act 1967 
53 Stamp Act 1949 
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3.3 TYPES OF TAXES 
 
Taxes in Malaysia are divided into two main categories, namely direct taxes and indirect 
(consumption) taxes.  Direct taxes consist of corporate taxes and individual taxes while 
indirect taxes include sales taxes, import and export duties, excise duties and service tax. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates types of taxes in Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct taxes 
Indirect taxes 
(Consumption) 
Corporate taxes 
Individual taxes 
Import duties
Export duties
Service taxes
Excise taxes
Sales taxes
Administered by the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) 
Administered by the Royal Malaysian Customs (RMC) 
Real property gain 
taxes 
Petroleum taxes 
Stamp duties
Figure 3.2: Types of taxes in Malaysia 
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3.4 PERSONAL INCOME TAXES IN MALAYSIA 
 
This section discusses personal income taxes in Malaysia including the definition of what 
is meant by ‘individual’, the scope of charge, the types of income, the aggregate income 
and the total income. Personal or individual taxation in Malaysia refers to the 
administration of income taxes that are applicable to self-employed (SE) and salary and 
wage earning (SW) individuals.  Individual taxpayers in these two categories are required 
to file their annual tax returns based on income derived during each calendar year. 
Income of the SW group is normally derived from an employment and in certain cases 
they may also derive income from business sources54.  
 
3.4.1 Definition of individual 
 
Section 2 of the ITA 1967 defines an individual as ‘a natural person’ (p.15) which means 
that any ‘unincorporated body of persons (not being a company) including a Hindu Joint 
Family55 but excluding a partnership’ (p.12).  
 
3.4.2 Scope of charge 
 
With effect of the 1 January 1968, personal income tax in Malaysia was initially based on 
a ‘worldwide scope of charge’. However, due to problems such as various technical 
issues, determination of source of income, and equity and fairness, in 1974 the basis of 
                                                    
54 Limited to sole proprietor and partnership business. 
55 Hindu Joint Family means ‘what in any system of law prevailing in India is known as a Hindu joint 
family or corpacenary.’ (ITA 1967, p.14) 
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taxation was replaced by the ‘derived and remittance’ basis56 meaning tax is charged on 
income derived in Malaysia and on income remitted to Malaysia from outside the 
country57.  However, for non-resident taxpayers, income remitted to Malaysia from 
outside the country would not be subject to tax. The ‘derived and remittance’ basis was 
implemented until the ‘remittance’ basis was removed stage by stage from the year of 
assessment (YA) 1995. Starting from year of assessment (YA) 2004, all income remitted 
to Malaysia from outside Malaysia became exempt from tax58. With this amendment, the 
scope of charge currently is ‘derived basis’ for all taxpayers59.  
 
3.4.3 Types of income 
 
Section 4 ITA 1967 classifies an ‘income’ as: 
a) gains or profits from a business; 
b) gains or profits from an employment; (as detailed in Appendix 1) 
c) dividends, interest or discounts; (as detailed in Appendix 2) 
d) rents, royalties or premiums; (as detailed in Appendix 2) 
e) pensions, annuities or other periodical payments not falling under any of the 
foregoing paragraphs; (as detailed in Appendix 3) 
f) gains or profits not falling under any of the foregoing paragraphs. 
 
                                                    
56 However, income derived from sea or air transport operations, banking and insurance businesses of 
resident taxpayers continues to be charged to income tax on the ‘world scope basis’ (ITA 1967). 
57 Section 3, ITA (1967). 
58 Paragraph 28, Schedule 6, ITA (1967), amended as at 2008. 
59 Except for income derived from air or sea transport operations, and banking and insurance businesses. 
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 3.4.4 Basis year 
 
 
Section 2 of the ITA 1967 outlined that the basis year for an individual is ‘the calendar 
year coinciding with a year of assessment’ (p.40) i.e. the basis period for the year of 
assessment 2009 is 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009. However, tax returns which 
report income in year 2008 are submitted within the period of March 2009 and no later 
than 30 April 2009. Prior to the year 2000, income tax was assessed on the preceding 
year basis.  However, since then, and under the SAS, income tax is assessed on the 
current year basis. The basis of taxation of a person’s chargeable income for a YA is 
ascertained by reference to the income derived in the basis period for that YA.   
 
3.4.5 Aggregate income (see Appendix 4) 
 
 
Section 43 of the ITA 1967 describes that the aggregate income of a person for a year of 
assessment shall consist of the amount of all income stated in section 4 (a), (b), (c), (d), 
(e) and (f) as described in subsection 3.4.3 (refer Appendix 4 – Tax return BE Form 
2007). As noted in the Appendix 4 page 2, the aggregate income is the accumulation of 
income C1 to C6. 
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3.4.6 Total income (see Appendix 4) 
 
 
Section 44 of the ITA 1967 describes that the total income of a person for a year of 
assessment shall consist of the amount of aggregate income less donations and gifts as 
follows: 
 
1) Gift of money to the Government or approved institutions (Section 2); 
2) Gifts in terms of artefacts, manuscripts or paintings (Schedule 4 or 4B); 
3) Gift of money to library or for library facilities (Section 6); 
4) Gift of money of benefit in kind for disable persons (Section 
8,9,10,11,11A,11B or 11C); 
5) Gift of money or medical equipment to any healthcare facility approved by the 
Ministry of Health; 
6) Gift of money or contribution in kind for any approved sports activity; and/or 
7) Gift of money or contribution in kind for any project of national interest 
approved by the Minister of Finance. 
  
 
If a married taxpayer chooses joint assessment, the spouse’s total income is included in 
calculating the total income being assessed. In Malaysia married couples can opt to be 
assessed separately or under ‘joint assessment’. If separate assessment is chosen, each 
partner has to complete a separate tax return and make a payment separately. All income 
of a married woman is automatically assessed separately from her husband and no 
election is required. The wife however has to declare her income on the tax return issued 
to her husband just for record keeping; tax liabilities are not calculated in husband’s tax 
 123
return (refer Appendix 4). A separate notice of assessment will be issued to her in her 
own name.  
 
Prior to YA 2001, a wife whose husband had no income was given a personal relief of 
only RM8,000 if she elected for a separate assessment. On the other hand, a husband 
whose wife had no income and who was joint-assessed would enjoy a relief of 
RM11,000, that is, a personal relief of RM8,000 and a wife's relief of RM3,000. 
However, a full relief of RM11,000 was enjoyed by both husband and wife if the wife 
elected for a joint assessment under the name of the husband who had no income, that is, 
a personal relief of RM8,000 given to the husband who had no income and the wife's 
relief of RM3,000. 
 
With effect from YA 2001, in order to accord equal tax treatment to individual taxpayers 
without gender bias, it was proposed that a husband who elects to be assessed under the 
wife's name be allowed a personal relief of RM8,000 and a husband's relief of RM3,000. 
Consequently, the legal provisions regarding tax treatment for husbands and wives are 
amended such as: i) to allow the husband to elect for joint assessment under the wife's 
name and be given husband's relief; and ii) to give husband's rebate equivalent to the 
wife's rebate. (IRB Annual Report, 2001) 
 
In contrast, if joint assessment is made, the wife or the husband who both have total 
income can elect to have their total income combined, and can opt to be assessed either in 
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the name of the husband or the wife, if they find that the combination of income is more 
beneficial in terms of lower tax liability compared to a separate assessment. The husband 
can elect to be assessed jointly with only one wife. Legally, a husband can be married to 
up to four wives at the same time, however, for tax treatment, the IRB has ruled that only 
one wife (any wife) would qualify for joint assessment; the other wives have to be 
assessed separately (IRB, 2008). Where the husband or wife has no total income, the 
assessment will be raised on the spouse who has the total income. He or she will also be 
entitled to relief under a combined assessment.  
 
3.4.7 Chargeable income (see Appendix 4) 
 
 
Section 45 of the ITA 1967 explains how the chargeable income of a person for a year of 
assessment shall consist of the amount of total income less deductions as per Table 3.1: 
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Table 3.1: List of deductions for YA 2009 
 Deductions Restricted 
to 
RM 
1. Individual and dependant relatives 8,000
2. Medical expenses for own parents 5,000
3. Basic supporting equipment for disabled self, spouse, child or parent 5,000
4. Disabled individual 6,000
5. Education fees (self) for acquiring law, accounting, Islamic financing, 
technical, vocational, industrial, scientific or technological skills or 
qualifications 
5,000
6.. Medical expenses for serious diseases for self, spouse or child  
7. Complete medical examinations for self, spouse or child (restricted to 
RM500) 
 
5,000
8. Purchase of books/magazines/journals/similar publications (except 
newspapers and banned reading materials) for self, spouse or child. 
1,000
9. Purchase of personal computers for individual (deduction allowed once in 
every three years) 
3,000
10. Net deposit in Skim Simpanan Pendidikan Nasional  (total deposit in 2009 
minus total withdrawals in 2009) 
3,000
11. Husband/wife/Payment of alimony to former wife60 3,000
12 Disabled husband/wife 3,500
13 Child under 18 (each) 
14 Child 18 and above and studying in Malaysia (each) 4,000
15 Child 18 and above and studying overseas (each) 1,000
16 Disabled child 5,000
17 Life insurance and provident fund 6,000
18 Education and medical insurance 3,000
 
In order to qualify any deduction in Table 3.1, a taxpayer must make a claim. 
 
3.4.8 Tax payable (see Appendix 4 Part E) 
 
 
The amount of tax payable in a year of assessment is derived according to the following 
progressive rates as at YA 2009: 
 
 
                                                    
60 According to Islamic law, a husband is allowed to marry up to four wives in a time. However, as for tax 
treatment, only a wife will qualify for a relief. 
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Table 3.2 Individual tax rates YA 2009 
 
Category Range of 
chargeable income 
(RM) 
Computation 
(RM) 
Rates Tax  
(RM) 
A 0 – 2,500 First 2,500 0 0 
B 2,501 – 5,000 Next 2,500 1 25 
C 5,001 – 10,000 First 5,000 
Next 5,000 
 
3 
25 
150 
D 10,001 – 20,000 First 10,000 
Next 10,000 
 
3 
175 
300 
E 20,001 – 35,000 First 20,000 
Next 15,000 
 
7 
475 
1,050 
F 35, 501 – 50,000 First 35,000 
Next 15,000 
 
12 
1,525 
1,800 
G 50,001 – 70,000 First 50,000 
Next 20,000 
 
19 
3,325 
3,800 
H 70,001 – 100,000 First 70,000 
Next 30,000 
 
24 
7,175 
7,200 
I 100,001 – 150,000 First 100,000 
Next 50,000 
 
27 
14,325 
13,500 
J 150,001 – 250,000 First 150,000 
Next 100,000 
 
27 
27,825 
27,000 
K Exceeding  250,000 First 250,000 
For every next ringgit 
 
27 
54,825 
 
Source: 
http://www.hasil.gov.my/lhdnv3e/individuIndex.jsp?process=21000&menu=13&expandable=1&
pg_title=Income%20Tax%20Rate 
 
Total tax payable derived from Table 3.2 must be deducted with the following tax 
rebates: 
 
a) RM350 tax rebate for individual (if chargeable income no more than RM35,000) 
(Appendix 4 E4); 
b) RM350 tax rebate for husband/wife (if chargeable income no more than 
RM35,000 and payment of alimony to former wife being made – see Table 3.1 no 11. 
(Appendix 4 E5); 
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c) Amount of zakat61 payment. The amount of zakat rebate is restricted to the 
amount of total income tax. If the amount of zakat exceeds this amount, the 
exceeded amount cannot  be carried forward. (Appendix 4 E5); 
d) Fees/levy paid by a holder of an Employment pass, Visit pass or Work pass. 
(Appendix 4 E7). 
 
Then, total tax charged (Appendix 4 E9) is deducted with Section 110 – tax deduction for 
dividends (Appendix 4 E10), Section 110 - tax deduction for others (Appendix 4 E11) 
and Section 132  and 133 – tax relief for double taxation agreement (Appendix 4 E12 and 
E13). 
 
 
3.4.9 Penalty 
 
 
Table 3.3 illustrates penalties for individual taxpayers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
61 Zakat or ‘alm’ is a compulsory payment for Muslims only. In Malaysia, tax is compulsory but not Zakat. 
The rate is 2.5% of any income, shares, gold, properties and savings (www.zakat.com.my). Zakat amount is 
deductible (tax rebate) in the particular YA (refer column E6 in Appendix 4). It serves principally as the 
welfare (wealth or income distribution) contribution to poor and deprived people in the Muslim society. 
Unlike tax, it is administered by the state government. (IRB 2005, Public Ruling No. 5/2005) 
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Table 3.3: Penalties for individual taxpayers in Malaysia 2008 
 
 
Sections in 
Income 
Tax Act 
1967 
Offences Penalties 
112 Failure to furnish return or give notice of 
chargeability 
Fine minimum RM200, maximum 
RM2000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding six months or both 
112 Incorrect return (omitting and 
understating income, giving any incorrect 
information in relation to any matter 
affecting chargeable income) 
Fine minimum RM1,000, maximum 
RM10,000 plus a penalty of double 
the amount of tax which has been 
undercharged. 
114 Wilful evasion (omitting any income 
which should be included, making a false 
statement or entry, giving a false answer 
(orally or in writing) to a question asked, 
preparing or falsifying a  book of 
accounts or other false records, fraud) 
Fine minimum RM1,000, maximum 
RM20,000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding three years or both plus a 
penalty of treble the amount of tax 
which has been undercharged. 
115 Leaving Malaysia without payment of tax Fine minimum RM200, maximum 
RM2,000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding six months or both. 
116 Obstruction of offices (refusing to permit 
the Director General (DG) to investigate, 
failure to produce any documents, 
refusing to answer any question asked) 
Fine minimum RM1,000, maximum 
RM10,000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or both. 
117 Breach of confidence (communicating 
classified materials to another person, 
allowing another person to have access to 
classified materials) 
Fine not exceeding RM4,000 or to 
imprisonment not exceeding one year 
or both. 
118 Offences by officials  Fine not exceeding RM20,000 or to 
imprisonment not exceeding three 
years or both. 
119 Unauthorized collection Fine not exceeding RM20,000 or to 
imprisonment not exceeding three 
years or both. 
119A Failure to keep records Fine minimum RM300, maximum 
RM10,000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or both. 
120 Other offences Fine minimum RM200, maximum 
RM2,000 or to imprisonment not 
exceeding six months or both. 
 
Source: Income Tax Act 1967 (emended 2008) page 230 – 235. 
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Having discussed how personal income taxes in Malaysia are administered, the following 
section  illustrates the implementation of SAS in Malaysia in further detail. 
 
 
3.5 SELF ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (SAS) 
 
This section discusses how SAS is implemented in Malaysia, including measures taken 
by the IRB before implementation, the operation of SAS and some measures taken by the 
IRB to achieve the objectives of SAS. 
 
When Malaysian income tax emerged on January 1, 1968 Malaysia adopted an Official 
Assessment System (also referred to as the 'Formal System'), whereby taxpayers were 
required to submit their returns within 30 days from the date of service. Under the Formal 
System, taxpayers received their annual tax returns from the IRB, normally in March 
each year. It was the taxpayers' statutory duty to declare all the necessary particulars 
pertaining to their income and expenses for that particular year of assessment and to 
submit the completed returns to the IRB no later than April 30th, every year (IRB, 2009). 
Under the Formal System, it was assumed that taxpayers did not possess the necessary 
knowledge to compute their tax payable (Kasipillai, 2000). If a taxpayer was doubtful as 
to whether a certain expense was allowable under the ITA, he made a claim to be 
considered by the Revenue authorities. (In contrast, under self assessment, a taxpayer has 
to ensure that an expense is deductible before making a claim in his or her return). 
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The critics of the Formal System called for tax reform in Malaysia (Kasipillai, 2000). The 
economic turmoil starting in 1998 required the IRB to make an aggressive and extensive 
assessment of the current tax system (Formal System). The Formal System was 
considered to be time consuming, costly, inefficient and complex to administer (IRB 
Annual Report, 2001).  In addition, it encouraged late tax collection and placed a huge 
demand on human resource, hence the IRB had been flooded with documents and 
burdensome work since the introduction of the tax system in Malaysia in 1967 (IRB 
Annual Report, 2001). The nature of Formal system itself required a high volume of 
returns to be processed resulting in a  ‘backlog of unassessed cases, and delays in 
processing and issuing of returns’ (Loo, 2006: 25).  In addition, it was argued that the 
Formal System did not encourage voluntary compliance as compared with SAS. The tax 
responsibility gap between taxpayers and tax authorities was therefore not in balance. Not 
only that, a weak enforcement due to lack of qualified staff and shortage of staff to carry 
out assessment activities added to the administrative problems (Kasipillai, 2000, 2002). 
Thus, the introduction of SAS in 2004 for individual taxpayers was an effort to enhance 
tax administration in Malaysia in line with global tax administration enhancement. Some 
neighbouring countries like Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore had turned to SAS earlier. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the majority of countries agreed that the main objective of 
SAS is to increase voluntary compliance, to minimise administrative costs, to increase 
efficiency and to lessen the IRB burden. Some unethical attitudes emerged in the Formal 
System such as failure to lodge tax returns and some individuals not registering  as  
taxpayers (Kasipillai, 2002).  
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A new system, known as the Self Assessment System (SAS), was implemented stage by 
stage as follows: 
 
Table 3.4: Stage of implementation SAS 
 Taxpayers Group Year of 
Implementation 
Companies 2001 
Business, partnerships and cooperatives 2003 
Salaried individuals 2004 
          
        Source: Inland Revenue Board Annual Report 2004. 
 
The IRB have now experienced nine years of companies’ SAS (2001 to 2009). Analysis 
of the effectiveness of the SAS has shown a positive effect since its implementation. In 
year 2002 to 200662, tax collection from companies has increased at an average rate of 
12.78% per year (IRB Annual Report, 2002). The legislation, tax services and education 
and the enforcement of the law are some important elements which led to the 
improvement of tax collection for companies.  The computer system implemented to 
handle corporate and individual taxation has been fully developed and used from the 1 
January 2003 and 1 January 2004 respectively (IRB Annual Report, 2004). The IRB has 
more company information that can be used for the purpose of assessing the rate of 
compliance or assisting the government in drafting the country’s taxation policies. The 
new computer system has served its function relating to generating and processing of 
forms, assessment and collection, particularly for individuals. Further details about 
electronic services are discussed in 3.5.3. 
 
                                                    
62 Latest IRB report covers until year 2006. 
 132
Tax audits are among the new applications developed under the SAS. The computer 
application selects cases to be audited based on scoring systems produced through the 
analysis of data. The management of audit activity is also implemented using the 
computer system so that a more effective monitoring of audit activity can be done (IRB 
Annual Report, 2006). Table 3.5 illustrates the amount of contribution from direct taxes 
to the federal government’s revenue 2001 – 2006. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Contribution of direct taxes to the federal government’s revenue 2001 – 
2006 
 
Year Federal government’s 
revenue 
Collection of direct 
taxes* 
Percentage of 
federal 
government’s 
revenue 
 RM  
billion 
£ 
billion# 
RM  
billion 
£ 
billion# 
 
2001 79.57 12.34 41.79 6.48 52 
2002 83.52 12.95 44.23 6.86 53 
2003 92.61 14.36 42.82 6.64 46 
2004 99.40 15.41 48.63 7.54 49 
2005 106.30 16.48 56.85 8.81 53 
2006 120.63 17.70 65.74 10.19 55 
 
Source: IRB Annual Report 2006 , p. 20 
*The amount of direct taxes based on actual figures collected by the IRB before deducting  
allocation for tax refunds. 
# Exchange rates £1 = RM6.45 
 
 
 
According to Table 3.5, throughout the years, the average direct tax contribution in 
relation to the total federal government’s revenue is approximately 50%. Even though the 
ratio is steady, the amount of tax collection had increased particularly in 2005 (and even 
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bigger increase in 2006 too), a significant increase from RM48.63 billion to RM56.85 
billion. However, the upward trend (tax collection) did not occur in 2003, which showed 
a small decrease of approximately RM1.5 billion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates revenue collection by main direct tax category for the years 2001 
to 2005. Corporate taxes63 are the main direct tax contributor to the federal government’s 
revenue followed by petroleum tax; individual income taxes are third, with average 
                                                    
63 Corporate tax rate for YA 2001 - 2006 and 2008 is 28%. 2007 = 27%.  
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collection ranging from RM7.1 billion to RM10.2 billion throughout the years. A 
significant decrease happened in 2002, where amounts fell from RM8.4 billion to RM7.1 
billion. Starting from 2003 personal tax collection steadily increased every year and 
recorded the highest collection in 2005 at RM10.22 billion. While individual tax 
collection fell in 2002 (compared to 2001), corporate taxes recorded a significant increase 
from RM21.5 billion to RM27.4 billion. However, this figure decreased to RM23.2 
billion in the following year before maintaining the upward trend in the following years. 
 
3.5.1 Actions taken by IRB before implementing of SAS 
 
The challenge faced by the IRB to implement an SAS and accomplish their three fold 
objectives was more intense due to a large number of individual taxpayers and the 
various categories involved (employment, business–sole proprietor, cooperatives, trusts, 
societies and estates) that were to be brought into the SAS. In the year 2003, a year 
before SAS was implemented for individuals, the categories involved approximately 3.5 
million64 taxpayers as at year of assessment 2003 (IRB Annual Report, 2003). Being 
aware of this challenge, the IRB drafted an implementation strategy to ensure that SAS 
could be implemented smoothly and effectively. 
 
Throughout 2003, the year before SAS was implemented for individual taxpayers, the 
IRB persisted with the planning to draft tax compliance procedures in line with the SAS 
environment. Among the strategies introduced were: 
                                                    
64 Out of this figure, a total of 1,959,183 relate to  individual taxpayers. 
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1) Married woman were required to file the tax return separately beginning in the 
year of assessment 2004. 
2) Tax returns were still to be issued as a service to taxpayers and as part of IRB’s 
commitment to ensure all taxpayers did not neglect their responsibilities of 
reporting their income and expenses including deductions and rebates. 
3) The tax returns were redrafted in line with the need to self-compute tax and report 
it in the stipulated forms. For individuals, Form BE was introduced for residents 
who had employment income but did not have business income while Form B 
was created for residents who only had business income such as sole proprietors, 
partnerships and estates. Individuals who were non-Malaysian residents must file 
Form M. 
4) All tax returns were to be processed centrally at the IRB Processing Centre in 
Pandan Indah, Kuala Lumpur. This was to enable more efficient processing of 
forms. 
5) An extensive tax education programme with regard to the tax computations and 
filing procedures was implemented. 
 
 
3.5.1 Understanding the self assessment system 
 
For Malaysia, the introduction of SAS was an experiment at the early stages of 
implementation.. The introduction of a self assessment basis of taxation involved a 
substantial shift of responsibility on to the taxpayers in terms of their compliance 
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obligations. The obligation has now been placed firmly on them to understand the law 
and apply it to their own situation. It is up to the taxpayers to compute the tax that they 
owe, based upon the information they have provided on their taxable income and 
allowable expenditure. A notice of assessment65 is no longer issued under SAS. The tax 
return furnished by the taxpayer is deemed to be a notice of assessment. Under SAS, the 
IRB was now involved in an expanded programme of checking and verifying tax returns 
on a post-assessment basis, particularly by way of tax audits and the implementation of a 
penalty system to enforce compliance with tax law. This programme allows revenue 
officials to 'inquire into returns' in the six years that follow the filing period. They will 
also be able to demand a taxpayer produce records that they may 'reasonably require' for 
them to verify within a six years period (IRB, 2009). Table 3.6 provides a brief 
comparison of the Formal System procedures and the Self Assessment System 
procedures for individual taxpayers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
65 Also known as Form J. It contains all income, deductions, reliefs and total tax payable. 
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Table 3.6: A brief comparison on the Formal System procedure and the Self 
Assessment System for individual taxpayers. 
 
Activity Formal System 
 
Self Assessment System 
Filing  - The IRB will issue forms. 
- Taxpayers need to report 
income and other information. 
- Forms must be returned within 
30 days from the date of 
issuance. However, in normal 
practice it must be submitted no 
later than April 30, each year. 
- The taxpayers must produce 
documents such as income 
statements and receipts for 
claiming deductions. 
- The IRB will issue forms 
- Taxpayers need to need to 
report income and other 
information as well as 
computing what tax is payable. 
- Forms must be returned within 
30 days from the date of issue.. 
- The taxpayers need not produce 
other documents except 
dividend vouchers for 
repayment cases due to credit 
claims on dividends. 
Documents pertaining to 
computation of tax must be kept 
(for seven years) and only need 
be produced upon request by 
the IRB. 
 
Assessment - All forms received must be 
checked before raising the 
assessment. 
- The Director General raises the 
assessment and notice of 
assessment issued. 
- The Director General is deemed 
to have raised the assessment 
based on the taxpayers’ 
computation. The form is also 
deemed to be the notice of 
assessment. 
- Notice of assessment will not 
be issued. 
 
Payment of tax - The estimated tax must be paid 
in accordance with the notice 
issued by the Director General. 
- Tax which has been assessed 
must be paid upon the 
assessment notice being sent to 
the taxpayer. 
- Tax liability for individuals 
must be paid  either by 
instalments in accordance with 
the notice of instalments as 
stipulated in the Income Tax 
Act 1967 (normally through 
monthly salary deduction know 
as Scheduled Tax Deduction 
(STD)) or payment in full by 
cheque or direct deposit to 
IRB’s bank accounts. 
 
Compliance - Audit activities are mostly desk 
audits. 
 
- Audit activities will be carried 
out to ensure that taxpayers 
comply with all tax legislations. 
Field audits are made more 
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extensive so that IRB officers 
have better understanding of 
business activities and thus are 
able to implement provisions of 
the laws fairly.  
- Educating the taxpayers is also 
part of the audit objectives. 
 
Source: IRB Annual Report 2003 page 27. 
 
3.5.2  SAS – Contribution to total revenue 
 
In 2003, although nearly 3.5 million tax returns were assessed, they represented only 67 
per cent of returns lodged (IRB Annual Report, 2003). In the first year of SAS for 
individuals the IRB collected RM9.471 (£1.662) billion as compared to only RM7.572 
(£1.328) billion in the preceding year in which the Formal System was still in operation 
(IRB Annual Report, 2004). The IRB also reported that total income tax collections 
increased from RM29.1 (£5.1) billion in 2000 (under the Formal System) to RM41.7 
(£7.3) billion in 2001.  The increase was attributable to the implementation of SAS (IRB 
Annual Report, 2002). However, it is inevitable that the increase in income tax 
collections could have been at least partly due to other factors like the improved 
economic situation after the 1997/1998 economic crisis in Asia or it could have been that 
the taxes collected were based on estimated tax payable under the newly introduced 
current year basis of assessment, and the IRB might have had to refund the excess 
collections.  Although the significant increase in collection in 2001 (43.31%) was not 
empirically evidenced solely by the introduction of SAS, at least SAS had a positive 
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impact upon total revenue. Table 3.7 illustrates Direct tax collection pre and post SAS 
from 1998 to 2006. 
 
Table 3.7: Direct tax collection pre and post SAS (1998 – 2006) 
Period Year RM 
billion 
Increase
% 
 1998 29.97  
 1999 27.04 (9.78) 
 2000 29.16 7.84 
Post SAS 2001* 41.79 43.31 
 2002 44.23 5.84 
 2003** 42.82 (3.19) 
 2004*** 48.63 13.57 
 2005 56.85 16.90 
 2006 65.74 15.64 
                                      
 Source: IRB Annual Report 1998 - 2006 
    * SAS for companies begins 
       ** SAS for business, partnerships and cooperatives begins 
*** SAS for salaried individuals begins 
 
 
3.5.3 Measures taken by IRB to achieved SAS’s objectives 
 
 
SAS was a big endeavour for the IRB in the early stage of the process. The outcome of 
SAS would affect its credibility, capability and image. Junainah (2002) in her case study 
in northern part of West Malaysia (Sabah) found a multi-dimensional perception of SAS. 
The study was to identify taxpayers’ perceptions of SAS compared to the Formal System 
and found that the majority (68%) of taxpayers were ready and willing to accept the 
changes but were afraid of their capability to complete tax returns on their own. 
Moreover, the study also revealed that taxpayers argued it was the responsibility of the 
IRB to administer tax in Malaysia. They (taxpayers) thought that the IRB should do the 
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job (complete, calculating tax etc), not the taxpayers. However, the study was not a 
national study and the results could not be generalised. Thus to defend against people’s 
negative perceptions, the IRB implemented a number of measures in their attempt to 
successfully implement in SAS. The next section reviews these measures. 
 
The IRB has been implementing various programmes to enhance its capacity and 
credibility. Issues discussed in Chapter 2 such as tax education programmes, audits and 
investigations and enhancing the simplicity of tax returns and tax systems have all been 
considered. 
 
a) Improving voluntary compliance 
 
Based on the IRB Annual Report 2005 (p. 133), the IRB admitted that with the 
introduction of SAS, ‘the formal function of assessing tax has been reduced’ and the 
burden of tax has partly shifted to taxpayers. However, the significant reduction of 
assessment by the IRB does not necessary mean that IRB does not play a significant and 
important role in SAS. The process of ascertaining taxpayers’ compliance with current 
tax laws and legislations has become more crucial as the IRB has to ensure that taxpayers 
must constantly fully comply with tax laws. The IRB is continuously improving its 
mechanisms for increasing voluntary compliance. There are four main measures 
emphasised by the IRB: 1) street surveys, 2) tax audits66, 3) Schedular Tax Deduction 
                                                    
66 Under SAS, tax audits become main focus of IRB branches in order to prevent tax evasion. 
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(STD)67 audits and 4) investigations. ‘Street surveys’ is a programme carried out through 
visits by officials to premises in various locations in order to collect additional 
information, educate and provide advisory services, report cases fit to be selected as 
desks audits and external audits, enhance the development of Unit “Q”/Data Warehouse68 
and, finally, in order to broaden the government agencies’ access to information. The role 
of a street survey is to broaden the tax base by carrying out tax compliance checks in 
every business sector covering major business areas including night markets held on 
week days.. In 2006, IRB visited 83,207 premises compared to 74,829 in 2005 (2004 - 
60,848) (IRB Annual Report, 2005; 2006: 49). This represents an increase of 11.20% in 
the number of taxpayers’ premises reviewed. 
 
b) Expansion of tax base 
 
As the number of taxpayers increases, the amount of tax collected will almost certainly 
increase as well. Therefore, the IRB actively seeks to expand its tax base by identifying 
potential taxpayers via various means, including through street surveys, economic 
zoning, publicity, tax education, customer service programme and introduction of IRB’s 
Unit ‘Q’/Data Warehouse. Street surveys have increased the number of new registered 
business taxpayers significantly. In 2005, a total of 74,829 business premises were visited 
                                                    
67 Under STD, employers are encourage to deduct and remit the tax portion during their monthly salary 
payment according to The Income Tax Rules (Salary Deduction) 1994 which means taxpayers receive net 
pay after tax. The STD is similar to PAYE in the UK.  
68 This unit gathers all taxpayers’ information to ensure that information such as current address, 
demographic and history of income and tax payable is correct, and is specifically designed to manage 
taxpayer’s information systems and become part of an important database (IRB Annual Report, 2005). 
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and evaluated compared to 60,648 in 2004. As a result, 10,178 new files were 
successfully registered in 2005 compared to 8,704 in the previous year (IRB Annual 
Report, 2005). The establishment of Unit Q can facilitate the detection (non compliance 
indicators) mechanisms by providing taxpayers with current information and at the same 
time cross-checking the information provided by taxpayers. For instance, if any abnormal 
income or tax payable is detected from the checking the system will be instantly notified 
and actions such as fraud detection and investigations will be implemented accordingly. 
 
c) Customer service 
 
In accordance with IRB’s motto; “Helpful, friendly and satisfying”, various initiatives 
were developed, particularly to assist and facilitate individual taxpayers in fulfilling their 
tax obligations. Since SAS is highly reliant on taxpayers’ responsibilities and honesty, 
this kind of service is really important, helpful and could reduce the barriers between the 
taxpayer and the tax authority. Programmes such as SAS Education and Publicity69, and 
Taxpayer Service Months (TSMs)70 are continuously implemented in order to facilitate 
taxpayers, grow public awareness and also increase voluntary compliance. Since TSM 
began, encouraging responses have been received about its role in developing voluntary 
compliance – a total of 1,210,223 visitors were recorded in 2005 compared to 590,419 in 
2004 (IRB Annual Report, 2005). In addition to having such a good programme as TSM, 
IRB also expanded its customer service programme by introducing Revenue Service 
                                                    
69 Education and publicity was made through counters in shopping complexes, advertisements on 
television, newspapers  and radio (refer 3.5.3 (f)). 
70 TSM is held from February to June every year. 
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Centres (RSCs) in Perak, Selangor, Johor, Sabah (two centres), Sarawak (two centres) 
and Terengganu. These centres were set up to expand its services into smaller districts. 
Among the services offered at these RSCs are assessment and payment of stamp duty; 
taxpayers can also check their income tax status and obtain tax advisory services. 
 
d) Electronic services 
 
To speed up tax assessments and related processes, IRB has enhanced its collection 
system by upgrading the electronic service. To provide further assistance to taxpayers, 
IRB collaborates with various financial institutions like CIMB Bank71 (formerly known 
as Bumiputra-Commerce Bank Berhad) and Public Bank Berhad (PBB)72 so that 
taxpayers can pay their income tax over the counter or via online banking. In addition to 
these collecting agents, IRB is actively promoting the use of E-filing - one of the most 
prominent and important mechanisms in increasing efficient and error-free filing. In 
2006, a total of 113,543 taxpayers were using this system (IRB Annual Report, 2006). 
Currently, e-filing is only an alternative method of filing tax returns and no incentives are 
given to those taxpayers who use this service (other than greater convenience to the 
taxpayer as it is easy to use, accurate and secure). An integrated information system was 
developed in line with SAS. The system covers payment, processing assessments, 
amending assessments, auditing, investigating and detecting. These innovations 
(particularly as they are part of an electronic service) has positioned the IRB a step ahead 
when compared to neighbouring countries like Indonesia (IRB Annual Report, 2005) and 
                                                    
71 www.cimbbank.com.my  
72 www.pbebank.com.my . CIMB and PBB are leading financial institutions in Malaysia. 
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has made it competitive with developed countries like the UK and the US in 
administering tax systems especially in relation to SAS.  
 
The IRB has also developed a website that offers a range of information, particularly for 
direct taxes administration (www.hasil.gov.my). Taxpayers who have problems regarding 
their tax matters can browse the website to seek solutions or communicate with the tax 
officials through emails or telephone. On the front page of the website, taxpayers can 
browse four main features/applications regarding individuals’ tax administration, namely 
e-filing, e-payment, e-register (for new taxpayers) and a calculator to determine 
Scheduler Tax Deduction. Starting from 16 March 2009, taxpayers can also update their 
tax status (e.g total tax credited) through mobile phones (via short message services/text) 
by paying as low as RM0.35 (£0.06) per text message received.  
 
e) Enhancing taxation procedures and officers’ skills 
 
IRB realises that efficient tax procedures and competent staff are important in managing 
tax in a borderless environment (IRB Annual Report, 2005; 2006). Efficient tax 
procedures can increase productivity and the collection of direct taxes (Junainah, 2002). 
A continuous staff training and development programme can add to the value, quality and 
professionalism of the officials in dealing with various aspects of problems, cases and 
taxpayers’ behaviour. Recently, human resources development has become a major focus 
of IRB although it involves a significant cost. For example, in order to produce officers 
who are competent, professional, knowledgeable, skilled and disciplined, the IRB has 
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planned and implemented special training programmes which are conducted by 
professional consultants for officers at every level to ensure that they understand and are 
equipped to carry out their duties according to current needs (IRB Annual Report, 2006). 
In addition, training and courses are not limited to intermediate and high level officials, 
but also involve clerical and supporting staff so that each level of personnel has the 
confidence and knowledge to deal with their job and responsibilities. IRB also constantly 
evaluates other countries’ tax administration development to benchmark its capacity and 
ability.  
 
 
In 2006, a total of 77 officers attended various conferences, seminars, workshops and 
international training courses held in Brazil, Cambodia, France, Mauritius, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Taiwan, 
Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (IRB Annual Report 
2006: 56). The aim of the training programmes was to increase self confidence, develop 
leadership qualities, increase mental and physical resilience and instil high discipline 
among IRB’s staff.  In 2001, the IRB also introduced Basic Training for Voluntary 
Forces Cadets in collaboration with the 515th Voluntary Forces Regiment of the 
Malaysian Armed Forces. The training includes marching, physical exercises, shooting 
and self-defence (IRB Annual Report, 2006: 58). 
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Current taxation issues such as transfer pricing, e-commerce and cross-border trading 
have also called for attention. In such areas, IRB has employed foreign agencies to train 
its staff in collaboration with various international professional organisations such as the 
Federal Law Enforcement Centre (FLEC), Japan International Corporation Agency 
(JICA), Organization for Economic Coorporation and Development (OECD) and also 
The Commonwealth Association of Tax Administrators (CATA) (IRB Annual Report, 
2006). 
 
 
f) Taxpayer education 
 
 
Tax education or tax knowledge is important in SAS. The nature of SAS in Malaysia 
requires sufficient knowledge of current tax laws and regulations in order to compute 
actual income reporting, make true deductions and reliefs claims and finally, make 
accurate tax calculations and payments. Various programmes have been implemented by 
IRB to facilitate taxpayers so they can acquire and practise the knowledge. Unlike the US 
tax system which educates and exposes tax laws and regulations from a very early age 
through the implementation of school education programmes, (IRS, 2008), Malaysian tax 
authorities educate taxpayers informally via a ‘Guidebook73’ posted to taxpayers together 
with tax returns every year since SAS began. It is then up to the taxpayers’ initiative to 
read the booklet and complete tax returns accurately. However, sending only a booklet to 
taxpayers has raised some issues: does the booklet provide enough information to 
                                                    
73 It is a 79-page (in YA 2007) booklet containing various instructions and guides for individual taxpayers 
on how to complete tax returns, including tax rates tables, examples and how to calculate tax payable. 
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sufficiently ‘educate’ taxpayers? If taxpayers abandoned the booklet and incorrectly 
completed the tax return unintentionally, should they be penalised? If so, is it fair being 
penalised due to insufficient and improper education given by the tax authority?  
 
Also, the tax education programme is implemented through briefings, workshops and 
talks held at all IRB branches and focused on how to complete the tax returns.   Interview 
sessions on the topic of taxation were also aired on radio and television from time to 
time. Such sessions were used to disseminate the latest information to taxpayers as well 
as to other viewers and listeners. Publicity through television and radio is one of the most 
effective communication mediums for conveying tax information  (IRB Annual Report, 
2006). Apart from these measures, the IRB also organised essay competitions among 
school children and published articles in tax magazines and local newspapers (IRB 
Annual Report, 2006).  
 
Taxation information was also posted on the official IRB website (www.hasil.org.my) 
(refer 3.5.3 (d)) to allow the public access to basic information on taxation and to find out 
about the schedule of various service programmes provided by the IRB. In 2006, the 
number of visitors to the website increased by 28.75% and number of e-mails received 
from taxpayers increased by 52.42% (IRB Annual Report, 2006).  
 
 
In addition, the IRB also organised a road show from place to place to deal face to face 
with taxpayers. For instance, a counter is now open in shopping complexes and offices 
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within ‘taxpayers’ month74’. It seems that tax education, especially for individuals, is 
seasonal.  This potentially poses the need for a discussion regarding the effectiveness of 
tax education programmes conducted by the IRB. 
 
g) Enforcements 
 
Apart from discussions in section 3.5.3 (a) to (f), the IRB also designed their audits and 
investigations programmes to increase compliance in the SAS (IRB Annual Report, 2006; 
22). In 2006, 34,898 audits were performed compared to 25,600 audits in 2005. Total 
collections of RM1,206.09 million (2005: RM773.94, an increase of 55.84%) in 
additional taxes and penalties were recorded  (IRB Annual Report 2006: 22). 
Investigation and prosecution programs were further implemented through law 
enforcement with the aim of preventing tax non-compliance. Based on the IRB Annual 
Report 2006, in 2006, investigations brought in an additional RM903.23 million in taxes 
and penalties, compared to RM763 million in 2005. Enforcement programmes and 
actions were also taken against taxpayers who failed to settle their taxes on time. In 2006, 
the IRB recorded an increase in civil suits with 8,722 new cases filed in court and tax 
arrears amounting to RM771.08 million. 6,934 cases were resolved in 2006, involving 
RM631.85 million in tax collections. In extreme cases, taxpayers were prevented from 
leaving Malaysia until the amounts owed to the IRB were settled. In 2006, a total of 
12,414 taxpayers were charged under these provisions, compared to 10,933 in 2005, 
                                                    
74 Every year in April, for about  two or three days in each location, tax officials will open a counter to 
facilitate taxpayers who have questions and problems and will give advisory services to taxpayers. 
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which netted RM226.05 million in tax arrears compared to RM281.27 million the 
previous year. 
 
The measures discussed in this section are important in order for the IRB to achieve the 
objectives of SAS. Various programmes have been designed to increase compliance and 
revenue collections including expanding the tax base, placing an emphasis on customer 
services, developing electronic services and a website, staff development and tax 
education programmes. Enforcements such as audits and investigations, penalties, 
restrictions from leaving Malaysia and civil suits are also implemented by the IRB in 
order to prevent tax non-compliance activities and instil taxpayers’ awareness of their 
responsibilities. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
After 33 years75 of the Formal System, IRB has developed a good knowledge and 
experience of problems and solutions as well as developing tax laws, boosting tax 
collections and the most important and difficult part – building an understanding of 
Malaysian taxpayers’ behaviour. These lessons, of course, have been used as the main 
input to plan and put SAS into operation. The implementation and successful operation of 
SAS in Malaysia is a big challenge, not only to the IRB but also to taxpayers. Unlike the 
previous system, SAS requires taxpayers to have sufficient tax updates so that they can 
                                                    
75 From 1967 to 2000. 
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be good participants and complete their tax return accurately. Failure to do so results in 
fines and perhaps a prison sentence for at least three months (see Table 3.3).  
 
Some taxpayers are not satisfied with SAS because they have to do more tasks than 
previously (e.g. completing tax returns and calculating tax liabilities) while the IRB only 
collect the money and administer the process. Taxpayers may perceive that SAS no 
longer preserves the equity and fairness principles and may feel that the tax compliance 
costs have been fully shifted to them as taxpayers. However, from the tax administrators’ 
perspective, SAS is one of the best ways to manage the tax system in a country like 
Malaysia, which has a large number of individual taxpayers. Under the Formal System, 
tax officials spent a lot of time assessing tax returns while in SAS, the officials can focus 
on enhancing the tax audits and investigation procedures, as well as concentrating on tax 
reforms so that the tax collection will increase. If the redistribution income is efficient, 
high tax collection can be redistributed to taxpayers through certain projects (health, 
education, infrastructures etc) which can benefit the whole nation in return. Although 
there are different perspectives between tax administrators and taxpayers, in other 
countries such as the UK, the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand SAS has been 
implemented successfully. In Malaysia, since SAS began in 2001, the direct tax 
collection has increased tremendously (see Table 3.6) and the numbers keep on 
increasing in each reported year of SAS operation to date. In addition, various actions 
have been taken by IRB in order to improve the success of SAS. It is up to taxpayers to 
respond to any mechanism introduced by IRB. The taxpayers’ awareness, honesty and 
voluntary behaviour are the central success factors in SAS.  
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In the next chapter, I will discuss the previous literature in tax compliance, including how 
tax compliance is defined and the importance of tax knowledge in SAS, as well as the 
determinants of tax compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
LITERATURE REVIEW – TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses previous literature in tax compliance and is divided into three 
main sections. The first section covers the concepts and the definitions of tax compliance 
and tax non-compliance focusing at issues of tax avoidance and tax evasion. The second 
section addresses the role of tax knowledge in affecting tax compliance and examines 
what previous research has had to say about this relationship. The third section reveals 
tax compliance determinants from various perspectives. The third section is divided into 
five main parts starting with an economic perspective which discusses how people 
comply with tax laws including impacts of tax rates, tax audits and the current economic 
situation. The second part focuses on institutional factors, namely the role of the tax 
authority, referent groups i.e family and friends and also the simplicity of the tax system. 
Social factors such as perceptions of equity and fairness, political factors/ruling party and 
changes to current government policies that affect tax compliance are elaborated upon in 
the third part of this section (three) while individual factors including the level of tax 
knowledge and awareness of offences and penalties are discussed in the fourth part. The 
final parts discuss other factors which prior literature suggests impacts upon tax 
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compliance including age, gender, level of income and education. Results from previous 
studies are also analysed, summarised and compared with this study’s research questions.   
 
4.1 THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
 
This section begins with defining the concept of tax compliance  followed by tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. Tax compliance is a major problem for many tax authorities and it is 
not an easy task to persuade taxpayers to comply with tax requirements even though ‘tax 
laws are not always precise’ (James and Alley 2004: 29).  
 
The exact meaning of tax compliance has been defined in various ways. For example, 
Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) claimed that tax compliance should be defined as 
taxpayers’ willingness to obey tax laws in order to obtain the economy equilibrium of a 
country. Kirchler (2007) perceived a simpler definition in which tax compliance is 
defined as the most neutral term to describe taxpayers’ willingness to pay their taxes. A 
wider definition of tax compliance, defined in 1978 by Song and Yarbrough suggested 
that due to the remarkable aspect of the operation of the tax system in the United States 
and that it is largely based on self assessment and voluntary compliance, tax compliance 
should be defined as taxpayers’ ability and willingness to comply with tax laws which are 
determined by ethics, legal environment and other situational factors at a particular time 
and place. Similarly, tax compliance is also defined by several tax authorities as the 
ability and willingness of taxpayers to comply with tax laws, declare the correct income 
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in each year and pays the right amount of taxes on time (IRS, 2009; ATO, 2009; IRB, 
2009).  
 
Alm (1991) and Jackson and Milliron (1986) defined tax compliance as the reporting of 
all incomes and payment of all taxes by fulfilling the provisions of laws, regulations and 
court judgments. Another definition of tax compliance is a person’s act of filing their tax 
returns, declaring all taxable income accurately, and disbursing all payable taxes within 
the stipulated period without having to wait for follow-up actions from the authority 
(Singh, 2003). Furthermore, tax compliance has also been segregated into two 
perspectives, namely compliance in terms of administration and compliance in terms of 
completing (accuracy) the tax returns (Chow, 2004; Harris, 1989).  
 
Compliance in pure administrational terms therefore includes registering or informing tax 
authorities of status as a taxpayer, submitting a tax return every year (if required) and 
following the required payment time frames (Ming Ling, Normala and Meera, 2005). In 
contrast, the wider perspective of tax compliance requires a degree of honesty, adequate 
tax knowledge and capability to use this knowledge, timeliness, accuracy, and adequate 
records in order to complete the tax returns and associated tax documentation (Singh and 
Bhupalan, 2001). In line with Singh and Bhupalan, Somasundram (2003, 2005a and 
2005b) claimed that the wider perspective of compliance becomes a major issue in a self 
assessment system since the total amount tax payable is highly dependent on the levels of 
tax compliance this perspective reveals, although it is inevitable that tax authorities will 
seek to ‘influence’  the areas taxpayers have influence over determining to reduce the 
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risks of non-compliant behaviour they face otherwise e.g through continuously 
conducting tax audits of different sorts and other means such as various compliance 
influencing activities including tax education76. 
 
Some authors have viewed tax compliance from a different perspective. For example, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) described tax compliance as an issue of ‘reporting an 
actual income’ and also claimed that tax compliance behaviour was influenced by a 
situation whereby taxpayers have to make a decision under uncertainty (see also 
Clotfelter, 1983) i.e either taxpayers would enjoy tax savings due to under-reporting 
income or have to pay tax on the undeclared amount at a penalty rate which is higher than 
they would have paid had the income been fully declared at the correct time.  
 
In 2001, McBarnet suggested tax compliance  should be perceived in three ways, namely; 
a) committed compliance - taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes without complaint;  b) 
capitulative compliance - reluctantly giving in and paying taxes and  c) creative 
compliance – engagement to reduce taxes by taking advantage of possibilities to redefine 
income and deduct expenditures within the bracket of tax laws.  
 
Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) perceived degrees of tax compliance as ‘a special form of 
gambling’ (which, may involve likelihood of detection and penalties) (p. 295) which 
                                                 
76 However, it is an argument in SAS that tax audits could not be exclusively applied because the nature of 
SAS is shifting tax administrator’s burden to taxpayers. The tax authority presumes that taxpayers are 
honest, knowledgeable and compliant (Kirchler et.al,. 2008). 
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requires the tax authority to understand the factors underlying taxpayers’ decision to 
comply with tax laws (p. 295). 
 
Some literature like Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Lewis 
(1982) and Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) therefore characterise and explain tax 
compliance as the output of interrelation among variables including perception of 
equity77, efficiency78 and incidence (public finance views). Tax enforcement aspects like 
penalties and the probability of detection also relate to tax compliance while other labour 
market behaviour factors including an individual’s wages and tax bracket also contribute 
to tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007).  
 
Based on previous authors’ definitions, there are some keywords which were widely and 
interchangeably used to define tax compliance. For example, the words ‘obey’, ‘ability’ 
and ‘willingness’ (McBarnet, (2001); Andreoni et al. (1998); Kirchler (2007); Song and 
Yarbrough (1978); IRS (2009); ATO (2009) and IRB (2009)). Other keywords were also 
relevant in defining tax compliance  i.e ‘reporting all income’ (Alm, 1991; Jackson and 
Milliron,1986), ‘act of filing tax returns’ (Singh, 2003), ‘declare the correct income’ 
(IRS, (2009); ATO, (2009) and IRB (2009)). In addition, some authors also included 
‘timeliness’, ‘right amount of tax’ (Song and Yarbrough (1978); IRS, (2009); ATO, 
(2009) and IRB (2009); Ming Ling, Normala and Meera 2005) as part of their definitions.  
 
                                                 
77 The effective tax system will be less equitable when the wealthy evade a larger share of taxes than the 
poor (Andreoni et.al,.1998). 
78 Any effort of tax non-compliance affects tax efficiency and compliance costs. Unreported income 
distorts tax collection (Andreoni et. al., 1998; Lewis (1982). 
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The wider perspective of tax compliance was also illustrated in the definition provided by 
Andreoni et. al. (1998) in which they included the desired outcome as a result of 
obedience to tax laws – ‘to obtain an economic equilibrium’; Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) and Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) – ‘enjoy tax saving’ or ‘penalty’. Singh (2003) 
described tax compliance as voluntary action – ‘without having to wait for follow up 
actions from tax authority’. Apart from these, Song and Yarbrough (1978) included some 
factors of compliance in their definition i.e. ‘determined by ethics, legal environment and 
other situational factors’. 
 
Since there have been many empirical studies attempts have been made to define tax 
compliance, for the purpose of this study, (based on IRS, (2009); ATO, (2009) and IRB 
(2009); Alm (1991); Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Kirchler (2007)), tax compliance is 
defined as taxpayers’ willingness to comply with tax laws, declare the correct income, 
claim the correct deductions, relief and rebates and pay all taxes on time. 
 
In contrast with tax compliance, tax non-compliance is defined as taxpayer’s failure to 
remit a proper amount of tax, perhaps on account of the complexity or even 
contradictions in the tax legislation or tax administration procedure (Jackson and 
Milliron, 1986: Kesselman, 1994: Kasipillai and Jabbar, 2003). Non-compliance is also 
perceived as the failure of a taxpayer to report (correctly) the actual income, claim 
deductions and rebates and remit the actual amount of tax payable to the tax authority on 
time (Kirchler, 2007). Some studies also segmented income tax non-compliance into 
unintentional and intentional behaviour (e.g Loo 2006; Mohani, 2001; Kesselman, 1994 
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and Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Thus, in conclusion, based on Jackson and Milliron 
(1986): Kesselman (1994): Kasipillai and Jabbar (2003) non-compliance is defined for 
the purpose of this study as failure to comply with tax laws and/or report incorrect 
income, the act of claiming incorrect deductions, relief and rebates and/or paying the 
incorrect amount of tax beyond the stipulated time frame. 
 
 
As the literature cited has therefore shown, tax compliance is a wide concept and can be 
viewed from many perspectives, including public finance, economic, legal and also 
psychological. James and Alley (2004) suggested two contrasting approaches pertaining 
to tax compliance as a summary of the extremes of ways of defining this topic (as 
illustrated in Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1: Approach to tax compliance 
 
Tax Compliance First Approach Second approach 
Concept of: Tax gap 
100% compliance less actual 
revenue 
 
Voluntary 
Willingness to act in 
accordance with the spirit as 
well as the letter of tax law. 
 
Definition Narrower  Wider 
 
Tax compliance Economic rationality Behavioural co-operation 
 
Exemplified by: Trade off: 
1. Expected benefit of 
evading. 
2. Risk of detection and 
application of 
penalties. 
3. Maximise personal 
income and wealth 
Individuals are not simply 
independent, selfish utility 
maximisers. They interact 
according to differing 
attitudes, beliefs, norms and 
roles.  
Success depend on co-
operation 
 
Issues of: Efficiency in resource 
allocation 
Equity, fairness and incidence. 
 
Taxpayer seen as Selfish calculator of pecuniary 
gains and losses 
 
“good citizen” 
Can be termed the: Economic approach Behavioural approach 
 
 
Source: James and Alley (2004), p. 33. 
 
 
In this study, the primary focus is to explore further the second approach where 
behavioural aspect are emphasized rather than the more economically rationality 
approach. 
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4.1.1 Measures of national tax compliance 
 
 
This section discusses various proposed measures of tax compliance in individual country 
studies e.g India as well as tax compliance indexes of various countries. The indexes as 
suggested by some authors i.e Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), Torgler and Schneider (2005) and 
Torgler (2007) are useful in order to evaluate the degree of tax compliance problems 
throughout the world and provide a comparative measure of tax compliance behaviours. 
 
A study by Das Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee (1995) attempted to provide a tax 
compliance index in India from 1965 to 1993. They constructed an aggregate index in 
which tax compliance was defined to be the ratio of actual income tax revenue receipts 
(ITR) to the amount of taxes that were actually due to the government.  
 
According to Figure 4.1, the results indicate that the compliance index in India was 
declining from 1965 to 1974. The index slightly increased in 1975 until 1977 before 
sharply decreasing until 1984. The index then increased in 1985 before constantly 
decreasing until 1993. 
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Figure 4.1: Compliance Index in India 1965 -1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Das Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee (1995) p. 2,056. 
 
 
This study has a number of limitations. The proxy used for scrutiny assessment activity 
may be unsatisfactory and the compliance measure is biased, perhaps seriously, due to 
problems with the measurement of the average effective tax rate and non agriculture 
gross domestic product (NAGDP). Others therefore have developed alternative measures 
of compliance using better estimates of income distribution. 
 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) attempted to compare the level of compliance in thirty countries 
worldwide. In this study, tax compliance in each country is measured based on four 
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variables, namely situation of high economic freedom, importance of equity markets (the 
degree that each country depends on equity financing), effective competition laws 
(measured by the answer to survey questions) and high moral norms (violent crime rates 
is used as proxy), Economic freedom is measured by the 1999 summary economic 
freedom index from Gwartney, Lawson and Samida (2000). Economic freedom is viewed 
from seven areas including size of government; economic structure and use or markets; 
monetary policy and price stability; freedom to use alternative currencies and legal 
structure and security of private ownership. Riahi-Belkaoui used a regression equation to 
examine these tax compliance determinants. 
 
 
 Table 4.2 demonstrates the results. According to the table, it seems that the highest 
compliance rate is from developed countries like Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, the 
UK and Hong Kong79. Surprisingly, among the lowest compliance indexes are from 
European countries like Italy, Sweden, Turkey, Portugal and Poland. Although the results 
of Riahi-Belkaoui’s study are important, impressive and interesting the reliability is 
questionable because he was using subjective measurements and indicators which have 
different impacts on each country. However, it is has become a benchmark and key 
indicator tool in the tax compliance discipline. 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 The Hong Kong tax system is simple and relatively attractive (tax haven). SAS is not implemented in 
Hong Kong. 
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Table 4.2: Tax compliance index internationally 
Name of country Tax compliance80 
Singapore 5.05 
New Zealand 5.00 
Australia 4.58 
UK 4.67 
Hong Kong 4.56 
Switzerland 4.49 
USA 4.47 
Malaysia 4.34 
Chile 4.20 
Japan 4.41 
Norway 3.96 
France 3.86 
Canada 3,77 
Denmark 3.70 
Austria 3.60 
Finland 3.53 
Germany 3.41 
Thailand 3.41 
Philippines 3.83 
Netherlands 3.40 
Spain 3.29 
Taiwan 3.25 
Cambodia 3.12 
Indonesia 2.53 
Mexico 2.46 
Argentina 2.41 
Poland 2.19 
Portugal 2.18 
Turkey 2.07 
Sweden 1.91 
Italy 1.77 
  
Source: Riahi-Belkaoui (2004)  p. 138. 
 
Torgler and Schneider (2005) attempted to improve on the Riahi-Belkaoui study’s 
contributions to this field of knowledge, although limited their work to a single country 
analysis (Austrian) taxpayers’ attitudes toward paying taxes or ‘tax morale’. The authors 
suggest that Austria is an interesting country to investigate as there is a high degree of tax 
                                                 
80 Tax compliance is measured based on a scale from 0 to 6. A high score indicates higher compliance. 
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morale over time (p. 232). Their study was based on the World Values Survey (WVS) 
and the European Values Survey (EVS) data of 1990 and 1999. WVS (and EVS) is a 
worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change based on representative 
national samples. Tax morale was measured by the following question (p. 233): “please 
tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between: …Cheating on tax if you have the chance”, 
followed by a 10-scale index with two extreme points ‘never justified’ and ‘always 
justified’ (p. 233). Of 1,447 WVS and 1,497 EVS observations, the study suggested that 
Austrian taxpayers’ tax morale decreased between 1990 and 1999 although they note that 
tax morale in Austria was still high compared to in other European countries. Torgler and 
Schneider (2005) found that tax morale in Austria was influenced by societal variables 
such as trust, national pride and religiosity. They also found that if taxpayers perceive 
that tax evasion is a common phenomenon, their intrinsic motivation to contribute to the 
society decreases.  
 
In 2007, using the same method as Torgler and Schneider (2005), Torgler analysed the 
level of tax morale in transition countries and found that tax morale in East Germany was 
quite high, exceeding the tax morale in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) in both years. The details of the results are exhibited in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Tax compliance in transition countries 
 
Countries      Mean 
  1995-97 
East Germany  1.919 
   
Former Soviet Union   
Armenia  1.508 
Azerbaijan  1.634 
Belarus  1.518 
Estonia  1.560 
Georgia  1.760 
Latvia  1.379 
Lithuania  1.687 
Moldova  1.426 
Russia  1.663 
Ukraine  1.558 
Average  1.576 
   
Central and Eastern Europe   
Bulgaria  2.240 
Bosnia  2.172 
Croatia  1.309 
Hungary   
Macedonia  2.109 
Montenegro  1.749 
Poland  2.001 
Romania   
Slovenia  1.913 
Serbia  1.969 
Average  1.718 
   
 
Source: Based on Torgler (2007) p. 220. 
 
Previous studies (i.e. Das Gupta et. al., 1995; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004; Torgler, 2007) have 
shown that tax compliance indexes vary among countries. Although these studies have 
different approaches, variables, different tax laws and measurements, the coefficient 
provided by those studies is relatively important for future research and benchmarks. The 
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following section discusses tax evasion and avoidance as part of non-compliance 
activities. 
 
 
 4.1.2 Tax evasion and avoidance: exploring tax non-compliance further 
 
 
As discussed in section 4.1, tax non- compliance can be considered to be the opposite 
action or behaviour to tax compliance. This section discusses tax evasion and tax 
avoidance as examples of tax non-compliance activities which have negative effects on 
tax collections and tax compliance indexes as discussed in 4.1.1. James and Alley (2004) 
asserted that non-compliance is more than tax evasion and it is also includes some forms 
of tax avoidance. James and Alley define tax evasion as ‘the attempt to reduce tax 
liability by illegal means’ while tax avoidance is defined as ‘reducing taxation by legal 
means’ (p. 28).  Lewis (1982: 123) perceived tax evasion as ‘any legal method of 
reducing one’s tax bill’ and tax evasion is ‘illegal tax dodging’. Similarly, Kasipillai, 
Aripin and Amran (2003) perceived tax evasion as actions which result in lower taxes 
than are actually owed (p. 135) while tax avoidance, denotes the taxpayers’ creativity to 
arrange his tax affairs in a proper manner based on law and regulation (any provision not 
violated) so as to reduce his tax bill, and this is (or should be) acceptable in view of the 
tax administrator.  
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Kasipillai et. al. (2003), Lewis (1982), Webley (2004), Elffers, Weigel and Hessing 
(1987) and Andreoni et. al. (1998) express that non-compliance includes both intentional 
and unintentional actions. The latter of these are normally due to calculation errors and 
inadequate tax knowledge although there are other determinants.  
 
Lewis (1982) outlined two major distinctions in intentional tax evasion: 1) evasion by 
commission and 2) evasion by omission. Evasion by commission requires an action by 
taxpayer, for example claiming deductions or rebates which mean that if a taxpayer is 
making a false claim, he will get a tax saving (a commission on top of his evading 
actions). Conversely, evasion by omission is intentional and should be classified as 
seriously as evasion by commission (Lewis, 1982). This kind of evasion requires 
taxpayers to do nothing in the tax return (i.e miss something out deliberately); for 
example, one would not report his casual income or any cash-basis income. 
 
Based on the definitions and explanation of tax evasion and avoidance, Lewis (1982) 
asserts that the dividing line between evasion and avoidance still remains unclear.  Figure 
4.2 summarises tax non-compliance activities including tax evasion and avoidance.  
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Figure 4.2: Summary of tax non-compliance definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kim (2008) reports the degree of tax evasion for 59 countries and 47 countries according 
to two reports by World Economic Forum (WEF) and the International Management 
Development (IMD) respectively. The scale for WEF is from 1 to 7 and IMD is 0 to 10. 
The higher number signifies a lower level of tax evasion. Kim used eleven variables to 
measure tax evasion namely: 
 
1. price controls,  
2. public service,  
3. litigation against government,  
4. collected personal income tax,  
5. collected corporate tax,  
6. administrative regulation,  
Tax non-
compliance 
Unintentional 
Intentional 
Avoidance 
Evasion 
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7. GDP per capita,  
8. tax system,  
9. composition of government spending, 
10. effective personal income tax rate, and  
11. average corporate tax rate.  
 
Across the countries, a regression analysis of this data suggested that tax evasion is 
predominantly influenced by only six variables, namely price controls, public services, 
collected corporate tax, GDP per capita, tax system and the composition of government 
spending.  Table 4.4 illustrates the countries and their level of tax evasion as suggested 
by Kim (2008). 
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Table 4.4: Countries and their level of tax evasion. 
 
Countries Tax evasion 
(WEF) 
 
Tax evasion 
(IMD) 
Argentina 2.35 2.02 
Australia 3.93 4.76 
Austria 4.49 5.47 
Belgium 2.30 2.45 
Bolivia 2.24  
Brazil 2.34 2.52 
Bulgaria 2.64  
Canada 5.37 6.64 
Chile 5.38 7.00 
China 2.84 3.56 
Colombia 2.40 1.85 
Costa Rica 2.53  
Czech 2.79 2.54 
Denmark 4.19 5.43 
Ecuador 2.00  
Egypt 2.84  
El Salvador 3.37  
Finland 4.53 7.02 
France 3.29 5.44 
Germany 3.25 4.66 
Greece 2.30 2.09 
Hong Kong 5.19 768 
Hungary 2.68 3.06 
Iceland 3.59 4.19 
India 2.39 2.50 
Indonesia 2.85 2.70 
Ireland 3.88 4.84 
Israel 3.86 4.96 
Italy 2.35 2.67 
Japan 4.59 6.15 
Jordan 3.98  
Korea 2.88 3.06 
Luxembourg 478 6.57 
Malaysia 4.34 5.94 
Mauritius 3.84  
Mexico 2.41 2.50 
Netherlands 4.89 5.67 
New Zealand 5.27 7.18 
Norway 4.02 5.67 
Peru 2.96  
Philippines 1.95 2.39 
Poland 3.24 3.23 
Portugal 2.75 2.92 
Russia 1.74 0.66 
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Singapore  6.00 8.18 
Slovakia 2.62 2.94 
South Africa 2.54 2.53 
Spain 4.04 5.09 
Sweden 3.23 4.40 
Switzerland 5.02 6.66 
Taiwan 3.62 4.56 
Thailand 2.92 3.77 
Turkey 2.41 2.44 
Ukraine 1.99  
United Kingdom 5.52 6.03 
United States 4.96 6.22 
Venezuela 2.23 2.04 
Vietnam 2.50  
Zimbabwe  3.00  
  
 
Source: Kim (2008) p. 407. 
 
According to Table 4.4, it seems that tax evasion coefficients in Asian countries are 
similar to those in developed countries i.e Europe. For instance, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Japan, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and Denmark  have tax evasion 
indices of approximately 5.00 (WEF). The lowest (highest tax evasion) tax evasion index 
goes to Russia (WEF 1.74) while the highest (lowest tax evasion) tax evasion index 
belongs to Singapore (WEF 6.00).  
 
Comparing Kim’s results to Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), Kim’s could be considered to be 
more reliable and meaningful because he used variables that summarise the economic 
situation in those countries (i.e. political factors, price controls and GDP per capita). In 
addition, Kim also concluded that tax evasion across the countries is highly correlated 
with politics and tax administration. 
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In summary, this section (4.1) has reviewed previous literature to produce a definition of 
tax compliance for this research, explored how tax compliance may be measured in a 
country and outlined several discussions in relation to tax evasion and tax avoidance 
measurement. The next section discusses the importance of the role of tax knowledge and 
its effect on compliance.  
 
4.2. TAX KNOWLEDGE AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
 
This section discusses the importance and the role of tax knowledge, particularly in 
determining taxpayers’ attitudes towards taxation. A significant amount of literature from 
various countries, different approaches, a range of variables and findings are also 
discussed in this section.   
 
The influence of knowledge on compliance behaviour has been proven in various 
research (Mohamad Ali et. al., 2007). Harris (1989) divided tax knowledge into two 
aspects, namely, knowledge through common or formal education received as a matter of 
course and knowledge specifically directed at possible opportunities to evade tax. In the 
first case, the level of education received by taxpayers is an important factor that 
contributes to the general understanding about taxation especially regarding the laws and 
regulations of taxation (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). Previous studies have evidenced that 
general tax knowledge has a very close relationship with taxpayers’ ability to understand 
the laws and regulations of taxation, and their ability to comply with them (Singh, 2003).  
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Given evidence that tax knowledge affects understanding of taxpayers, an obvious next 
that has been raised by previous researchers (e.g. Singh, 2003; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; 
Harris, 1989) is whether enhancement of tax knowledge will increase tax compliance. 
Thus, the remainder of this section describes the relationship between tax knowledge and 
tax compliance. 
 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996: 387) claimed that ‘knowledge about tax law is assumed to be 
important for preferences and attitudes towards taxation. There is little research that 
explicitly considers how attitude towards taxation is influenced by specific knowledge of 
tax regulations’. The research done by Eriksen and Fallan has illustrated the importance 
of tax knowledge in a tax system, especially in a SAS. They suggested that fiscal 
knowledge correlates with attitudes towards taxation and tax behaviour can be improved 
by a better understanding of tax laws81. 
 
Eriksen and Fallan’s study is divided into three main parts. Firstly, the investigation is 
focused on taxpayers’ knowledge. Secondly, the research tries to reveal the overall 
impact of tax knowledge on tax compliance behaviour among individual taxpayers and 
thirdly, the research involves tax agents in order to determine their influence in 
determining taxpayers’ behaviour because in SAS, tax agents are assumed to be involved 
more in preparing, declaring and calculating tax liability on behalf of individual 
taxpayers than in the directly assessed system. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) attempt to 
determine the relationship between the level of tax knowledge and attitudes toward 
                                                 
81 This finding is in line with earlier research on this topic by Lewis (1982) 
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taxation; whether specific tax knowledge influences attitudes in general (not only tax 
attitudes) and investigates people’s behaviour toward traditional crime. The study was 
conducted through quasi-experiment with pre-testing and post-testing of two student 
groups in Norway. The control group comprised of students who were going to take 
marketing as an elective subject in the second year of their BA education whereas the 
other group (experimental group) consisted of students who had selected tax laws as an 
elective.  
 
The pre-test included 149 students; 102 students from the experimental group took tax 
law as an elective and 47 students from the control group took marketing as an elective. 
The post-test included 123 students; 94 students from the experimental group took tax 
law as elective and 29 students from the control group took marketing as an elective. Tax 
knowledge was measured in the pre-test and post-test using a score calculated from 12 
questions82 concerning tax allowances and tax liabilities. In the post-test, the researchers 
extended the questions to 28 in order to get a better picture of tax knowledge between the 
two groups.  
 
The researchers developed four constructs based on Schmolders (1970) and Lewis (1982) 
in order to operationalise the study; 1) attitudes to other people’s tax evasion (‘other’), 2) 
attitudes to one’s own tax evasion without identifiable victims (‘ethics’), 3) attitudes to 
other illegalities  with identifiable victims (’crime’) and 4) understanding of the fairness 
of the tax systems (‘fairness’).  
                                                 
82 Erikson and Fallan used  multiple choice questions in which in each question respondents had to choose 
either ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Do not Know’. Tax knowledge was measured based on the answers. 
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The result of the study suggested that tax knowledge has a positive correlation with 
perceptions of fairness, tax ethics and attitudes to others’ tax evasion. The result of the 
study supports the principle of attitudes being affected by better tax knowledge and 
demonstrates that it holds other attitude dimensions as well as the fairness of progressive 
tax which was studied by Robert et. al. (1994).  
 
The predominant result of this experiment is the strong influence (r = 0.30, p < 0.001 
two tailed t test) of increased tax knowledge on the respondents’ perceptions of the 
fairness of the tax system. The students’ perception of the fairness of the tax system 
increases as tax knowledge is improved.  
 
This result is in line with previous studies by Lewis (1982) where low tax knowledge 
correlates with negatives attitude toward taxation. ‘Tax attitudes can be improved through 
better tax knowledge’ (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996: 398) and thus this will in turn increase 
compliance and reduce the inclination to evade taxes. 
 
 Collins, Milliron and Toy (1992) however, produced a counter result in their study in the 
United States from a random mail survey of 700 households from telephone directories. 
Out of 220 usable responses, Collins et. al. found that tax knowledge and the level of 
education were negatively correlated with compliance behaviour. In addition, knowledge 
about tax law is assumed (by Collin et. al.) to be of importance for preferences and 
attitudes towards taxation. Nevertheless, there is little research that explicitly considers 
how attitudes towards taxation are influenced by specific knowledge of tax regulations 
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and their economic effects. A number of prior studies (e.g. Vogel, 1974; Spicer and 
Lundstedt, 1976; Song and Yarbrough, 1978; Kinsey and Grasmick, 1993) have taken 
into account the general level of education of the taxpayers as an additional variable, but 
this indirect method is based on the assumption that knowledge about taxation increases 
with the length of education, independent of the educational content. Since there are 
many people with less formal education or even those do not have any qualification, who 
have better knowledge about taxation than those with higher education qualification. 
Such indirect measurements do not therefore give a completely satisfactory answer to the 
issue of whether there is a connection between specific tax knowledge and attitudes 
towards taxation.  
 
Although there was a contradiction between the results of Collins et. al. (1992) and 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996), the result of Eriksen and Fallan’s study indicated that  a 
successful means of reducing tax evasion is to provide more tax knowledge to as many 
taxpayers as possible in order to improve their tax ethics and  perceptions of fairness and 
equity. Their result also implied that there is a strong suggestion that tax law and tax 
knowledge should be included as a ‘compulsory course in social science in the schools’ 
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996: 399).  
 
Lewis (1982) attempted to determine whether there is a connection between specific tax 
knowledge and attitudes during completing the tax return. His aim was to study any 
changes in the attitudes towards taxation that result from increased knowledge about 
taxation which might have a significant impact on tax compliance. Lewis argued that that 
 177
there is insufficient knowledge about tax regulations and this situation leads to negative 
economic effects (an increase in the tax gap).  
 
Furthermore, there also seemed to be considerable differences in the level of knowledge 
although the level of education remains the same. Moreover, there are no comparable 
experiments focusing on how better specific tax knowledge affects attitudes towards 
taxation as mentioned by Alm (1991), who presents a survey of experiments in tax 
compliance research.  
 
As SAS requires the full capability and competency of taxpayers’ knowledge; some 
aspects of attitudes towards taxation, such as tax ethics and their perceptions of the 
fairness of the tax system also have an influence on the inclination towards tax evasion 
(Jackson and Milliron, 1986). Consequently it is important to get more details about how 
these attitudes are influenced. For example, ‘teachers of tax law and tax planning are used 
to measure specific tax knowledge in the sense of the ability to calculate tax liabilities on 
income and wealth for different taxpayers in different situations especially in SAS. 
Specific tax knowledge combines information about tax rules with financial knowledge 
to make it possible to calculate economic consequences for taxpayers. Tax knowledge is 
not a clear construct, but attitudes towards taxation are an even more problematic term’ 
(Eriksen and Fallan, 1996: 389).  
 
Hasseldine and Hite (2003b) extended the tax compliance literature by testing goal 
framing in a tax compliance setting. Although this study does not specifically relate to tax 
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knowledge determinants as a whole, the variables used in this study addressed 
information about tax laws and inclination of behaviour, thus it can be argued to 
contribute to the findings in the tax knowledge literature particularly in relation to how it 
affects tax attitudes. They attempted to answer the main research question whether 
information about tax in a certain year of assessment (that is negatively or positively 
framed), affects tax compliance behaviour. The study focused on research framing 
introduced by Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) and Levin, Schneider, Lauriola and 
Gaeth,(2002).  
 
Levin et .al. (1998) and Levin et. al. (2002) proposes that there are three types of framing 
effects in the literature: 1) risky choice, 2) attribute framing and 3) goal framing. In risky 
choice framing, the outcome of some decision choice by the taxpayer may involve 
options with different risk levels. Attribute framing means that when a single attribute is 
framed, either positively or negatively, it will affect the whole item evaluation, i.e. tax 
compliance decision. This kind of framing is normally used in marketing research where 
the consumers may have their own perception of certain things regardless of the framing 
manipulation. The third frame is goal framing which means that how people perform 
(their behaviour in response to persuasive communication stressed by other party, i.e. 
referent group). Attribute framing and goal framing are different from risky choice 
framing because there is no risk element involved. 
 
The Hasseldine and Hite (2003b) hypothesised that; 1) taxpayers who read negatively 
framed persuasive communication will make different tax reporting decisions than 
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taxpayers who read an objectively positively framed advertisement, and 2) women will 
make different tax reporting decisions than men after reading persuasive communication 
regarding compliance behaviour. The method of the study was through mail survey as 
advocated by Dillman (1978). The dependant variable measured was whether the 
taxpayers would illegally omit the cash income as stated in the questionnaire and the 
control variable was the attitude of taxpayers to noncompliance.  
 
Out of 435 usable respondents, the results show that there were no significant differences 
between men and women on two demographics (age and household income) and on three 
tax reporting characteristics (last tax return outcome, and being either audited or 
questioned by IRS). The results suggest that the non-compliance scale is strongly 
significant as a covariate, confirming that attitudes to tax non-compliance strongly predict 
compliance behaviour and thus rejecting the first hypothesis. One conclusion of this 
study was that males were more persuaded by the negatively framed messages while 
females were more persuaded by the positively framed messages.  
 
Although the result of the study can be considered as convincing, nevertheless, this study 
does not compare the other two approaches of framing (risky choice framing and attribute 
framing). Levin et. al. (1998) mentioned that the research evidence for goal framing is 
less homogenous than other types of framing because of greater variations in 
operationalising goal framing.  
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A study in Malaysia conducted by Loo and Ho (2005) examined salaried individual 
competency in SAS but limited their sample to individuals who pay taxes in and prior to 
2003 and who are likely to pay taxes in and after the year of 2004. Tax knowledge was 
measured in terms of chargeable income, exemptions, reliefs, rebates and tax credits. By 
using a survey of 250 questionnaires83, the study concluded that although the respondents 
have tertiary education, their tax knowledge in relation to personal taxation was 
considered to be relatively low thus making them ‘incompetent and not ready to exercise 
appropriate compliance under self assessment regime’ (Loo and Ho, 2005: 53).  
 
Furthermore, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) suggested that a taxpayer should be given better 
tax knowledge to improve perceptions of fairness, tax ethics and attitudes to others’ tax 
evasion and thus suggesting that: 
 
“…a successful means of preventing tax evasion is to provide more tax 
knowledge to larger segment of society in order to improve tax ethics and 
people’s conception of the fairness of the tax system. “ 
“…it would be a step in the right direction to make teaching in tax law and tax 
knowledge a compulsory part of social science teaching in the schools.” 
 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996: 399) 
 
                                                 
83 A total of 106 usable questionnaires were used after excluding those who employed in banking, finance 
and insurance industries, professionals in accounting, tax, legal and corporate secretarial. The reason why 
these groups of respondents were excluded was to obtain a genuine finding as these respondents by virtue 
of the nature of their occupations require high levels of tax knowledge.  
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In conclusion, after taking into consideration findings from previous literature, it is clear 
that developing tax knowledge in taxpayers is an important element in operating a 
successful tax system – particularly one based on self assessment. Achieving an 
appropriate voluntary compliance level (which is one of the main objectives of a SAS as 
discussed in Chapter 3) could be achieved if taxpayers can complete the tax returns 
correctly and pay the right amount of taxes. Thus to realise the objectives of SAS, 
taxpayers need to be informed, well educated (particulalrly in tax matters), and their tax 
literacy level needs to be enhanced on a regular basis to keep their knowledge up to date 
and relevant. 
 
After reviewing the importance of tax knowledge more generally in determining tax 
compliance, the next section describes the determinants of tax compliance behaviour. 
 
4.3 TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
 
 
This section discusses the factors that may affect tax compliance according to the 
literature. Factors discussed were divided into five main parts, namely 1) economic 
factors (tax rates, tax audits and perceptions of government spending); 2) institutional 
factors (the role of the tax authority, simplicity of the tax returns and administration and 
probability of detection); 3) social factors (ethics and attitude, perceptions of equity and 
fairness, political affiliation and changes on current government policy, referent groups); 
4) individual factors (personal financial constraints, awareness of offences and penalties) 
 182
and 5) and other factors (age, income, level, culture, education, gender). The division into 
these categories is based on Kirchler (2007) and Loo (2006) in which they approached 
tax compliance from an interdisciplinary perspective which represents a wider 
perspective of tax compliance determinants compared to other researchers. For example, 
Kirchler (2007: 3) divided tax compliance determinants into five categories and the study 
was based on psychological and tax authority-taxpayers’ view namely, political 
perspectives, social psychological perspectives, decision making perspectives, self 
employment and interaction between tax authorities and taxpayers.  
 
4.3.1 Economic factors 
 
 
Economic factors in relation to tax compliance refer to actions which are associated with 
the costs and benefits of performing the actions (Loo, 2006: 96). Hasseldine (1993), Song 
and Yarbrough (1978) and Torgler and Schneider (2005) assumed that taxpayers are 
rational economic evaders who likely would assess the costs and/or benefits (tax savings, 
see Allingham and Sandmo (1972) of evasion. They would attempt to minimise their tax 
liability, for example, by intentionally under reporting their income and would enjoy tax 
savings if they were not detected by the tax authorities. On the other hand, they would be 
willing to pay more, including a penalty, if they were caught (Song and Yarbrough, 1978; 
Somasundram, 2005b; Torgler, 2007). In the following subsections, the tax compliance 
determinants associated with economic factors i.e tax rates, tax audits and perceptions of 
government spending are explored in more detail. 
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4.3.1.1 Tax rates 
 
 
This subsection discusses how tax rates influence taxpayers’ decision to comply with tax 
laws. Clotfelter (1983) claimed that “reducing tax rates is not the only policy that has the 
potential to discourage tax evasion” (p. 363) but the tax rate is an important factor in 
determining tax compliance behaviour although the exact impact is still unclear and 
debatable (Kirchler, 2007:114). Clotfelter also suggests that there was a significant 
relationship between tax rates and evasion due to tax rates being used  as an instrument 
that can be manipulated for policy goals in particular. Raising marginal tax rates will be 
likely to encourage taxpayers to evade tax more (Whitte and Woodbury, 1985; Ali, Cecil 
and Knoblett, 2001; Torgler, 2007)  while lowering tax rates does not necessarily 
increase tax compliance (Trivedi, Shehata, and Mestelmen, 2004; Kirchler, 2007) This 
uncertainty and conflicting issue (for example reducing tax rate to increase compliance) 
has attracted the attention of tax researchers aiming to come up with more certain and 
concrete evidence of the impact of tax rates on evasion.  
 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) previously attempted to find a relationship between actual 
income, tax rates, penalty  and investigation and tax evasion using  statistical modeling. 
Allingham and Sandmo concluded that taxpayers may choose either to fully report 
income or report less, regardless of tax rates. Tax rates appeared to be insignificant in 
determining tax evasion. However, a study in 1980 by Tanzi used an econometric model 
to explain the relationship between marginal tax rates and evasion. By using aggregate 
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data in the United States, he illustrated that tax rates were positively correlated with tax 
evasion according to his data. 
 
Other economic models of rational compliance decisions however, perceived that tax 
rates have a mixed impact84 on tax compliance or predict that increasing tax rates will 
increase compliance behaviour (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008). In contrast with 
Allingham and Sandmo, various studies found that increasing tax rates encouraged non-
compliant behaviour or produced mixed findings (see Pommerehne and Wech-
Hannemann, 1996; Park and Hyun, 2003). Porcano (1988) claimed that tax rates have no 
effect on tax compliance while most experimental studies found that increasing tax rates 
leads to tax evasion (Alm, Jackson and Mckee, 1992; Friedland et .al., 1978; Park and 
Hyun, 2003).  
 
Since the impact of tax rates was debatable (positive, negative or no impact on evasion), 
Kirchler et. al. (2008) and McKerchar and Evans (2009) suggested that the degree of trust 
between taxpayers and the government has a major role in ascertaining the impact of tax 
rates on compliance. When trust is low, a high tax rate could be perceived as an unfair 
treatment of taxpayers and when trust is high, the same level of tax rate could be 
interpreted as contribution to the community (Kirchler et. al., 2008).  
 
In summary, evidence suggests tax rates have mixed impact on tax compliance i.e 
decreasing tax rates does not necessarily always increase compliance (Kirchler et. al., 
                                                 
84 Increase in tax rates might have positive or negative impact on evasion. 
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2008) and increasing tax rates will not necessarily always decrease compliance behaviour 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). The following subsection discusses how tax audits 
influence tax compliance. 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Tax audits 
 
 
Tax audits, audit rates and prior audit experience have been ambiguously discussed in 
relation to tax compliance. Some studies claimed that audits have a positive impact on tax 
evasion85 (See Jackson and Jaouen, 1989; Shanmugam, 2003; Dubin, 2004). These 
findings suggest that in self assessment systems, tax audits can play an important role and 
their central role is to increase voluntary compliance. Audits rates86 and the thoroughness 
of the audits could encourage taxpayers to be more prudent in completing their tax 
returns, report all income and claim the correct deductions to ascertain their tax liability. 
In contrast, taxpayers who have never been audited might be tempted to under report 
their actual income and claim false deductions.  
 
Butler (1993) also found that tax audits can change compliance behaviour from negative 
to positive. These findings complement the Witte and Woodbury (1985) and the Beron, 
Tauchen and Witte (1988) studies.  Witte and Woodbury in their study of small 
proprietors found that tax audits have a significant role in tax compliance. They did not 
empirically test individual taxpayers, thus left open room to conduct research in this area. 
                                                 
85 Meaning that taxpayers who have been audited by a tax authority at same point will be more compliant 
following the audit. 
86 Audit rates are calculated based of number of tax returns audited divided by number of tax returns 
accepted by tax authority. 
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While Butler (1993) and Witte and Woodbury (1985) found significant results, Beron et. 
al. (1988) found a contradictory result. They reported that audits did not significantly 
correlate with evasion for all groups they studied. Audits were found to be more effective 
in inducing taxpayers to over claim deductions rather than encouraging them to correctly 
report actual income. (Beron et. al., 1988) 
 
Another study by Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1987) estimated the determinants of income 
tax reporting as a function of audit rates using state-level, time-series and cross-section 
data from the Annual Report of the IRS for the years 1977-1985. They found that higher 
audit rates often have a positive impact on income tax reporting but one that varies by 
audit class and one that is not always statistically significant. The study also found that 
there is a spillover effect from tax audits; that is, taxpayers who are not themselves 
audited pay more in taxes when audit rates increase.   
 
From another point of view, Evans, Carlon and Massey (2005) studied the tax 
compliance of small and medium size enterprises (SME) in Australia. Their objective 
was to examine the relationship between record keeping practices of SMEs and the 
potential exposure to tax compliance problems. The study hypothesised that low tax 
compliance among SMEs might better encourage the tax authority to increase audits and 
investigations. This study involved 129 small business owners, 130 tax practitioners and 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) auditors. Using mail surveys, this study found that audit 
history, including frequency, audit outcome and the type of audit of small business 
owners has a significant indirect impact on tax compliance (in terms of record keeping). 
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The result also evidenced that the primary objective of the small business owners doing 
their record keeping is tax compliance related rather than part of their management of 
their business. Thus, as the audits investigations increase, many SMEs will make more of 
an effort at proper record keeping.   
 
In summary, previous studies have evidenced that tax audits play an important role in 
increasing voluntary compliance. Audits rates and the thoroughness of the audits could 
potentially encourage taxpayers to be more prudent in completing their tax returns. The 
next subsection describes the impact of perceptions of government spending on 
compliance. 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Perceptions of government spending 
 
 
Studies on the relationship between the specifics of actual government spending and tax 
compliance, particularly on tax evasion, are very limited. Logically, taxpayers, and 
especially those who pay high amounts of tax, will be sensitive to what the government 
spends their money on. Although there is limited empirical evidence, it is reasonable to 
assume that taxpayers will tend to evade tax if they perceive that the government spends 
tax money unwisely. However, in most developed countries like the United Kingdom 
which implement Pay as You Earned (PAYE), it is quite difficult to evade much of their 
tax libility as deductions are made at source for the majority of many taxpayers’ 
liabilities. Unlike the United Kingdom, in other countries where PAYE is not as 
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extensively used, taxpayers have a larger opportunity to under report their income and 
therefore pay less tax.  
 
Lewis (1982) suggests that attitudes should be examined for the degree to which they are 
a product of myth and misperception. He argued that when myths and misperceptions are 
replaced by knowledge, a change in attitudes towards taxation will occur even if the 
taxpayers' basic ideology and values remain unchanged and the tax law is unchanged. He 
also claimed that misperception probably plays a major role shaping fairness evaluations. 
Meanwhile, Roberts, Hite and Bradley (1994) also suggest that attitude to one's own tax 
evasion (tax ethics), and attitude to other people's tax evasion are important. If the 
government is wisely spending the national revenue, for example for basic facilities like 
education, health and safety and public transportation, it is likely that voluntary 
compliance will increase. In contrast, if taxpayers perceive that the government is 
spending too much on something considered unnecessary or unbeneficial to them then 
taxpayers will feel betrayed and attempt to evade. 
 
In summary, the government should prudently spend taxpayers’ money because the way 
in which the government spends the money produces different levels of compliance. 
Taxpayer’s perceptions are potentially important in determining their compliance 
behaviour.  
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4.3.1.4 Summary 
 
This subsection discusses tax compliance determinants from an economic perspective, 
discussing results of previous studies that have suggested that tax rates, tax audits and 
perceptions of government spending have influenced taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. 
The next subsection demonstrates tax compliance determinants explored from an 
institutional perspective, including the simplicity of tax administration and probability of 
detection. 
 
4.3.2 Institutional factors 
   
 
While taxpayers are influenced by their pure economic concerns either to evade or not to 
evade taxes, evidence suggest that institutional factors also play an important role in their 
compliance decisions. Institutional factors discussed in this section include t taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the efficiency of the tax authority/government, the simplicity of the tax 
returns as tax system more generally as well as the probability of being detected. 
 
4.3.2.1 Role (efficiency) of the tax authority/government 
 
 
A for many aspects of tax compliance, there is a debate in the literature as to how the 
effective operation of the tax system by the tax authorities influences taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour as researchers from different countries have been unable to 
achieve agreement about this issue which appear to differ from country to country. 
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Therefore different countries have proposed and develop different solution to the 
relationship between taxpayer compliance and their operation of the tax system. In the 
US for example, the IRS views tax non-compliance as a big challenge as the tax gap has 
increased tremendously in the last few decades. In 1976, an Internal Revenue Service 
report estimated under reported income was $75 to $100 billion - about 7% to 9% of 
reported income (IRS 1979a: 11)87. While Guttman (1977)88 and Fiege (1979)89 estimated 
that in reality it was probably higher than this. Guttman (1994)90 revealed that in 1993 the 
tax gap in the US was more than $170 billion (around 70% to 126% increase compared to 
the IRS estimate in 1976).  
 
In Belgium, the total amount of tax evaded was estimated at 20% of income tax 
(Hasseldine, 1993) while across the US, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden, surveys 
revealed that one quarter of respondents admit that they deliberately under-report their 
income (Hasseldine, 1993).  
 
The role of the tax authority in minimising the tax gap and increasing voluntary 
compliance is clearly very important. Hasseldine and Li (1999) illustrated this, placing 
the government and the tax authority as the main party that need to be continuously 
efficient in administering the tax system in order to minimise tax evasion. The 
government plays a central role through designing the tax systems itself, and the specific 
enforcement and collection mechanisms (Hasseldine and Li, 1999: 93). Furthermore, 
                                                 
87 Cited in Clotfelter (1983). 
88 Cited in Clotfelter (1983). 
89 Cited in Clotfelter (1983). 
90 Cited in Hasseldine and Li (1999) 
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Roth et. al. (1989) suggested that in order to increase compliance, maximise tax revenue 
and be respected by taxpayers, a government must first have an economical tax system, 
which is practicable91; they must discourage tax evasion and not induce dishonesty; they 
must avoid the tendency to dry up the source of the tax and should avoid provoking 
conflict and raising political difficulties; they should also have a good relationship with 
the international tax regime.  
 
A recent study conducted by Richardson (2008) also suggested that the role of a 
government has a significant positive impact on determining attitudes  toward tax. His 
study attempted to investigate the determinants of tax evasion across 47 countries 
including the USA, the UK, Argentina, Thailand, Canada, Chile and Brazil. Richardson 
also suggested that the government should increase their reputation and credibility in 
order to obtain trust from the taxpayers.  
 
In summary, although previous studies could not provide conclusive results on the 
measurable impact of the efficiency of the government on compliance, however, 
researchers from different countries have discussed  this issue and some authors have 
describe how the role of government in inducing tax compliance is important and 
relevant in self assessment systems (see Richardson, 2008; Hasseldine and Li, 1999). The 
next section discusses the impact of the simplicity of tax returns and administration on 
compliance. 
 
                                                 
91 The government have suitable powers (assessment and collection) to administer the tax system . 
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4.3.2.2. Simplicity of tax returns and administration 
 
As tax systems have become increasingly complex over time in many developed 
countries, complexity has become an important determinant of tax compliance behaviour. 
The main feature of SAS is self-completed tax returns which require at least a reasonable 
level of simplicity because taxpayers come from various backgrounds, with differing 
levels of education, income and most importantly levels of tax knowledge. In helping 
taxpayers to complete the tax returns accurately, the tax authority should have come up 
with a simple, but sufficient, tax return. The information required in the return must be at 
minimum level and be readily available from taxpayers’ business and personal records.  
 
Denmark, Canada and New Zealand are the leading countries that have introduced 
simplified tax returns by reducing the number of pages to facilitate and increase 
voluntary compliance among taxpayers (Mohani, 2001: Mohani and Sheehan, 2003, 
2004). In the UK for example, the HMRC has, in recent years tried to present more 
simplified tax returns that ordinary people can understand better. In 2007, the tax return 
was accompanied by a 35 page guide on how to complete the tax return and that did not 
even include the 8 extra pages of notes that also needed to be considered by some 
taxpayers (HMRC, 2009). The form and the accompanied guide has now been simplified 
to facilitate taxpayers, in particular by computerising this process so that only context-
sensitive details are needed as the taxpayers complete their returns. This significantly 
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simplified the range of guidance the taxpayer is exposed to, keeping it to the necessary 
minimum.  
 
Silvani and Baer (1997) discuss the importance of the tax authority having a simple tax 
return and system from the taxpayers’ point of view. Although the word ‘simple’ carries 
multiple interpretations, at least the majority of taxpayers require that the tax return 
should be as simple as possible. The tax authority may assume its tax return is simple and 
easy to complete but it may not be from the taxpayers’ point of view. Therefore, it is 
good practice, before the final version is delivered to taxpayers, to ensure that ‘pilot’ tests  
have taken place first so that the tax return is really as simple and easy as it can be.  
 
In addition, Silvani and Baer (1997) added that simplifying the tax return will encourage 
taxpayers to complete the tax return on their own rather than employing a tax agent and 
thus reducing compliance costs. From another point of view, previous studies have 
evidenced that complexity of reporting requirements has a high association with errors 
detected by audits (Long 1988). This finding (by Long) of course is perhaps to be 
logically expected by tax authorities. If many errors are detected in tax returns and the 
same errors happen every year by different taxpayers, it means that the wordings or the 
sentences of the format in tax return may be at least partly to blame. Slemrod (1989) 
makes a similar point to Long (1988) in that he believes that a simple tax return and 
simpler tax regulations will increase tax compliance especially in a self assessment 
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system because taxpayers do not have to spend much time in ascertaining the accuracy of 
the returns and calculating their tax liabilities.  
 
As the tax regulations and laws in most countries are amended almost every year as part 
of annual budget process, the current regulations might be no longer relevant in the 
future. For example, tax rates, personal allowances, deductions, rebates and taxable 
income are usually different each year. This situation will encourage taxpayers to make 
mistakes. Simplifying tax administration is important because it can facilitate efficient 
and enhanced administration and reduce costs (Mohani, 2001; Bird, 1998; Silvani and 
Baer, 1997). Thus, non compliance in terms of inaccurate tax returns is not only caused 
by taxpayers evasive behaviour (either intentional or unintentional), but may also be 
because of the tax authority’s mistakes or weaknesses in developing and designing the 
systems.  
 
Interestingly, Richardson (2008) in his study extending studies by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) 
and Jackson and Milliron (1986), found that out of seventeen variables tested across 45 
countries (including age, gender, education, fairness, culture and religion), complexity is 
found to be the most important determinant of tax evasion (p. 164). He therefore 
concluded that ‘a more simple tax system and administration can reduce tax evasion’ 
(p.165).  
 
In summary, as the main feature of SAS is self-completed tax returns and taxpayers come 
from various levels of backgrounds, therefore, simplifying tax returns and administration 
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potentially could help taxpayers to complete their tax returns accurately and increase 
compliance. The next subsection describes the relationship between the probability of 
detection and compliance. 
 
4.3.2.3. Probability of detection 
 
 
Compliance in respect to the probability of detection92 has received attention from many 
researchers. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) claimed that taxpayers will always declare 
their income correctly if the probability of detection is high. Probability of detection 
plays a significant role in reporting behaviour as taxpayers will declare everything if they 
perceive that they will be one of the auditees in that particular year (Riahi-Belkaoui, 
2004; Richardson, 2008). Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (1998) investigated the 
relationship between the probability of being audited and the taxpayers’ responses. The 
experiment93 indicated that taxpayers’ behaviour varied with respect to level of income 
and the probability of being audited played a significant role in determining taxpayers’ 
evasion behaviour. However, the direction of the relationship (positive or negative) was 
not clearly stated by Slemrod et. al. (1988).  
 
The Slemrod et. al. result was also supported by Andreoni et. al. (1998) who found that 
prior audit experience and continuous contact (relation) with the tax authority influenced 
                                                 
92 The degree or probability rates is defined as the number of tax returns audited divided by total tax returns 
received by the tax authority. 
93 Using taxpayers’ tax returns for two years to compare the differences in reported income, deductions and 
tax liabilities. Random sampling was used.  
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and increase compliance among taxpayers. Conversely, Young (1994) and Slemrod et. al 
(2001) found that probability of being audited again was negatively correlated with 
compliance behaviour.  
 
Bergman (1998) investigated tax compliance behaviour in Argentina using two 
approaches; 1) the measures to enhance commercial taxpayers and 2) extensive 
campaigns and audits which will increase the probability of detection among individual 
taxpayers. The results suggested that as the number of audits and the probability of 
detection increased, taxpayers are encouraged to comply with tax laws and accurately 
report their income. This suggests that unintentional evasion may occur rather than 
intentional evasion (p. 63). He also claimed that the lack of audits and investigations 
implemented by tax authorities in the 1980s in Argentina had driven taxpayers to behave 
‘recklessly’. Moreover, as taxpayers were aware that they would not be detected due to 
lack of investigations, they incorporated more complex tax evasion strategies and less 
traceable documentations so that they could pay less tax. Findings by Bergman are 
consistent with the theoretical proposition that the fear of detection influences the level of 
compliance behaviour, suggesting that the evaders take precautionary measures when the 
perceived risk of detection is high. Findings from Bergman (1998) have also evidenced 
that probability of being detected plays a significant role in inducing compliance 
behaviour although Young (1994) and Slemrod et. al. (2001) contradicted this.  
 
A recent study by Eisenhauer (2008), investigated tax compliance determinants 
particularly in terms of ethical preferences and risks aversion (high or low audit 
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probability) using three major data sources: survey, audits and experiments, across the 
United States.  The study concluded that individuals who are self employed have greater 
opportunity to evade than other groups, especially in light of the low probability of audits 
they face coupled with less third-party withholding of their income tax liabilities. The 
study also suggested that due to increased  evasion across the USA, tax audits have 
become more important as a way of minimising tax non-compliance However, the 
importance of the audit programmes was not solely determined by individuals who are 
self employed taxpayers (as suggested by this study); other groups of taxpayers (for 
example employees) might provide different results and interpretations.  
 
In summary, different levels of probability of detection provide different degrees of 
compliance. For example, a high probability of detection potentially increases 
compliance (see Bergman, 1998; Eisenhauer, 2008), although some authors found 
contradictory results in some circumtances (i.e. Young, 1994: Slemrod et. al., 2001).  
 
4.3.2.4 Summary 
 
 
This subsection  discusses tax compliance determinants from an institutional perspective, 
where previous literature has evidenced that the role of tax authority, the simplicity of tax 
returns and administration as well as the probability of detection are likely influences on 
taxpayers’ behaviour. The next subsection demonstrates tax compliance determinants 
from a social perspective including ethics, perceptions of equity and fairness and changes 
to government policy. 
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4.3.3 Social factors 
 
 
Tax compliance determinants from a social perspective relates to taxpayers’ willingness 
to comply with tax laws in response to other peoples behaviour and their social 
environment (i.e the government, friends and family members) (Torgler, 2007). On the 
other hand, Kirchler (2007) suggested that social factors should be viewed in a broader  
sense than Torgler’s perspective; this includes the psychology of the taxpayers. The 
factors discussed in this section are therefore ethics and attitudes toward tax compliance, 
perceptions of equity and fairness, changes to current government policy and referent 
groups. 
 
4.3.3.1 Ethics and attitudes toward tax compliance 
 
In a tax system which is based largely on voluntary compliance (such as a SAS), the 
taxpayers’ standard of ethics is ‘extremely important’ (Song and Yarbrough, 1978: 442). 
Song and Yarbrough (1978) conducted a survey study in the United States; the objective 
was to investigate the tax ethics of taxpayers by emphasising and answering the 
following questions: 1) How high or low was the level of the taxpayers’ ethics? And 2) 
What are the factors impacting tax ethics?  
 
The survey was conducted in a university town (in eastern North Carolina) with over 
11,000 university students, more than 600 faculty members and other related university 
staff and family members. The city selected could not be used as representative of the 
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whole population of North Carolina, however, the city does have one major characteristic 
which tends to distinguish it from the conservative, rural, character typical in other areas 
in North Carolina: the university-environment population make it closer to the national 
patterns in terms of level of education and demographic factors like age, gender and 
income. Although this area of the sample (the university town) does not represent the 
whole population of the United States and thus no generalizations could be made about 
national populations even in the USA, the researchers believe that the findings  generally 
could produce some ‘indication of tax knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of taxpayers 
in general’ (Song and Yarbrough, 1978: 443). 
 
Song and Yarbrough also suggested that due to the remarkable aspect of the operation of 
the tax system in the United States (that it is largely based on self assessment and 
voluntary compliance), the willingness to comply with tax laws is determined by ethics, 
legal environment and other situational factors at a particular time and place. Song and 
Yarbrough (1978) also indicated that the average taxpayers’ ethics scores 60.3 on a scale 
of 100 and 21 percent of taxpayers had a negative level of tax ethics regarding taxation. 
Song and Yarbrough labeled this measurement as “barely passing” (p. 451).  They were 
afraid that with the level of tax ethics suggested it had become a disease ‘seriously 
threatening the moral fiber of society and the viability of the democratic system’ (p. 451). 
The study also brought attention to the fact that deterioration of tax ethics in the future 
may occur due to an increase in the tax burden if the tax law did not get simpler and 
fairer. 
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Ethics are a subjective continuum and the level of ethical behaviour is heavily reliant on 
how people perceive the behaviour being considered (Ajzen, 1988). Studies on tax 
psychology which predicts people’s behaviour using the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(TRA) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) was first introduced by Fishbein and 
Ajzen (1975) and Ajzen (1991).These theories attempt to predict people’s behaviour 
based on their intentions. It is assumed that ethics encourage individuals to act according 
to them and a taxpayer with a negative attitude towards tax evasion tends to be less 
compliant (Kirchler et. al., 2008).  
 
Surveys conducted in Germany (Schmolders, 1960, 196494) reported that tax evasion was 
committed by approximately half of the respondents. On the other hand, only one-third 
perceived tax evaders as criminals. Orviska and Hudson (2002) and Trivedi, Shehata and 
Mestelmen (2004) found a significant (but weak) relationship between tax evasion and 
ethics. Elffers, Weigel and Hessing (1987) earlier found that ethics, attitudes and moral 
beliefs impacted upon tax compliance behaviour according to their psychological model 
of tax compliance.  
 
The evidence clearly shows various attitudes towards taxation, such as tax ethics and the 
fairness of the tax system and that these have an influence on the inclination towards tax 
evasion (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). It is consequently important to get more details 
about how these attitudes are influenced. Roth et. al. (1989) identified two primary 
                                                 
94 Cited in Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl (2008) 
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factors in taxpayer compliance, namely financial self interest95 and moral commitment. 
Individuals comply with tax laws because it is in their own financial interests to minimise 
their tax bill, but also because of their perceived moral obligation to obey tax laws. Roth 
et. al. (1989) validates that there was a consistently positive relationship between moral 
commitment and compliance behaviour. Roth et. al.’s (1989) finding seems to theorise 
that ethics have a positive effect on compliance behaviour, more so than financial self 
interest. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) claimed that the best predictor of a person’s 
behaviour is ethics, but argued that this link can be disrupted by the passage of time, 
unforeseen events or new information. In addition, low involvement behaviours are likely 
to be based on few, weakly-held or possibly unstable views.  
 
In summary, as suggested by previous studies (see Kirchler et. al., (2008); Trivedi et. al. 
(2004); Orviska and Hudson (2002); Jackson and Milliron (1986)), attitudes and ethics 
remain important in determining evasion behavior. Based on Ajzen (1991) the theory of 
reasoned action or the intention to evade will encourage a taxpayer to behave negatively 
toward taxation and thus attempt to under-report income. On the other hand, attitudes 
towards the tax authority are also important as tax attitudes and ethics generally depend 
on perceived use of the money collected by the government (Kirchler et. al., 2008). The 
following subsection discusses the influence of perceptions of equity or fairness on 
compliance. 
 
 
                                                 
95 Which assumes individuals maximise their expected utility by reporting an income that balances the 
benefits of successful evasion against the consequences of detection. 
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4.3.3.2 Perceptions of equity or fairness 
 
As earlier mentioned by Smith (1776), one of the main principles of the taxation system 
design is equity or fairness, which can be perceived via two dimensional views – 
horizontal equity (people with the same income or wealth  brackets should pay the same 
amount of taxes) and vertical equity (taxes paid increase with the amount of the tax base). 
The driving principle behind vertical equity is the notion that those who are more able to 
pay taxes should contribute more than those who are not. 
 
Wenzel (2003) suggested three areas of fairness from the taxpayers’ point of view (social 
psychology): 1) distributive justice (viewed as the exchange of resources i.e. benefit and 
cost); 2) procedural justice (viewed as the process of resource distribution) and 3) 
retributive justice (viewed as the appropriateness of sanctions when norm-breaking 
occurs). 
.  
In distributive justice, an individual is concerned about the fairness of their actions, and 
wants to be treated in relation to his merits, efforts and needs (Kirchler et. al., 2008). If he 
feels that his tax burden is higher than other people within the same income group, his tax 
compliance probably decreases more widely at group levels; taxpayers want a fair 
treatment of their group relative to other income groups. If a specific group perceives that 
their tax liability is higher than other groups, then tax evasion might occur among the 
group members (Spicer and Becker, 1980). At a society-wide level, tax compliance is less 
likely if the perception is held that the tax system is unfair; wide scale tax evasion is 
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likely to occur (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Barjoyai, 1987). In contrast, if the society 
perceives that the tax system is equitable and fair, voluntary compliance is expected to 
increase. 
 
With regard to procedural justice, the main elements for perceived fairness are neutrality 
of procedures used, trustworthiness of the tax authorities, and the polite, dignified, and 
respectful treatment of taxpayers as individuals or groups. (Tyler and Lind, 1992). 
Taxpayers expect that tax authorities will provide sufficient information about the tax law 
and regulations so that they can complete their tax return as accurately as possible. It is 
argued therefore that increased information about tax law and regulations can increase 
fairness perception and compliance (Wartick, 1994). Retributive justice, unreasonable 
and intrusive audits and unfair penalties lead to stressful and dissatisfied taxpayers 
(Spicer and Lundsted, 1976). Unfavorable retributive justice perceptions could lead to 
non compliant behaviour and consequently increase tax evasion and inflate the tax gap.  
 
Spicer and Becker (1980) examined the relationship between fiscal inequity and tax 
evasion. An experiment (simulation of completing a tax return) of 57 University of 
Colorado students, revealed that high income groups (“high-tax group”96) had the highest 
percentage of tax evasion cases compared to other groups (“low tax and medium tax 
group”). Variables like perceived relative tax rates, gender mean tax resistance score, age 
and income correlated significantly with tax evasion. Furthermore, they also suggested 
that tax evasion increases (decrease (this doesn’t seem to make sense – why increase and 
                                                 
96 “High tax group” refers to those participants who were told that their tax rates were higher than average.  
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then decrease?)) when taxpayers perceive fiscal inequity (equity) because they feel to be 
victimised by an imbalance of income redistributions.  
 
In summary, the beneficiaries of income equity and what forms of inequity are likely to 
affect evasion behaviour are still unclear and debatable based on results of prior research. 
The perceived fairness of the tax system also has an influence on the inclination towards 
tax evasion (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Richardson, 2008). In the next subsection, 
changes to current government policy with regard to tax compliance are discussed. 
  
4.3.3.3 Changes to current government policies. 
 
Political stability and the ruling government party in a country might play a significant 
role in determining tax evasion behaviour. For instance, if an individual favours the 
current ruling government party, he might choose to be compliant because he believes 
that the government is trusted, efficient and equitable. Conversely, a taxpayer from the 
opposition party might be more noncompliant because he perceives that the government 
is not on his side.  
 
In addition to the political affiliation, changes of current government policies might also 
impact tax compliance behaviour. For example, unlike in the UK, in Malaysia, petrol 
prices and some basic needs like sugar, wheat flour, rice and cooking oils are controlled 
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by the government and the prices regularly increase according to global economic and 
government financial situations. Thus, increasing these resources has a negative impact 
on taxpayers’ purchasing power and finally may encourage taxpayers to evade tax. Kim 
(2008) in his study on tax evasion in 50 countries each year97 illustrated these points and 
concluded that tax evasion is influenced by price control (positive direction), public 
service (positive), collected corporate tax (positive), GDP per capita (positive), tax 
system (positive) and the composition of government spending (positive).  
 
Hasseldine and Hite (2003) examined whether attitudes toward the federal income tax 
system and the tax rebate vary by political party affiliation in the United States. Using 
data from a randomised telephone survey they found that political party affiliation 
impacted upon taxpayers’ behaviour. Consequently, any study of taxpayer attitudes 
would benefit from examining whether the attitudes are dependent on underlying political 
affiliations. Hasseldine and Hite’s study examined two potential influences on taxpayer 
attitudes, namely political party affiliation and attribute framing. Since tax attitudes may 
be influenced by one’s political preferences, taxpayer attitudes towards the current 
system are tested for differences by political affiliation (Democrat, Republican, and 
Independent in this case). McGowan (2000) suggested that taxpayers who support the 
Republican Party were more likely to prefer flat tax and sales tax systems than were 
Democrats and Independents.  
                                                 
97 Observations made more than 50 countries each year 1998-2000. However the valid number of 
observation is limited to 129 with all variables included in the model. 
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Hasseldine and Hite (2003) also found that age, income and expected refund status were 
significantly associated with political party affiliation. Regression analyses were 
computed on the overall attitude toward the current income tax system, and on the 
attitude toward the tax rebate to support the earlier findings. Independent variables such 
as political party, framing effect, expected tax status (refund or balance due), age, and 
income level were again regressed with tax evasion behaviour and the study posits that 
there is a significant political party effect on tax rebate attitude. Hasseldine and Hite 
(2003) concluded that firstly, political party affiliation has a significant impact on 
taxpayers’ behaviour; secondly, the more closely identified the tax provision is to a 
specific party, the more favorably it will be received by members of that party relative to 
taxpayers with other political party affiliations; thirdly, the policy changes (the 2001 tax 
rebate) in this particular case tended to be viewed positively by taxpayers (i.e. creating an 
increase in taxpayers trust and in voluntary compliance), and those who did perceive it 
positively also tended to perceive the current system as more fair. 
 
In summary, previous studies have evidenced that the government decision and changes 
to policies in accordance with the economic and political situation have a significant 
impact on compliance. For example, a positive move made by the government such as an 
increase in tax rebate (see Hasseldine and Hite, 2003) is likely to increase taxpayers’ 
compliance. The next subsection discusses some evidence of the influence of referent 
groups on compliance. 
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4.3.3.4 Referents groups (family and friends) 
 
 
Research in ascertaining the importance of referent groups i.e family members and 
friends in tax compliance is limited although Ajzen (1988) and Ajzen and Fishbein  
(1980) (in their Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB)) theorised that referent groups play a significant role in determining people’s 
intentions and behaviour. However, researchers in tax compliance did not take this 
variable into consideration (for example Mohani, 2001; Loo, 2006; Loo and Ho, 2005: 
Andreoni et. al.,1998; Sandmo, 2005; Manaf, Hasseldine and Rodges, 2005).  
 
In other disciplines of research, Guo et. al. (2007) found that TRA and TPB could predict 
smoking behaviour among youngsters in China. However, TRA can better predict 
smoking among students with lower than ‘normal’ perceived behavioural control. 
William and Keith (1983) investigated on insurance-buying behaviour and found that the 
insurance-buying behaviour seems to be a personal decision, and was influenced by only 
the immediate family or closed friends. Subjective norms play a major role in 
determining the intention to buy insurance but this was restricted to closed referents 
(parents and closed friends).  Crosby and Muehling (1983) examined student attendance 
in art in a university in the USA. They also found a similar result to William and Keith 
(1983), where students’ attendance decision was also influenced by close friends. 
 
As for tax evasion discipline, decisions either to evade or not to evade tax sometimes are 
influenced by family members or friends (i.e. according to Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) 
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although the extent of the influence was not clearly stated in this research. Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976) included the importance of referent groups in a wider continuum in 
which they used heads of families in Central Ohio as the respondents. Spicer and 
Lundstedt’s belief was that the head of the household “…would most likely manage tax 
matters or play a major role in managing them.” (p. 299). Judging from this statement 
although it is not explicitly stated, the head of household would have power to influence 
other members of the family in tax matters. Following Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Clotfelter (1983) also claimed that referent groups play a 
significant role in evasion although it was also not clearly discussed which was stronger 
(family members or friends) in this paper. Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller (1994) report 
that the numbers of evaders known to the respondent made the largest contribution to the 
model of under-reporting income which means that the more respondents know the 
evaders, the more under-reporting of income may happen. 
  
In summary, other disciplines of research as well as tax compliance have evidenced that 
the influence of friends and family members in making decisions may be important. 
Therefore, the influence of referent groups is seemingly important in making a decision, 
particularly involving monetary aspects and the obedience to laws (tax compliance).  
 
4.3.3.5 Summary 
 
In conclusion, this section has discussed the impact of social factors on compliance 
including ethics, perceptions of equity or fairness, changes to current government policy 
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and referent groups. In the following section, tax compliance determinants with regard to 
individual factors are discussed. 
 
4.3.4 Individual factors 
  
 
Decisions either to evade or not to evade taxes are heavily reliant on taxpayers’ personal 
judgment (Barrand, Harrison and Ross, 2004). Other influences, such as that of peers 
might also affect the decision, but the final decision is made by the individual. Personal 
circumstantial factors like personal financial constraints and awareness of penalties and 
offences are therefore likely to have a significant impact on taxpayer compliance 
behaviour. 
 
4.3.4.1 Personal financial constraints 
 
Personal financial constraints are believed to have an impact on tax evasion as financial 
distress faced by an individual may encourage him to prioritise what has to be paid first 
as basic survival needs (foods, clothing, housing etc.) or where immediate demand on 
limited income is enforced (i.e perceived threat of action from money lenders etc.) rather 
than tax liabilities. People who face personal financial problems are likely to be more 
prone to evade tax when compared to people in less financial distress (Mohani and 
Sheehan, 2004; Mohani, 2001).  
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Conversely, however Vogel (1974) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982) illustrate that 
people with no financial distress also exercise tax evasion and surprisingly, the level of 
evasion they exhibit can be more serious than people in financial distress. Vogel 
presumed that this situation is related to economic status rather than personal conditions. 
Similarly, Webley and Halstead (1986) indicated that perception of economic 
deterioration is only one way that strain may be conceptualised while Besley, Preston and 
Ridge (1997) report that economic downturn may have been a factor in poll tax non-
compliance in England. An additional explanatory argument for these findings may be 
that those with greater financial capability are less concerned by the fixed penalty 
solutions typical in many SAS as they have the resources to pay these penalties if caught 
evading, which those with greater financial constraints do not. (i.e the threat of penalties 
being imposed is less of a concern to those with greater financial resources). 
 
Hence, based on previous studies, personal financial distress appears to be a significant 
factor in tax evasion but the degree of the impact is uncertain. The implementation of 
SAS in a country in which requires the tax payment made together with submission of the 
tax return might affect the compliance decision among taxpayers, especially those who 
have financial problems. Table 4.5 summarises the findings in relation to tax compliance 
and financial distress. 
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Table 4.5: Relationship between financial constraint and compliance 
 
Variable Year 
 
Authors Key findings 
1974 Vogel Improved economic status also 
evades taxes more than deteriorate 
ones. 
 
1982 Warneryd and Walerud Financial strain is not a significant 
factor for tax evasion. 
 
1986 Webley and Halstead Perception of economic 
deterioration is only one way that 
strain may be conceptualised. 
 
Financial 
constraint 
1997 Besley, Preston and Ridge Economic hardship may have been 
a factor in poll tax non-compliance 
in England 
 
Source: Mohani (2001 ) p. 54. 
 
 
In summary, personal financial constraints appear to be an important determinant in tax 
compliance. Although some authors posited that taxpayers who are facing financial 
constraints during economic recessions tend to be less compliant, however, other authors 
found that financial constraints also appear to be significant in normal economic 
situations. The following section describes the relationship between tax compliance and 
taxpayers’ awareness of offences and penalties. 
 
4.3.4.2 Awareness of offences and penalties 
 
 
A theoretical economic model introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has clearly 
indicated that penalties as well as audit probability have an impact on tax compliance. 
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The higher the penalty and the potential audit probability the greater the discouragement 
for potential tax evasion. However, the more complex models like principal agent theory 
and game theory suggest that penalties and audit probability are difficult to portray in 
compliance models as the results are determined endogenously with tax cheating 
(Andreoni et. al., 1998). Andreoni et. al. suggested that to overcome the endogeneity it is 
necessary to control the enforcement environment artificially by using laboratory 
experiment methods. This has been evidenced by Beck, Davis and Jung (1991) and 
Becker, Buchner and Sleeking (1987) through their experiments in which they found that 
penalty rates affect tax compliance in accordance with the theory. However, an 
experimental approach does limit the environment to a narrow perspective compared to 
the real world. Bryman and Bell (2003) suggested that an experimental approach is only 
suitable for a study that can be addressed with a high degree of experimental arrangement 
and control. Nevertheless, an experimental approach for a tax compliance study might 
show a smaller effect or influence than for direct observation (Alm, Jackson and McKee, 
1992). In addition, Marrelli (1984), Wang and Conant (1988), Gordon (1990), Marrelli 
and Martina (1988) found that penalty rates have a negative association with evasion. In 
contrast however, Virmani (1989) indicated results the other way around, in which 
penalty rates had a positive association with evasion, meaning that higher rates did indeed 
encourage people to cheat.  
 
In summary, since previous studies indicate that penalty rates impact upon tax 
compliance behaviour, the awareness of offences was presumed to have a significant 
influence as well. If the taxpayers are aware of the offences they are committing when 
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evading tax and the consequences of being non compliant taxpayers, they might reduce 
their tendency to evade tax. On the other hand, if they are not aware of the implications 
of being dishonest in terms of the offence they are likely to be charged with if caught, 
they might be more inclined to cheat because they presume that they will not be detected 
and could save money. Thus, educating taxpayers and keeping them well informed with 
the sentences of being an evader may be important, as a prevention measure is better than 
cure (imposition of a penalty). 
 
4.3.4.3 Summary 
 
In conclusion, individual factors including personal financial constraints and awareness 
of offences and penalties appear to be important in determining taxpayers’ behaviour. 
People with no financial constraint also tend to evade tax although they are capable of 
paying the tax liabilities (see Vogel, 1974 and Warneryd and Walerud, 1982). Taxpayers’ 
awareness of penalties and offences is also a factor believed to encourage compliance in 
order to avoid penalties and sanctions. The following section discusses other factors such 
as age, gender, income levels and education that potentially influence tax compliance 
behaviour. 
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4.3.5 Other factors 
 
This section describes other factors (predominantly demographic) that previous research 
has illustrated may affect tax compliance behaviour. These include age, gender, general 
level of education and income level. These are the most common variables used in tax 
compliance research (Devos, 2005).  
 
4.3.5.1 Age 
 
 
Demographic factors such as age have long been studied by researchers; however the 
findings from different studies remain inconclusive.  For example Tittle (1980), 
Warneryd and Walerud (1982) and Wahlund (1982) posit a negative association -i.e older 
people are less compliant. In contrast, Clotfelter (1983), Dubin and Wilde (1986) and 
Beron et. al. (1992) argued that age was positively related with compliance. However, 
there have been a significant number of studies that have found no relationship (See 
Spicer and Lundstedt ,1976; Spicer and Becker, 1980 and Porcano, 1988). Table 4.6  
summarises some key findings on the relationship between age and compliance. 
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Table 4.6: Some previous studies on the relationship between age and compliance 
 
Variable Year Authors Country of 
study 
Data 
collection 
and sample 
size 
Key findings 
 
1976 Spicer and 
Lundstedt 
USA Survey 
130 middle 
and upper 
income 
households 
Indeterminate relationship 
 
1980 Spicer and 
Becker 
USA Experiment, 
57 students 
 
No significant relationship- 
age did not affect 
compliance 
1982 Warneryd and 
Walerud 
Sweden Survey, 
426 adults 
Negative association-older 
people less compliant 
1983 Clotfelter USA Survey, 
47,000 tax 
returns 
from IRS 
TCMP 
Age has positive 
correlation with evasion. 
Middle age group less 
likely to comply 
 
1984 Wallschutzky Australia Survey Evaders come from an 
older group 
 
1992 Wahlund Sweden Survey 
 
Negative association-older 
people less compliant 
 
1997 Wearing and 
Headey 
Australia Survey Negative link between age 
and non-compliance 
 
Age 
2000 Chan, 
Troutman and 
O’Bryan  
USA and 
Hong Kong 
Survey Age has a direct, positive 
effect on income and a 
direct, positive (negative) 
effect on education in US 
(Hong Kong) 
 
 2001 Mohani Malaysia Tax returns 
audits,  
507 
samples 
throughout 
Malaysia 
 
Older people above 50 
years less compliant. 
 2006 Loo Malaysia Survey, 
322 
samples pre 
SAS, 
478 post 
SAS  
Middle aged (30-50) less 
compliant 
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 2007 Torgler  Switzerland Experiment Age has a positive 
association with 
compliance 
 
* TCMP – Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Programme 
 
Source: Based on Mohani (2001) p. 39. 
 
 
Chan et. al. (2000) also concentrated on age and compliance behaviour and further 
suggested that age has a direct, positive effect on income and a direct, positive (negative) 
effect on education in the US (Hong Kong).  These inconsistent findings are explained by 
Torgler (2007) as first, age does not impact compliance in all taxpayers; secondly, 
inconsistent non-compliance definitions used in the research; third, the effect on 
taxpayers compliance is diluted when age is associated with a number of other variables 
and fourth, the assessing interaction of age with other variables is problematic. 
 
In summary, previous studies have evidenced that age could have various effects on 
compliance, for example age has a negative effect on compliance (i.e. Tittle (1980); 
Warneryd and Walerud (1982) and Wahlund (1982),  positive effect (Clotfelter (1983), 
Dubin and Wilde (1986) and Beron et. al. (1992)) and some studies have found no 
relationship at all between age and compliance (Spicer and Lundstedt (1976); Spicer and 
Becker (1980) and Porcano (1988). The next subsection discusses the relationship 
between income level and tax compliance. 
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4.3.5.2 Income level 
 
 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) found that income level has a mixed and unclear impact on 
compliance, a theory also supported by Christian and Gupta, (1993) and Hite (1997). 
Although Jackson and Milliron did not clearly elaborate on the reasons for this finding, it 
is presumed that the endogenous tax regulations among countries might contribute to the 
inconsistent findings. For example, progressive tax rates might encourage high income 
groups to evade rather than lower income groups because their (high income groups) tax 
rates and taxable income are high, thus making the tax liabilities much higher than those 
in the lower income group. For example Wallschutzky (1984) in his study in Australia 
and Loo (2006) in her study in Malaysia found that high income earners were less 
compliant. These studies have evidenced that income level has a significant impact on 
compliance. In contrast, high income earners are likely to be more compliant rather than 
lower income earners, as suggested by Wearing and Heady (1997) and Torgler (2007). In 
a country where the income redistribution is not satisfying98, higher income groups tend 
to evade more (Mohani, 2001) because a high income earner might feel the tax system is 
not treating him fairly. 
 
According to the Fischer Model (see next section for further information on this model 
and Chan et. al. 2000), non compliance opportunities based on income level can be 
affected directly and indirectly through attitudes and perceptions. Results of Chan et. al. 
(2000) suggest that income level is unrelated to compliance among US and Hong Kong 
                                                 
98 i.e. Tax revenue is being spent unwisely. 
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taxpayers. Previous literature therefore suggests the direct relationship between income 
level and tax compliance remains unclear (Jackson and Miliron, 1986; Roth et. al., 1989). 
Table 4.7 summarises some previous findings on the relationship between income level 
and compliance. 
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Table 4.7 : Some previous studies on the relationship between income level and 
compliance 
 
Variable Year Authors Key findings 
 
1977 Frank and Dekeyser-
Meulders 
High income earners professional-
extensive tax evasion in Belgium. 
 
1981 Mason and Lowry Middle income earners were more 
compliant than low income earners. 
 
1984 Wallschutzky Higher income earners in Australia are 
more prone to evade taxes. 
 
1985 Witte and Woodbury Middle income earners were more 
compliant than high and low income 
earners. 
 
1993 Christian and Gupta Income level is negatively correlated 
with evasion. 
 
Income 
level 
1997 Wearing and Heady Lower occupational status, earn less 
and without family responsibilities 
tend to evade taxes more. 
 1998 Andreoni et. al. The impact of income on compliance 
in the USA is inconclusive (analysis 
through IRS data, surveys and 
experiments) 
 2000 Chan et. al. Income level is found to be unrelated 
to compliance among US and Hong 
Kong taxpayers. 
 2001 Mohani Middle and high income earners in 
Malaysia less compliant (RM12,000 – 
50,000) 
 2003 Park and Hyun Income levels have no effect on 
compliance in South Korea 
 2006 Loo High income earners in Malaysia 
prone to evade tax. 
 2007 Torgler Lower income earners in Western 
Germany less compliant. 
 
Source: Based on Mohani (2001) p. 45. 
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Despite the mixed negative and positive associations of income levels with tax 
compliance, there are studies that found insignificant results that should be perhaps also 
noted: for example, Park and Hyun (2003) in their experiment in South Korea found that 
income levels had no significant effect on tax compliance. Chan et. al. (2001) also found 
the same results as Park and Hyun. Andreoni et. al. (1998) in their triangulation study 
using a combination of IRS data, surveys and experiments suggested that the impact of 
income on compliance in the USA is inconclusive.  
 
Therefore while some research, income levels are the most important determinant of 
compliance (e.g. Kirchler, 2008: 116), other previous studies, however, have shown that 
the impact of income on compliance is still unclear and the relationship between the two 
variables needs to be investigated further and it is perhaps not linear, as many studies 
implicitly assume (Kirchler, 2007: 199). Tax evaders should have an incentive to report 
at the top of a tax bracket rather than at the beginning or in the middle range, whereas 
honest taxpayers should report their income, independent of where it falls within a tax 
bracket (Kirchler 2007). A higher level of education, perhaps, would lead to a better 
income level and would improve one’s tax knowledge; consequently this might 
eventually change one’s attitude towards compliance (Loo, 2006: 107). 
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4.3.5.3 Culture 
  
Chan et. al. (2000) also explored whether taxpayers’ compliance is influenced by cultures 
as part of their study, they explored similarities and differences in taxpayer compliance 
behaviour between the USA and HK.  Their study validated the empirical link established 
in prior research between moral beliefs and taxpayer compliance (Hanno and Violette, 
1996; Hite, 1996); simultaneously, they modeled and tested all the major constructs 
articulated in the Fischer et. al.  (1992) model (Fischer Model) namely demographic, 
noncompliance opportunity, attitudes towards and perception of the tax system and, of 
particular interest to this section, explored the potential effects of an additional construct: 
cultural difference on taxpayer compliance in an international setting as suggested by 
Andreoni et. al. (1998). The reason why the study made a comparison between the USA 
and HK was due to a number of structural differences between US and HK tax systems. 
HK uses a proportional tax rate structure, no periodic withholding, a mandatory 
provisional tax, no capital gains tax and no self assessment mechanism whereas the USA 
uses a progressive tax rate structure, periodic withholding, no provisional tax, a capital 
gains tax and a self assessment mechanism. Both countries also have significant problems 
with taxpayer non-compliance.  
 
Chan et. al.’s (2000) results suggest that the Fischer Model is a viable conceptual 
framework for the study of tax compliance.  However, this illustrated that the Fisher 
model could be more meaningful, realistic and reliable if a cultural construct was 
included in the model (Chan et. al., 2000 and Figure 4.4). Chan et. al.’s surveys of 158 in 
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the USA and 86 in Hong Kong99, revealed that cultural differences in both countries had 
significantly changed taxpayers’ attitudes towards taxation which meant that culture 
plays a significant role in determining tax compliance behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Fischer, Wartick, and Mark’s (1992) model of Taxpayer Compliance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Chan et. al. (2000) p. 95. 
 
Richardson (2008) studied the relationship between culture and tax evasion across 47 
countries including the USA, the UK, Argentina, Japan and Malaysia. Cultural 
dimensions are represented by power distance (PD), individualism (IDV), uncertainty 
                                                 
99 Of this number, 101 US and 56 Hong Kong respondents were included in the analysis. 
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avoidance (UA) and masculinity (MAS) (Based on Hofstede, 1980. See Richardson 2008, 
p. 69 and 72). The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between 
Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions and tax evasion across countries, using several 
measures of tax evasion. Richardson found that uncertainty avoidance (UA) and 
individualism (IDV) had a significant impact on evasion across countries which meant 
that the higher the level of uncertainty avoidance and the lower level of individualism, 
the higher the level of tax evasion across countries. The study also showed that culture 
remained an important variable in determining tax evasion decisions across countries 
(especially in developing countries) thus suggesting that the policymakers should 
consider cultural variables alongside  legal, political, and religious variables.  
 
In summary, culture has a significant impact on compliance, and different cultures in 
various countries provide different levels of tax compliance. In addition, different 
definitions and variables used in the studies also become important factors in determining 
the association between culture and compliance (see Richardson, 2008). The following 
subsection describes the relationship between education levels and compliance.  
 
4.3.4.4. Education 
 
According to the Fischer Model, non compliance opportunities can affect tax compliance 
both directly and indirectly through attitudes and perceptions. Chan et. al. (2000) 
investigates the direct and indirect effects of two noncompliance opportunities, namely 
educational and income level. Previous literature supports the direct, negative 
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relationship between educational level and taxpayer compliance but a direct relationship 
between income level and tax compliance is unclear (see previous section 4.3.5.2 and 
Jackson and Miliron, 1986; Roth et. al., 1989). Chan et. al. (2000) also postulate that 
greater education is directly linked to a likelihood of compliance. They argue that 
educated taxpayers may be aware of non compliance opportunities, but their potentially 
better understanding of the tax system and their higher level of moral development 
promotes a more favorable taxpayer attitude and therefore greater compliance. Chan et. 
al. also suggested that those with a higher education level are more likely to have a 
higher level of moral development and higher level attitudes toward compliance and thus 
will tend to comply more.  
 
Hite and Hasseldine (2001) investigate the current developments in the USA, 
highlighting that tax academics need to emphasise teaching and development. In other 
countries, tax education, as well as tax development is not as good as in the USA. Their 
study was expected to be able to help academics in other countries to adapt what has been 
done in the USA, especially in teaching methodology (in tax courses) so that other 
countries can learn how to educate taxpayers more effectively and efficiently.  
 
Traditionally, the US taxation courses are taught within accounting departments only. 
The first paper introduces students to personal taxation; by the end of the course, the 
students will be able to prepare the tax return. The weaknesses of this method had been 
commented upon by Jones and Duncan (1995). They noted that this narrow approach in 
the long run does not fulfill the education needs for the students because most students 
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are not aiming to become accountants or tax professionals. Jones and Duncan added that 
a first taxation course should be broader in nature so that the students will be able to 
relate taxation aspects to other related fields such as accounting, financial economics and 
perhaps law. This scenario happened in other countries as well, when the education 
systems itself indirectly narrowed the students’ mindset to be focused only on a taxation 
field without then relating this to other fields (Craner and Lymer, 1999). A formal tax 
education is only taught to accounting students in higher learning institutions. Other than 
this, they could not easily find any tax related courses but in other countries such as the 
USA, there are a lot of accounting (tax) education programmes offered to the public. 
While the education levels become more important in increasing tax compliance across 
countries, Mohani (2001) suggested that one of the measures to increase voluntary 
compliance is by assuring that taxpayers have a certain level of qualifications, ability and 
confidence to exercise their tax responsibility. In contrast, the most recent study, by 
Richardson (2008) also revealed that there is a negative association between education 
and compliance. 
 
In summary, greater education potentially increases compliance, as educated taxpayers 
may be more aware of their responsibility as well as the sanctions to be imposed if they 
were not compliant with tax laws, although other authors found a negative association 
between education and compliance. The following subsection discusses the gender effect 
on compliance.  
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4.3.5.5 Gender 
 
The association between gender and tax compliance has received some attention in prior 
literature however, findings vary across studies. Some studies found that males are more 
compliant but others found the other way around (see Table 4.8). Although the agreement 
among the findings is still in discussion, the need explore this more fully is still relevant 
especially in a SAS, in order to help tax administrators to plan and determine the 
framework of their tax audits and help target tax education programmes effectively. 
 
 
 
Table 4.8: Relationship between gender and compliance 
 
Variable Year Authors 
 
Key findings 
1974 
1978 
Vogel  
Mason and Calvin 
 
Males less compliant  
1978 Friedland, Maital and 
Rutenberg 
 
Females less compliant 
1980 Tittle 
 
Males less compliant 
1986 Jackson and Milliron Compliance gap between females and 
males is shrinking over time. 
 
Gender 
1984 Grasmick, Finley and 
Glaser 
A new generation of independent non-
traditional women may be closing the 
compliance gap between men and 
women with regard to tax evasion. 
 
 1993 Kinsey and Grasmick Males less compliant 
 
 1997 Hite Females without college degrees 
tended to be compliant and males 
without college degree were non-
compliant. In contrast, females with 
college degrees tended not to comply 
and males with college degrees tended 
to comply. 
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 2003 Hasseldine and Hite Female taxpayers were more compliant 
than males. On the other hand, the 
study reports that males were more 
compliant compared to females when a 
negatively framed message was used, 
and females were more compliant than 
males when a positively framed 
message was used.  
 
 2007 Mohamad Ali et. al. 
 
Females were more complaint  
 2008 Richardson Gender has no significant impact on 
compliance across 45 countries. 
 
Source: Based on Mohani (2001) p. 42. 
 
Hasseldine and Hite (2003) found that males were more persuaded by negatively framed 
messages while females were more persuaded by positively framed messages. Although 
the result of the study can be considered as convincing, nevertheless, this study does not 
compare with the other two approaches of framing, which are risky choice framing and 
attribute framing. Levin et. al. (1998) mentioned that the research evidence for goal 
framing is less homogenous than other types of framing because of greater variations in 
operationalising goal framing.  
 
In summary, the impact of gender on tax compliance is inconsistent, and a recent study 
by Richardson (2008) contimue to find no association between gender and compliance. A 
greater longitudinal emphasis could be undertaken to examine the impact of gender as 
well other important variables on changes in tax evasion levels.  
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4.4 SUMMARY 
 
 
Tax compliance (evasion) has been an important subject of research in a large number of 
developed and a number of developing countries. Since each country has its own 
approach to managing tax compliance levels and each has different tax laws and 
regulations, the factors impacting tax compliance behaviour appear to vary among 
countries. Factors affecting tax compliance can be viewed from various continuums; for 
example, economists and policy analysts have given increasing attention to tax 
compliance theoretically and empirically (Clotfelter, 1983).  
 
Cultural difference was a factor that impacted tax compliance in the US and Hong Kong 
(see Chan et. al., 2000; Richardson, 2008). Tax knowledge appears to be an important 
element in tax compliance in a SAS but the degree of required level of knowledge varies 
among countries (see Lewis, 1982; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Loo, 2006; Kim, 2008). 
Economic factors such as tax rates, tax audits and perceptions of government spending as 
well as institutional factors (the role of the tax authority, simplicity of the tax return and 
administration, and probability of detection) have both positive and negative associations 
with tax compliance.   
 
Social factors and individual factors also appear to play an important role in influencing 
tax compliance. These factors however, are more difficult to control by the tax authority 
(for example financial constraints faced by taxpayers, ethics, political affiliation and 
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referent groups) because these factors involve taxpayers’ own decisions. Other 
demographic factors like age, gender, income level and education level also appear to 
potentially have their own influence on tax compliance. 
 
Generally, policy makers are interested in tax evasion for two main reasons: its revenue 
implications and equity concerns. With tax rates fixed, tax evasion decreases the 
government's revenue. Reduction in tax revenue attracts policy makers’ attention and 
makes them take steps to alleviate the problem. This is particularly noticeable when the 
government faces poor fiscal conditions such as serious fiscal deficits and global 
economy recessions. A further reason that policy makers worry about tax evasion is on 
equity grounds. Previous research suggests that tax evasion levels vary across age, 
gender, income and education etc. These variations inevitably result in an equity problem 
among various groups of citizens: citizens who cannot or do not evade taxes raise an 
equity issue against those evading them.  
 
In conclusion, although various studies have been undertaken to determine as accurately 
as possible the factors that impact upon tax compliance behaviour, undoubtedly, the 
government should consider seriously the characteristics of non compliant taxpayers, 
review current regulations and possibly as a result, increase audit rates and penalty rates 
(enforcement) as well as attempting to  build good relationships with taxpayers in seeking 
to improve general tax compliance levels. 
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In the remainder of this thesis I will explore how the various determinants prior literature 
has indicated may have an impact on tax compliance apply in a developing country 
migrating from an official/direct assessment system to a SAS with the aim of providing 
further evidence on how these determinants apply in this situation to add to the general 
literature in the field of tax compliance studies, specifically this research will add to our 
understanding of tax compliance in developing countries where literature on the extent to 
which determinant of compliance in developed countries apply to different countries Is 
very limited at present . In Chapter 5, I will discuss the research design and methodology 
employed in this study including the questionnaire, sampling design, hypotheses 
development and data analysis techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology involved in the study. The 
early part describes the survey method used, including the data collection method (survey 
procedures, sampling frame and development of the questionnaire). Details of the 
research framework, hypotheses and data analysis techniques are also discussed in the 
latter part of the chapter.  
 
5.2 DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
 
This section describes the data collection process including the sampling frame and 
survey procedures, the respondents involved and measures taken to increase the response 
rates. 
 
5.2.1 Sampling frame and survey procedure 
 
The survey was carried out between June and August 2007. After conducting a pilot 
survey on a group of 23 lecturers and professionals in various sectors and the public 
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(non-tax specialists) to improve validity and reliability, as well as to further refine the 
questions, a total number of 5,500 mail surveys were distributed to individual taxpayers 
throughout Malaysia who were selected at random from telephone directories.  Preparing 
a survey pack containing a self addressed enveloped and a questionnaire as well as 
printing recipient addresses and sticking stamps was time consuming. Hence, two batches 
of dissemination were undertaken; 3,000 and 2,500 surveys were disseminated in each 
batch respectively. The time gap between both batches was approximately two weeks. 
 
Kasipillai and Baldry (1998) asserted that the selection of samples from local telephone 
directories may exclude low income earners who are less likely to have a telephone. 
However, in the Malaysian context two factors help to overcome this potentially results-
biasing position. Firstly, many since low income earners are unlikely to lodge tax returns 
in the Malaysian SAS, their possible exclusion from this survey is not considered to be of 
major concern given focus is on taxpayers who have had direct experience of the SAS. 
An individual who earns less than RM25,501 (£4,636.54) per annum does not have to 
lodge a tax return (IRB, 2010). Secondly (and perhaps more importantly), in Malaysia, 
phone ownership is very high (refer Table 5.1) and no ‘ex-directory’ service is available 
whereby numbers could be unlisted (as typical in the UK for example). Therefore, 
together, this sampling method in this context, leads to good randomisation with few 
limitations compared to other sampling approaches for this scale of survey101.  
 
                                                 
101 Alternatively, a list of taxpayers could be obtained from the tax authority. However, it is very difficult to 
obtain the list as the tax authority is not allowed by the Income Tax Act 1967 to reveal any taxpayers 
information to the public. 
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Using a sample from a telephone directory approach is, however, limited in one key 
output that may alter our results, namely the possibility of the impact of the growth in 
mobile phone ownership which is becoming significant in Malaysia. In early 2006, 
mobile penetration passed the 80% mark, with subscriber numbers at the same time 
passing 20 million102.   
 
This was up from only 2 million subscribers in 1998.  Malaysia has the second highest 
mobile penetration in South East Asia after Singapore (South East Asian Mobile 
Communications & Mobile Data Markets Report, 2006 ).  Although the growth of mobile 
telephones is significantly higher than that of landlines, the ownership of landlines is both 
classical and traditional –to own a landline is still considered necessary even in 
households which possess more than one mobile. This can bee seen in Table 5.1 in which 
the landlines penetration rates remain constant at between 43% to 44% (particularly in 
2009 and 2010) despite the significant increase in mobile penetration which occurred 
throughout the concurrent period. Table 5.1 illustrates the comparison between landline 
and mobile growth in Malaysia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
102  Total population in 2000 was 23.27 million compared to 18.38 in 1990 (27.15% increase) (The 
Population and Housing Census 2000). This figure increased to 27.46 million in 2008 (Malaysia 
Department of Statistics, 2008). 
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Table 5.1: Mobiles and landlines penetration rates in Malaysia 2006-2010 
Landlines Mobiles  
Year 
 
Quarter Per 100 
households 
Per 100 
inhabitants
2006 1 49.2 77.7 
 2 49.0 80.8 
 3 48.8 81.6 
 4 48.4 72.3 
2007 1 48.9 77.0 
 2 48.6 78.2 
 3 48.3 80.8 
 4 47.8 85.1 
2008 1 46.6 87.9 
 2 45.8 90.5 
 3 45.4 93.9 
 4 44.9 98.9 
2009 1 44.7 100.1** 
 2 44.5 100.8 
 3 44.2 104.1 
 4 44.0 106.2 
2010*  43.6 108.1 
 
* - Forecast  
** -  Penetration rate over 100% could occur because of multiple subscriptions. 
 
Source: Malaysian Communication and Multimedia Commission Report, 2010 
(http://www.skmm.gov.my/facts_figures/stats/index.asp) 
 
 
According to the IRB Annual Report for 2006, the number of registered individual 
taxpayers is 2,198,914103  (IRB Annual Report, 2006: 37). This figure includes both 
taxpayers with employment income only as well as those with employment and business 
                                                 
103 This figure is based on total number of tax returns distributed to registered individual taxpayers.  
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income. However, the total of individual taxpayers will probably be higher than this 
figure because there are a lot of unregistered taxpayers who do not file their tax returns 
voluntarily. It is impossible to include all the taxpayers as respondents to this survey due 
to impracticality, cost, time consumption and lack of resources. This study therefore uses 
probability sampling which is described by Bryman and Bell (2003: 90-93) as the most 
equal (probability of a sample to be chosen as a sample is equal) sampling method. It is 
generally assumed that a representative sample is more likely to be the outcome when 
this method of selection from the population is employed. By using this sampling 
method, the sampling error can be minimised. Whenever a sample is drawn from a 
population, only the part of the population included in the sample is measured, and this is 
used to represent the entire population. Hence, there will always be some error in the 
data, resulting from those members of the population who were not measured. Error will 
however be reduced as the sample size is increased (Sekaran, 2000: 286-290). 
 
As this study used telephone directories as the database, non-probability sampling was 
not applied because if non-probability sampling is employed, each unit in the population 
did not have equal chance to be selected as a sample. Moreover, non-probability 
sampling implies that some units in the population are more likely to be selected than 
others. 
 
This study used cluster (or area) sampling by dividing the population into ten areas based 
on states (refer Table 5.2). The basis of cluster division was based on the ten area 
telephone directories produced by TM Bhd. (A public listed cum government owned 
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company who are granted a sole license to operate landlines in Malaysia, 
www.tm.com.my) hence some states are combined into the same cluster. The advantages 
of using cluster sampling are: convenience to obtain the data and the fact that the cost of 
sampling from the entire population is reduced because the scope of study is reduced to 
clusters. The cost per respondent is usually lower than stratified sampling because of 
lower respondents’ listings or locating costs. The time and cost of contacting respondents 
of the population can also be reduced, for follow up calls. In addition, cluster sampling 
will also reduce the distance between  the sampled elements of population (Black, 2001:  
219-220). Table 5.2 illustrates the clusters involved in this study: 
 
Table 5.2: Clusters and states involved 
 
Cluster no. 
 
States 
1 Selangor/Kuala Lumpur 
2 Perlis/Kedah 
3 Pulau Pinang/Perak 
4 Melaka/Negeri Sembilan 
5 Johor 
6 Kelantan 
7 Terengganu 
8 Pahang 
9 Sabah/ Labuan 
10 Sarawak 
 
In this study, a national survey covering ten regions throughout Malaysia has been 
undertaken. 5,500 mail questionnaires were disseminated to the respondents, using 
telephone directories as the database. 1,073 (19.51%) usable responses were received and 
analysed (refer to 5.2, and Table 6.1). The response rates were considerably higher than 
other studies in Malaysia undertaken on tax compliance to date (refer to Table 5.3), 
perhaps due to the strategic timing of dissemination (July – August, a few months after 
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taxpayers had gone through filing process), the appearance of the questionnaire and the 
use of follow up calls (refer to 5.2.3). The numbers of responses also compare very 
favourably with other studies on tax compliance in other countries. The questionnaire 
was developed based on Kogan and Wallach (1964), Troutman (1993), Chan et. al. 
(2000), Harris (1989), Eriksen and Fallan (1996), Loo (2006) and Income Tax Act 1967 
(refer to 5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.2 and Appendix 5). These previous studies contributed to this 
study particularly in developing the wording and approach used in the questionnaire 
because asking unethical questions (i.e tax compliance) would be embarrassing and 
would cause sensitivity. 
 
Evans et. al. (2005) asserted that a mail survey is the most effective way to reach large 
number of respondents residing in a large geographical area and could provide the 
opportunity for respondents to complete the questionnaires at their own leisure as well as 
reducing the risk of the researcher influencing responses. The questionnaire design 
developed by Evans et. al. (2005) was adopted to meet some objectives of this study such 
as 1) user friendliness (the questions were short and simple to encourage legibility and 
high response rate); 2) administrative simplicity (A3 paper was folded to make an A4 
questionnaire booklet so that the researcher can minimise the time in stapling and 
collating the booklet); 3) comprehensiveness (the total number of questions was 48 for 
SMEs and 37 for tax practitioners).  Also, following Evans et. al.’s study, the survey 
questionnaire used in this study was made available in both Malay and English languages 
to help reduce the impact of language being a barrier to completion; in addition, the A4 
paper being folded to make a booklet made for easier completion by respondents.  
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Some previous studies in Malaysia which also used mailing surveys have shown that the 
average response rates were between 16% and 34%. Table 5.3 exhibits some recent 
evidence on mail surveys as well as other research designs in Malaysia in relation to tax 
studies: 
 
Table 5.3: Previous data collection methods in Malaysia (tax studies) 
 
Year Authors Methodologies Total 
questionnaires 
distributed 
Total usable 
questionnaires 
returned 
Response 
rates 
2008 Pope and 
Abdul Jabbar 
 
Postal surveys 
to  SMEs  
1,300 175 13.5% 
2007 Mohamad Ali, 
Hajah Mustafa 
and Mohd Asri 
Experimental 
design 
involving 
postgraduate 
students 
(individual 
taxpayers) in 
local 
universities. 
 
NA NA NA 
(42 subjects 
from 
experimental 
group and 
46 subjects 
from control 
group) 
2006 Loo Postal survey 
involving 
random 
sampling via 
telephone book 
directories 
 
6,000 939 16% 
2006 Manaf, 
Hasseldine and 
Hodges 
Postal survey 
involving 
random 
sampling. The 
addresses were 
obtained from 
every state 
government. 
 
750 179 24% 
2005 Loo and Ho Survey cum 
meetings with 
respondents to 
salaried white 
collars middle 
and senior 
250 106 42.4% 
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employees in 
the state of 
Malacca only. 
 
2004 Ming Ling, 
Obid and 
Meera 
 
Postal survey 
using 
systematic 
sampling. 
 
572 192 34% 
2003 Kasipillai and 
Abdul Jabbar 
Postal survey 
involving 
random 
sampling from 
telephone 
directory. 
 
150 selected 41  
agreed to 
interview 
27.3% 
2002 Junainah Survey on 
salaried 
individuals 
from selected 
companies in 
the state of 
Sabah. Simple 
random 
sampling was 
used. 
 
300 195 65% 
 
 
Based on Table 5.3, the highest response rate, 34% was represented by a study conducted 
by Ming Ling, Obid and Meera (2004) whose subjects were tax practitioners, while other 
studies involved personal taxpayers as the subjects. Since the target for usable 
questionnaires returned for this study was 1,000 (to achieve the highest sample and 
statistically relevant sample, refer Table 5.3), therefore, a total of 5,500 survey 
disseminated was considered valid and reasonable. 
 
Bryman and Bell (2007:143) asserted that there are a number of weaknesses of using 
questionnaires rather than interviews which include tendency to closed questions, as open 
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questions are more difficult and time consuming, to complete so respondents might be 
unwilling to answer them. In addition, in agreement with Bryman and Bell (2003:144), 
Sekaran (2000:250) and Das Gupta (2008) suggest that mail questionnaires will always 
get a low response rate; for instance, around 30% is acceptable. In addition, as the 
researcher is unable to clarify the questions since most of the questions are close-ended, 
follow up procedures for non-responses are necessary.  
 
In contrast, according to Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), the strength in using 
questionnaires is it evokes honest responses and also produces a valid indirect measure of 
behaviour. They also argue that responses obtained are directly related to the individual’s 
own propensity to commit tax evasion by ensuring the respondents of complete 
confidentiality. Elffers et. al. (1992) added that self reporting (where taxpayers are asked 
to self disclose their compliance behaviour) is the most popular method in tax evasion 
studies and still a dominant strategy in research in this field. 
 
In summary, notwithstanding the weaknesses, and in agreement with Spicer and 
Lundstedt (1976), Bryman and Bell (2003:142) and Sekaran (2000:252-253) conversely 
suggest that there are particular advantages that overwhelm the disadvantages, including 
cheaper and quicker administration, absence of interviewer effects, high anonymity, 
access to wide geographic reasons, the potential for the inclusion of token gifts if requires 
and the fact that it is convenient for respondents to respond to questions and easy  to 
disseminate electronically. 
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5.2.2 The respondents 
 
Like Spicer and Lundstedt (1976), Song and Yarbrough (1978) and Kasipillai and Baldry 
(1998) this study targets heads of households as a unit of analysis. While this will not 
provide a complete picture of tax compliance in the country, it is acknowledged 
(particularly in light of the issue of women now being required to file independently, 
perhaps for the first time for some), that heads of household are typically the most 
experienced members of a family unit and, as such, provide the best view of the leading 
edge of SAS-related tax knowledge currently (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). As exploring 
the relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance is one of the main purposes 
of the study, this limitation is considered to be acceptable, as other household members 
are unlikely to routinely hold greater tax knowledge than the survey respondents and 
therefore our results are unlikely to be upper bounded in application even if there are 
some limitations to be considered in the analysis at the lower bound.  
 
5.2.3 Measures to increase response rates 
 
It has been frequently demonstrated that research using postal surveys will face lower 
response rates than other more direct methods of distributing surveys. Table 5.3 
evidenced that responses from mailing surveys in Malaysia were slightly lower compared 
to other countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and Australia (refer to 
Chapter 4). The following measures had been taken into consideration in an attempt to 
increase the response rates since a survey for tax discipline usually receives less attention 
from respondents: 
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5.2.3.1 Survey dissemination timing  
 
To ascertain the quality of results and responses from respondents, this study follows the 
survey dissemination period suggested by Song and Yarbrough (1978) who timed 
dissemination of their survey questions in the United States in the months of July and 
August - a few months after taxpayers there had gone through the annual process of filing 
the federal and state incomes tax returns. This period was selected because it was argued 
that the data would be least likely to be biased by any exaggerated and critical feelings 
about the tax system likely to be highlighted by the filing period. In Malaysia, the 
equivalent ideal time in the annual tax cycle to disseminate the survey is between May 
and September and hence our survey was conducted within this window. The due date for 
individual taxpayers to submit tax returns is on the 30th April (but sometimes extended to 
31st May) every year. 
 
5.2.3.2 The questionnaires booklet appearance 
 
The front page of the survey was printed in colour (refer Appendix 5 – the cover letter). 
The questionnaires were also printed in high quality style to ensure a clear layout so that 
respondents would understand that a professional study was being undertaken. In 
attempting to obtain honest and valid responses from respondents, the logos of the 
University of Birmingham, the University Kebangsaan Malaysia and the Tax Research 
Institute, University of Nottingham (the three sponsoring participants) were printed on 
the cover letter. The cover letter also provided an explanation of the project and its 
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independence particularly from any tax authority involvement, in an attempt to further 
reduce bias in responses to the extent this can be done in practice. Bryman and Bell 
(2003:144) and Hong (2005:51) indicated that mentioning sponsorship of a study is a 
good way to increase the response rate because respondents will believe that the research 
is considered valid and has gone through a thorough process of revision and evaluation. 
Acknowledging  these bodies also increases confidence in confidentiality as no link with 
the tax authority is apparent. 
 
5.2.3.3 Other measures 
 
Apart from timing and booklet appearance, the following steps were also taken into 
account to attempt to boost the response rates: 
• Stamped, addressed, return envelopes were supplied to ensure no cost (other than 
respondents’ time) was associated with completing the survey that may have lead 
to bias in the respondents.  
• After two weeks, follow up calls were made to remind the respondents. 
• The content of the questionnaires was as precise as possible to allow respondents 
to complete them in approximately 20 minutes at most. 
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5.3 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN, VARIABLES DEVELOPMENT AND 
MEASUREMENT 
 
This section describes the development of the questionnaire and development of variables 
and measurements used. 
 
5.3.1 The nature of questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire was prepared in both Malay and English versions (in the same booklet) 
to facilitate respondents and was divided into four sections:  
 
5.3.1.1 Section A – Tax compliance hypothetical questions 
 
This section consisted of eight hypothetical questions related to tax compliance 
behaviour. This section was developed based on Troutman (1993) and Chan et. al. 
(2000). The development of hypothetical questions was also based on the ‘Choice of 
Dilemma Questionnaire’ (CDQ) developed by Kogan & Wallach (1964). Kogan and 
Wallach introduced a series of CDQ questions to examine human resource risk-based 
decision making as follows: the central person (based on Kogan and Wallach) in each 
situation is faced with a choice between two alternative courses of action. Alternative X 
is more desirable and attractive than alternative Y, but the probability of achieving X is 
less than that of achieving Y. For each situation, respondents are asked to indicate the 
minimum probability of success they would require before recommending that alternative 
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X be chosen. Respondents are asked to indicate their choice on a ten-point scale that 
ranges from 1 (risk averse) to 10 (risk seeker). Response from this instrument will be 
summed to derive a relative measure of risk aversion personality. The CDQ test has been 
used in various studies such as decision making (risk taking) by Cartwright (1971), and 
human resource management (Nutt, 1986). 
 
Cartwright (1971:1) in his study to examine the effect of group discussion on decisions 
involving risk claimed that the CDQ is the most suitable method of asking, easy to 
administer, permits a comparison of findings from different studies, and most 
importantly, produces replicable results, particularly when examining the propensity of a 
person of risk taking. A risky shift in CDQ scores has been found by numerous 
researchers in several different countries and in the variety of subjects (see Nutt, 1986). 
Cartwright also asserted that the popularity of research employing the CDQ is interesting; 
different measures of risk, did not find significant differences between individuals and 
groups. Researchers have continued to use other methods to measure risk, but their 
results have not led to simple general conclusions when compared to CDQ (Cartwright, 
1971).  
 
Nutt (1986) investigated how managers responded with external and internal challenges 
in order to position their organisation in the market. Managers were given a set of CDQ 
questions in relation with certain circumstances. He found that, compared to other 
research methods such as interviews, using CDQ was more accurate and capable of 
predicting managers’ behaviour toward the organisation’s achievement.  
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Therefore, based on Cartwright (1971) and Nutt (1986), since the CDQ has been 
demonstrated to produce more conclusive findings, particularly in decisions risk taking, it 
has had greater appeal than other possible approaches. The choice-dilemma paradigm that 
CDQ is based upon is also suitable to be used in this study. However, some modifications 
of the hypothetical questions have been undertaken so that variables used in this study 
were in line with research questions. The degree of adaptation of Kogan and Wallach’s 
CDQ was limited to the style of questionnaire development not focusing on moral 
reasoning or risk aversion.  For example, respondents were required to indicate their 
actions in relation to tax compliance behaviour (i.e does the probability of being audited 
encourage taxpayers to be more compliant?) (refer Appendix 6). 
 
In this study, the predictors (which affect tax compliance) tested were based on previous 
literature (refer Chapter 4) namely: i) the probability of being audited (Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite, 2000; Kirchler et. al. 2008); ii) perceptions of government spending; iii) 
perceptions of equity and fairness of the tax system (Harris, 1989; Troutman, 1993; 
Richardson 2006; Kirchler et. al., 2008); iv) penalties (Gupta, Lahiri and Mookherjee 
1995; Devos, 2005; Kirchler et. al., 2008); v) financial constraints; vi) changes of current 
government policy such as fuel price increases; vii) referral group; and viii) the role of 
the tax authority (Kirchler et. al., 2008). 
  
This section required the respondent  both to answer Yes/No (YN) and to ‘tick’ a 
probability that, as a taxpayer they would undertake the same action if they faced the 
same situation (PROB) using a series of hypothetical questions (from ‘very low 
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probability’ to ‘very high probability’, using a Likert scale of 1 to 5, refer Appendix 6 – 
the questionnaire). Each question represents an independent variable, hence, eight 
questions were included in this section – one for each predictor from the prior literature. 
 
To derive a score for each question, the YN was initially weighted as 40% (‘Yes’ = 1 
mark, ‘No’ = 2 marks) while PROB was weighted as 60% (1 = 5 marks and 5 = 1 mark). 
For example, if the respondent answered ‘Yes’ and ticked ‘very high probability’, it 
indicated that he/she was highly non-compliant. The given score for him/her would be 1 
((1*0.4) + (1*0.6)). On the other hand if the answer was ‘No’ and ‘very low probability’, 
it indicated that he/she was highly compliant and would be given a score of 3.8 ((2*0.4) + 
(5*0.6)).  
 
Instead of using 50:50 weighting ratio (or other ratio), the ratio of 40:60 was used 
because the nature, length and rigorousness of the questions were different. The ‘YN’ 
part of the questions did not require respondents to think a lot -  simply to tick either 
‘Yes’ or ‘No’  while the ‘PROB” questions lead respondents to determine which scale 
(out of five scales) they were on. To increase results’ validity, a sensitivity analysis was 
also undertaken by considering other weighted combinations for YN:PROB i.e. 30:70, 
50:50 and 60:40. However, multicollinearity tests suggested that there was high 
correlation among the different ratios tested (.998), hence only the 40:60 ratio was used 
for the subsequent analysis.  
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5.3.1.2 Section B – Tax knowledge questions 
 
Section B of the questionnaire consisted of 37 questions related to the respondent’s level 
of tax knowledge and was primarily based on Section 4 (a) to (f) of Income Tax Act 
1967104 as well as studies conducted by Harris (1989); Eriksen and Falllan (1996); Loo 
(2006); Loo and Ho (2005). (See also Mohamad Ali et. al. (2007) and Devos (2008) who 
also used a similar approach). Harris (1989) conducted an experiment (association 
between tax knowledge and perception of fairness of the tax system) using video, divided 
into two phases. Each subject was given 10 scenarios using a 10 point Likert scale 
ranging from 0 (‘allowing this deduction is extremely unfair’) to 10 (‘allowing this 
deduction is extremely fair’). Eriksen and Fallan (1996) in their quasi-experiment 
measured tax knowledge in pre-test and post-test using a score calculated from 12 
questions (post test 28 questions) related to tax allowances and tax liabilities. Instead of a 
5 point Likert scale, Eriksen and Fallan used ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘Do not Know’ scales in 
measuring the level of tax knowledge. Those who answered ‘Do not know’ would receive 
a score of 2.  
 
                                                 
104 Section 4. Classes of income on which tax is chargeable. 
 
“Subject to this Act, the income upon which tax is chargeable under this Act is income in respect of: 
(a) gains or profits from a business, for whatever period of time carried on; 
(b) gains or profits from an employment; 
(c) dividends; interest or discounts; 
(d) rents, royalties or premium; 
(e) pensions, annuities or other periodical payments not falling under any of the foregoing 
paragraphs; 
(f) gains or profits not falling under any of the foregoing paragraphs”. 
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Loo (2006) used a mixed method approach (triangulation) combining a survey, 
experiment and case study. The survey instrument consisted of open-ended and closed 
questions. Unlike this study, Loo’s tax knowledge variables were limited to four 
categories only, namely type of income taxable, relief available, rebates allowable to 
individual taxpayers and a simple calculation of tax liabilities (p. 132). Similar to the 
present study however, Loo also used a 5 point Likert scale (1= Definitely yes; 2= 
Probably yes; 3=Not sure; 4=Probably not and 5=Definitely not). Loo and Ho (2005) 
attempted to examine the level of tax knowledge in terms of joint and separate 
assessment, chargeability of income, exemptions, relief, rebates and tax credit using the 
scale (similar to Eriksen and Fallan, 1996): 1 = Yes; 2= No; 3=Not sure). 
 
 
Unlike other studies (i.e Eriksen and Fallan (1996); Loo (2006); Loo and Ho (2005); 
Devos (2005, 2008)), in response to Erikson and Fallan (1996: 399, refer 1.5) this study 
has divided the level of tax knowledge into seven categories, namely i) knowledge about 
taxpayers’ general responsibilities and rights (three questions); ii) employment income 
(eight questions); iii) dividend and interest income (six questions); iv) personal reliefs 
(eight questions); v) child reliefs (six questions); vi) rebates (four questions); and vii) 
awareness of offences and penalties (three questions). This section required respondents 
to answer (by ticking) options ranging from the scale of 1 (‘if you think the statement 
given is definitely wrong’) to the scale of 5 (‘if you think the statement is definitely 
correct’).  
 
Unlike Eriksen and Fallan (1996), the level of knowledge was measured based on the 
total score of each respondent. In Eriksen and Falllan (1996), respondents with correct 
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answers received a score of 3 (well informed), respondents with ‘do not know’ answer 
received a score of 2 (un-informed) and respondents with a wrong answer received a 
score of 1 (mis-informed) (p. 399).  In this study, for example, for question number 4 in 
Section B (part B-2)105, (refer Appendix 5), the correct answer was ‘5’ on the Likert scale. 
If a respondent ticked scale 5, then he would get 5 marks and if he ticked scale 1, he 
would get 1 mark. (the same procedure applied to scale 4, 3 and respectively). In contrast, 
if the correct answer was  the scale of 1, he would get 5 marks if 1 on the scale was 
ticked, whereas  if he ticked 5 on the scale, he would get 1 mark only106. This kind of 
scoring method enhanced the method used by Eriksen and Fallan (1996) by attempting a 
greater degree of differentiation of knowledgeable and less knowledgeable taxpayers as 
Eriksen and Fallan only used three scales (Yes, No and Do not know) in differentiating 
the level of tax knowledge (p. 400).   
 
 
5.3.1.3 Section C – Tax compliance direct questions 
 
Section C consisted of 26 direct questions related to tax compliance behaviour. The 
variables (i.e. predictors being explored) remained the same as in Section A (hypothetical 
questions). This section was developed to examine the taxpayers’ responses via direct 
questions to complement the hypothetical questions in Section A as well as to enhance 
validity and reliability of the data obtained from Section A questions. This ‘direct 
                                                 
105 The questions was ‘Basic salary must be included in taxable income’. The respondent should have 
answered either ‘Wrong (Likert scale no. 1)’ or ‘ Correct (Likert scale no. 5)’ 
106 For example, questions no. 8 in Section B (part B-2). The questions was ‘Living accommodation 
provided by an employer must be excluded in taxable income.’ The respondent should have answered 
either ‘Wrong (Likert scale no. 1)’ or ‘Correct (Likert scale no. 5)’. 
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questions’ approach was based on Troutman (1993) and Chan et. al. (2000). Comparisons 
of results for both Section A and C will be made in the following chapter. This section 
required the respondents to answer using the Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly 
disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’)107.  Details of the questions can be referred in Appendix 
5. 
 
5.3.1.4 Section D – Respondent background 
 
The final section (Section D) consisted of demographic variables including age, gender, 
income, education background, and some background information on the respondent’s 
tax history. These variables became independent variables in further analysis so that an 
association between these demographic variables and tax knowledge and tax compliance 
could be analysed.  
 
 
5.4 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK, LINKAGE WITH RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
AND RESEARCH STAGES 
 
 
To facilitate and structure the data analysis process, this study was divided into five 
stages: Stage 1 examined the basic sample descriptive statistics in relation to tax 
knowledge; Stage 2 examined the relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
                                                 
107 Compliant taxpayers were measured if they answered ‘Agree’ (5 in Likert scale) or ‘Strongly disagree’ 
(1 in Likert scale) depending on the questions.  
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compliance behaviour; Stage 4 sought to identify the determinants of tax compliance. 
Various control variables were included in Stages 3 and 5 in order to investigate any 
effect of those additional variables in the regressions models used in Stages 2 and 4 to 
expand on the analysis at each of these stages. 
 
5.4.1 Stage 1- The level of tax knowledge – Sample descriptive statistics 
 
 
This section describes the objective and variable measurement, hypotheses development 
and data analysis techniques in Stage 1. 
 
 
5.4.1.1 The objective and variable measurement 
 
This section explain how this research seeks to answer sub-research objective no.1 as 
stated in Chapter 1 (section 1.4) which is seeking to obtain an overview of the tax 
knowledge of individual Malaysian taxpayers. Various tests were conducted to examine 
which variables (from prior literature i.e. gender, race, religion, education level, monthly 
income, location, attended tax courses and experience being audited by the tax authority) 
have significant impact on tax knowledge. Tax knowledge was also divided into seven 
elements of knowledge, namely taxpayers’ responsibilities and rights, knowledge about 
employment income, dividend and interest, personal relief, child relief, rebates and 
awareness on offences, penalties and fines.  
 
In Loo (2006: 156), the level of tax knowledge was measured by the respondents 
themselves (self reported). Respondents were required to rate their knowledge either 
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‘extremely good’, ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘poor’, ‘extremely poor’ and ‘no response’.  
Loo’s study found that more than half (51.7%) of the respondents rated themselves as 
‘satisfactory’ while a very small portion of respondents (2.9% and 0.4% respectively)  
rated either ‘extremely good’ or ‘extremely poor’. Loo’s study also did not take into 
account constructs such as location of taxpayers, attending tax courses and experience of 
being audited by the tax authority. Table 5.4 describes the variables in Stage 1. 
 
Table 5.4: A description of the variables in Stage 1 
Variables Symbol Description 
Age AGE Divided into eight groups:  20-25, 26-30,31-35,36-
40, 41-45,46-50,51-55 and above 56. 
 
Religion RELIG Classified into four main religions: Muslim, 
Christian, Bhuddist and Hindu. 
 
Race/ethnic ETH Classified into four: Malay, Chinese, Indian and 
other (other immigrants from other countries). 
 
Education EDUC Highest education level obtained and divided into 
six levels (SPM/STPM; Certificate/Diploma; 
Degree/Professional; Master; PhD. and others). 
 
Income INCOME Gross monthly income in Ringgit Malaysia (RM). 
 
Attended tax 
courses 
COURSE Attendance at any tax courses organised by 
approved bodies including subjects in any level of 
education (i.e Certificate/Diploma; 
Degree/Professional; Master; PhD.). 
 
Audited by the tax 
authority 
AUDITED Respondents who have been audited by the tax 
authority in the past five years. 
 
Location LOC States where respondents reside. 
 
Total tax 
knowledge 
TOTALTN (B1) Total tax knowledge score (B2 – B8): minimum 
score is 37 (least compliant) and maximum score is 
185 ( most compliant). 
 
Tax knowledge 
about 
responsibilities 
TNRES (B2) Respondents need to know their responsibilities as a 
taxpayer in terms of informing and declaring actual 
income received from all sources to the IRB, 
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and rights keeping records/documents pertaining to income 
and expenditure for a period of seven years after 
submission of the tax return and payment of taxes 
due within 30 days from the date of issue of the 
Notice of Assessment or within the stipulated 
period. Measured based on the number of correct 
answers, minimum mark is 3, maximum mark is 15. 
 
Tax knowledge 
about employment 
income 
TNEMPLOY (B3) Respondents need to know which income should be 
included or excluded in determining the taxable 
income (basic salary, allowances, living 
accommodation provided by employer). Measured 
based on the number of correct answers, minimum 
mark is 7, maximum mark is 35. 
  
Tax knowledge 
about dividend and 
interest 
TNDIVINT (B4) Respondents need to know which dividend and 
interest should be included or excluded in 
determining the taxable income (gross dividend or 
net? Various sources of interest and dividend). 
Measured based on the number of correct answers, 
minimum mark is 6, maximum mark is 30. 
 
Tax knowledge 
about personal 
reliefs 
TNPERSREL (B5) What reliefs and amounts can be claimed? (i.e. 
spouse’s relief, medical expenses for parents, 
purchase of books, journals and magazines 
including newspapers. Measured based on the 
number of correct answers, minimum mark is 8, 
maximum mark is 40. 
 
Tax knowledge 
about child relief 
 
TNCHILDREL (B6) What child relief and amount can be claimed? (i.e. 
category of child, married, unmarried, study locally 
or abroad, disabled child). Measured based on the 
number of correct answers, minimum mark is 6, 
maximum mark is 30. 
 
Tax knowledge 
about rebates 
 
TNREB (B7) What rebate amount can be claimed? (i.e rebates for 
taxable income less than RM35,000, dividend, 
purchase of computer). Measured based on the 
number of correct answers, minimum mark is 4, 
maximum mark is 20. 
 
Tax knowledge 
about awareness 
on offences, 
penalties and fine 
 
TNAWARE (B8) Failure to notify chargeability, late submission of 
tax return or fail to declare his/her source of income 
after making a declaration in the tax return, fraud, 
omissions and understatement. Measured based on 
the number of correct answers, minimum mark is 3, 
maximum mark is 15. 
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5.4.1.2 Data analysis technique 
 
 
T-tests, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and post hoc tests (Scheffe) were used in 
this stage. T-tests were used to examine the significant difference between two means 
while ANOVA was used to examine the significant difference among two or more 
means. The Scheffe (at 5% level of confidence) test was undertaken to make pairwise 
comparisons between means when the groups have different sample size (Agresti and 
Finlay, 2009; Hong, 2005:77-80). Non-parametric tests such as Mann-Whitney U and 
Wilcoxon W. (for 2 independent samples) as well as Kruskall Wallis (for more than 2 
independent samples test) were used to test the difference in medians. The results of  
Stage 1 analysis  are illustrated in details in Chapter 6 (section 6.5).  
 
 
5.4.2 Stage 2 – Relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour 
 
This section describes the objective and variable measurement, hypotheses development 
and data analysis techniques for Stage 2 of our analysis which sought to explore the 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
5.4.2.1 The objective and variable measurement 
 
 
Eriksen and Fallan, (1996) claimed that “no study has been done to investigate which 
parts of tax knowledge have the greatest effect on attitude toward taxation.”(Eriksen and 
Fallan, 1996:399). Thus, this stage attempts to contribute to the filling of this gap as 
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suggested by Eriksen and Fallan and to answer the research questions (refer 1.4) - ‘Does 
tax knowledge affect tax compliance? Which tax knowledge variables (elements) 
significantly correlate with tax compliance behaviour?’  
 
The independent variable, tax knowledge - separated into seven elements of knowledge, 
(as discussed in 4.2 and 5.3.1.2) namely; taxpayers responsibilities’ and rights, 
knowledge about employment income, dividend and interest, personal reliefs, child 
reliefs, rebates and awareness of offences, penalties and fines (Table 5.4). Table 5.5 
describes variables used in Stage 2 in addition to Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.5: A description of the variables in Stage 2 
Variables Symbol Description 
Tax compliance 
Hypothetical 
questions 
(Dependent 
variable) 
TCHYP40:60 Total score derived through a set of eight 
hypothetical questions. Minimum total score for each 
respondent is 8 (1 mark times 8 questions – non-
compliant) and maximum total score is 30.4 (3.8 
times 8 questions – very compliant).  (Further details 
of these computations can be found in 5.3.1.1) 
Tax compliance 
Direct questions 
(Dependent 
variable) 
TCDIR Total score derived through a set of 26 direct 
questions. Minimum total score for each respondent 
is 26 (1 mark times 26 questions – non-compliant) 
and maximum total score is 130 (5 times 26 
questions – very compliant).  (Further details of these 
computations can be found in 5.3.1.3). 
 
*  Table 5.4, Section 5.3.1.2 and Appendix 6 should be read together with this table. 
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5.4.2.2 Hypotheses development for Stage 2 
 
The influence of tax knowledge on compliance behaviour has been described in various 
research (e.g. Mohamad Ali et. al., 2007). The level of education received by taxpayers is 
an important factor that contributes to the understanding about taxation especially 
regarding the laws and regulations of taxation (Eriksen and Fallan, 1996). Previous 
studies have evidenced that tax knowledge has a very close relationship with taxpayers’ 
ability to understand the laws and regulations of taxation, and their ability to comply 
(Singh and Bhupalan, 2001). A question that has been raised by previous researchers (for 
example Singh, 2003; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Harris, 1989) is whether enhancement in 
tax knowledge will increase tax compliance. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Lewis (1982) 
suggested that lack of fiscal knowledge correlates with negative attitudes towards 
taxation and therefore tax behaviour can be improved by better understanding in tax laws. 
This result is in line with previous study by Lewis (1982) that low tax knowledge 
correlates with negatives attitude toward taxation: ‘Tax attitudes can be improved 
through better tax knowledge’ (Eriksen and Fallan 1986: 398) and thus this will in turn 
increase compliance and reduce inclination to evade taxes. 
 
Therefore, following Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Lewis (1982), the following 
hypothesis was developed in relation to Stage 2 (the results can be referred in 6.6.1.1, 
6.6.1.2 and 6.6.2): 
 
HS2 –Tax knowledge is positively associated with attitude towards tax compliance 
behaviour (Equation 5.1 and 5.2). 
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5.4.2.3 Data analysis technique 
 
 
To test hypothesis HS2, the data collected was analysed using multiple regressions 
(Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)). Stepwise multiple regressions were used in Stage 2. 
Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and Tatham (2006: 209) claimed that stepwise multiple 
regression is the best method used to predict multivariate association as it eliminates 
automatically any independent variables that are not statistically significant with the 
dependent variables. The application of this technique at this stage is further appropriate  
as noted by Hair et. al. (2006: 176) because; 1) the data is metric and appropriately 
transformed, and 2) classification of dependent and independent variables are clearly 
made prior to testing.  
 
 
Two measurements of tax compliance behaviour were tested (direct and hypothetical 
questions). Unlike other studies, for example Loo (2006), Mohamad Ali et. al. (2007) and 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996), this study tested tax compliance behaviour using both 
approaches in particular making additional use of the hypothetical questions which, as 
indirect questions, it is argued that can increase reliability of results and minimises 
respondents’ dishonesty when answering the questionnaire (Troutman, 1993, refer 5.3.1.1 
for details).  
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The association between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour to hypothetical 
questions (TCHYP) was analysed using one ratio only: 40:60, as other ratios tested 
(30:70, 50;50 and 60:40) having multicollinearity problems108.  
 
Equation 5.1 and 5.2 describes the relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance to direct and hypothetical questions respectively. 
 
TCDIRi  = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i + β4TNPERSREL i +  
β5TNCHILDREL i + β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL i +  
β9 GENDER i + β10INCOME i + β11AGE i + β12EDUC i + β13 COURSE i + 
β14AUDITED i +  ε i                                                                      
(Equation 5.1) 
Where: 
TCDIR i  - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i    - Tax knowledge about rebates 
TNAWARE i      - Tax knowledge about awareness offences, penalties and 
fines 
                                                 
108 An analysis using other ratios produced a high correlation (.998) among the dependent variables, in this 
case TCHYP. 
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TNTOTALi  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i  - Gender 
 INCOME i  - Income level of  taxpayer 
AGE i    - Age 
EDUC i  - Education level 
COURSE i  - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
TCHYP 40:60 = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i +  β4TNPERSRELi +  
β5TNCHILDREL i + β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL i + β9 
GENDER i + β10INCOME i + β11AGE i + β12EDUC i + β13 COURSE i + 
β14AUDITED i +  ε i                                                              
(Equation 5.2)                               
Where: 
TCHYP40:60 - Tax compliance score (hypothetical questions) 
TCDIR i  - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i  - Tax knowledge about rebates 
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TNAWARE i      - Tax knowledge about awareness offences, penalties and 
fines 
TNTOTALi  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i  - Gender 
 INCOME i  - Income level of taxpayer 
AGE i    - Age 
EDUC i  - Education level 
COURSE i  - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
Results of the analysis of these equations are illustrated in Chapter 6 (6.6.1.1 Table 6.14 
and 6.6.1.2 Table 6.15) 
 
5.4.3 Stage 3- Relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour 
(with addition of control variables) 
 
This section describes the objective and variable measurement, hypotheses development 
and data analysis techniques for Stage 3. 
 
5.4.3.1 The objective and variables measurement 
 
Stage 3 is an extension of Stage 2 in which control variables were included in the 
analysis. Using the same independent and dependent variables from Stage 2, Stage 3 
attempts to include control variables namely gender, income level, age, education level, 
  262
attended tax courses and experience of being audited by the tax authority.  The control 
variables were included in this stage to examine whether control variables affect 
(moderate) the tax compliance behaviour.  
 
The control variables were divided into two categories in order to differentiate the impact 
of each group (i.e tax background) on tax compliance: 
 
1. Demographic control variables (DCV) - gender (D1), income (D2), age (D3), and 
educational level (D4); and  
2. Tax background control variables (TBCV) - attended tax course (E1) and 
experience of being audited by the tax authority (E2).  
 
Description of the control variables can be referred in Table 5.4 and 5.5. 
 
5.4.3.2 Hypotheses development 
 
The development of hypotheses at Stage 3 was classified into two categories, namely 
demographic and tax background.  
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A. Demographics control variables (DCV) 
 
Gender - Some studies found that males are more compliant but other studies revealed 
contradictory results or no significant difference at all (see Table 4.8). As agreements on 
the findings are still maintain, the need to explore current results is relevant. Hasseldine 
and Hite (2003) found that female taxpayers were more compliant than males. However, 
the study reported that males were more compliant compared to females when a 
negatively framed message was used, and females were more compliant than males when 
a positively framed message was used. Mohamad Ali et. al. (2007) also reported that 
females were more compliant in their study. In contrast, Richardson (2006) suggested 
that gender has no significant impact on compliance across a study of 45 countries (refer 
4.3.5.5 for further details).  
 
 
Income - Jackson and Milliron (1986) found that income level has a mixed and unclear 
impact on compliance, and some later research agrees with that statement (see Christian 
and Gupta, 1993: Hite, 1996). Although Jackson and Milliron did not clearly mention the 
reason, it is presumed that endogenous tax regulations among countries might contribute 
to inconsistent findings. For example, progressive tax rates might encourage the higher 
income group to evade rather than the lower income group because their (higher income 
group) tax rates and taxable income are high, thus, making the tax liabilities much higher 
than lower income group. In a country where income redistribution is not satisfying109, 
                                                 
109 For instance, most of tax revenue would have been expensed unwisely. 
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the higher income group tends to evade more (Mohani, 2001) because the high income 
earner might feel betrayed and unfairly treated. Loo (2006) found that high income 
earners in Malaysia are prone to evading tax while Torgler (2007) reported that lower 
income earners in Western Germany were less compliant (refer 4.3.5.2 for further 
details).  
 . 
Age - Demographic factors like age have long been researched by many researchers and 
findings are different along the way.  For example Tittle (1980), Warneryd and Walerud 
(1982) and Wahlund  (1992) posits negative association-older people are less compliant. 
In contrast, Clotfelter (1983), Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1987), Chung and Trivedi (2003) 
and Beron, Tuachen and Witte (1992) argued that age was positively related with 
compliance. However, there have been a significant number of studies which found no 
relationship between age and compliance (See Spicer and Lundstedt 1976; Spicer and 
Becker 1980 and Porcano, 1988).  Mohani 2001 also found that older people are more 
compliant (refer 4.3.5.1 for further details).  
. 
Education - Previous literature supports the direct, positive relationship between 
educational level and taxpayer compliance (Jackson and Miliron 1986; Roth, et. al. 
1989). Chan et. al. (2000) also postulate that education level is directly linked to a 
likelihood of compliance. Educated taxpayers may be aware of non compliance 
opportunities, but their potentially better understanding of the tax system and higher level 
of moral development promote a more favorable taxpayer attitude and greater compliance 
(refer 4.3.5.4 for further details).  
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B. Tax background control variables (TBCV) 
 
Attended tax course – Taxpayers who have attended a tax course would be expected to 
have better tax knowledge in comparison with taxpayers who have never attended a tax 
course. However, in a new SAS in which tax laws and regulations keep on changing, a 
course attended in the previous one or two years might not be as useful anymore as new 
regulations are brought into place i.e. tax course knowledge is likely to be rendered of 
only limited use within fairly short periods. This may however not be true for all types of 
tax course e.g those courses aimed at general tax system knowledge.. Mohamad Ali et. al. 
(2007) has proven that attending tax courses significantly increases tax knowledge but 
central to this study is the need to determine if this association increases tax compliance 
behaviour. 
 
Audited by the tax authority - Some studies have claimed that being audited has a positive 
impact on tax compliance (taxpayers who have ever been audited by a tax authority will 
be more compliant (e.g. see Jackson and Jaouen, 1989; Shanmugam, 2003; Dubin, 2004). 
These findings evidenced that in self assessment system, tax audits play an important role 
and to increase voluntary compliance. Audits rates110 and the thoroughness of audits 
could encourage taxpayers to be more prudent in completing their tax returns. Similarly, 
taxpayers will also report all income and claim the actual deductions to ascertain their tax 
liability. In contrast, taxpayers who have never been audited might attempt to leave 
unreported their actual income and make false deductions.  
                                                 
110 Audit rates are calculated based of number of tax returns audited divided by number of tax returns 
accepted by tax authority. 
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Butler (1993) found that tax audits can change compliance behaviour from negative to 
positive. This finding complements the Witte and Woodbury (1985) and the Beron et.al. 
(1988) studies.  Witte and Woodbury reported that tax audits have a significant role in tax 
compliance but this is limited to small proprietors. They did not empirically test 
individual taxpayers, thus left the need for further research this area. While Butler (1993) 
and Witte and Woodbury (1985) found significant results, Beron et. al. (1988) revealed a 
contradictory result. They reported that audits did not significantly correlate with evasion 
for all groups. Audits were more effective in inducing taxpayers to overclaim deductions  
rather than encouraging them to correctly report actual income. 
 
 
Therefore, based on previous literature, assuming that the tax knowledge is constant, the 
following hypotheses were developed in relation with Stage 3: 
 
 
H3A – Female taxpayers are significantly more compliant. 
H3B – Higher income earners are significantly more compliant. 
H3C – Older people are significantly more compliant. 
H3D – Taxpayers with high level of education are significantly more compliant. 
H3E – Taxpayers who have attended tax courses are significantly more compliant. 
H3F – Taxpayers who have experienced being audited are significantly more compliant. 
Results of the testing of these hypotheses are presented in section 6.7 
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5.4.3.3 Data analysis techniques 
 
In Stage 3, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were used to test the Equation 5.1 
and 5.2 as presented in Table 6.17 and Table 6.18. Results of this regression (in Panel A) 
become the base regression in the model before the supplementary regression model 
(Panel B) was employed by including the control variables as discussed in 5.4.3.2. 
Results in Panel A and B were compared in order to determine whether the inclusion of 
each control variable affects (improves) the base regression model in Panel A. 
 
 
5.4.4 Stage 4 – Exploring the determinants of tax compliance 
 
 
This section describes the objective and variable measurement, hypotheses development 
and data analysis techniques of Stage 4 of this analysis. 
 
5.4.4.1 The objective and variable measurement 
 
 
Stage 4 investigated factors that affect tax compliance behaviour. Based on previous 
literature (refer section 4.3), a total of nine predictors (independent variables) were 
examined namely probability of being audited (E1), perception of government spending 
(E2), perception of equity and fairness (E3), penalty (E4), financial constraint (E5), 
changes to current government policies (E6), referral group (E7), the role of the tax 
authority (E8) and tax knowledge (E9).  
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Table 5.6: A description of the variables in Stage 4 
Variables Symbol Description 
Tax compliance 
Hypothetical 
questions 
(Dependent 
variable) 
TCHYP40:60 Total score derived through a set of eight 
hypothetical questions. Minimum total score for each 
respondent is 8 (1 mark times 8 questions – non-
compliant) and maximum total score is 30.4 (3.8 
times 8 questions – very compliant).  (The details are 
in 5.3.1.1) 
Tax compliance 
Direct questions 
(Dependent 
variable) 
TCDIR Total score was derived through a set of 26 direct 
questions. Minimum total score for each respondent 
is 26 (1 mark times 26 questions – non-compliant) 
and maximum total score is 130 (5 times 26 
questions – very compliant).  (The details are in 
5.3.1.3). 
 
Probability of 
being audited (E1) 
PROBAUDIT Probability of a taxpayer being audited or 
investigated by the tax authority. Minimum score is 1 
(non-complaint), and maximum is 15 (very 
complaint). 
 
Perception of 
government 
spending (E2) 
 
GOVSPEND Taxpayers’ perception of how the government spends 
taxpayers’ money or redistributes the tax collection. 
Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), and maximum 
is 15 (very complaint). 
 
 
Perception on 
equity and fairness 
(E3)  
 
EQUITY Taxpayers’ perception on the equity and fairness of 
the tax system. Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), 
and maximum is 15 (very complaint). 
 
Penalty (E4) PENALTY Penalty rates and the enforcement undertaken by the 
tax authority. Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), 
and maximum is 15 (very complaint). 
 
Financial 
constraint (E5)  
FINCONS Personal financial constraint including inadequacy of 
taxpayers’ income to pay their tax and personal 
expenditures. Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), 
and maximum is 15 (very complaint). 
 
Changes on 
current 
government 
policies (E6)  
 
CHANGES Changes on any government policies for example 
increase of tax rates, increase of fuel prices etc. 
Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), and maximum 
is 15 (very complaint). 
 
Referral group 
(E7)  
GROUP The role of referral group, for example, family 
members and closed friends in determining 
  269
taxpayers’ decision either to comply or not to 
comply. Minimum score is 1 (non-complaint), and 
maximum is 15 (very complaint). 
 
 
The role of Inland 
Revenue Board 
(E8) 
ROLE The role of the tax authority in administering the tax 
system (efficiency, refunds, response with 
complaints, customer services etc). Minimum score is 
1 (non-complaint), and maximum is 15 (very 
complaint). 
 
Tax knowledge 
(E9) 
TNTOTAL Total tax knowledge score. minimum score is 37 
(non-compliant) and maximum score is 185 ( ver 
compliant). 
 
*  Section 5.3.1.1, 5.3.1.3 and Appendix 6 should be read together with this table. 
 
 
5.4.4.2 Hypotheses development 
 
 
As discussed in section 4.2 and 4.3, compliance with respect to probability of being 
audited has received attention from many researchers. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
claimed that taxpayers will always declare their income correctly if probability of 
detection is high. Probability of detection plays a significant role in reporting behaviour 
as taxpayers will declare everything if they perceive that they will be one of the auditees 
in that particular year (Riahi-Belkaoui,2004; Richardson, 2006). Slemrod, Blumenthal 
and Christian (2001) investigated the relationship between the probability of being 
audited and taxpayers’ response. The experiment111 indicated that taxpayers’ behaviour 
varied in terms of level of income and the probability of being audited which played a 
significant role in determining taxpayers’ evasion behaviour. However, the direction of 
the relationship (positive or negative) was not clearly stated by Slemrod et. al. (1998).  
                                                 
111 Using taxpayers’ tax returns for two years to compare the differences in reported income, deductions 
and tax liabilities. Random sampling was used.  
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This result was also supported by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) who also found 
that prior audit experience influenced and increased compliance among taxpayers. 
Conversely, Young (1994) and Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian (2001) found that 
probability of being audited negatively correlated with compliance behaviour. Therefore, 
following the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4A– Probability of being audited is positively correlated with tax compliance. 
  
 
Studies on the relation between government spending and tax compliance, particularly on 
tax evasion are very limited. Taxpayers, especially those who pay high amounts of tax, 
could be expected to be sensitive to how the government spends their money. Although 
there is limited empirical evidence on this topic, it is suspected that taxpayers will tend to 
evade tax if they perceive that the government spends tax money unwisely.  Lewis (1982) 
claimed that misperception probably plays a major role shaping fairness evaluations. 
Meanwhile, Roberts, Hite and Bradley (1994) also suggest that attitude to one's own tax 
evasion (tax ethics), and attitude to other people's tax evasion are considered important. If 
the government is spending the national revenue wisely, such as for basic facilities like 
education, health and safety and public transportation, it is assumed that voluntary 
compliance will increase. In contrast, if taxpayers perceive that the government is 
spending too much on unnecessary things, taxpayers might feel betrayed and attempt to 
evade. Therefore, following the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
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H4B– Positive perception of government spending is positively correlated with tax 
compliance. 
 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) claimed that it is generally accepted that perceptions of 
equity and fairness and tax compliance are related. Spicer (1976) and Song and 
Yarbrough (1978) found a significant negative association between fairness and tax 
evasion. Spicer and Becker (1980) also suggested that tax evasion increases (decreases) 
when taxpayers perceive fiscal inequity (equity) because they feel victimized by 
imbalanced income redistributions. However, the beneficiaries of income equity and what 
forms of inequity are likely to affect evasion behaviour were still unclear and debatable. 
Perceived fairness of tax system also has an influence on the inclination towards tax 
evasion (Jackson and Milliron, 1986; Richardson, 2006). Moreover, Hite and Roberts 
(1992) also suggested that perception of equity and fairness occurred in an improved and 
efficient tax system. Therefore, following the above discussions, it is hypothesized that: 
 
H4C – Positive perception of equity and in the tax system is positively correlated 
with tax compliance. 
 
A theoretical economic model introduced by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) has clearly 
indicated that penalties have an impact on tax compliance- higher penalties discourage 
tax evasion. However, more complex models like principal agent theory and game theory 
suggest that penalties and audit probability are difficult to  portray in compliance models 
as results are determined endogenously with tax cheating (Andreoni et. al. 1998). Beck, 
Davis and Jung (1991) and Becker, Buchner and Sleeking (1987) found that penalty rates 
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affect tax compliance. However, an experimental approach does limit the environment 
into a narrow perspective compared to the real world or a national survey. Marrelli 
(1984), Wang & Conant (1988), Gordon (1990), Marrelli and Martina (1988) found that 
penalty rates have a negative association with evasion. In contrast, Virmani (1989) 
indicated that penalty rates have a positive association with evasion, meaning that higher 
rates will encourage people to cheat. Since previous studies have indicated that penalty 
rates affect tax compliance behaviour, awareness of offences and penalties are presumed 
to have a significant influence as well. If the taxpayers are aware of the offence and the 
consequences of being non compliant taxpayers, they might not cheat. On the other hand, 
if they are unaware of the implication of being dishonest, they might cheat because they 
presume that they will not be detected and could save money. Therefore, following the 
above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4D–Penalty rate is positively correlated with tax compliance. 
 
 
Personal financial constraints are believed to have an impact on tax evasion as financial 
distress faced by an individual will encourage him to prioritise which bill or liability has 
to be paid first, rather, perhaps than tax liabilities. People who face personal financial 
problems are more prone to evade tax when compared with someone with less financial 
distress (Mohani, 2001). Conversely, Vogel (1974) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982) 
found that people with no financial distress also exercise tax evasion and, surprisingly, 
the level of evasion is more serious than that of people with financial distress. Vogel 
presumed that this situation is related to economic status rather than personal condition. 
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Besley, Preston and Ridge (1997) report that an economic downturn may have been a 
factor in poll tax non-compliance in England. Therefore, following the above discussions, 
it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4E – Personal financial constraint is negatively correlated with tax 
compliance. 
 
 
Political stability and the ruling government party in a country might play a significant 
role in determining tax evasion behaviour. For instance, if an individual favours the 
current ruling government party, he might choose to be compliant because he believes 
that the government is trusted, efficient and equitable. Conversely, taxpayers from the 
opposition parties might be noncompliant because they perceive that the government is 
not on their side. In addition to the political affiliation, changes to current government 
policies might also affect tax compliance behaviour. For example, unlike in the UK, in 
Malaysia, petrol prices and some basic needs like sugar, wheat flour, rice and cooking 
oils are control by the government and the prices are regularly increased depending on 
current global economic and government financial situation. Thus, increasing the price of 
these resources has a negative impact on taxpayers’ purchasing power and ultimately will 
encourage taxpayers to evade tax.  
 
Kim (2008) in his study on tax evasion in 50 countries over a three-year period between 
1995 - 2000 concluded that tax evasion is influenced by price control (positive direction), 
public service (positive), collected corporate tax (positive), GDP per capita (positive), tax 
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system (positive) and the composition of government spending (positive). Hasseldine and 
Hite (2003) also concluded that policy changes (the 2001 tax rebate) in the US tended to 
be viewed positively by taxpayers (increasing taxpayers trust and voluntary compliance), 
and those who perceived it positively also tended to perceive the current system as more 
fair. Therefore, following the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4F– Changes to current government policies are negatively correlated with tax  
compliance. 
 
 
Research to ascertain the importance of referent group i.e family members and friends in 
tax compliance is limited, although Ajzen (1988) and Ajzen and Fishbein  (1980) (in their 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB)) theorised 
that referent groups play a significant role in determining people’s intentions and 
behaviour. Decisions either to evade or not to evade are sometimes influenced by 
members of family or friends (Allingham and Sandmo 1972) although the extent of 
influence was not clearly determined. Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) perceived the 
importance of a referent group in a wider continuum in which they used heads of families 
in Central Ohio as the respondents. Spicer and Lundstedt believed that heads of 
households “…would most likely manage tax matters or play a major role in managing 
them.” (p. 299). Judging from this statement however, heads of households would have 
power to influence other members of family in tax matters.  
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In agreement with Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972), 
Clotfelter (1983) also claimed that referent group plays a significant role in evasion 
although it was not clearly mentioned which had stronger influence (family members or 
friends). Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller (1994) reported that the number of evaders 
known to respondents made the largest contribution to the model of under reporting 
income which means that the more respondents know the evaders, the more under 
reporting of income may happen, therefore it is hypothesised that:                 
 
H4G – The influence of referent group is positively correlated with tax  
 
compliance. 
 
 
No conclusive evidence exists for how tax authorities can influence taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour, as researchers from different countries were unable to reach an 
agreement on this issue, as each country has their own approach in ascertaining 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. In the US for example, the IRS view tax 
noncompliance as a big challenge and has had to deal with this carefully as the tax gap 
has increased tremendously in the last decade. The role of tax authority in minimising the 
tax gap and increasing voluntary compliance is very important as Hasseldine and Li 
(1999) placed the government and tax authority as the main party that needed to be 
continuously efficient in administering the tax system in order to minimise tax evasion. 
The government plays the central role in designing the tax systems, enforcement and 
collection (Hasseldine and Li, 1999: 93).  
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Furthermore, Roth et. al. (1989) suggested that in order to increase compliance, maximise 
tax revenue and be respected by taxpayers, a government must first have an economical 
tax system which is practicable112; they must discourage tax evasion and induce honesty, 
avoiding the tendency to dry up the source of the tax; in addition, they must not provoke 
conflict and raise political difficulties and should have a good relationship with 
international tax regime. A recent study conducted by Richardson (2006) also suggested 
that the role of a government has a significant impact on determining attitudes towards 
tax. A simpler tax system introduced by a government can reduce tax evasion. Therefore, 
following the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4H– The role (efficiency) of the tax authority is positively correlated with tax  
  
compliance. 
  
 
A question that has been raised by previous researchers (Singh, 2003; Eriksen and Fallan, 
1996; Harris, 1989) is whether enhancement in knowledge will increase tax compliance. 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996: 387) claimed that ‘knowledge about tax law is assumed to be 
important for preferences and attitudes towards taxation. There is little research that 
explicitly considers how attitude towards taxation is influenced by specific knowledge of 
tax regulations’. They suggested that lack of fiscal knowledge correlates with negative 
attitudes towards taxation and tax behaviour can be improved by better understanding in 
tax laws113. This result is in line with previous study by Lewis (1982) that low tax 
knowledge correlates with negatives attitudes towards taxation. ‘Tax attitudes can be 
                                                 
112 The government have suitable powers (assessment and collection) to administer the tax system . 
113 This finding is in line with Lewis (1982) 
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improved through better tax knowledge’ (Eriksen and Fallan 1986: 398) and thus this will 
in turn increase compliance and reduce inclination to evade taxes. Therefore, following 
the above discussions, it is hypothesised that: 
 
H4J– Tax knowledge is positively correlated with tax compliance. 
 
5.4.4.3 Data analysis technique  
 
 
To test the hypotheses, the data was analysed using multiple regressions (Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS)).  Two measurements of tax compliance behaviour were tested (direct and 
hypothetical questions). Equation 5.3 and 5.4 were used as the base regression models to 
test the hypotheses and establish the tax compliance determinants. 
 
 
TCDIRi  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + β4PENALTY i +  
β5FINCONS i + β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + β8 ROLEi +  
                  β9 TNTOTALi  + β10 GENDER i + β11INCOME i + β12AGE i + β13EDUC i + 
β14 COURSE i + β15AUDITED i + ε i                                                                      
(Equation 5.3) 
Where: 
TCDIR i        - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
PROBAUDIT i   - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND i   -Perception on government spending 
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EQUITY i   - Perception on equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLE i        - The role of the tax authority 
  TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i   - Gender 
 INCOME i   - Income level of taxpayer 
AGE i     - Age 
EDUC i   - Education level 
COURSE i   - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i  - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
TCHYP40:60 i  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + 
β4PENALTY i +  β5FINCONS i + β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + 
β8 ROLEi +  β9 TNTOTALi +  β10 GENDER i + β11INCOME i + 
β12AGE i + β13EDUC i + β14 COURSE i + β15AUDITED i ε i                                           
(Equation 5.4) 
Where: 
TCHYP i        - Tax compliance score (hypothetical  questions) 
PROBAUDIT i   - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND i    -Perception on government spending 
  279
EQUITY i   - Perception on equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLE i        - The role of the tax authority 
TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i   - Gender 
 INCOME i   - Income level of taxpayer 
AGE i     - Age 
EDUC i   - Education level 
COURSE i   - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i  - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
Results for these equations are illustrated in Chapter 6 (6.8.2 and 6.8.3). 
 
5.4.5 Stage 5 – Exploring tax compliance determinants with control variables 
 
This section describes the objective and variable measurement, hypotheses development 
and data analysis techniques in Stage 5. 
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5.4.5.1 The objective and variable measurement 
 
 
Stage 5 is an extension of Stage 4 in which control variables were included in the 
analysis. Using the same independent and dependent variables from Stage 4, Stage 5 
attempts to include control variables, namely gender, income level, age, education level, 
attended tax courses and experience of being audited by the tax authority. Control 
variables in Stage 5 were included to examine whether control variables affects 
(moderates) tax compliance behaviour.  The control variables used in this stage were the 
same as Stage 3; details of each control variable can be referred to in 5.4.3.1, 5.4.3.2 and 
Table 5.4. 
 
5.4.5.2 Hypotheses development 
 
 
Following the control variables used in Stage 3 and based on the discussions on 5.4.3.1 
and 5.4.3.2, the objective of including control variables in the base regression model was 
to examine whether each control variable significantly affects the regressions model. 
Unlike the hypotheses at Stage 4 which specifically tested the direction of association 
(positive or negative), the development of hypotheses for Stage 5 is to examine whether 
demographic and tax background variables would increase tax compliance behaviour. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses were developed in relation to Stage 5: 
 
H5A – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, female taxpayers are 
significantly more compliant. 
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H5B – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, higher income earners are 
significantly more compliant. 
 
H5C – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, older taxpayers are 
significantly more compliant. 
 
H5D – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, taxpayers with higher levels of 
education are significantly more compliant. 
 
H5E – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, taxpayers who have attended 
tax courses are significantly more compliant. 
 
H5F – With regard to other tax compliance determinants, taxpayers who have been 
audited are significantly more compliant. 
 
5.4.5.3 Data analysis techniques 
 
In line with Stage 3, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions were also used to test 
the base regression model as illustrated in the Equation 5.3 and 5.4, (results are illustrated 
in Table 6.26 and Table 6.28). Results of these regressions (Panel A) become the base 
regression in the model before supplementary regression models (Panel B) were 
employed to include the control variables discussed in 5.4.3.2. Results in Panel A and B 
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were compared in order to determine whether the inclusion of each control variable 
affects (improves) the base regression model in Panel A. 
 
5.5 Methodology limitations  
 
 
The approach applied in this study has a number of limitations. Firstly, the use of landline 
telephone directories might cause some groups of taxpayers to be eliminated from the 
sample frame, thus creating a potential threat to external validity and increasing sampling 
error. However, this issue has been balanced by a high number of usable responses 
(1,073) which is relatively high compared to other similar tax studies (refer Table 5.3).  
 
Secondly, the use of a mail survey may create some problems such as non response bias, 
misunderstanding of questions and variables measured by self reporting. Any survey has 
to be concerned with “non-response bias”. This refers to a situation in which people who 
do not return a questionnaire have opinions that are systematically different from the 
opinions of those who do return their surveys. The standard way to overcome this 
problem is to compare the responses of those who return the first mailing of the 
questionnaires with those who return the second mailing (Donzé, 2002; Sydow, 2006). 
Details of analysis undertaken to test for this potential problem in this study are explained 
in Chapter 6.  
 
Thirdly, tax knowledge was only measured based on a limited coverage of the Income 
Tax Act 1967. The results might be different if a wider scope of tax knowledge were 
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used. A wider coverage of tax knowledge would not be able to be conducted in this study 
as doing so would make the questionnaire lengthy and cumbersome and it thus might be 
potentially disregarded by the respondents and therefore the response rate might decrease. 
 
Fourthly, the compliance measure is a judgment based measure using hypothetical 
situations. As tax evasion is a sensitive issue, respondents may not feel comfortable 
answering the questions without any control or direct contact. Actual behaviour of the 
subjects may vary from the responses given. Acknowledging this constraint, however, it 
is believed that this is the most suitable way to predict taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, 
as direct questions might lead respondents to answer the questions dishonestly and could 
be potentially embarrassing for respondents. 
 
Fifthly, since this study used a printed message and communicated on one occasion, it is 
possible that different results might be obtained if a different medium of communication 
was used, such as interviews. However, as the objective of this study is to obtain a 
national response, therefore, this kind of communication (a printed message) is believed 
to be the most viable method (in terms of time and money) in order to reach wider 
coverage compared with interviews and experiments. 
 
Finally, results of this study might be different if other data analysis techniques like 
structured equation modeling (SEM) were used rather than multiple regressions. This 
study was unable to be tested using SEM because the questionnaire is designed to test 
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only one way interaction between independent and dependent variables. Therefore, 
multiple regressions were considered sufficient to answer the research objectives. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology of this study, including the 
data collection process, sampling frame and sampling procedures as well as the 
development of the questionnaires. Five stages of data analysis were employed in order to 
answer the research objectives outlined in section 1.4. In each stage, an explanation 
regarding variables of definitions and measurement, hypotheses development and data 
analysis techniques were discussed in detail. Despite the advantages of using OLS as a 
data analysis method, some limitations in the methodology were also highlighted as 
limitations of this study. In the next chapter, the results of this study are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter describes the results of the study starting with summary of the survey, 
response rates and respondents’ background. The remainder of this chapter will then be 
divided into the following sections: 1) Stage 1 – to examine the level of taxpayers’ 
knowledge and the profile of respondents; 2) Stage 2 – to examine the association 
between tax knowledge in various aspects (independent variables) and tax compliance 
based on hypothetical and direct questions; 3) Stage 3 – to examine the association 
between tax knowledge  and tax compliance with control variables; 4) Stage 4 – to 
identify factors impacting tax compliance behaviour by using both hypothetical and 
direct questions; and 5) Stage 5 – to identify determinants of tax compliance with control 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
6.2 SURVEY DISTRIBUTION AND RESPONSE RATES 
 
The following table summarises the survey and response rates. According to Table 6.1, 
the initial surveys were distributed evenly among the locations and the response rates of 
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each location were considered balanced in the range of 94 to 120 usable questionnaires. 
Out of 5,500 surveys distributed, 71 were returned due to incomplete addresses, 
respondents having moved or deceased. Sabah/Labuan and Sarawak were the leading 
states with 15 and 12 returned mails respectively while Melaka/Negeri Sembilan had the 
least number of returned questionnaires. Out of 1,106 surveys returned, 1,073 
representing 19.51% of the total sample were usable and could be further analysed. 
Section 6.4 describes the validity of these sample groups. 
 
Table 6.1: Summary of survey distribution and response rates 
 
Cluster States Survey 
distributed 
Survey 
returned 
due to 
incomplete 
address, 
moving 
and died 
Survey 
returned 
but 
incomplete 
(not used) 
Total 
usable 
response 
Total 
usable 
response 
% 
1 Selangor/ 
Kuala Lumpur 
 
550 
 
8 
 
3 
 
120 
 
21.82 
2 Perlis/Kedah 550 5 5 101 18.36 
3 Pulau Pinang/ 
Perak 
550 6 - 115 20.91 
4 Melaka/Negeri 
Sembilan 
 
550 
2 4 104 18.91 
5 Johor 550 3 5 107 19.45 
6 Kelantan 550 9 6 112 20.36 
7 Terengganu 550 5 4 104 18.91 
8 Pahang 550 6 3 119 21.64 
9 Sabah/ Labuan 550 15 - 97 17.64 
10 Sarawak 550 
 
12 3 94 17.09 
Total 5,500 71 33 1,073 19.51 
 
Malaysia consists of fourteen states. However, telephone directories in Malaysia were 
classified based on region, for example Perlis and Kedah telephone directories were 
classified in ‘northern region’ directories. This is the reason why clusters were used in 
this study. In terms of the number of surveys distributed, 5,500 were far away from the 
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total population of Malaysia, particularly individuals taxpayers of 2,198,914114 in year 
2006 (IRB Annual Report, 2006). However, a past study (Loo, 2006) has shown that 
using such a number of questionnaires in distribution is large enough to represent 
individual taxpayers in  Malaysia. In addition, Sekaran (2000:295) suggests that the 
optimum sample size for a total population of one million is 384 or 0.0384% (p.295).  
 
Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) provide some guidelines as to the minimum sample 
size needed for accurate predictions in multiple regressions.  They suggested that in order 
to obtain a valid and good prediction in multiple regressions, the number of the sample is 
determined by the number of predictors in the multiple regressions. As this study attempt 
to analysis nine predictors, Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) suggested that the number 
of the sample should be 900 (see Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008), Table 1, p. 438). 
 
As determining the sample size is controversial, Hinkle and Oliver (1983), Cochran 
(1953) and Krejcie and Morgan (1970) suggested a commonly used approach to 
determine the number of sample by a formula provided that the population error variance 
(ơ2) and the degree of accuracy (effect size) are exist.. Since both variables were not 
available for this study and the total individual taxpayers (population) were 2,198,914, 
therefore based on Sekaran (2000:295-296) and Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008), the 
sample size should be at least 845 or 900. Thus, the response of 1,073 was considered 
representative enough to obtain reliable and valid results. 
 
                                                 
114 This figure is based on total number of tax returns distributed to registered individual taxpayers.  
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6.3 BACKGROUNDS OF RESPONDENTS  
 
This section describes respondents’ demographic and tax background including age, 
gender, educational levels, income levels, attendance at tax courses and experience of 
being audited by the tax authority. Some descriptive statistics are also illustrated in this 
section. 
 
 
The respondents comprised of 588(55%) females, 483 (45%) males while 2 respondents 
did not mention their gender. The majority of the respondents were Malays with 910 
(85%), followed by Chinese, Indian and other ethnicity with 84(8%), 44(4%) and 32 
(3%) respectively.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 represents the age statistics. Since this study emphasised individual taxpayers, 
a minimum age of 20 years old was considered reasonable. There were eight age groups 
involved in this study with a 5-year range in each group except for ‘above 56 years old’ 
category. The largest group of the respondents, (252 or 24%) were aged between 26 and 
30 years old and respondents in the group of above 56 years old was the lowest number 
with 14 responses (1%). Cumulatively, respondents aged between 20 and 40 years old 
made up the largest portion with 749 responses (70%).  A total of 768 (72%) respondents 
were married, 280 (26%) were single and 20 (2%) were widows/widowers.  
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Figure 6.1: Age group 
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As presented in Figure 6.2, most of the respondents had good academic qualifications: a 
total of 377 respondents or 35% had a degree while 101 (9%) respondents had higher 
than degree level qualifications. Only 259 respondents had a lower level of education 
including secondary level, SPM/STPM115. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM) is the equivalent of GCSE-Level while Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran Malaysia 
(STM) is the equivalent of A-level in the UK education system. 
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Figure 6.2: Level of Education 
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As shown in Figure 6.3, the majority (944, 88%) of the respondents earned less than 
RM6,000 while 64 (6%) respondents had a monthly income of more than RM6,000. Only 
19 (2%) earned more than RM10,000 per month116. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 The average income for all regions is approximately between RM2,001 – RM4,000. 
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Figure 6.3: Monthly Income 
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Figure 6.4 illustrates the fraction of respondents who had attended any informal or formal 
tax courses organised by authorised bodies. A total of 192 (18%) of the respondents had 
attended taxation courses while a large number of them, 876 (82%) not attended any tax 
courses before. A total of only 36 (3%) of the respondents had been audited while a large 
number of them, 1,028 (97%) had never been audited. Figure 6.5 represents the 
respondents who had experienced being audited by the IRB.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  292 
 
Figure 6.4 Attended tax courses 
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Figure 6.5 Audited by IRB 
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6.4 INTERNAL VALIDITY (RELIABILITY TEST) 
 
Internal validity refers to cause-effect relationship among independent and dependent 
variables. It attempts to answer “to what extent does the research design permit the 
researcher to conclude that the independent variable A causes a change in the dependent 
variable B” (Sekaran 2000:151). Research with high internal validity enables a researcher 
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to better argue that a relationship is causal whereas low internal validity produces less 
valid results. (Sekaran 2000:151). Reliability tests measure the internal consistency and 
stability of the multi-item scales and the extent to which the measurement across the 
items in the questionnaires are biased (Hong, 2005).  
 
Hair et. al. (2006:102,137) benchmarked data, stating that alphas of more than .70 are 
good enough to be analysed in order to produce reliable and valid data, although this may 
decrease to .60 in exploratory research. Results (see Table 6.2) indicate that the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha117 for 8 out of 16 constructs were more than 0.700, 4 constructs were 
more than 0.600, while the others were less than 0.600 but more than 0.5000 which 
suggests that the instruments used were valid and of a high degree of reliability. In 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996: 392), their Cronbach alpha were 0.52 (pre test) and 0.60 (post 
test). Although some of the variables had slightly low Cronbach’s Alpha, based on 
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) the coefficients were acceptable for further analysis and the 
ability to produce valid, reliable and verifiable results was convincing (Hair et. al. 2006: 
137; Sekaran, 2000: 310-313). The following table summarises the results of reliability 
tests (Cronbach’s Alpha) for factors involved.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Since each factor is measured by three questions in the survey, this reliability test measures consistency 
responses in relation with the factor. 
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Table 6.2: Reliability test - Cronbach’s Alpha for variables 
 
Main variables Sub variables Cronbach 
Alpha 
Tax knowledge General responsibilities and rights .693 
 Employment income .521 
 Dividend and interest income .676 
 Personal relief .731 
 Child relief .665 
 Rebates  .567 
 Awareness of offences penalties and fines .816 
   
Probability of being audited .707 Tax compliance 
(Direct) Perception of government spending .793 
 Perception of equity and fairness .512 
 Penalties .752 
 Financial constraint .665 
 Changes on current government policy .890 
 Referral group .869 
 Role of IRB .562 
 Ethics .830 
 
 
6.5 STAGE 1 – LEVEL OF TAXPAYERS’ KNOWLEDGE – SAMPLE 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
This section explains the characteristics of taxpayers’ knowledge. Some demographic 
variables including gender, age, income level and education level, religion, race/ethnicity 
and attended tax courses were tested using T-tests, ANOVA, Mann-Whitney U., 
Wilcoxon W. and Kruskall-Wallis. 
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6.5.1 T-tests, Mann-Whitney U. and Wilcoxon W. 
 
This section presents results of the tested variables including gender, attended tax courses 
and experience being audited by the IRB. 
 
6.5.1.1 A1 - Gender 
 
A t-test is used to assess whether the means of two groups (i.e male and female) are 
statistically different from each other (Bryman and Bell 2003:352; Sekaran 2000: 317; 
Hair et. al.2006: 388-390; Hong 2005: 45). Table 6.3 illustrates the results of t-test 
between males and females.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  296 
 
 
Table 6.3: Mean different between variables (t-test) 
 
IV:DV# 
 
Mean SD t 
A1:B1 
 Male 
 Female 
 
132.13 
130.25 
 
17.92 
16.15 
 
1.799*** 
A1:B2 
 Male 
 Female 
 
6.77 
6.19 
 
2.83 
2.57 
 
3.506* 
A1:B3 
 Male 
 Female 
 
26.48 
26.54 
 
5.27 
5.06 
 
-.187 
A1:B4 
 Male 
 Female 
 
17.74 
17.86 
 
5.92 
5.27 
 
-.436 
A1:B5 
 Male 
 Female 
 
32.29 
31.92 
 
6.28 
6.22 
 
.930 
A1:B6 
 Male 
 Female 
 
18.58 
18.38 
 
5.64 
5.19 
 
.597 
A1:B7 
 Male 
 Female 
 
14.34 
13.89 
 
3.77 
3.56 
 
2.044** 
 
A1:B8 
 Male 
 Female 
 
9.78 
9.67 
 
3.38 
3.05 
 
.546 
 
* significant at p < 0.01 
** significant at p < 0.05 
*** significant at p < 0.10 
   # Refer to Table 5.4 for variable definitions 
 
In general Table 6.3, illustrates that there was a significant difference (t = 1.799, p<0.10) 
between males’ and females’ tax knowledge. It shows that males’ tax knowledge (mean = 
132.13, SD = 17.92) was significantly better than females’ (mean = 130.25, SD = 16.15). 
Moreover, males were also found to be more significantly knowledgeable in terms of 
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familiarity with employment income (mean = 6.77, SD = 2.83, t = 3.506, p < 0.01) and 
rebates (mean = 14.34, SD = 3.77, t = 2.044, p < 0.05). 
 
These results were also supported by Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon (MWW)118 tests 
which showed that there were significant differences between males and females in terms 
of knowledge on rebates (p<0.01, z =-2.593) and total score of the tax knowledge 
(p<0.05, z = -2.08). However, the MWW test indicated that significant tax knowledge 
differences occurred in knowledge about responsibility and rights (p<0.01, z = -3.286) 
instead of employment income as suggested by the t-test.  
 
 
6.5.1.2  A7 – Attended tax courses 
 
Table 6.4 illustrates t-test results between taxpayers who had attended tax courses (A7) 
and tax knowledge variables (B1 to B8). This analysis attempts to investigate whether 
attending tax courses could increase knowledge of tax. It is theorised that the more tax 
courses that the taxpayers attend, the better their tax knowledge would be (refer section 
4.2). In general the t-test suggests that there was significant difference between the tax 
knowledge of taxpayers who had attended tax courses and those who had not with t = 
4.585, p < 0.01.  
 
 
 
                                                 
118 To test the difference in medians, details can be found in 5.4.1.2. 
  298 
 
Table 6.4: Mean difference between variables (t-test) – A7 (Attended tax courses) 
* Significant at p < 0.01 
 
Taxpayers who had attended tax courses had a mean of 133.52 (SD = 16.84) compared to 
130.61 (SD = 16.99). The two groups had significant mean difference with respect to 
their tax knowledge on B3, B4 and B8 with t = 8.338, 6.491 and 20.92 respectively (p < 
0.01). 
 
In addition, MWW tests also showed that there was a significant association between tax 
knowledge and tax course attendance. Tax knowledge on employment income (p< 0.01, z 
= -3.016), dividend and interest (p<0.01, z = -2.615), awareness of offences and penalties 
(p<0.001, z = -4.614) and general score of tax knowledge (p< 0.05, z = -2.133) appear to 
be significant. 
 
 
6.5.1.3 A8 – Experience of being audited by IRB 
 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 describe the relationship between tax knowledge and experience 
of being audited by the Inland Revenue Board (IRB).  According to Table 6.5, there was 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t 
A7 
Yes 
No 
 
133.52 
130.61 
 
16.84 
16.99 
4.585*  
5.91 
6.56 
 
2.68 
2.70 
9.40*  
27.49 
26.30 
 
5.15 
5.14 
8.338*  
18.76 
17.63 
 
5.45 
5.58 
6.491* 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t 
 
A7 
Yes 
No 
  
 
 
32.46 
32.01 
 
 
5.91 
6.32 
 
.743 
 
 
18.13 
18.56 
 
 
5.63 
5.34 
 
.987 
 
 
13.86 
14.14 
 
 
3.85 
3.62 
 
.903 
 
 
10.68 
9.52 
 
 
2.89 
3.23 
 
20.921* 
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no significant mean difference between experience of being audited and tax knowledge 
level in general (A8:B1). However, as for A8:B5 and A8:B8, there were significant mean 
differences between experienced and non-experienced taxpayers in relation to knowledge 
about personal relief (B5) and awareness of offences, penalties and fines (B8) with t = 
6.168 (p < 0.01) and 2.159 (p<0.10) respectively. 
 
Table 6.5: Mean different between variables (t-test) – A8 – Audited by IRB 
 
* Significant at p <0.01 
*** Significant at p < 0.10 
 
 
The t-test revealed that experience of being audited by IRB did not significantly increase 
tax knowledge. In addition ANOVA and post hoc test analysis as illustrated in Table 6.6 
also supported the theory that the frequency of being audited did not significantly affect 
the level of tax knowledge. Taxpayers who had been audited once had significantly better 
tax knowledge than those audited three times with F = 4.375, p < 0.01 in terms of 
knowledge about employment income (B3). On the other hand, the frequency of being 
audited had significant mean difference with F = 2.429, p< 0.10 for awareness of 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t 
A8 
Yes 
No 
 
134.58 
130.97 
 
17.63 
16.89 
 
1.579 
 
6.97 
6.42 
 
 
2.47 
2.71 
 
1.417 
 
25.45 
26.56 
 
6.73 
5.08 
 
1.569 
 
17.72 
17.82 
 
4.97 
5.59 
 
.011 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t Mean SD t 
A8 
Yes 
No 
  
 
34.65 
32.65 
 
5.34 
6.23 
 
6.168* 
 
18.94 
18.42 
 
5.81 
5.36 
 
.325 
 
14.22 
14.07 
 
3.67 
3.65 
 
.056 
 
10.50 
9.70 
 
3.35 
3.20 
 
2.159*** 
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offences, penalties and fines (B8). However, the Scheffe post hoc test did not indicate 
any significant different for A8a:B8. 
 
Table 6.6: Mean differentcebetween variables (t-test) – A8a – Audited by IRB (frequency) 
 
* Significant at p <0.01 
*** Significant at p < 0.10 
# Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
 
The MWW test has shown that knowledge about personal relief (p<0.05, z = -2.505) is 
the only variable that appears to be significant, implying that experience of being audited 
by the IRB did not increase taxpayers’ knowledge in any area except knowledge about 
personal relief. 
 
 
 
 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
A8a 
  1 time 
  2 times 
  3 times 
 
138.47 
124.80 
136.83 
 
15.23 
27.30 
15.78 
1.246  
6.91 
7.40 
7.00 
 
2.35 
2.70 
2.82 
 
.083  
27.00# 
21.80 
15.00# 
 
5.64 
8.87 
5.65 
4.375*  
17.39 
16.60 
20.50 
 
4.86 
7.16 
3.53 
.407 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
A8a 
  1 time 
  2 times 
  3 times   
 
35.82 
32.40 
36.00 
 
 
4.923 
6.69 
5.65 
.895  
19.26 
19.40 
22.00 
 
5.94 
8.23 
.00 
.178  
14.29 
15.20 
15.50 
 
3.92 
3.03 
4.94 
.195  
10.69 
7.20 
12.50 
 
3.56 
3.89 
.70 
2.429*** 
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6.5.2 One-way ANOVA, post hoc test (Scheffe119) and Kruskall Wallis (KW) 
 
Variables involved in this section are race/ethnicity, religion, education level, monthly 
income, location and age (refer section 5.4.1.2 for details of these methods of analysis). 
 
 
6.5.2.1  A2 – Race/Ethnicity 
 
Table 6.7 demonstrates ANOVA and post hoc tests (Scheffe) between race (A2) and tax 
knowledge variables (B1). Results suggest that there was a significant difference in terms 
of tax knowledge among Malays, Chinese, Indian and other ethnic groups with F = 2.351 
(p < 0.01). Post hoc tests (p < 0.05) showed that Malay respondents had significantly 
higher tax knowledge than others with mean = 131.45, SD = 16.72. In addition results 
also indicated that there were significant mean differences with regard to certain sub-
level tax knowledge variables, namely taxpayers’ responsibilities and rights (B2) (F = 
2.139, p < 0.05), employment income (B3) (F = 2.202, p < 0.05), dividend and interest (F 
= 6.620, p < 0.01), rebates (B7) (F = 5.164, p < 0.01) and awareness of offences, 
penalties and fines (B8) (F = 2.301, p < 0.01).  As for B4, Indian’s tax knowledge was 
significantly the highest followed by Chinese, Malays and other ethnics while for B7, 
again Malay was the highest group compared to other ethnics (mean = 14.25, SD = 3.67, 
p < 0.01).  
                                                 
119 Post hoc test (Scheffe) is used to examine the significant difference among independent variables in 
relation to dependent variable. Scheffe tests could describe which of the dependent variables has most 
significant effect (Norusis 2008;Hong 2005:77) 
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Table 6.7: ANOVA and Post Hoc test (Scheffe) – A2 (Race) 
 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
IV             
A2 
  Malay 
  Chinese   
   Indian  
  Others   
 
131.45# 
130.97 
129.96 
123.48# 
 
16.72 
18.78 
16.48 
19.42 
2.351*  
6.51 
5.79 
6.34 
6.94 
 
2.67 
2.68 
3.12 
2.89 
2.139**  
26.56 
27.18 
25.07 
25.34 
 
4.90 
5.44 
6.76 
7.88 
2.202**  
17.72 # 
18.74# 
20.39# 
15.06# 
 
5.56 
5.58 
5.20 
4.27 
6.62* 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
A2 
  Malay 
  Chinese   
   Indian  
  Others  
 
32.11 
32.16 
31.88 
30.90 
 
6.18 
6.96 
6.32 
6.25 
.430  
18.55 
17.64 
17.91 
19.34 
 
5.38 
6.00 
4.78 
4.86 
1.157  
14.25# 
13.02# 
13.75 
12.50# 
 
3.67 
3.43 
3.43 
3.63 
 
5.164*  
9.77 
10.02 
9.05 
8.59 
 
3.14 
3.46 
3.05 
3.97 
2.301* 
* Significant at p <0.01 
** Significant at p <0.05 
*** Significant at p < 0.10 
# Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
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Non-parametric test, KW and median tests also suggested that the other ethnic groups 
had significant differences, particularly in knowledge about responsibility (p<0.05, χ2 
= 8.731, med = 6), dividend and interest (p<0.001, χ2= 20.450, med = 18), rebates 
(p<0.01, χ2= 17.195, med = 14) and total tax knowledge scores (p<0.10, χ2= 6.687, 
med = 131).  
 
6.5.2.2 A3 – Religion 
 
Table 6.8 illustrates ANOVA and the post hoc test between religion (A3) and tax 
knowledge variables (B1 to B8). In general ANOVA suggested that there was no 
significant difference between tax knowledge and religion except for sub tax 
knowledge variables, namely dividend and interest income (B4) and personal relief 
(B5). There was significant mean difference for knowledge about personal relief with 
F = 2.264, p < 0.01. The post hoc test suggested that Buddhist taxpayers were 
significantly more knowledgeable than Christian with mean = 34.23, SD = 5.48, p < 
0.05. 
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Table 6.8: ANOVA and Post Hoc test (Scheffe) – A3 (Religion) 
 
* Significant at p <0.01 
# Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
 
KW and median tests also suggested that religion produced significant difference 
particularly regarding knowledge about responsibility (p<0.10, χ2 = 8.672 med = 6), 
dividend and interest (p<0.01, χ2= 16.075, med = 18), employment (p<0.05, χ2= 
11.719, med = 27) and personal relief (p<0.10, χ2= 9.277, med = 32).  
 
 
6.5.2.3  A4 – Education level 
 
Table 6.9 illustrates ANOVA and the post hoc test between education level (A4) and 
tax knowledge variables (B1 to B8). In general ANOVA suggested that there was no 
significant difference between an individual’s education level and tax knowledge. 
However, education level appears to have an impact in terms of sub tax knowledge 
variables, namely dividend and interest income (B4) (F = 2.628, p < 0.01), child relief 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
IV             
A3 
  Muslim    
 Christian 
  Buddha 
  Hindu 
  Others 
 
131.34 
127.57 
136.03 
130.83 
130.67 
 
16.96 
15.36 
19.09 
17.90 
19.97 
1.262  
6.48 
6.26 
5.67 
5.83 
7.67 
 
2.64 
2.80 
2.86 
2.89 
6.35 
1.437  
6.48 
6.27 
5.67 
5.83 
7.67 
 
2.64 
2.80 
2.86 
2.90 
6.30 
1.437  
17.74 
18.22 
19.38 
20.72 
13.00 
 
5.58 
4.34 
5.60 
5.57 
4.58 
 
3.385* 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
A3 
  Muslim   
 Christian 
  Buddha 
  Hindu 
  Others    
 
32.15 
30.13 
34.23 
31.29 
34.33 
 
6.21 
5.99# 
5.48# 
6.58 
3.51 
2.264* 
 
 
18.48 
19.10 
17.23 
17.03 
21.33 
 
5.40 
4.47 
6.04 
4.95 
7.77 
1.364  
14.15 
13.02 
13.64 
13.55 
14.00 
 
3.69 
3.11 
3.57 
4.01 
2.65 
1.269  
9.79 
9.28 
10.00 
9.41 
8.00 
 
3.16 
3.50 
3.45 
3.35 
4.36 
.626 
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(B6) (F= 3.1113, p < 0.01) and rebates (B7) (F = 1.529, P < 0.10). As for A4 – B6 
relationship, surprisingly the post hoc test reported that the SPM/STPM holders had 
significantly higher tax knowledge than bachelor/professional qualification or 
equivalent (mean = 19. 23, SD = 5.66, p <0.01). 
 
Table 6.9: ANOVA and Post Hoc test (Scheffe) – A4 (Education level) 
* Significant at p <0.01 
*** Significant at p < 0.10 
# Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
 
KW and median tests also suggested that different educational levels significantly 
affected some sub-levels of tax knowledge, particularly knowledge about dividend 
and interest (p<0.01, χ2= 15.537, med = 18) and child relief (p<0.001, χ2= 18.545, 
med = 18). However, the total score of tax knowledge appears to be not significantly 
associated with the level of taxpayers’ education. 
 
 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
IV             
A4 
  SPM/STPM  
  Cert./Diploma     
  Bachelor/Prof. 
  Master 
  Ph.D 
   
 
130.74 
131.33 
130.70 
131.66 
139.26 
 
18.41 
15.94 
16.62 
17.66 
15.82 
.809  
6.41 
6.56 
6.40 
6.48 
6.07 
 
2.80 
2.47 
2.87 
2.65 
6.07 
.234  
26.23 
26.66 
26.61 
26.30 
27.67 
 
5.99 
5.01 
4.52 
5.50 
3.62 
.494  
17.38 
17.41 
18.13 
19.06 
20.53 
 
5.37 
5.66 
5.52 
5.85 
4.10 
2.628* 
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
             
A4 
  SPM/STPM   
 Cert./Diploma  
Bachelor/Prof. 
  Master 
  Ph.D   
 
31.61 
32.33 
32.07 
32.31 
34.63 
 
6.70 
6.43 
5.76 
6.54 
5.53 
 
.844  
19.23 
18.73 
17.82 
17.49 
20.08 
 
5.66# 
5.14 
5.37# 
5.49 
3.95 
3.113*  
14.26 
14.39 
13.79 
13.72 
15.00 
 
4.02 
3.52 
3.58 
3.43 
2.67 
1.529***  
9.74 
9.60 
9.70 
10.15 
8.93 
 
3.10 
3.11 
3.32 
3.21 
3.45 
.841 
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6.5.2.4  A5 – Monthly Income 
 
Table 6.10 illustrates the results of ANOVA and the post hoc test between monthly 
income120 (A5) and tax knowledge variables (B1 to B8). ANOVA suggested that there 
was a significant difference between monthly income level and tax  
                                                 
120 The average income in Malaysia in 2008 was RM25,784 (RM2,149 per month), 2009 (3rd quarter) 
was RM24,131 (RM2,011 per month).(Malaysia Department of Statistics, 2010) 
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Table 6.10: ANOVA and Post Hoc test (Scheffe) – A5 (Monthly income) 
 
* Significant at p <0.01 
   *** Significant at p < 0.10 
   # Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
   B1   B2   B3  
  Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
           
IV IV          
A5 (RM) 
  <1000 
  1001 -2000 
  2001 – 4000 
  4001 – 6000 
  6001 – 8000 
  8001 – 10000 
  >10000   
A5 (£) 
   <153 
  154 - 307  
  308 – 615 
  616 – 923 
  924 – 1231 
  1232 - 1538 
  >1538 
 
131.39 
128.42# 
132.98# 
132.62 
125.49 
135.61 
127.67 
 
17.44 
16.13 
16.62 
18.39 
16.44 
19.09 
20.90 
3.431*  
7.13 
6.53 
6.42 
6.18 
6.18 
7.10 
5.63 
 
2.88 
2.57 
2.75 
2.70 
2.75 
3.18 
5.63 
1.436***  
25.42 
25.61# 
26.99# 
27.33# 
26.50 
27.36 
27.58 
 
5.56 
5.38 
4.93 
4.85 
4.91 
2.58 
6.94 
3.671* 
   B4   B5 
 
  B6  
  Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
A5 (RM) 
  <1000 
  1001 -2000 
  2001 – 4000 
  4001 – 6000 
  6001 – 8000 
  8001 – 10000 
  >10000 
A5 (£) 
   <153 
  154 - 307  
  308 – 615 
  616 – 923 
  924 – 1231 
  1232 - 1538 
  >1538     
 
17.18 
17.37 
18.13 
18.33 
17.85 
16.45 
16.72 
 
6.50 
4.92 
5.83 
5.65 
5.91 
5.22 
5.54 
1.180  
30.80 
31.00# 
32.67# 
33.33# 
31.81 
32.91 
31.21 
 
6.38 
6.40 
5.90 
6.06 
5.60 
9.73 
8.09 
3.805*  
20.70# 
19.07 
18.41# 
17.37# 
15.65# 
18.35 
16.26# 
 
4.00 
5.07 
5.38 
5.94 
5.71 
5.77 
6.15 
5.671* 
   B7   B8     
  Mean SD F Mean SD F    
           
A5 (RM) 
<1000 
  1001 -2000 
  2001 – 4000 
  4001 – 6000 
  6001 – 8000 
  8001 – 10000 
  >10000 
A5 (£) 
   <153 
  154 - 307  
  308 – 615 
  616 – 923 
  924 – 1231 
  1232 - 1538 
  >1538  
 
14.41 
14.15 
14.15 
13.85 
13.12 
16.00 
13.21 
 
3.61 
3.57 
3.65 
3.75 
3.96 
2.79 
4.50 
1.302  
9.64 
9.23# 
9.98# 
10.05 
9.12 
10.45 
10.47 
 
2.66 
3.04 
3.17 
3.40 
3.86 
3.64 
4.51 
2.542*    
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knowledge with F = 3.431, p < 0.01. Post hoc test showed that taxpayers whose 
monthly income range between RM2001 – RM4000 (£308 – £615) had significantly 
more tax knowledge than income group of RM1001 – RM2000 (£154 – £307) (mean 
132.98, SD 16.62, p < 0.01). Monthly income played a major role in determining tax 
knowledge. This was proven by the significant mean difference in  taxpayers’ income 
levels for knowledge about taxpayers’ responsibilities and rights (B2) (F = 1.436 , p < 
0.10), employment income (B3) (F = 3.671, p < 0.01), personal relief (B5) (F= 3.805, 
p < 0.01), child relief (B6) (F = 5.671, p < 0.01) and awareness of offences, penalties 
and fines (B8) (F = 2.542, p < 0.01).  
 
The post hoc test revealed that as for A5:B3 and A5:B5, middle income earners 
ranging  between RM4001 – RM6000 (£616 – £923) had the highest mean in relation 
to income group RM2001 - RM4000 (£308 – £615) and RM1001 - RM2000 (£154 – 
£307) (significant at p < 0.05); as for A5:B6, lower income group earning below 
RM1000 (£153) per month had significantly better tax knowledge compared to 
earners ranging between RM2001 – RM8000 (£308 – £1231). As for A5:B8, 
taxpayers with income ranged between RM2001 – RM4000 (£308 – £615) had 
significantly higher tax knowledge than those in the RM1001 – RM2000 (£154 – 
£307) income group. 
 
KW tests also suggested that different income levels had significant effects on tax 
knowledge variables. The test revealed that knowledge about employment (p<0.01, 
χ2= 17.557), personal relief (p<0.001, χ2= 24.281), child relief (p<0.001, χ2= 30.190), 
awareness of offences and penalties (p<0.05, χ2= 16.039), as well as the total score of 
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tax knowledge (p<0.05, χ2= 18.92) appears to be associated with the taxpayers’ 
income level. Moreover, KW median tests also found that all tax knowledge variables 
(B1-B8) except for knowledge about rebates were significantly associated with the 
level of income. Median tests suggested that two variables were significant at p<001 
(child relief (χ2= 21.966) and awareness of offences (χ2= 18.157)), three variables 
were significant at p<0.05 (responsibility (χ2=12.792), personal relief (χ2=16.194), 
and total score of tax knowledge (χ2=12.643)) and two variables were significant at 
p<0.10 (employment (χ2 = 11.158) and dividend and interest (χ2 = 10.757)). 
 
6.5.2.5  A6 – Location 
 
Table 6.11 illustrates ANOVA and post hoc tests between location (A6) and tax 
knowledge variables (B1 to B8). ANOVA suggested that there was significant 
difference between the location of taxpayers and their tax knowledge with F = 2.320, 
p < 0.01. Post hoc tests showed that taxpayers living in Johor had significantly higher 
tax knowledge than taxpayers living in Selangor / Kuala Lumpur with mean = 128.30, 
SD 15.35, p<0.01. The highest score came from Kelantan taxpayers with mean 134.63 
(SD = 17.24) while the lowest came from Selangor / Kuala Lumpur taxpayers with 
mean 127.46 (SD = 17.40). ANOVA also revealed that there was also a significant 
mean difference between location and knowledge about employment income, A6:B3 
(F = 1.844, p < 0.01), dividend and interest income, A6:B4 (F = 1.828, p <0.01), 
personal relief, A6:B5 (F= 2.384, p<0.01) and rebates, A6:B7 (F = 1.466, p < 0.05). 
As for A6:B3, post hoc tests reported that Perlis/Kedah taxpayers (mean = 28.10, SD 
= 4.77) were significantly more knowledgeable than Selangor / Kuala Lumpur 
taxpayers (mean = 25.49, SD = 4.85), p < 0.05. 
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Table 6.11: ANOVA and Post Hoc test (Scheffe) – A6 (Location) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   * Significant at p <0.01 
   ** Significant at p < 0.05 
   *** Significant at p < 0.10 
   # Scheffe post hoc test, p< 0.05 
  B1   B2   B3   B4  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
A6 
  Sel/KL   
Perlis/Kedah 
  PP/Perak 
  Mel/NS 
  Johor 
  Kelantan   
  Terengganu 
 Pahang    
Sabah/Lab 
  Sarawak 
 
127.46# 
133.68 
129.61 
131.98 
128.30# 
134.63 
131.72 
130.62 
134.10 
129.63 
 
17.40 
16.44 
16.20 
18.08 
15.35 
17.24 
14.44 
17.75 
18.98 
16.52 
2.320*  
6.54 
6.24 
6.29 
6.70 
6.20 
6.23 
6.91 
6.48 
6.65 
6.30 
 
2.41 
2.69 
2.75 
2.72 
2.50 
2.89 
2.85 
2.57 
3.07 
2.61 
.846  
25.49# 
28.10# 
26.82 
26.26 
26.17 
26.07 
26.53 
27.71 
26.61 
26.63 
 
4.85 
4.77 
5.42 
5.49 
5.12 
5.17 
4.48 
4.73 
6.46 
4.69 
1.844*  
16.57 
18.74 
17.31 
17.84 
16.48 
18.63 
18.52 
18.34 
18.11 
17.72 
 
5.38 
5.78 
5.54 
5.40 
4.40 
6.03 
5.49 
6.04 
5.83 
5.32 
1.828* 
             
  B5   B6   B7   B8  
 Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F Mean SD F 
A6 
  Sel/KL   
  Perlis/Kedah 
  PP/Perak 
  Mel/NS 
  Johor 
  Kelantan   
  Terengganu 
 Pahang            
Sabah/Lab 
  Sarawak  
 
31.44 
31.76 
31.53 
32.45 
32.44 
33.18 
31.87 
31.70 
32.76 
31.95 
 
6.83 
5.85 
6.36 
6.67 
6.40 
5.05 
6.66 
6.11 
6.26 
6.03 
2.384*  
17.91 
18.43 
18.14 
18.90 
18.10 
19.53 
18.69 
17.92 
18.47 
18.71 
 
5.02 
5.28 
5.34 
5.77 
5.67 
5.56 
4.94 
5.41 
5.39 
5.57 
.972  
14.28 
14.51 
13.88 
14.10 
4.22 
14.73 
14.08 
13.44 
14.24 
13.38 
 
3.49 
3.45 
3.57 
3.76 
3.73 
4.14 
3.63 
3.35 
3.88 
3.49 
1.466**  
3.09 
3.26 
3.35 
3.18 
3.07 
3.29 
3.22 
3.23 
3.48 
3.27 
 
1.15 
1.10 
1.05 
1.02 
1.08 
1.13 
1.04 
1.07 
1.09 
0.92 
1.344 
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KW tests also suggested that there was an association between the locations where 
taxpayers lived and their level of tax knowledge. Results reported that knowledge 
about dividend and interest (p<0.01, χ2= 22.673), employment (p<0.05, χ2= 19.131), 
rebates (p<0.10, χ2= 15.586) and total tax knowledge score (p<0.05, χ2= 18.627) were 
also significantly varied between locations. In contrast with the t-test results (Kelantan 
region), KW suggested that taxpayers from Sabah/Labuan region appear to be the 
most knowledgeable taxpayers compared to other regions. However, Kelantan region 
remained with the second highest score in KW tests. 
 
6.5.2.6 A8 – Age 
 
 
ANOVA suggested that there was a significant difference between age and level of 
tax knowledge with F = 6.178, p < 0.001. Taxpayers’ age plays a major role in 
determining their tax knowledge. This was evidenced by the significant mean 
difference between taxpayers’ age and knowledge about taxpayers’ responsibilities 
and rights (B2) (F = 1.893 , p < 0.10), employment income (B3) (F = 5.303, p < 
0.001), personal relief (B5) (F= 7.999, p < 0.001), dividend and interest (B4) (F= 
2.429, p < 0.05) and awareness of offences, penalties and fines (B8) (F = 6.866, p < 
0.001). The test also suggested that older taxpayers are more knowledgeable (for 
example age group > 56 (mean = 138, SD = 19.38), 46-50 (mean =  136, SD = 17.42), 
41-45 (mean = 133, SD = 17.51). 
 
KW tests also suggested that difference in age group had significant effect on tax 
knowledge variables. All variables except for knowledge about child relief were 
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significantly associated with age. The test revealed that knowledge about 
responsibility (p<0.01, χ2=18.289 ), employment (p<0.001, χ2=33.997), dividend and 
interest (p<0.10., χ2=12.866), personal relief(p<0.001., χ2= 56.984 ), rebates(p<0.10, 
χ2= 12.794 ), awareness of offences and penalties(p<0.001, χ2= 49.934 ) and total 
score(p<0.001, χ2=40.401  were significantly varied between the age groups. 
 
 
 
6.5.3   Summary of results of Stage 1 – Characteristics of knowledgeable 
taxpayers 
 
In conclusion, the above tests suggested that tax knowledge was influenced by gender, 
ethnicity, income level, location and attending tax courses. Results also revealed that 
the most knowledgeable group of taxpayers were: 
- Males, 
- Malays (followed by Chinese and Indians),  
- Earned monthly income ranged RM8,001 – RM10,000 (£1,232 -£1,538) 
followed by RM2,000 to RM 4,000 (£308 -£615),  
- Reside in north east of Peninsular Malaysia – Kelantan followed by 
Sabah/Labuan and Perlis/Kedah.  
- As expected, taxpayers who had attended tax courses appear to be more 
knowledgeable. Perhaps surprisingly however, experience of being audited by 
IRB did not significantly influence levels of tax knowledge.  Taxpayers who 
have been audited once had significantly better tax knowledge than those 
audited three times. 
- Older taxpayers aged more than 56 years old. 
  313 
 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates the results while Table 6.12 summarises the relationship between 
the research objectives and results of Stage 1. 
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Figure 6.6: Result Stage 1- Characteristics of knowledgeable taxpayers in SAS in 
Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher tax 
knowledge 
Males 
t=1.799 
Middle and 
high Income 
F=3.431 
Kelantanese 
F=2.320 
Malay 
F=2.351 
Attend 
tax course 
t=4.585 
Older 
taxpayers 
F = 6.178
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Table 6.12: Summary and relationship between research objectives and results for Stage 1  
 
 
Findings 
(levels of knowledge) 
Main research 
objectives 
Sub research 
objectives 
Variables 
Most  Moderate least 
 To obtain a complete 
overview of the tax 
knowledge of 
individual Malaysian 
taxpayers. 
1. To determine the 
level of tax 
knowledge of 
individual 
taxpayers; 
 
2. To identify the 
characteristics of 
knowledgeable 
and less 
knowledgeable 
taxpayers; 
 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Location 
 
 
Attended tax 
course? 
Males 
 
Older taxpayers 
(more than  56 
years old) 
 
 
Malay 
 
Middle and high 
income ranged 
RM2,001 – 
RM4,000 and 
RM8,001 – 
RM10,000 
 
 
 
 
Live in Kelantan 
 
 
Yes 
Females 
 
Age between 
36 – 45 years 
old 
 
 
Chinese 
 
< RM1,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Terengganu 
 
 
No 
Females 
 
Age less 
than 25 
years old 
 
 
Indian 
 
RM6,001 – 
RM8,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KL/Selangor 
 
 
No 
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The relationships between results in Stage 1 and prior literature and hypotheses are 
discussed in section 7.2. 
 
6.6  STAGE 2 – TAX KNOWLEDGE AND TAX COMPLIANCE  
BEHAVIOUR 
 
 
This section examines association between tax knowledge and tax compliance 
behaviour.  
 
6.6.1  Stepwise multiple regressions 
 
Table 6.13 illustrates the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and independent 
variables. There were a number of significant correlations between tax compliance 
and tax knowledge. For example, there were fairly high correlations (p<0.01) between 
TCHYP and TNRES (r = .347), TCHYP and TNCHILDREL (r = .182) and TCHYP 
and TNEMPLOY (r = .16). Correlations were also found (p<0.01) between TCDIR 
and TNCHILDREL (r = .30), TCDIR and TNREB (r = .237) and TCDIR and TNRES 
(r = .15). Table 6.13 also evidences that independent and dependent variables were 
not all highly correlated (more than 0.8121), hence all dependent variables were 
included in the analysis.  
 
 
 
                                                 
121 Black (2001: 558) suggested that the cut off point for choosing the independent variables is 0.8 to 
avoid multicollinearity. 
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Table 6.13: Stage 2 -Pearson correlation (r) matrix for dependent and 
independent variables. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. TCHYP40:60 1          
2. TCDIR -.293** 1         
3. TNRES (B2) -.347** .150** 1        
4. TNEMPLOY 
(B3) .160** .028 -.138** 1      
 
5. TNDIVINT 
(B4) .059 .030 .013 .207** 1     
 
6. TNPERSREL 
(B5) .032 .145** -.059 .145** .085** 1    
 
7. TNCHILDREL 
(B6) -.182** .300** .067* -.022 .025 .220** 1   
 
8. TNREB (B7) -.145** .237** .046 .046 .032 .291** .445** 1   
9. TNAWARE 
(B8) .118** .054 -.111** .125** .110** .152** .076* .134** 1 
 
10. TNTOTAL 
(B1) -.034 .258** .085** .453** .488** .620** .533** .536** .479** 1 
See Table 5.5 for variable definitions 
Dependent variables - TCHYP40:60  and TCDIR 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
6.6.1.1 Relation between tax knowledge and tax compliance direct questions 
(TCDIR) 
 
Results show that knowledge about child relief, responsibilities and rebates appears to 
be significantly correlated with tax compliance (TCDIR). As shown in Table 6.14, by 
examining t statistics for the constant and four independent variables, estimated 
regression shows that estimated coefficient for constants, B2, B6,B7 and B1 were 
statistically significant  at 1% level (as p value < 0.01). All significant variables had a 
positive effect on tax compliance. Estimated coefficient of correlation (R = 0.36) 
shows a reasonable linear correlation between tax knowledge and tax compliance. 
Estimated coefficient of determination, R2  is 0.13 indicating that 13% variance of tax 
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compliance (dependent variables) was explained by the variance of tax knowledge 
(independent variables).  
 
These positive relationships illustrate that taxpayers with higher tax knowledge 
potentially tend to be more compliant. The F statistic (F= 37.82, p = 0.000) was 
substantiated at 1% significance level, implying that the null hypothesis that 
regression coefficients were all zeros can be rejected at 1% level of significance. Thus 
the estimated regression was efficient for prediction.  
 
Results also revealed that there was no multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. Tolerance indexes were high between .59 and .99 and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) was also low (less than 1.69). Tolerance is defined as the amount of 
variability of selected independent variables not explained by other independent 
variables. VIF is calculated as the inverse of tolerance value. For example if the 
tolerance value is 0.677, thus VIF is 1.478 (1.0 ÷ 0.677 = 1.478) (Hair et.al. 
2006:227) It is calculated as 1 - R2 (from each independent variable). 
.Multicollinearity exists when the tolerance value is low (the range is between 0 to 1)   
(Hair et.al. 2006: 227-228). Hair et.al (2006: 227) suggested that common cut-off 
threshold is tolerance value 0.10 and thus VIF is 10.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  319 
 
Table 6.14 : Stepwise multiple regressions - tax knowledge and tax compliance 
direct questions (TCDIR) 
 
 
Variables Coefficient 
 
t Sig. 
 
Tolerance VIF 
Constant 49.060 17.531 .000   
B6 – TNCHILDREL  .413 5.327 .000 .677 1.478 
B2 – TNRES .614 4.750 .000 .987 1.013 
B7 – TNREB  .314 2.756 .006 .670 1.493 
B1 – TNTOTAL .067 2.510 .012 .593 1.687 
      
Model fit:      
    R .36     
    R2 .13     
    Adjusted R2 .126     
    Std. error 10.97     
Note: 
TCDIRi  = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i + β4TNPERSREL i +  β5TNCHILDREL i      
+ β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL i +  ε i    
 
Where: 
TCDIR i   - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i   - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i    - Tax knowledge about rebates 
TNAWARE i           - Tax knowledge about awareness of  offences, penalties and fines 
TNTOTALi             - Total tax knowledge score 
 
 
6.6.1.2  Relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance hypothetical 
questions (TCHYP40:60 ) 
 
 
In comparison to the result in 6.6.1.1, these results indicate that independent variables 
that impact tax compliance behaviour increased from four to five variables. It appears 
that knowledge about responsibilities, child relief and rebates are still significant 
while two additional variables occurred- employment income and awareness of 
offences, penalties and fines.  
 
  320 
 
Based on Table 6.15, estimated regression showed that estimated coefficient for 
constant, B2, B3, B6, B7 and B8 were statistically significant at 1% level (p value < 
0.01). The B3 and B8 variables had a positive effect on tax compliance while B2, B6 
and B7 had a negative relationship with tax compliance.  
 
Results implied that taxpayers with good knowledge about responsibilities, child 
relief and rebates tend to be non compliant with negative coefficient .53, .12 and .12 
respectively. On the other hand, taxpayers with good knowledge of employment 
income and awareness of offences, penalties and fines tend to be more compliant. 
 
Table 6.15 : Stepwise multiple regressions - tax knowledge and tax compliance 
hypothetical questions (TCHYP) 
 
Variables Coefficient 
 
t Sig. 
 
Tolerance VIF 
Constant 23.184 22.901 .000   
B2 - TNRES -.532 -10.466 .000 .963 1.038 
B6 - TNCHILDREL -.119 -4.291 .000 .792 1.262 
B3 - TNEMPLOY .106 4.028 .000 .960 1.042 
B8 - TNAWARE .121 2.830 .005 .952 1.050 
B7 - TNREB -.112 -2.757 .006 .788 1.269 
      
Model fit:      
    R .419     
    R2 .176     
    Adjusted R2 .172     
    Std. error 4.24     
Note: 
TCHYPi  = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i + β4TNPERSREL i +  β5TNCHILDRELi   
+ β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL i +  ε i    
 
Where: 
TCHYP i  - Tax compliance score (hypothetical questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i  - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i    - Tax knowledge about rebates 
TNAWARE i           - Tax knowledge about awareness of  offences, penalties and fines 
TNTOTALi             - Total tax knowledge score 
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The estimated coefficient of correlation (R = 0.419) and the estimated coefficient of 
determination, (R2 = 0.176) indicate a linear correlation between tax knowledge and 
tax compliance. The F statistic stand at 43.15, (p = 0.000) was substantiated at 1% 
significance level, implying that the null hypothesis that the regression coefficient are 
all zeros can be rejected at 1% level of significance. The result also revealed that there 
was no multicollinearity among the independent variables. The tolerance indexes 
were between .78 and .96 while the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was also low and 
ranged between 1.04 and 1.27.  
 
6.6.2. Summary of results of Stage 2 – Relationship between tax knowledge and 
tax compliance. 
 
Results suggest that tax knowledge had a significant impact on tax compliance both in 
direct and hypothetical questions, and consequently support the HS2 hypothesis (Tax 
knowledge is positively associated with attitude towards tax compliance behaviour). 
Filling the gap as suggested by Eriksen and Fallan (1996) this study suggested that 
knowledge about employment income, awareness of offences, penalties and fines, 
taxpayers’ responsibilities and rights, child relief and rebates, appears to be 
significantly correlated with tax compliance behaviour, thus rejecting the null 
hypothesis (refer 5.4.2.2 – HS2). Discussion of results in Stage 2 appears in Chapter 7.  
 
Figure 6.7 summarises all tax knowledge variables that affect tax compliance.  
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Figure 6.7: Tax knowledge variables that affect tax compliance. 
 
, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 STAGE 3 – TAX KNOWLEDGE AND TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR 
WITH CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
This section investigated the effect of inserting control variables in the regression 
models. 
 
6.7.1 Multiple regressions with control variables 
 
This section attempts to examine whether inserting control variables in the OLS will 
produce better explanatory values regarding tax compliance behaviour. Table 6.16 
illustrates the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and control 
variables for Stage 3. There were a number of significant correlations between tax 
compliance and control variables. For example, there was significant association but 
TAX 
COMPLIANCE 
(HYP) 
TAX 
COMPLIANCE 
(DIRECT) 
Taxpayers’ responsibilities 
and rights 
Employment income 
Child relief 
Awareness of offences, 
penalties and fines 
Rebates 
R=.42, R2=.19 
R=.36, R2=.13 
TAX KNOWLEDGE 
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low correlation (p<0.01) between TCDIR and INCOME (r = -0.172) and TCDIR and 
EDUCATION (r = -0.087). Another significant and high correlations was also found 
(p<0.01) between TCHYP and AGE (r = .264), TCHYP and GENDER (r = 0.095) 
and TCHYP and INCOME (r = .213). 
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Table 6.16: Stage 3 -Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and control variables.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. TCHYP40:60 1                
2. TCDIR -.293(**) 1               
3. TNRES (B2) -.347(**) .150(**) 1              
4. TNEMPLOY (B3) .160(**) .028 -.138(**) 1             
5. TNDIVINT (B4) .059 .030 .013 .207(**) 1            
6. TNPERSREL (B5) .032 .145(**) -.059 .145(**) .085(**) 1 .          
7. TNCHILDREL (B6) -.182(**) .300(**) .067(*) -.022 .025 .220(**) 1          
8. TNREB (B7) -.145(**) .237(**) .046 .046 .032 .291(**) .445(**) 1         
9. TNAWARE (B8) .118(**) .054 -.111(**) .125(**) .110(**) .152(**) .076(*) .134(**) 1        
10. TNTOTAL (B1) -.034 .258(**) .085(**) .453(**) .488(**) .620(**) .533(**) .536(**) .479(**) 1       
11. GENDER .095(**) -.040 -.107(**) .006 .013 -.029 -.018 -.062(*) -.017 -.055 1      
12. INCOME .213(**) -.172(**) -.069(*) .112(**) .029 .089(**) -.161(**) -.039 .071(*) .030 -.250(**) 1     
13. AGE .264(**) -.041 -.064(*) .165(**) .074(*) .191(**) -.047 .062(*) .175(**) .179(**) -.206(**) .427(**) 1    
14. EDUCATION  .048 -.087(**) -.011 .028 .084(**) .045 -.086(**) -.053 .019 .027 -.096(**) .364(**) .037 1   
15. COURSE -.040 -.009 .094(**) -.088(**) -.078(*) -.027 .031 .029 -.139(**) -.066(*) -.013 -.069(*) .045 -.051 1  
16. AUDITED -.003 -.010 -.037 .039 .003 -.077(*) -.018 -.007 -.045 -.039 .061(*) -.054 -.098(**) -.049 .035 1 
See Table 5.5 for variable definitions 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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A. Dependent variable TCHYP 
 
Table 6.17 summarises the results of the OLS regression analysis for the base OLS 
regression model (Panel A) and the control variables (Panel B) to consider variables 
that affect tax compliance.  
 
Table 6.17 describes that these models were significant at p < 0.01 level (F statistic 
ranging from 23.32 to 30.81), while R and R2 were estimated at  .430 and .496 and 
.185 to .246 respectively. The explanatory power of the base regression in Panel A is 
improved by the inclusion of control variables.  
 
Panel A in Table 6.17 indicates that TNRES, TNCHILDREL and TNREB remain the 
determinants of tax compliance as suggested in the analysis in Stage 2 (Table 6.15), 
and negatively associated with TCHYP (p<0.01). TNREB appears to be the most 
important determinant (-.596, p<0.001). This negative association illustrates that 
taxpayers with high knowledge in TNRES, TNCHILDREL and TNREB tend to be 
less compliant. However, in contrast with this result, TNTOTAL appears to be 
another factor that could indicate significant increases in tax compliance (p<0.10). 
Although sub tax knowledge i.e TNRES, TNCHILDREL and TNREB had a negative 
association with tax compliance behaviour, multiple regressions results in Panel A 
suggested that general tax knowledge had a significant positive association with tax 
compliance behaviour. 
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Table 6.17 - OLS regressions results (dependent variable TCHYP) 
 Coefficient t Sig. VIF 
Panel A:     
     
(Constant) 22.468 19.312 .000***  
TNRES (B2) -.596 -10.478 .000*** 1.207 
TNEMPLOY (B3) .042 1.088 .277 2.083 
TNDIVINT (B4) -.002 -.064 .949 2.091 
TNCHILDREL (B6) -.165 -4.250 .000*** 2.367 
TNREB (B7) -.174 -3.287 .001*** 2.039 
TNAWARE (B8) .045 .741 .459 2.086 
TNTOTAL (B1) .041 1.735 .083* 8.227 
     
Model fit:     
    R .430    
    R2 .185    
    Adjusted R2 .179    
    Std. error 4.24    
    F statistic 30.81***    
     
Panel B:     
     
(Constant) 17.003 7.990 .000***  
TNRES (B2) -.525 -10.054 .000*** 1.074 
TNEMPLOY (B3) .062 2.246 .025** 1.119 
TNDIVINT (B4) .032 1.276 .202 1.083 
TNPERSREL (B5) .013 .561 .575 1.181 
TNCHILDREL (B6) -.089 -3.162 .002*** 1.312 
TNREB (B7) -.125 -2.999 .003*** 1.339 
TNAWARE (B8) .083 1.923 .055* 1.101 
GENDER 1.293 4.589 .000*** 1.112 
INCOME .551 3.375 .001*** 1.516 
AGE .491 5.459 .000*** 1.375 
EDUCATION  -.019 -.133 .894 1.187 
COURSE .373 1.045 .296 1.062 
AUDITED .169 .226 .821 1.034 
    
Model fit:     
    R .496    
    R2 .246    
    Adjusted R2 .235    
    Std. error 4.09    
    F statistic 23.32***    
 
Note: 
* Significant at p < 0.10 
** Significant at p < 0.05 
*** significant at p < 0.001 
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TCHYP 40:60 = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i + β4TNPERSREL i +  
β5TNCHILDREL i + β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL +  
β9 GENDER i + β10INCOME i + β11AGE i + β12EDUC i + β13 COURSE i + 
β14AUDITED i +  ε i                                                                 
                            
Where: 
TCHYP40:60 - Tax compliance score (hypothetical questions) 
TCDIR i   - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i   - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i  - Tax knowledge about rebates 
TNAWARE i        - Tax knowledge about awareness of  offences, penalties and fines 
TNTOTALi                - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i  - Gender 
 INCOME i  - Income level of the taxpayer 
AGE i    - Age 
EDUC i   - Education level 
COURSE i  - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
 
Panel B (Table 6.17) however provides a different result after control variables were 
included. The inclusion of control variables has increased the number of significant 
independent variables, TNEMPLOY and TNAWARE but eliminated TNTOTAL. The 
regression model in Panel B suggested that TNRES remains the most important 
determinant of tax compliance (-.525, p<0.001). TNREB, TNCHILDREL, 
TNAWARE and TNEMPLOY become the next most important determinants of tax 
compliance. Again, consistent with the result in Panel A, TNRES, TNCHILDREL 
and TNREB had a negative association with tax compliance behaviour while 
TNAWARE and TNEMPLOY were positively associated with tax compliance. 
 
In relation to the significance of control variables in Panel B, results show that 
GENDER, INCOME and AGE appear to be significantly correlated with tax 
compliance behaviour. Specifically, the association between GENDER and TCHYP 
was positive and significant (p<0.001), consequently these results support hypothesis 
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H3A (female taxpayers are significantly more compliant). The association between 
INCOME and TCHYP was also positive and significant (p<0.01), consequently 
supporting hypothesis H3B (higher income earners are significantly more compliant). 
The association between AGE and TCHYP was also positive and significant 
(p<0.001), consequently supporting hypothesis H3C (older people are significantly 
more compliant). Finally, other control variables: EDUCATION, COURSE and 
AUDITED, had no significant association with TCHYP. Therefore, H3D, H3E and H3F 
are not supported by the multivariate results.  
 
These results demonstrate that the inclusion of control variables has increased the 
number of significant independent variables (from four to five) and has increased the 
coefficient of determination R2 (from .179 to .246). The inclusion of control variables 
also evidenced that there was no multicollinearity among the independent variables 
with average VIF at 1.300.  
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B.  Dependent variable TCDIR 
 
Table 6.18 illustrates the results of OLS regressions by using TCDIR as the dependent 
variable. In line with results in Table 6.17, results show that these models were also 
significant at p < 0.001 level (F statistic ranging from 12.56  to 19.91), while the R  
and R2    were estimated at .358 to .386 and .128 to .149 respectively. In contrast with 
results in Table 6.17, the explanatory power of base regression in Panel A was not 
significantly improved by inclusion of the control variables. 
 
Based on Panel B (Table 6.18), results suggest that TNRES, TNPERSREL, 
TNCHILDREL and TNREB were the key determinants of tax compliance. The 
supplementary regression model suggested that TNRES remains the most important 
determinant of tax compliance (p<0.001) both in Panel A and B (Table 6.18).  
 
With regards to the significance of control variables in Panel B (Table 6.18), results 
show that INCOME and GENDER appear to be significantly correlated with tax 
compliance behaviour. Specifically, the association between INCOME and TCDIR 
was negative and significant (p<0.001), consequently hypothesis H3B  is rejected  (that 
lower income earners are significantly more compliant). The association between 
GENDER and TCDIR was also negative and significant (p<0.10), thus the hypothesis 
H3A that females are significantly more compliant is accepted by the result. Finally, 
other control variables AGE, EDUCATION, COURSE and AUDITED, had no 
significant association with TCDIR. 
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Table 6.18 - OLS regressions results (dependent variable TCDIR) 
 Coefficient t Sig. VIF 
Panel A:     
     
(Constant) 48.497 16.039 .000***  
TNRES (B2) .604 4.088 .000*** 1.207 
TNEMPLOY (B3) -.043 -.429 .668 2.084 
TNDIVINT (B4) -.122 -1.316 .188 2.095 
TNCHILDREL (B6) .329 3.263 .001*** 2.370 
TNREB (B7) .236 1.715 .087* 2.042 
TNAWARE (B8) -.120 -.755 .450 2.087 
TNTOTAL (B1) .125 2.044 .041** 8.241 
  
Model fit:  
    R .358  
    R2 .128  
    Adjusted R2 .121  
    Std. error 11.02  
    F statistic 19.91***  
  
Panel B:  
  
(Constant) 56.663 9.949 .000***  
TNRES (B2) .725 5.198 .000*** 1.074 
TNEMPLOY (B3) .114 1.537 .125 1.118 
TNDIVINT (B4) -.012 -.185 .853 1.083 
TNPERSREL (B5) .166 2.660 .008*** 1.181 
TNCHILDREL (B6) .408 5.427 .000*** 1.311 
TNREB (B7) .336 3.009 .003*** 1.340 
TNAWARE (B8) .101 .877 .381 1.101 
GENDER 1.215 -1.611 .099* 1.112 
INCOME -1.770 -4.049 .000*** 1.517 
AGE -.043 -.179 .858 1.374 
EDUCATION  .035 .089 .929 1.188 
COURSE -1.143 -1.198 .231 1.062 
AUDITED .207 .103 .918 1.034 
 
Model fit:     
    R .386 .   
    R2 .149    
    Adjusted R2 .137    
    Std. error 10.953    
    F statistic 12.56***    
 
Note: 
* Significant at p < 0.10 
** Significant at p < 0.05 
*** significant at p < 0.001 
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TCDIR 0 = α + β1TNRESi + β2TNEMPLOY i + β3TNDIVINT i + β4TNPERSREL i +  
β5TNCHILDREL i + β6TNREB i  + β7TNAWARE i  + β8 TNTOTAL +  
β9 GENDER i + β10INCOME i + β11AGE i + β12EDUC i + β13 COURSE i + 
β14AUDITED i +  ε i                                                                 
                            
Where: 
TCDIR  - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TCDIR i   - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
TNRES i  - Tax knowledge about responsibilities and rights 
TNEMPLOY i - Tax knowledge about employment income 
TNDIVINT i - Tax knowledge about dividend and interest 
TNPERSREL i - Tax knowledge about personal relief 
TNCHILDREL i   - Tax knowledge about child relief 
TNREB i  - Tax knowledge about rebates 
TNAWARE i        - Tax knowledge about awareness of offences, penalties and fines 
TNTOTALi                - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i  - Gender 
 INCOME i  - Income level of the taxpayer 
AGE i    - Age 
EDUC i   - Education level 
COURSE i  - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
 
6.7.2 Summary results for Stage 3 
 
Therefore, Table 6.19 summarises the results of Stage 3. Discussion of these results is 
described in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.19: Results of Stage 3 - Significant independent and control variables 
which affect tax compliance 
 
Dependent 
varia
bles 
Significant IV without 
control variables 
(Table 6.17 and 6.18 Panel A) 
Significant IV with control 
variables (Table 6.17 and 
6.18 Panel B) 
Accepted 
hypotheses 
TCHYP TNRES  (negative) TNRES (negative)  
 TNCHILDREL (negative) TNEMPLOY (positive)  
 TNREB (negative) TNCHILDREL (negative)  
 TNTOTAL (positive) TNREB (negative)  
  TN AWARE (positive)  
  GENDER (positive) (CV) H3A 
  INCOME (positive) (CV) H3B 
  AGE (positive) (CV) H3C 
    
TCDIR TNRES (positive) TNRES (positive)  
 TNCHILDREL (positive) TNPERSREL (positive)  
 TNREB (positive) TNCHILDREL (positive)  
 TNTOTAL (positive) TNREB (positive)  
  GENDER (positive) (CV) H3A 
  INCOME (negative) (CV) H3B (partly) 
* IV – Independent variables, CV- control variables 
    
 
 
6.8 STAGE 4 – TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
 
 
This stage examines determinants of tax compliance. Nine variables were tested using 
OLS, namely the probability of being audited, perception of government spending, 
perception of equity and fairness, penalties, financial constraints, changes to current 
government policy, roles of referent groups, roles of the tax authority and tax 
knowledge.  
 
6.8.1 Correlation among variables 
 
 
Tables 6.20 and 6.21 illustrate the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and 
independent variables. Based on Table 6.20, all independent variables except for 
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EQUITY and TOTAL were significantly correlated with TCHYP (p < 0.01, ROLE p 
< 0.05). The highest correlation occurred between TCHYP and FINCONS (r = -.331) 
followed by GROUP, PROBAUDIT and PENALTY.  
 
Table 6.21 provides other results of tax compliance determinants in which all 
independent variables except for GOVSPEND were found to be significantly 
correlated with TCDIR (p < 0.01). The coefficient of correlation between each 
independent variable and TCDIR was stable at between  r = - .198 to r = -.247. The 
highest correlation occurred between TCDIR and TNTOTAL  (r = .258) followed by 
EQUITY, GROUP, PROBAUDIT and FINCONS. According to univariate results in 
both Table 6.20 and 6.21, it was suggested that TNTOTAL, FINCONS, EQUITY, 
GROUP, PROBAUDIT and PENALTY were the most significant determinants.  
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Table 6.20: Stage 4 -Pearson correlation matrix for dependent (TCHYP) and 
independent variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. TCHYP40:60 1  
2. PROBAUDIT -.295(**) 1  
3. GOVSPEND .138(**) -.003 1  
4. EQUITY .051 -.029 .394(**) 1  
5. PENALTY -.246(**) .393(**) -.030 -.010 1  
6. FINCONS -.331(**) .214(**) -.156(**) .087(**) .319(**) 1  
7. CHANGES -.197(**) .162(**) -.065(*) .125(**) .217(**) .563(**) 1 
8. GROUP -.307(**) .404(**) -.040 -.048 .356(**) .294(**) .269(**) 1
9. ROLE .072(*) -.011 .411(**) .371(**) .037 -.133(**) -.011 .034 1
10. TNTOTAL -.034 .129(**) .201(**) .230(**) .081(**) .093(**) .116(**) .051 .185(**) 1 
 
See Table 5.6  for variable definitions 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.21: Stage 4 -Pearson correlation matrix for dependent (TCDIR) and 
independent variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. TCDIR 1  
2. PROBAUDIT -.224(**) 1  
3. GOVSPEND .035 .087(**) 1  
4. EQUITY -.247(**) .503(**) .069(*) 1  
5. PENALTY -.198(**) .442(**) .080(**) .536(**) 1  
6. FINCONS -.241(**) .399(**) .010 .507(**) .466(**) 1  
7. CHANGES -.221(**) .407(**) .014 .527(**) .461(**) .636(**) 1 
8. GROUP -.234(**) .387(**) -.031 .522(**) .486(**) .598(**) .626(**) 1
9. ROLE -.204(**) .338(**) .033 .399(**) .378(**) .431(**) .485(**) .495(**) 1
10. TNTOTAL .258(**) -.022 -.029 -.060(*) .012 -.042 -.034 .013 -.013 1
 
See Table 5.6  for variable definitions 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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6.8.2 Factors affecting tax compliance  (TCHYP 40:6 0)  
 
In this section, tax compliance determinants were calculated based on the association 
between each score in each factor (ie. E1, E2, E3…E8) (independent variables) and 
the total score of tax compliance using hypothetical questions (TCHYP) (dependent 
variables).  
 
6.8.2.1 Multiple regressions and stepwise multiple regressions 
 
Based on Table 6.22, multiple regressions and stepwise multiple regressions analysis 
indicates that the factors affecting tax compliance were PROBAUDIT, GOVSPEND, 
FINCONS and GROUP. According to stepwise multiple regression, FINCONS 
appears to be the main factor in determining tax compliance behaviour with Beta of -
.231 followed by PROBAUDIT, GROUP and GOVSPEND with Beta coefficient of -
176, -.166 and .090 respectively. The estimated correlation coefficient (R) and 
estimated coefficient of determination (R2) were estimated within the range of .44 and 
.19 respectively.  
 
These results evidenced that taxpayers who had crucial financial constraints, a high 
probability of being audited and high influence from immediate family members and 
friends tend to be less compliant (negative association), subsequently hypotheses H4E 
(personal financial constraint is negatively correlated with tax compliance) was 
accepted while H4A, (probability of being audited is positively correlated with tax 
compliance) and H4G (referent group is positively correlated with tax compliance) 
were rejected. In contrast, positive perceptions of government spending tend to 
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increase compliance among taxpayers, thus hypothesis H4B  (positive perception of 
government spending is positively correlated with tax compliance) was accepted. This 
result also suggested that other variables such as perception of equity and fairness, 
penalties, changes to current government policy, roles of the tax authority, and tax 
knowledge were not significantly correlated with tax compliance. 
 
Table 6.22: Multiple regressions and Stepwise multiple regressions – Factors 
affecting tax compliance – hypothetical question (TCHYP40:6 0 ) 
 
 Multiple regression Stepwise multiple regression 
Variables Coefficient
 
t VIF Coefficient
 
t VIF 
(Constant) 26.370 22.082*** 26.611 36.693***  
PROBAUDIT -.246 -5.036*** 1.322 -.270 -5.782*** 1.204 
GOVSPEND .119 2.524*** 1.363 .131 3.192*** 1.028 
EQUITY .026 .407 1.356   
PENALTY -.081 -1.7088 1.327   
FINCONS -.346 -6.341*** 1.692 -.349 -7.803*** 1.135 
CHANGES .026 .412 1.534   
GROUP -.219 -4.851*** 1.352 -.232 -5.318*** 1.262 
ROLE .010 .181 1.340   
TNTOTAL .001 .078 1.115   
   
Model  fit:       
    R .442   .439   
    R2 .195   .192   
    Adjusted R2 .188   .189   
    Std. error 4.19   4.19   
   F statistic 62.13***   62.17***   
 
Notes:  
 
Dependent variable - TCHYP40:6 0 
* Significant at p < 0.10 
**  Significant at p < 0.05 
*** Significant at p < 0.01 
 
TCHYP40:60 i  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + β4PENALTY i +  
β5FINCONS i + β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + β8 ROLEi +  β9 TNTOTALi + ε                                 
Where: 
TCHYPi        - Tax compliance score (hypothetical  questions) 
PROBAUDITi    - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND i    -Perception of government spending 
EQUITY i   - Perception of equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
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GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLEi i        - The role of the tax authority 
TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
 
 
 
6.8.3 Factors affecting tax compliance (TCDIR)  
 
Based on stepwise multiple regressions, results in Table 6.23 indicate that tax 
compliance was influenced by four variables namely PROBAUDIT, GROUP, 
FINCONS and TNTOTAL. Stepwise multiple regression also suggests that 
TNTOTAL becomes the main factor with Beta coefficient of .256 followed by 
PROBAUDIT (β= -.136), GROUP (β= -.129) and FINCONS (β = -.100).  
 
Conversely, multiple regression tests suggest an additional factor, namely 
GOVSPEND as an additional determinant. Again, TNTOTAL becomes the main 
factor with Beta coefficient of .254 followed by PROBAUDIT (β  = -.106), GROUP 
(β = -.078) and FINCONS (β = -.068). These results suggest that high tax knowledge 
would increase tax compliance and tax knowledge also becomes the main factor in 
determining tax compliance, thus hypothesis H4J (tax knowledge is positively 
correlated with tax compliance) is accepted. In agreement with results in Table 6.22, a 
high probability of being audited, crucial financial constraints and influence from 
family and friends would discourage tax compliance.  In contrast, a positive 
perception of how the government spends taxpayers’ money would potentially 
increase tax compliance. 
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Table 6.23.: Multiple regression and Stepwise multiple regression – Factors 
affecting tax compliance – direct  question (TCDIR) 
 
 Multiple regression Stepwise multiple regression 
Variables Coefficient
 
t VIF Coefficient
 
t VIF 
(Constant) 62.994 20.274***  63.458 21.841***  
PROBAUDIT -1.459 -3.076*** 1.475 -1.874 -4.297*** 1.240 
GOVSPEND .968 2.018** 1.022    
EQUITY -.810 -1.539 1.881    
PENALTY -.529 -1.001 1.641    
FINCONS -.883 -1.679* 2.020 -1.303 -2.735*** 1.649 
CHANGES -.115 -.213 2.194    
GROUP -1.071 -1.908* 2.095 -1.771 -3.565*** 1.631 
ROLE -.672 -1.499 1.483    
TNTOTAL .176 8.914*** 1.011 .177 8.979*** 1.004 
       
Model fit:       
    R .403   .391   
    R2 .162   .153   
    Adjusted R2 .155   .150   
    Std. error 10.81   10.84   
   F statistic 22.39***   47.29***   
 
Notes:  
 
Dependent variable - TCDIR 
* Significant at p < 0.10 
**  Significant at p < 0.05 
*** Significant at p < 0.01 
 
TCIR i  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + β4PENALTY i +  β5FINCONS i 
+ β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + β8 ROLEi +  β9 TNTOTALi + ε                                                                  
Where: 
TCDIRi        - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
PROBAUDITi    - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND iI   -Perception of government spending 
EQUITY i   - Perception of equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLEi i        - The role of the tax authority 
TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
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6.8.4 Summary results of Stage 4  
 
 
Table 6.24 and Figure 6.8 illustrate the determinants of tax compliance suggested by 
the analysis. Discussion of these results is described in Chapter 7. 
 
Table 6.24: Results of Stage 4- Tax compliance determinants 
Determinants Expected signs/hypotheses Results 
  TCHYP TCDIR 
PROBAUDIT +  
(high probability, high compliance) 
- - 
GOVSPEND +  
(good perception, high compliance) 
+ (H4B) +(H4B) 
FINCONS - 
(crucial financial problem, low compliance)
- (H4E) - (H4E) 
GROUP + 
(high influence, high compliance) 
- - 
TNTOTAL + 
(high tax knowledge, high compliance) 
NS + (H4J) 
         * NS – not significant 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Results of Stage 4-Tax compliance determinants 
TAX COMPLIANCE 
(DIRECT) Perception of govt. spending 
Financial constraint 
Referent Group 
Tax knowledge 
Probability of being audited 
TAX COMPLIANCE 
TAX COMPLIANCE 
(HYP) 
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6.9 STAGE 5- TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS WITH CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
 
 
This section investigates the effect of inserting control variables into the analysis of 
tax compliance behaviour. 
 
 
 
6.9.1 Dependent variable TCHYP 
 
 
This section attempts to examine whether inserting control variables in the OLS will 
produce a better explanatory value of tax compliance behaviour. Table 6.25 illustrates 
the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and control variables for 
Stage 5. There were a number of significant correlations between TCHYP and 
independent variables. All independent variables except EQUITY and TNTOTAL 
were significantly correlated with TCHYP at p< 0.01 (except ROLE, p< 0.05). This 
outcome provides preliminary results that most of the TCHYP determinants tested are 
associated with TCHYP. There was significant association but low correlation 
(p<0.01) between TCHYP and GENDER (r = .095) and TCHYP and INCOME (r = 
.213).  Other significant and high correlations were also found (p<0.05) between 
TCHYP and AGE (r = .264).                        
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                           Table 6.25: Stage 5 -Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and control variables. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. TCHYP40:60 1                
2. PROBAUDIT -.295(**) 1               
3. CHANGES .138(**) -.003 1              
4. EQUITY .051 -.029 .394(**) 1             
5. PENALTY -.246(**) .393(**) -.030 -.010 1            
6. FINCONS -.331(**) .214(**) -.156(**) .087(**) .319(**) 1           
7. CHANGES -.197(**) .162(**) -.065(*) .125(**) .217(**) .563(**) 1          
8. GROUP -.307(**) .404(**) -.040 -.048 .356(**) .294(**) .269(**) 1         
9. ROLE .072(*) -.011 .411(**) .371(**) .037 -.133(**) -.011 .034 1        
10. GENDER .095(**) -.037 .082(**) .008 -.080(**) -.068(*) -.053 -.081(**) .081(**) 1       
11. INCOME .213(**) -.068(*) -.058 -.112(**) -.109(**) -.141(**) -.075(*) -.041 -.098(**) -.250(**) 1      
12. AGE .264(**) -.038 .152(**) .099(**) -.090(**) -.162(**) -.066(*) -.083(**) .055 -.206(**) .427(**) 1     
13. EDUCATION  .048 -.029 -.067(*) -.051 -.035 -.050 -.048 -.032 -.046 -.096(**) .364(**) .037 1    
14. COURSE -.040 .059 -.084(**) -.037 .032 .099(**) .035 -.006 -.113(**) -.013 -.069(*) .045 -.051 1   
15. AUDITED -.003 -.002 .005 .038 .046 -.018 -.052 -.027 -.030 .061(*) -.054 -.098(**) -.049 .035 1  
16. TNTOTAL -.034 .129(**) .201(**) .230(**) .081(**) .093(**) .116(**) .051 .185(**) -.055 .030 .179(**) .027 -.066(*) -.039 1 
 
 
See Table 5.5 for variable definitions 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6.26 summarises the results of the OLS regression analysis for the base OLS 
regression model (Panel A) and includes a number of control variables (Panel B) to 
consider the variables that affect tax compliance.  
 
Table 6.26 (Panel A) describes that the base OLS regression model was significant at 
p <0.01 level (F statistics = 27.97), while the R and R2 were .442 and .195 
respectively. With respect to the significance of the regression coefficients for the 
independent variables summarised in Panel A, results show that FINCONS is the 
most important determinant of tax compliance behaviour. The association between 
TCHYP and FINCONS was negative and significant (p < 0.001). PROBAUDIT, 
GROUP, GOVSPEND and PENALTY represent the next most important 
determinants of tax compliance.   
 
Table 6.26: OLS regressions results (dependent variable TCHYP) 
 Coefficient t Sig. VIF 
Panel A:     
     
(Constant) 26.370 22.082 .000***  
PROBAUDIT -.246 -5.036 .000*** 1.322 
GOVSPEND .119 2.524 .012*** 1.363 
EQUITY .026 .407 .684 1.356 
PENALTY -.081 -1.708 .088* 1.327 
FINCONS -.346 -6.341 .000*** 1.692 
CHANGES .026 .412 .680 1.534 
GROUP -.219 -4.851 .000*** 1.352 
ROLE .010 .181 .857 1.340 
TNTOTAL .001 .078 .938 1.115 
     
Model fit:     
    R .442    
    R2 .195    
    Adjusted R2 .188    
    Std. error 4.192    
    F statistic 27.97***    
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Panel B:     
     
(Constant) 20.773 9.979 .000***  
PROBAUDIT -.247 -5.131 .000*** 1.346 
GOVSPEND .090 1.923 .055* 1.410 
EQUITY .049 .773 .439 1.394 
PENALTY -.042 -.897 .370 1.350 
FINCONS -.279 -5.136 .000*** 1.749 
CHANGES .030 .479 .632 1.524 
GROUP -.200 -4.545 .000*** 1.364 
ROLE .015 .281 .779 1.373 
TNTOTAL -.008 -.963 .336 1.155 
GENDER 1.208 4.505 .000*** 1.119 
INCOME .581 4.020 .000*** 1.548 
AGE .446 5.319 .000*** 1.405 
EDUCATION  -.012 -.093 .926 1.176 
COURSE -.007 -.021 .983 1.050 
AUDITED .183 .262 .793 1.030 
    
Model fit:     
    R .504    
    R2 .254    
    Adjusted R2 .243    
    Std. error 4.05209    
    F statistic 23.06***    
Note: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
 
TCHYP40:60 i  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + β4PENALTY i +  β5FINCONS i 
+ β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + β8 ROLEi +  β9 TNTOTALi +  β10 GENDER i + 
β11INCOME i + β12AGE i + β13EDUC i + β14 COURSE i + β15AUDITED i ε i                                                  
Where: 
TCHYPi        - Tax compliance score (hypothetical  questions) 
PROBAUDITi    - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND i    -Perception of government spending 
EQUITY i   - Perception of equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLE i        - The role of the tax authority 
TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i   - Gender 
 INCOME i   - Income level of the taxpayer 
AGE i     - Age 
EDUC i    - Education level 
COURSE i   - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i  - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
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Table 6.26 (Panel B) summarises the results of the supplementary regression model 
which incorporated several control variables. Results show that the model is 
significant at p < 0.01 level (F statistic 23.06), while the R is estimated at .504.  In 
Panel B, FINCONS, PROBAUDIT, GROUP and GOVSPEND appear to be the 
determinants of tax compliance incorporated with the control variables. The 
supplementary regression model also suggested that FINCONS remain the most 
important determinants of tax compliance (r= -.279). PROBAUDIT, GROUP, and 
GOVSPEND become the next most important determinants of tax compliance 
(p<0.01).   
 
In relation to the significance of the control variables in Panel B, results show that 
GENDER, INCOME and AGE appear to be significantly and positively correlated 
with tax compliance behaviour. Specifically, the association between GENDER and 
TCHYP was positive and significant (p<0.001), consequently supporting hypothesis 
H5A that males taxpayers are significantly more compliant. The association between 
INCOME and TCHYP was also positive and significant (p<0.001), thus supporting 
hypothesis H5B that higher income earners are significantly more compliant. The 
association between AGE and TCHYP was also positive and significant (p<0.001), 
hence supporting hypothesis H5C that older people are significantly more compliant. 
Finally, other control variables: EDUCATION, COURSE and AUDITED, had no 
significant association with TCHYP.  
 
Again, consistent with results in Table 6.17, these results evidenced that control 
variables had a significant impact on increasing tax compliance behaviour, as well as 
demonstrated that the supplementary regression model remains robust. 
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6.9.2 Dependent variable - TCDIR 
 
Table 6.27 illustrates the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and 
control variables for Stage 5. There were a number of significant correlations between 
TCDIR and independent variables as well as TCDIR and control variables. In line 
with results in Table 6.26, it appears that all independent variables except CHANGES 
were significantly correlated with TCHYP at p< 0.01. There were also significant 
associations (p<0.01) between TCDIR and INCOME (r = -.172) and TCDIR and 
EDUCATION (r = -.087).  
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Table 6.27: Stage 5 -Pearson correlation matrix for dependent, independent and control variables. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. TCDIR 1 -               
2. PROBAUDIT -.224(**) 1               
3. CHANGES .035 .087(**) 1              
4. EQUITY -.247(**) .503(**) .069(*) 1             
5. PENALTY -.198(**) .442(**) .080(**) .536(**) 1            
6. FINCONS -.241(**) .399(**) .010 .507(**) .466(**) 1           
7. CHANGES -.221(**) .407(**) .014 .527(**) .461(**) .636(**) 1          
8. GROUP -.234(**) .387(**) -.031 .522(**) .486(**) .598(**) .626(**) 1         
9. TNTOTAL -.204(**) .338(**) .033 .399(**) .378(**) .431(**) .485(**) .495(**) 1        
10. ROLE .258(**) -.022 -.029 -.060(*) .012 -.042 -.034 .013 -.013 1       
11. GENDER -.040 .083(**) -.015 .051 .119(**) .071(*) .094(**) .069(*) .066(*) -.055 1      
12. INCOME -.172(**) .138(**) -.044 .177(**) .105(**) .188(**) .221(**) .179(**) .157(**) .030 -.250(**) 1     
13. AGE -.041 .217(**) .002 .194(**) .103(**) .242(**) .260(**) .183(**) .173(**) .179(**) -.206(**) .427(**) 1    
14. EDUCATION  -.087(**) .020 -.032 .033 .044 .060 .052 .017 .049 .027 -.096(**) .364(**) .037 1   
15. COURSE -.009 -.035 .007 -.041 -.068(*) -.034 .007 -.024 -.037 -.066(*) -.013 -.069(*) .045 -.051 1  
16. AUDITED -.010 .012 -.017 -.003 .007 -.042 -.014 .017 .030 -.039 .061(*) -.054 -.098(**) -.049 .035 1 
 
 
See Table 5.5 for variable definitions 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.28 (Panel B) suggests that PROBAUDIT, GOVSPEND, GROUP and 
TNTOTAL were significantly associated with tax compliance. The supplementary 
regression model (Panel B) suggested that TNTOTAL remains the most important 
determinant of tax compliance, (β = .25) followed by PROBAUDIT and GROUP. 
 
With respect to the significance of control variables in Panel B, results show that 
INCOME and EDUCATION appear to be significantly correlated with tax 
compliance behaviour. Specifically, the association between INCOME and TCDIR 
was negative and significant (p<0.001), consequently supporting hypothesis H5B that 
lower income earners are significantly more compliant. It was also found that the 
association between EDUCATION and TCDIR was negative and significant 
(p<0.001), consequently supporting hypothesis H5D that highly educated taxpayers are 
significantly less compliant. Finally, other control variables: GENDER, AGE, 
COURSE and AUDITED, had no significant association with TCDIR. 
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Table 6.28 - OLS regressions results (dependent variable TCDIR) 
 Coefficient t Sig. VIF 
Panel A:     
     
(Constant) 62.994 20.274 .000***  
PROBAUDIT -1.459 -3.076 .002*** 1.475 
GOVSPEND .968 2.018 .044* 1.022 
EQUITY -.810 -1.539 .124 1.881 
PENALTY -.529 -1.001 .317 1.641 
FINCONS -.883 -1.679 .093* 2.020 
CHANGES -.115 -.213 .831 2.194 
GROUP -1.071 -1.908 .057* 2.095 
ROLE -.672 -1.499 .134 1.483 
TNTOTAL .176 8.914 .000*** 1.011 
     
Model fit:     
    R .403    
    R2 .162    
    Adjusted R2 .155    
    Std. error 10.807    
    F statistic 22.39***    
     
Panel B:     
     
(Constant) 68.411 12.697 .000***  
PROBAUDIT -1.347 -2.789 .005*** 1.508 
GOVSPEND .861 1.772 .077* 1.031 
EQUITY -.719 -1.353 .176 1.890 
PENALTY -.654 -1.211 .226 1.681 
FINCONS -.854 -1.581 .114 2.097 
CHANGES .089 .162 .872 2.262 
GROUP -1.073 -1.898 .058* 2.102 
ROLE -.539 -1.181 .238 1.518 
TNTOTAL .175 8.586 .000*** 1.064 
GENDER -.611 -.853 .394 1.131 
INCOME -1.486 -3.904 .000*** 1.523 
AGE .223 .993 .321 1.424 
EDUCATION  -.210 -.589 .000*** 1.180 
COURSE -.712 -.801 .423 1.030 
AUDITED -.016 -.009 .993 1.022 
    
Model fit:     
    R .422    
    R2 .178    
    Adjusted R2 .166    
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    Std. error 10.77748    
    F statistic 14.68***    
 
Notes: 
*** Significant at 0.01 level 
**Significant at 0.05 level 
* Significant at 0.10 level 
 
TCDIRi  = α + β1PROBAUDITi + β2GOVSPEND i + β3EQUITY i + β4PENALTY i +  β5FINCONS i + 
β6CHANGES i  + β7GROUP i  + β8 ROLEi +  β9 TNTOTALi  + β10 GENDER i + β11INCOME i + 
β12AGE i + β13EDUC i + β14 COURSE i + β15AUDITED i + ε i                                                                      
 
Where: 
TCDIRi        - Tax compliance score (direct questions) 
PROBAUDITi    - Probability of being audited 
GOVSPEND iI   -Perception of government spending 
EQUITY i   - Perception of equity and fairness 
PENALTY i  - Penalty rates and enforcement 
FINCONS i   - Personal financial constraint 
CHANGES i     - Changes on current government policy 
GROUP i    - Referent group 
ROLEi        - The role of the tax authority 
  TNTOTAL i  - Total tax knowledge score 
GENDER i   - Gender 
 INCOME i   - Income level of the taxpayer 
AGE i     - Age 
EDUC i    - Education level 
COURSE i   - Experience of attending tax courses 
AUDITED i  - Experience of being audited by the tax authority 
 
 
 
 
6.9.3 Results summary Stage 5 – tax compliance determinant with control variables 
 
Table 6.29 summarises the results of Stage 5. Discussions of these results is presented in 
Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.29: Results of Stage 5 - Significant independent and control variables which 
affect tax compliance 
 
Dependent 
variables 
Significant IV without 
control variables 
(Table 6.26 and  
6.30 Panel A) 
Significant IV with control 
variables (Table 6.26 and 
6.30 Panel B) 
Accepted 
hypotheses 
TCHYP PROBAUDIT (negative) PROBAUDIT (negative)  
 GOVSPEND (positive) GOVSPEND (positive)  
 PENALTY (negative) FINCONS (negative)  
 FINCONS (negative) GROUP (negative)  
 GROUP (negative) GENDER (positive) (CV) H5A 
  INCOME (positive) (CV) H5B 
  AGE (positive) (CV) H5C 
    
TCDIR PROBAUDIT (negative) PROBAUDIT (negative)  
 GOVSPEND (positive) GOVSPEND (positive)  
 FINCONS (negative) TNTOTAL (positive)  
 GROUP (negative) GROUP (negative)  
  INCOME (negative) (CV) H5B (partly) 
  EDUCATION (positive)(CV) H5D 
    
* IV – Independent variables, CV- control variables 
     
 
 
6.10  NON-RESPONSE BIAS ANALYSIS 
 
 
Non-response bias can usually occur in surveys and interviews and it requires careful 
management in order to produce valid and reliable results (Sydow, 2006 and Donzė 
2002). Previous studies (see Biemer, 2001; Saris and Hagenaars, 1997) have attempted to 
determine if there is a difference between respondents and non-respondents and reported 
that people who respond to surveys many answer questions differently than those who do 
not. They have also found that late responders may answer differently than early 
responders, and that the differences may be due to the different level of interest in the 
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subject matter. Most researchers view non-response bias as a continuum, ranging from 
fast responders to slow responders (with non-responders defining the end of the 
continuum). There are a number of non response bias measurements such as 
extrapolation to estimate the magnitude of bias created by non-response, and the used of 
a mixed method data collection (using different methods of data collection in  research 
such as questionnaires and phone interviews) (see Donzė 2002).  
 
Thus, in order to validate, verify and increase the reliability and explanatory power of the 
results, following Donzė (2002)122; Li and Prabhala (2005)123 and Sydow (2006)124, due 
to limitations such as different questionnaire design and research objectives, this study 
measured non-response bias through two types of responses, namely ‘before follow up 
calls’125 and ‘after follow up calls’. These responses (before and after follow up calls) 
were examined and analysed using ANOVA and the following hypotheses were tested: 
  
H Null  -  μbefore = μafter 
(There is no significant mean difference between response received from 
non-followed up and followed up respondents) 
 
                                                 
122 Donzė (2002) attempted to introduce the methodology to correct non response in research on KOF ETH 
(Swiss Economic Institute) Zurich’s survey in year 2000 by using ‘weighting factors’ in his logit linear 
regression model. 
123 Li and Prabhala (2005) reviewed econometric model of self selection in corporate finance research 
particularly in random sampling. Issues such as sample selection and non-response bias are the focal point 
of the research.  
124 Sydow (2006) extends Donzė’s study by collecting the same data from the same dataset of population 
(KOF ETH Zurich). A mixed method approach (self administered questionnaires and phone interviews) 
was also employed. She exercised Chi square (χ2) and McNemar’s test and Logit models. 
125 Like Donzė (2002) and Sydow (2006), responses received without any follow up calls were categorised 
as ‘respondent’ while responses received after follow up calls made were categorised as ‘non respondent’ 
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H Alternative  -  μbefore ≠ μafter 
(There is significant mean difference between response received from non-
followed up and followed up respondents) 
 
The null hypotheses will be rejected if ANOVA analysis indicates significant signs, thus 
non-response might occur. However, if ANOVA analysis indicates insignificant signs, 
thus the data is valid for further analysis because non-response bias does not occur. 
 
Table 6.30 indicates the response received before and after follow up calls in each sample 
group. Tables 6.31 to Table 6.36 summarise ANOVA for tax knowledge, tax compliance 
direct and tax compliance hypothetical questions (all variables).  
 
Based on the analysis, the Levene’s test126 (see Table 6.31 and 6.35) indicates that 
majority of the variables (except ‘employment income’ and ‘child relief’ (see Table 6.31) 
were insignificant which mean that the variances of the variables were constant (no 
significant variance different between before follow up and after follow up calls). Thus it 
can be said that non-response bias does not occur in this data. In addition, ANOVA 
analysis for all variables measured (tax knowledge, tax compliance direct and tax 
compliance hypothetical questions) were also insignificant (except for ‘dividend and 
interest’ in Table 6.32 and ‘current policy changes’ in Table 6.34). In conclusion, 
                                                 
126 Levene’s test is used to test the homogeneity of variance. If the result is insignificant (p > 0,05), it 
means that the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance cannot be rejected. Therefore the variances of the 
variables are constant. Thus the assumption of non response bias does not occur in this data (Hair et.al. 
2006:432, 438; Hong 2005:75-76; Sekaran 2000:319) 
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ANOVA test results were sufficiently powerful (5 out of 7 variables or 71%) to accept 
the null hypothesis in which there is no significant mean difference between response 
received from non-followed up and followed up respondents. Thus, non-response bias 
does not occur in this study. 
 
 
 
Table 6.30: Response received before and after follow up calls in each sample group. 
 
 
Cluster States Before follow 
up calls 
After follow up 
calls 
Total 
responses 
1 Selangor/Kuala 
Lumpur 
76 44 120 
 
2 Perlis/Kedah 64 37 101 
3 Pulau Pinang/ 
Perak 
71 44 115 
4 Melaka/Negeri 
Sembilan 
58 46 104 
5 Johor 70 37 107 
6 Kelantan 59 53 112 
7 Terengganu 62 42 104 
8 Pahang 73 46 119 
9 Sabah/ Labuan 69 28 97 
10 Sarawak 61 33 94 
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Table 6.31: Tax knowledge - Test of homogeneity of variance between ‘before’ and 
‘after’ follow up calls 
 
Variables (Tax knowledge) Levene’s test df1 df2 Sig. 
Responsibility .018 1 1,070 .893 
Employment income 3.339 1 1,066 .068* 
Dividend and interest .378 1 1,066 .539 
Personal relief .723 1 1,030 .395 
Child relief 7.587 1 1,058 .006* 
Rebates .417 1 1,067 .519 
Awareness of offences, penalties .397 1 1,068 .529 
* significant at p < 0.05 
 
 
Table 6.32: ANOVA-Non response bias analysis for tax knowledge 
 
Variable (Tax 
knowledge) 
Sum of Squares df Mean  
Square 
F Sig. 
Responsibility Between Groups 6.284 1 6.284 .859
 Within Groups 7825.194 1,070 7.313 
 Total 
 
7831.478 1,071  
Employment income Between Groups 77.945 1 77.945 2.940
 Within Groups 28258.681 1,066 26.509 
 Total 
 
28336.625 1,067  
Dividend and interest Between Groups 1.086 1 1.086 .035*
 Within Groups 33199.328 1,066 31.144 
 Total 
 
33200.415 1,067  
Personal relief Between Groups 59.333 1 59.333 1.523
 Within Groups 40120.977 1,030 38.952 
 Total 
 
40180.310 1,031  
Child relief Between Groups 112.749 1 112.749 3.884
 Within Groups 30710.960 1,058 29.027 
 Total 
 
30823.708 1,059  
Rebates Between Groups 15.981 1 15.981 1.194
 Within Groups 14278.929 1,067 13.382 
 Total 
 
14294.909 1,068  
Awareness of offences, 
penalties 
Between Groups 6.683 1 6.683 .651
 Within Groups 10968.323 1,068 10.270 
 Total 
 
10975.006 1,069  
* significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 6.33: Tax compliance direct - Test of homogeneity of variance between ‘before’ 
and ‘after’ follow up calls 
 
Variables (Tax compliance 
Direct) 
Levene’s test df1 df2 Sig. 
Audited 1.572 1 1,071 .210 
Govt. spending .381 1 1,071 .537 
Fairness and equity .065 1 1,060 .798 
The tax authority role .101 1 1,067 .751 
Penalty .484 1 1,064 .487 
Financial constraint .202 1 1,065 .653 
Current policy changes 1.152 1 1,067 .283 
Referents group .020 1 1,066 .886 
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Table 6.34: ANOVA-Non response bias analysis for tax compliance direct 
 
Variable (tax 
compliance 
direct) 
Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Audited Between Groups 1.631 1 1.631 .173
 Within Groups 10085.324 1,071 9.417 
 Total 
 
10086.954 1,072  
Govt. spending Between Groups 40.129 1 40.129 3.831
 Within Groups 11217.944 1,071 10.474 
 Total 
 
11258.073 1,072  
Fairness and equity  Between Groups 8.868 1 8.868 1.588
 Within Groups 5918.631 1,060 5.584 
 Total 
 
5927.499 1,061  
The tax authority role Between Groups 1.583 1 1.583 .217
 Within Groups 7767.004 1,067 7.279 
 Total 
 
7768.587 1,068  
Penalty Between Groups 3.755 1 3.755 .382
 Within Groups 10470.241 1,064 9.840 
 Total 
 
10473.996 1,065  
Financial constraint Between Groups 1.710 1 1.710 .181
 Within Groups 10085.137 1,065 9.470 
 Total 
 
10086.847 1,066  
Current policy changes Between Groups .168 1 .168 .027*
 Within Groups 6732.011 1,067 6.309 
 Total 
 
6732.180 1,068  
 
* significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 6.35: Tax compliance hypothetical - Test of homogeneity of variance between 
‘before’ and ‘after’ follow up calls 
 
 
Variables (Tax compliance 
hypothetical) 
Levene’s test df1 df2 Sig. 
Audited .589 1 1,066 .443 
Govt. spending .485 1 1,064 .486 
Fairness and equity .026 1 1,065 .871 
The tax authority role .129 1 1,063 .719 
Penalty .000 1 1,065 .990 
Financial constraint .353 1 1,064 .552 
Current policy changes .416 1 1,067 .519 
Referents group .180 1 1,066 .672 
 
 
Table 6.36: ANOVA-Non response bias analysis for tax compliance hypothetical 
 
Variable (Tax 
compliance 
hypothetical) 
Sum of Squares df Mean 
 Square 
F Sig. 
Audited Between Groups .178 1 .178 .246
 Within Groups 772.701 1066 .725 
 Total 
 
772.879 1067  
Govt. spending Between Groups .135 1 .135 .274
 Within Groups 524.062 1064 .493 
 Total 
 
524.197 1065  
Equity and fairness Between Groups 1.564 1 1.564 2.016
 Within Groups 826.535 1065 .776 
 Total 
 
828.099 1066  
Penalty Between Groups .343 1 .343 .525
 Within Groups 695.255 1065 .653 
 Total 
 
695.598 1066  
Financial constraint Between Groups 1.131 1 1.131 1.399
 Within Groups 860.409 1064 .809 
 Total 
 
861.541 1065  
Changes policies Between Groups 3.987 1 3.987 4.831
 Within Groups 880.755 1067 .825 
 Total 
 
884.742 1068  
Referent group Between Groups .734 1 .734 .998
 Within Groups 783.663 1066 .735 
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 Total 
 
784.397 1067  
The tax authority role Between Groups 1 1.900 2.315 .128
 Within Groups 1063 .820  
 Total 
 
1064  
 
 
 
 6.11 CONCLUSION 
 
 
Based on the analysis presented in the preceding sections of this chapter, it can be 
concluded that in the self assessment system in Malaysia, tax knowledge has a significant 
impact on tax compliance and the level of tax knowledge varies among respondents. 
Males, Malays, residents of Eastern region, high income earners and taxpayers who have 
attended tax courses appear to be the most knowledgeable taxpayer groups. The results 
also indicate that tax compliance was influenced by probability of being audited, 
perception of government spending, penalties, personal financial constraints, and referent 
group. These results were validated through a multiple method of questionnaires (direct 
and hypothetical questions) and analysis (stepwise multiple regressions and multiple 
regressions). Moreover, in Stage 3 and Stage 5 the inclusion of control variables 
enhanced and help to produce even more meaningful results in terms of explaining the 
link between levels and nature of tax knowledge and tax compliance. Table 6.37 
summarises the results of the analysis. Discussion of the results is presented in the next 
chapter. 
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Table 6.37: Results summary 
 Results Accepted 
hypotheses
Stage 1 Levels of knowledge (most): NA 
 Males,Malay, 
Earned monthly income ranged RM8,001 – RM10,000 (£1,232 
-£1,538), 
Reside in Kelantan,  had attended tax course  And Older 
taxpayers aged more than 56 years old. 
 
   
Stage 2 Tax knowledge is positively associated with attitude towards tax 
compliance behaviour 
HS2 
   
Stage 3 Tax knowledge and tax compliance (control variables (CV)) – 
TCHYP: 
 
               TNRES (negative)  
                TNEMPLOY (positive)  
                TNCHILDREL (negative)  
                TNREB (negative)  
               TN AWARE (positive)  
               GENDER (positive) (CV) H3A 
               INCOME (positive) (CV) H3B 
              AGE (positive) (CV) H3C 
   
 Tax knowledge and tax compliance (control variables (CV)) –
TCDIR: 
 
              TNRES (positive)  
              TNPERSREL (positive)  
              TNCHILDREL (positive)  
              TNREB (positive)  
              GENDER (positive) (CV) H3A 
              INCOME (negative) (CV) H3B (partly) 
  
Stage 4 Tax compliance determinants (TCDIR):  
              PROBAUDIT  
              GOVSPEND H4B 
              FINCONS H4E 
              GROUP  
              TNTOTAL H4J 
  
 Tax compliance determinants (TCHYP):  
              PROBAUDIT  
              GOVSPEND H4B 
              FINCONS H4E 
              GROUP  
   
Stage 5  Tax compliance determinants (control variables (CV)) – TCHYP:  
               PROBAUDIT (negative)  
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              GOVSPEND (positive)  
              FINCONS (negative)  
              GROUP (negative)  
              GENDER (positive) (CV) H5A 
              INCOME (positive) (CV) H5B 
              AGE (positive) (CV) H5C 
   
 Tax compliance determinants (control variables (CV)) – TCDIR:  
              PROBAUDIT (negative)  
              GOVSPEND (positive)  
              TNTOTAL (positive)  
              GROUP (negative)  
              INCOME (negative) (CV) H5B (partly) 
              EDUCATION (positive)(CV) H5D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter discusses the results of this study in relation to prior literature. In order of 
presentation, this section firstly discusses the importance of tax knowledge and then 
moves on to the determinants of tax compliance in the self assessment system. The 
objectives of this study are to determine the importance of tax knowledge in the self 
assessment system and identify the determinants of tax compliance. The results suggested 
that the characteristics of knowledgeable taxpayers are males, aged more than 56 years 
old, Malay, earning between RM2,001 – RM4,000 and RM8,001 – RM10,000, residing 
in Kelantan who have attended a tax course (Stage 1). The study also found that tax 
knowledge is positively associated with good attitudes towards tax compliance behaviour 
(Stage 2). Demographic variables such as gender, income levels and age were also found 
to significantly affect tax compliance behaviour with regard to tax knowledge (Stage 3). 
The results also indicate that tax compliance was influenced by the probability of being 
audited, perceptions of government spending, personal financial constraints, referent 
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groups, gender, income, age and education levels (Stage 4 and 5). The following sections 
discuss the results in detail. 
 
 
7.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF TAX KNOWLEDGE IN SAS 
 
Previous studies have evidenced that tax knowledge is important in self assessment 
systems and the influence of knowledge on compliance behaviour has been proven in 
various research (Mohamad Ali et. al. 2007). For example, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) 
found that the level of education is an important factor that contributes to the 
understanding of taxation, especially regarding laws and regulations of taxation. This 
study illustrated that tax knowledge has a very close relationship with taxpayers’ ability 
to understand the laws and regulations of taxation, and their ability to comply (see also 
Singh, 2003: Loo, 2006). A question that has been raised by previous researchers (for 
example Singh, 2003; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Harris, 1989) is whether enhancement in 
knowledge automatically increases tax compliance.  
 
In response to claims made by those researchers (i.e Mohamad Ali et. al.,2007; Singh, 
2003; Loo, 2006; Eriksen and Fallan, 1996; Harris, 1989), in other tax regimes, for 
example in Canada (refer Table 2.2), the Canada Revenue Authority (CRA) explicitly 
mentioned that the objectives of introducing SAS were to encourage voluntary 
compliance, simplify tax systems and increase taxpayers’ knowledge about tax laws 
(CRA, 2009). From the mission stated by the CRA, it can be deduced that there must be a 
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reason why the CRA emphasised the ‘increase of tax knowledge about tax laws’ as part 
of their mission. According to this statement, the CRA believed that increasing voluntary 
compliance could be achieved by increasing awareness of tax knowledge among 
taxpayers in Canada and therefore support findings suggested by Eriksen and Fallan 
(1996); Mohamad Ali et. al. (2007) and Lewis (1982).  
 
The objectives of this study with regard to tax knowledge, were to determine the level of 
tax knowledge of individual taxpayers in Malaysia and to identify the characteristics of 
most knowledgeable, average and least knowledgeable taxpayers (Section 1.4). Malaysia 
was chosen because a new self assessment system was introduced in 2004. Also, 
particular conditions in Malaysia such as the fact that is has significant cross cultural 
differences and is a complex multi-racial and multi-faith country enable this research to 
contribute new evidence to the tax compliance literature in a unique developing country 
(refer section 1.3). To answer those research objectives, this study hypothesised that ‘Tax 
knowledge is positively associated with attitudes towards tax compliance behaviour’ 
(refer to section 5.4.2.2– HS2). Results suggested that tax knowledge significantly affects 
tax compliance both in direct and hypothetical questions, consequently supporting HS2 
hypothesis (refer to section 6.6.1 and 6.6.2). Filling the gap as suggested by Eriksen and 
Fallan (1996), this study suggested that knowledge about employment income, awareness 
of offences, penalties and fines, taxpayers’ responsibilities and rights, child relief and 
rebates, appear to be significantly and positively correlated with tax compliance 
behaviour (Table 6.14 and 6.15).  
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In line with Lewis (1982), Eriksen and Fallan (1996), Loo (2006: 250) and Mohamad Ali 
et. al. (2007), this result suggests that fiscal knowledge correlates with attitudes towards 
taxation and therefore tax behaviour can be improved by a better understanding of tax 
laws. ‘Tax attitudes can be improved through better tax knowledge’ (Eriksen and Fallan 
1986: 398) and thus this will in turn increase compliance and reduce the inclination to 
evade taxes. This finding consequently provides some of the answers to Eriksen and 
Fallan’s (1996) claimed that “…no study has been done to investigate which parts of tax 
knowledge have the greatest effect on attitude toward taxation.”(Eriksen and Fallan, 
1996: 399).  
 
 
As such, when a taxpayer has better tax knowledge, attitudes towards tax would be 
positive and this will in turn increase compliance and reduce the propensity to evade 
taxes. Thus, this study suggested that providing more tax knowledge to a larger group of 
society helps to prevent tax evasion in SAS. Teaching tax laws and tax knowledge as a 
compulsory part of secondary school education might be relevant in a self assessment 
system in order to increase voluntary compliance (further policy implications are 
discussed in Chapter 8). In contrast, poorer tax knowledge correlates with negative 
attitudes toward taxation, implying that a better attitude could be achieved through better 
tax knowledge (Lewis 1982: 59) (refer to Tables 6.14, 6.15, section 6.6.2 and Figure 6.7). 
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As this study suggested that tax knowledge is important in increasing voluntary 
compliance in SAS (refer to Table 6.14, 6.15 and section 6.6.2), various measures need to 
be taken to educate taxpayers (or more specifically to encourage taxpayers to be more 
knowledgeable) so that the level of compliance will increase and some of the objectives 
of SAS in Malaysia (refer to section 1.5) would be achieved. One of the ways in which 
this could be achieved is through a tax education programme, which is being 
implemented in many developed countries like the US, Canada and UK (see section 
2.3.1). However, to educate all taxpayers without specific target groups is costly and time 
consuming. Therefore results presented in Stage 1 (refer to 5.4.1 and section 6.5) and 
Stage 3 (5.4.3. 6.7, Table 6.17, Table 6.18 and Table 6.19) could be useful to facilitate 
the tax authority in targeting which group of taxpayers is to be focused on for any one 
activity; for example, for tax audits and investigations and education programmes.  
 
According to results from our Stage 1 and Stage 3 analysis (for the summary of these 
results, refer to section 6.5.3 and section 6.7.2), this study suggested that some notable 
characteristics of the most knowledgeable taxpayer group is that they are male, Malay, 
with a monthly income ranging from RM8,001 – RM10,000 (£1,232 - £1,538) and 
RM2,000 – RM4,000 (£308 - £615) (the average income in Malaysia in 2008 was 
RM25,784 (RM2,149 per month), 2009 (3rd quarter) was RM24,131 (RM2,011 per 
month), (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2010)), reside in the north east of Peninsula 
of Malaysia, have attended a tax course and are aged more than 56 years old (refer to 
6.5.1, 6.5.2, 6.5.3 and Figure 6.6). In addition, further analysis presented in Table 6.19 
 366
also revealed that gender, income and age appear to be significantly correlated with tax 
compliance behaviour, assuming that all respondents have equal levels of tax knowledge.  
 
The result (that males are significantly more tax-knowledgeable than females at a 
national level) contradicts that reported in  Mohamad Ali et. al.  (2007: 10) in which their 
experiment on 42 respondents among postgraduate students in Malaysian universities 
indicated that there was no significant difference between male and female’s tax 
knowledge. However,  further analysis in this study based on each region revealed that 
each region has no significant tax knowledge difference between males and females 
(except for Kelantan region, n = 112, t = 2.091, p < 0.05), thus supporting the results 
suggested by Mohamad Ali et. al. (2007). Comparing this study’s result and Mohamad 
Ali et. al. (2007), it indicates that larger sample (in this case 1,073 compared to 42 
respondents) may provide different results.  Thus, this national survey perhaps provides a 
more comprehensive result and understanding as well as new evidence that experimental 
designs and national surveys provide different perspectives. 
 
In line with McKerchar, (2002) and Braithwaite, Reinhart and Smart, (2009), this 
research also demonstrates that younger taxpayers and lower income earners are shown to 
be less knowledgeable about tax matters. This could be explained by the fact that younger 
taxpayers who normally earn lower incomes are new to the tax system and they have 
been shown to have less well developed sense of moral obligation to pay tax (Orviska 
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and Hudson, 2002; Wearing and Headey, 1997). In addition, younger taxpayers may be 
prone to use tax agents’ services in their capacity to comply with tax law, particularly in a 
self-assessment tax system (Braithwaite et. al., 2009). 
  
This study also suggests that there was a significant difference between the tax 
knowledge of taxpayers who had attended tax courses and those who had not (see section 
6.5.1.2 and Table 6.4). As expected, taxpayers who have attended tax courses are more 
knowledgeable. Taxpayers of Malay ethnicity were also found to be significantly more 
knowledgeable than other ethnicities (Chinese, Indian and others). This result contrasts 
with a report released by the Ministry of Education of Malaysia, in which those of 
Chinese origin demonstrate higher academic performance than other ethnic groups in 
Malaysia in any levels in secondary schools and universities (Ministry of Education 
Malaysia, 2010).  
 
This result also supports the results in section 6.5.2.3 and Table 6.9, which demonstrate 
that the level of tax knowledge is not significantly determined by the individual’s general 
level of education. Better educated taxpayers do not necessarily have higher tax 
knowledge. The results in Table 6.9 also indicate that the tax knowledge score among 
taxpayers is not significantly different (score between 130 and 131) except for PhD 
holders (with an average score of 139) – who hold the highest score (this result is in line 
with other studies (see Loo, 2006 and Mohamad Ali, et. al., 2007) which suggested that 
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higher levels of education cultivate greater tax knowledge. However, the score (for PhD 
holders) was not statistically significant (refer to Table 6.9 column B1). Therefore this 
study suggests that tax knowledge is not determined by levels of general education. 
 
In relation to ethnicity and religion, in Malaysia, Malays heritage is normally associated 
with Muslims, Chinese heritage with Buddhism and Indian origins with Hinduism. This 
claim is supported by a high correlation between ethnicity and religion with r = 0.70, p < 
0.001. However, in certain cases, Malays, Chinese and Indians are also associated with 
Christianity. Although there is a high correlation between ethnicity and religion, 
however, this study found that there was no significant difference between religion and 
tax knowledge (refer Table 6.8 and section 6.5.2.2). Since this study only attempts to 
make associations between religion and the levels of tax knowledge, therefore, religiosity 
might be a useful factor to investigate in further research, as suggested by Torgler (2007). 
 
This study’s results (see Table 6.19 and Figure 6.6) therefore provide evidence that in 
order to maximise the impact of a national education programme of taxpayers, the tax 
authority should focus more on female taxpayers, ethnic groups other than Malays (i.e. 
Indian and  Chinese), on lower income earners, on those residing in other regions than the 
north east, on those who have never attended tax courses, and on younger taxpayers. By 
focusing on these groups, it is believed that the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) could come 
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up with education programmes that could be more effective and efficient at reducing tax 
non-compliance on a national level. 
 
In addition to potentially helping in the selection of samples to be targeted for tax 
education by the IRB, results of this study could also be useful to the IRB in improving 
audit sampling for investigations. For example, since this study suggested that tax 
knowledge is positively associated with tax compliance, hence the audit samples could be 
selected from taxpayers who do posses lower tax knowledge as suggested by results in 
Table 6.12 and Figure 6.6. 
 
Nevertheless, Malaysia has just started (in 2004) the process of exposing and educating 
taxpayers to the implementation of SAS (refer section 3.5).  Countries such as the US, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and UK have been implementing a continuous 
tax education system to taxpayers and children (refer 2.4.1 for further details). Other 
countries like Australia (ATO, 2009) have focused on a special purpose online website, 
while Sweden, through the Swedish Tax Agency, has launched extensive advertising 
campaigns to educate people about the benefits of paying taxes (Wittberg, 2006). 
Furthermore, the findings of this study have prompted some tax authorities, particularly 
in Malaysia to educate young taxpayers, like the Australian Taxation Office, to tailor 
their advisory services to young taxpayers through a special purpose online site 
(Commissioner of Taxation, 2004).  
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However, having discussed the broad characteristics of knowledgeable taxpayers, we 
must next review the awareness and attitudes of taxpayers themselves in more detail, as 
the effectiveness of tax education and voluntary compliance largely depend on taxpayers’ 
readiness, acceptance and honesty. The next section reviews the findings of this study on 
tax compliance determinants beyond levels of tax knowledge itself.  
  
7.3 TAX COMPLIANCE DETERMINANTS 
 
As mention in section 1.4, the objective of this section of the research is to examine the 
characteristics of compliant and non-compliant taxpayers as well as to examine factors 
affecting taxpayers’ behaviour. Nine potential determinants of tax compliance were 
examined in this study, namely the probability of being audited, perceptions of 
government spending, perceptions of equity and fairness, penalties, financial constraints, 
changes to current governmental policies, the impact of referral groups,  the role of the 
Inland Revenue Board and tax knowledge.  
 
Using the hypothetical questions as the dependent variable, results of this study suggested 
that the significant factors affecting tax compliance in SAS in Malaysia at the time of this 
study include the probability of being audited (negative), perceptions of government 
spending (positive), financial constraints (negative) and the influence of referent groups 
(negative) (refer to Table 6.24). Financial constraints was found to be the main 
explanatory factor in determining tax compliance behaviour, followed by the probability 
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of being audited, perceptions of government spending and the influence of referent 
groups (refer to Table 6.22) 
 
Using direct questions as the dependent variable, results suggested that tax compliance 
was still being influenced by the same variables (also in the same directions), namely the 
probability of being audited, the influence of referent groups, financial constraints and 
perceptions of government spending. Interestingly, however, in this case tax knowledge 
(positive association) becomes another factor that affects tax compliance behaviour in 
SAS in Malaysia and becomes the most significant determinant (refer Table 6.23) 
followed by the probability of being audited, the influence of referent groups and 
financial constraints, implying that high tax knowledge would increase tax compliance, 
thus hypothesis H4J was accepted (refer to 5.4.4.2) and supports the results in Stage 2 and 
3. In agreement with the results shown in Table 6.22, a high probability of being audited, 
crucial financial constraints and influence from family and friends would discourage tax 
compliance.  In contrast, positive perceptions of how the government spends taxpayers’ 
money would potentially increase tax compliance. 
 
 
These results provide new evidence that taxpayers who have crucial financial constraints, 
a high probability of being audited and high influence from immediate family members 
and friends would tend to be less compliant (negative association) and subsequently 
hypotheses H4E was accepted while H4A, and H4G were rejected (refer to 5.4.4.2). In 
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contrast, positive perceptions of government spending would tend to increase compliance 
among taxpayers, thus hypothesis H4B was accepted.  
 
Comparing the result between hypothetical and direct questions, although the four 
significant variables are the same, the order and directions were different, perhaps due to 
the different approach taken in these two sets of questions. For example, the hypothetical 
questions required the respondents to answer the probability of doing something ethical 
or unethical while direct questions required the respondents to answer the questions based 
on a Likert scale and thus reflect the scoring methods (refer Appendix 6, section 5.3.1.1 
and 5.3.1.3). 
 
This result also suggests that other variables such as perceptions of equity and fairness, 
penalties, changes to current government policy and the role of the tax authority were not 
significantly correlated with tax compliance at the time of this study. 
 
With regards to the probability of being audited, previous studies (for example, 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972); Jackson and Jaouen (1989); Shanmugam (2003); Dubin 
(2004); Riahi-Belkaoui (2004); Richardson (2006).; Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 
(1998); Bergman (1998); Verboon, and van Dijke (2007); Eisenhauer (2008)), have 
found that a high probability of being audited or detected would encourage taxpayers to 
be more compliant (positive relationship) but  some other studies found contradicting 
results i.e. a high probability of being audited would potentially decrease compliance 
creating a negative association (for example Young (1994), and Slemrod et. al. (2001): 
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Braithwaite et. al. (2009). In addition, Slemrod et. al. (1998) did not clearly state the 
direction (either positive or negative). Therefore, since a high probability of audited could 
encourage tax compliance, the tax authority should increase their number of audit 
samples so that tax compliance would increase, the tax gap would decrease and the 
missions of SAS would be achieved.  
 
 
With regards to perceptions of government spending, those who engage in tax evasion 
often justify such behavior by suggesting that the government wastes tax revenue and 
spends unwisely; such arguments can decrease voluntary compliance in the long run 
(Braithwaite et. al. 2009). It is expected that if the government spends taxpayers’ money 
wisely, for example on basic facilities like education, health and safety and public 
transportation, it is assumed that voluntary compliance will increase. In contrast, if 
taxpayers perceive that the government spends too much on something else, taxpayers 
might feel betrayed and attempt to evade. In judging their own behaviour, people tend to 
believe the cause is due to external attributes. For example, “he is a tax evader because he 
is a bad person; I am a tax evader because the government wastes my taxes (and that’s 
not my fault)” (McKerchar and Evans, 2009:176). Therefore, the government should 
spend taxpayers’ money wisely so that tax compliance will increase, thus the tax 
collection will also increase. 
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With regard to financial constraints, results of this study were in line with other studies in 
Malaysia conducted by Mohani (2001): that taxpayers who faced personal financial 
problems were more prone to evading tax in comparison with those in less financial 
distress. This study also revealed and verified that people in financial distress would tend 
to prioritise their financial needs and obligations first rather than paying taxes (as 
deductions at source or PAYE are not compulsory in Malaysia). For example, people are 
likely to pay their utility bills and mortgages because failure to do so would result in 
immediate fines or actions by the relevant authorities (utility providers or financial 
institutions). On the other hand, delaying the paying of tax would not be fined 
immediately by the tax authority because the enforcement is quite weak in Malaysia 
(Shanmugam, 2003).  
 
 
The propensity of taxpayers to pay their personal obligations first rather than tax 
liabilities is considered a ‘normal’ situation in Malaysia, as the penalties and fines 
imposed by the tax authority are not serious and the action of not paying is not considered 
to be an offence. This statement is supported by the conclusions of this study, which 
found that penalties and the role of the tax authority were not significantly correlated with 
tax compliance in both hypothetical and direct question measurement (refer to Table 6.22 
and 6.23). These insignificant findings demonstrate that taxpayers are not taking penalties 
and the role of the tax authority into consideration when making a compliance decision.  
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In relation to this finding (financial distress), another independent variable, namely 
changes to current government policies, was also insignificant (see Table 5.6 for variable 
definition and Table 6.22 and 6.23 for the results). This variable attempts to examine 
whether changes to prices (for example an increase or decrease in basic needs127) would 
be associated with a tax compliance decision. In June to August 2007 when the surveys 
were disseminated, the government had just increased fuel prices significantly. In April 
2006, fuel prices increased from RM1.60 to RM1.90 per litre (18.75%) and again in June 
2008 the fuel price increased 40% to RM2.70 per litre (Bank Negara Annual Report, 
2006 and 2008). The multiplying effects of these fuel price increments were tremendous 
and prices of goods and services went up significantly (Bank Negara Annual Report 
2006). Despite this economic situation at the time, which could be considered to be more 
extreme than normal and perhaps more likely to produce a significant tax compliance 
effect, if at all, changes to current government policy were not found to be significantly 
correlated with tax compliance. However, these two variables (financial constraint and 
changes to government policies) were interrelated but not highly correlated (see Table 
6.20 and 6.21). 
 
Conversely, Vogel (1974) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982) found that people with no 
financial distress also exercise tax evasion and, surprisingly, the level of evasion they 
reported was more serious than those of people in financial distress. Vogel presumed that 
this situation is related to economic status rather than personal conditions. Similarly, 
Webley and Halstead (1986) indicated that perceptions of economic deterioration is only 
                                                 
127 In Malaysia, basic needs prices (i.e. Fuels, sugar, wheat, cooking oil, rice etc.) are controlled by the 
government, not determined by the market. 
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one way that economic strain may be conceptualised. Therefore, although this study 
suggests that financial constraint is a significant factor affecting tax compliance 
behaviour, other factors i.e personal behaviour (decisions) and attitudes towards tax 
compliance tend to be of more influence in preference to financial constraints, as 
suggested by Vogel (1974) and Warneryd and Walerud (1982). 
 
With regard to the influence of the referent group, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) found 
that influence from family and friends significantly affects tax compliance (although the 
extent of influence was not clearly stated). Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Clotfelter 
(1983) also claimed that referent groups play a significant role in evasion although it was 
not clearly detailed which was stronger (family members or friends). Hasseldine et. al., 
(1994) reported that the numbers of evaders known to respondents made the largest 
contribution to the model of under-reporting income which means that the more 
respondents know evaders, the more under reporting of income may happen.  
 
In line with Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) and Clotfelter (1983), this study also suggests 
that friends and family members are of significant influence to taxpayers’ behaviour. The 
influence of referent groups tends to be important in SAS, as taxpayers are keen to refer 
their tax matters to their immediate family members or friends rather than tax experts, in 
order to minimise their compliance costs. If a taxpayer refers to a compliant taxpayer, 
then the tendency to commit tax evasion is lower, but if a taxpayer refers to a non-
compliant taxpayer, they might become a non-compliant taxpayer as well. Therefore, 
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cultivating personal awareness of compliance is important so that they are less influenced 
by these factors i.e friends and family members’ levels of compliance. 
 
In addition to these results, two factors (namely referent groups and perceptions of 
government spending) are variables beyond the IRB direct control as these factors rely 
solely on taxpayers’ decisions. Kirchler (2007: 3) classified these factors as ‘social 
psychological perspectives’ and outlined that these perspectives are difficult to  deal with 
in order to increase tax compliance. Since negative perceptions of government spending 
behaviours will affect tax compliance according to these results, despite these difficulties, 
the Malaysian government should respond positively by  wisely spending taxpayers’ 
money and fulfilling the nation’s (taxpayers’) basic needs, including infrastructures, 
medical allocations and education in order to increase taxpayers’ confidence in the 
government ruling party. Unnecessary expenses by the government will cultivate tax non-
compliant behaviour according to the results of this study.  
 
As such, to the IRB, low compliance rates and non-compliance had influenced the 
frequency of their tax audit activities and the practice of imposing penalties. However, 
the prior literature suggets (see Beck et. al. (1991) and Becker et. al.  (1987)), that 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour is not solely influenced by penalties and the frequency 
of tax audits (although this study did not find these factors to be significant), but also by 
their level of tax knowledge and their attitudes towards and perceptions of the tax system, 
such as in relation to the fairness of the system and inadequacy of the tax authority’s 
enforcement strategies (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007; Richardson, 2006). 
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In this study, other variables such as perceptions of equity and fairness, penalties, 
changes to current government policy and the role of the tax authority appear to be not 
significantly correlated with tax compliance decisions, even though previous studies in 
other countries found significant associations (see Harris, (1989). For example, the role 
of the tax authority in minimising the tax gap and increasing voluntary compliance was 
found to be very important as Hasseldine and Li (1999) placed the government as the 
main influencing factor in relation to tax evasion. The government plays a central role 
through designing and enforcing the tax systems, and collecting taxes (Hasseldine and Li, 
1999: 93). Spicer and Becker (1980), Andreoni et. al. (1998) and Wenzel (2003) claimed 
that if a specific group perceived their tax liability was higher than other groups, then tax 
evasion might occur among the group members. At a social level, tax compliance with 
regards to fairness is viewed as a national concern. If taxpayers perceive that the tax 
system is unfair, tax evasion is more likely to occur (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; 
Baldry, 1999b). At a general level, however, this study did not find similar results to 
those found in this prior work. 
 
Further analysis at Stage 5 (refer to section 6.9) found that out of six control variables 
examined, only three of them were positively significant. Consistent with results in Stage 
3, gender, income level and age were significantly correlated with tax compliance (refer 
Table 6.26). Females, higher income earners and older taxpayers were more compliant 
while other control variables such as education level, tax courses attended and experience 
of being audited by the tax authority were insignificant.  
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With regard to age, this result supports previous studies, for example those of Clotfelter 
(1983), Dubin and Wilde (1988), Loo (2006), Torgler (2007) and Beron et. al. (1992), 
which asserted that age was positively related with compliance.  However, there were 
some studies which found a negative association, for example, those of Tittle (1980), 
Warneryd and Walerud (1982) and Wahlund (1982). There were also a significant 
number of studies that found no relationship (See Spicer and Lundstedt 1976; Spicer and 
Becker 1980 and Porcano, 1988; refer Table 4.6). Therefore, results of this study suggest 
that in the self assessment system in Malaysia, age is an important determinant of tax 
compliance. 
 
With regard to income level, this study supports the findings of Torgler (2007), that lower 
income earners were less compliant. In contrast, two previous studies in Malaysia (before 
SAS was implemented) suggested that middle and high income earners in Malaysia were 
less compliant (Mohani, 2001) and high income earners in Malaysia were prone to evade 
tax (Loo, 2006), (refer to Table 4.7). Therefore, findings of this study could be interesting 
and important for the tax authority as in the new self assessment system, higher income 
earners are appear to act more responsibly and are more compliant with tax laws when 
compared to their behaviour under the previous official assessment system.  
 
With regard to gender, although agreements on findings from other studies are not 
conclusive and a concrete solution is still being debated, this study found that female 
taxpayers were more compliant. Again, this study found similar results with other 
Malaysian studies. For example, Mohani (2001: 177) asserted that ‘total income omitted 
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by males were eight time greater than females’. Mohamad Ali et.al (2007) in their 
experiment on postgraduate students also found similar results (refer to Table 4.8). 
Therefore, regardless of SAS or the official assessment system, based on the results of 
this study and previous research, it can be concluded that females taxpayers are more 
compliant in comparison with males. 
 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, this study found that tax knowledge is an important element in the self 
assessment system in Malaysia. Greater tax knowledge is believed to have a positive 
impact on compliance according to prior literature and this is borne out in this study of 
Malaysia’s SAS. This chapter discussed the findings of this study with regard to the 
characteristics of knowledgeable and less knowledgeable taxpayers, tax knowledge areas 
that have a great impact on compliance, determinants of tax compliance, as well as the 
function of control variables that affect compliance behaviour.  The findings could be an 
important input, particularly to the IRB (or to other developing countries’ tax 
administrators) in general in designing their various policies in order to enhance 
compliance and achieve the missions of SAS.  
 
The next chapter summarises the results, contributions, limitations of the study, 
elaborates further regarding the policy implications for tax authorities resulting from this 
research and outlines the future direction of research in order to describe what has not 
been fully covered in this work as presented. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Self assessment systems have been widely used in many countries. According to the 
objectives of SAS in various countries (see section 2.1 and Table 2.2), it can be 
concluded that the increase of voluntary compliance, the encouragement of 
administrative efficiency and the improvement of fairness and equity are the key 
motivating factors for the introduction of SAS. However, one of the main barriers in 
implementing SAS is voluntary compliance, which involves many factors such as audit 
probability, taxpayer knowledge and attitude and the taxpayer’s perceptions of fairness 
within the system (Kirchler et. al., 2008). Findings of research had also indicated that in 
SAS, taxpayers tend to comply less when compared with direct assessment (Andreoni, et. 
al. 1998). Is this true in all cases? (e.g. developing and developed countries?). Why might 
this happen in a move to a SAS? How can this best be managed and addressed by a tax 
authority? If this cannot be addressed it may bring into question the value of 
implementing a new tax administrative system (SAS) if taxpayers become less compliant 
when compared to direct assessment. 
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To answer these issues, several questions need to be addressed such as: what are the 
factors that make taxpayers less compliant in tax SAS? Do the changes to the actual 
mechanisms themselves of filing, assessment and administration under a SAS (i.e self 
completed tax returns, no supporting documents needing to be submitted, no tax return 
assessments etc.) encourage taxpayers to be less compliant or are there other contributory 
factors that also influence their behaviour that users of SAS also need to consider in 
managing voluntary compliance in a SAS? Is a possible explanation that taxpayers are 
not intentionally less compliant but appear to be so because they have insufficient tax 
knowledge to operate correctly in the SAS environment? 
 
Therefore, this study attempts to provide some clarifications and answers to these 
questions by providing further evidence to existing literature on what are the 
determinants of tax compliance in SAS and by directly testing whether tax knowledge 
significantly influences tax compliance. This was done through use of a developing 
country (Malaysia) as a case study.  This country was a good case for study of these 
questions as it is a recent adopter of a SAS (2004) and so issues related to the change to a 
SAS are more acute still in this environment and prior pre and post change studies can 
also be drawn on to support the wider study undertaken in this research. Most of the prior 
work on tax compliance issues in SAS has been undertaken in developed countries 
therefore the use of a developing country in this study helps to extend knowledge of 
developed countries’ compliance determinants into new areas where very little prior work 
has been undertaken. 
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This study seeks to contribute to the body of knowledge by providing new evidence on 
the importance of tax knowledge in SAS as well as identifying a series of tax compliance 
determinants in SAS in a developing country which is newly implementing SAS. The 
findings could also be useful to other countries, and particularly to Asian countries which 
have similar backgrounds of taxpayers, tax systems and mixes of culture.  
 
As potential issues of tax compliance in SAS are large in number, the primary objective 
of this study is to explore the importance of tax knowledge and to establish its place 
amongst the determinants of tax compliance in SAS. Based on a national survey using 
over 1,073 responses, providing the largest study of the topic to tax compliance so far 
undertaken in Malaysia, the findings of this study also address the questions posed in the 
previous paragraphs and evidence that tax knowledge along with improvements in 
several other factors (namely increasing the probability of being audited, improving 
development of perceptions of government spending, addressing personal financial 
constraints, decreasing negative impact of referent groups, and targeting specific 
programmes on tax compliance based on specific profile of gender, income, age and 
education levels) is more likely to deliver  the desired increasing voluntary compliance 
compared to other possible approaches. Besides these results, this study also explores the 
specific nature of tax knowledge in detail to illustrate how different profile of tax 
knowledge (e.g. the typical characteristics of knowledgeable, moderate and less 
knowledgeable taxpayers) are important to provide useful guidance for the tax 
administrator in aiding the administration of the SAS system. 
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Therefore, this chapter summarises the results of the study, its contributions to 
knowledge, how these study findings could be useful to the Malaysian, and other, tax 
administrators, the limitations of the study and future research directions. 
 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY AND THE RESULTS 
 
Self assessment systems are believed to be better than direct assessment systems by many 
tax administrators (James and Alley, 2004). That is why many developed and developing 
countries move from direct assessments to SAS. Although there are issues pertaining to 
the implementation of SAS, from tax administrators’ perspectives, SAS could enhance 
their tax collections, efficiency and the usage of human resource in assessing all tax 
returns. In contrast, taxpayers may perceive that the burden of tax (assessments for 
example) has been shifted to them and many taxpayers choose to be less complaint as a 
result of protesting against the new system (SAS) at the early stage of implementation or 
perhaps for a longer period of time (Kirchler, 2007). Since the authority to determine the 
tax system lies with tax administrators, taxpayers ultimately have to comply with any 
system that is introduced, even if they perceive that the system is unfair. However as 
compliance is not an absolute, levels of tax compliance will vary based on a variety of 
factors and the levels may change from year to year as the tax system changes. Managing 
the levels of compliance are therefore key challenges that the tax administrator has to 
resolve in SAS. 
 
 385
Like many countries, implementing a self assessment system has been an adventure for 
Malaysia’s tax administrators. Most importantly, with the introduction of a self 
assessment system, the responsibilities for assessment shifted from the tax authority 
(IRB) to taxpayers and reduced the IRB’s direct assessment-based administrative costs, 
providing the potential for a shift from administrative costs to compliance enforcement. 
However, these shifts will only produce a net benefit to the country if the move to self 
assessment produces adequate degrees of voluntary compliance by taxpayers to allow a 
net saving in such costs to occur without a reduction in the overall effectiveness of the tax 
system.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the objectives of this study are to obtain an overview of 
Malaysian taxpayers’ knowledge and identify the factors that affected tax compliance 
behaviour after the introduction of SAS in 2004. The desired outcomes of a shift from the 
official assessment system to SAS were: to collect taxes in an efficient manner, which 
meant at the lowest costs (in terms of time and money); to improve compliance and to 
institute effective enforcement through prevailing legal procedures (IRB, 2006). In order 
to accomplish their mission, the three fold objectives set by the IRB were (IRB, 2006): 1) 
to assess and collect the correct amount of revenue as provided under the law in the most 
effective manner and at a minimum cost; 2) to instill public confidence in the fairness and 
integrity of the tax system; and 3) to encourage voluntary compliance.  
 
Chapter 2 then discusses the nature of self assessment systems (SAS) in detail, including 
its objectives, principles, comparisons between other systems in operation and issues of 
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operation highlighted from other cases already using SAS. Issues pertaining to the 
implementation of a SAS in other tax regimes, for example in the US, UK, Japan and 
Cambodia were discussed. Chapter 3 then discusses extensively how SAS is implemented 
in Malaysia. A history of the Malaysian tax system and its administration, as well as 
problems and solutions of SAS were also discussed in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 illustrates previous studies in relation to tax knowledge and tax compliance. 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first part of Chapter 4 covers the 
concepts and the definition of tax compliance and the second part reveals tax compliance 
determinants from various perspectives. The second section is divided into five main 
parts, starting with an economic perspective, institutional factors, social factors, 
individual factors and other factors which affect tax compliance including age, gender, 
level of income and education. Results from previous studies were also analysed, 
summarised and compared with the research questions in the chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses research design and methodology including the data collection 
methods implemented (survey procedures, sampling frame and development of the 
questionnaire). Details of the research framework, the development of hypotheses and 
data analysis techniques (t-tests, ANOVA, OLS) were also discussed in the chapter. 
Since this study involved many sets of analysis, in order to provide an easier 
understanding of the results, this study divided the data analysis process into five stages. 
Stage 1 examined the sample descriptive statistics in relation to tax knowledge; Stage 2 
examined the relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour; Stage 4 
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identified the tax compliance determinants, while some control variables were included in 
Stages 3 and 5 in order to investigate the effect of those control variables on the 
regressions model both in Stages 2 and 4. 
 
Chapter 6 provides results and analysis of this study. The importance of tax knowledge in 
a self assessment system, the characteristics of tax knowledge background and  the 
determinants of tax compliance as well as demographic factors were presented in this 
chapter. Results of the hypotheses testing as discussed in Chapter 5 were also presented 
in Chapter 6. 
 
While Chapter 6 provides results of this study, Chapter 7 then discusses the results by 
explaining the rationale of the results in comparison with the research objectives and 
previous findings from other related research. This final chapter summarises and 
concludes the study by providing some suggestions, contributions and limitations of the 
study as well as future research directions. 
 
This study provides further evidence that tax knowledge is important in SAS and 
significantly affects tax compliance (in a positive direction) meaning that in SAS in 
Malaysia, developing tax knowledge further would probably help to increase tax 
compliance. In addition further analysis presented in Table 6.17 also revealed that gender 
(positive association, females more compliant), income (positive association, higher 
income earners more compliant) and age (positive association, older taxpayers more 
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compliant) appear to be significantly correlated with tax compliance behaviour, assuming 
that all respondents have an equal level of tax knowledge. Since the levels of tax 
knowledge (and the characteristics of knowledgeable and less knowledgable taxpayers) 
among taxpayers in SAS and the relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance 
has received less attention from previous researchers, this study, with a new design, 
approach, scoring method and time of dissemination of the questionnaires (refer to 
section 5.2 and 5.3) could contribute more meaningful and reliable results on these issues 
both in the context of Malaysia as the core case study but also of potential value to the 
wider study of this domain particularly among of developing countries. 
 
Interestingly, this study also provides additional new evidence that all factors discussed 
in section 4.3 namely 1) economic factors (perceptions of government spending); 2) 
institutional factors (probability of detection); 3) social factors (referent groups); 4) 
individual factors (personal financial constraint) and 5) and other factors (age, income, 
level, gender) were significantly correlated with tax compliance. Financial constraints 
(refer to Table 6.22) and tax knowledge (refer to Table 6.23) appeared to be the main 
factors in determining tax compliance behaviour, followed by the probability of being 
audited, perceptions of government spending and the influence of referent groups. This 
study also found that other potential variables which are evidenced by other researchers 
in other study settings as significant factors affecting tax compliance (such as penalties, 
perceptions of equity and fairness, changes to government policy and the role of the tax 
authority) are not significantly associated with tax compliance in SAS in Malaysia.  
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Further analysis (refer to section 6.9) also found that demographic control variables 
(DCV), such as gender, income level and age (refer to 5.4.3.2) were significantly 
correlated with tax compliance (refer to Table 6.26). Females, higher income earners and 
older taxpayers were more compliant while other tax background control variables 
(TBCV) such as education levels, attendance at tax courses and experience of being 
audited by the tax authority were insignificant.  
 
8.2 ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This research has made a contribution to the tax compliance literature by demonstrating 
the importance of tax knowledge in SAS in a developing country in order to increase 
voluntary compliance as well as highlighting the areas of tax knowledge that help overall 
compliance; therefore, this study can suggest specific areas where the education of others 
may help to increase overall levels of voluntary compliance in SAS (as per one of 
objectives of IRB for introducing SAS in Malaysia in the first place and typical also of 
many administration who use SAS). This study also contributes to knowledge in this field 
by illustrating the personal characteristics that do not appear to be of significant influence 
to tax compliance via levels of tax knowledge. 
 
This study further contributes by providing evidence of other key tax compliance 
determinants in a developing country, particularly in Asian countries that were previously 
under researched. These determinants, it is claimed may affect tax compliance behaviour 
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in other countries which have similar taxpayer backgrounds, culture, economic 
environments and policies. This study has provided further evidence to aid tax authorities 
in these countries develops their SAS plan further. 
 
With regards to methodological contributions, firstly, this study is the national study on 
the general topic of tax compliance with the highest number of responses received ever in 
Malaysia, (evaluating direct or self assessment systems). As a result, the study provides a 
further interpretation and understanding of the Malaysian situation in terms of 
representativeness and generalisability. Secondly, unlike other studies (for example, 
Troutman (1993), Chan et. al (2000), Loo (2006) and Mohamad Ali  et. al. (2007)), the 
two approaches of measuring taxpayers’ compliance behaviour (hypothetical and direct 
questions) were believed to increase validity and generalisability of the results. It may be 
that this approach could be a useful one for other researchers to replicate in other tax 
regimes.   
 
With regard to contributions to the body of knowledge, firstly, this study investigated the 
importance of tax knowledge in self assessment systems and suggested that an increase in 
tax knowledge in this domain could encourage improvements to taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour. Hence, this finding could enlighten tax administrators as to further methods 
necessary for designing the most appropriate and effective tax education programmes in 
order to increase taxpayers’ knowledge. As such, this study also suggested the 
characteristics of knowledgeable taxpayers (i.e. male, the location where they live and 
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middle income earners) for tax administrators to conveniently choose target taxpayer 
groups to be formally or informally educated.  
 
Secondly, this study not only tested the importance of tax knowledge in a general setting 
but specifically suggested which elements of tax knowledge most significantly affect tax 
compliance. These three prominent factors (i.e knowledge about child relief, 
responsibilities and rebates) may be useful to tax administrators to help focus their work 
particularly in audit and investigations processes. This could reduce auditing time and 
costs and could help tax authorities to invest more time and money in tracing and 
investigating taxpayers who may potentially commit tax evasion and thereby reduce the  
tax gap. 
 
Thirdly, five significant factors from different perspectives (economic factors, 
institutional factors, social factors, individual factors and other factors) that affect tax 
compliance were important information to the IRB especially in the early stage of SAS.  
These factors were vital in helping the IRB achieve certain aims, including helping them 
to benchmark their short term and long term achievements, re-evaluate their auditing 
programmes and aiding them in human resource planning in order to achieve the SAS 
missions and goals. Moreover, this study also contributes and complements previous tax 
compliance models developed by Fischer, Wartick and Mark (1992) and Chan, Troutman 
and O’Bryan (2000). Both models suggested that factors such as individual, economic, 
social-psychological and demographic factors are likely to affect compliance decisions.  
The general model for tax compliance behaviour developed in this study also 
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incorporated additional variables including tax knowledge and other variables which have 
never been tested in Malaysia before (i.e. changes to current government policy and 
perceptions of government spending) which provide, arguably, a more diversified and 
comprehensive model in the understanding of tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Hence, this research has contributed new empirical evidence on the importance of tax 
knowledge in SAS in a developing country, for example in Malaysia, as well as detailing 
factors affecting tax compliance behaviour. The findings of this research could also be 
used as a reference for any tax regime in order to improve the management of their tax 
system. The following section discusses how this study’s results could possibly be useful 
to other tax administrators in designing and administering their tax systems. 
 
8.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND HOW THE FINDINGS ARE USEFUL TO 
TAX ADMINISTRATORS 
 
The results of this study support the phenomenon of attitudes being affected by better tax 
knowledge and demonstrate that this holds true for other attitude dimensions. This 
positive relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance could be useful as a key 
input for the IRB in increasing taxpayers’ awareness regarding tax matters and as input 
into the designing of tax education programmes (especially in targeting groups of 
taxpayers or potential taxpayers (i.e. school children and university students)).  It could 
also be useful for helping the IRB in designing the best mechanism of delivering the 
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latest information on tax regulations (i.e. advertisements in media, websites, brochures 
and customer services desks) and also in achieving its goals in deciding to change the 
collection system to a SAS. It is also important for the IRB to be kept informed of 
taxpayers’ level of knowledge so that it can effectively and efficiently communicate (i.e. 
current changes in tax laws) and design tax policies (for example, the tax rates, filing 
requirements, penalties etc.). This study will contribute important information for this 
purpose given it is the most comprehensive study of its kind to date – as well as being the 
most recent. 
 
Moreover, the results could also be useful to the IRB in designing their auditing and 
investigation processes because a good relationship between the tax authority and 
taxpayers is an important consideration  in increasing tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007). 
However, the self assessment system itself does not permit the IRB to aggressively 
increase auditing tasks as investigations could only be performed at a reasonable rate. 
Although the number of audits would reflect taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, audit 
probability would influence voluntary compliance as suggested by the result of this study. 
 
Based on the results of this study as illustrated in Stages 1 – 3 and also the future 
expectations of the IRB (refer to section 3.5.3), this study could be useful to the Ministry 
of Education (governing all primary and secondary levels with students aged 7 to 17 
years old) or the Ministry of Higher Education (governing all higher learning institutions) 
in Malaysia to help further the development of a suitable syllabus for school children and 
the students of higher learning institutions in order to educate the nations on the 
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importance of tax  in their life. An introductory tax course should be introduced, perhaps 
as an elective subject at the beginning of higher learning education so that students are 
aware of their responsibilities as a taxpayer. This education method could be expected to 
help cultivate responsible taxpayers in Malaysia as the result of this research  show 
(higher levels of tax education do produce higher levels of tax complaince in Malaysia) 
as currently, tax courses are only taught to accounting students at diploma and degree 
levels. 
 
 
The results of this study also provide implications for all governments that seek to reduce 
the level of tax non-compliance in their society and become a benchmark or model for 
other similar tax regimes, and particularly for developing countries, in enhancing their tax 
systems. For example, in a country of similar cultures, tax laws and society (i.e. 
Indonesia, Vietnam and Cambodia), these findings could provide  useful input for 
designing tax education programmes. These specific insights should allow policy makers 
to gain a better understanding of the key variables that are significantly associated with 
tax compliance  and enable them to implement suitable strategies to minimise potentially 
damaging factors, and should also allow them to improve the governments’ tax revenue 
collections. Further, it is recommended that this kind of survey (study) should be 
conducted every two years as part of official monitoring  and evaluation (M & E) by the 
Malaysian tax auhority. 
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8.4 LIMITATIONS  
 
It is acknowledged that this study has a number of limitations. First, the tax knowledge 
questions and the scope of questions asked in the questionnaire were only limited to 
Section 4 of the Income Tax Act 1967. The section only covers some levels of tax 
knowledge. This study unable to determine all levels of tax knowledge as stipulated in 
the act as it this would have been time consuming and made the questionnaire lengthy, 
hence low response rates would potentially occurred.  
 
Secondly, the use of a self-report survey might be less reliable, especially when the 
information sought on tax is sensitive, potentially incriminating or embarrassing 
(Richardson, 2008). Actual behaviour of the subjects may vary from the responses given. 
Acknowledging this constraint, however, it is believed that this is the most suitable way 
to predict taxpayers’ compliance behaviour, as direct questions (face to face) might lead 
respondents to answer the questions dishonestly and could be potentially embarrassing 
for respondents.  
 
Thirdly, using telephone directories potentially limits response through only getting the 
head of households; also, replies from landline telephone owners tend to include only the 
richer group of the society. However, this issue has been balanced by a high number of 
usable responses (1,073) which is relatively high compared to other similar tax studies 
(refer to Table 5.3).  
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Fourthly, improved survey measures of tax compliance and various potential tax 
compliance determinants such as occupational status, religiosity, marginal tax rates and 
culture could improve the reliability of the empirical results and further reduce the risk of 
measurement error. This study was unable to include those variables at the same time. 
Therefore, to balance this issue, two approaches (direct and hypothetical questions) were 
used and were considered sufficient to validate the results.  
 
Fifthly, the types of approache used in measuring tax knowledge and tax compliance (i.e. 
by using a survey instrument) might provide limited results, and different research 
designs (such as interviews or an experiment) could produce different results. However, 
regardless of these limitations and weaknesses, the findings of this study could provide a 
model and become a benchmark to other developing countries for aiding their successful 
implementation of SAS for individuals. 
 
8.5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The area of tax education related to tax knowledge and levels of compliance, particularly 
in a self assessment system, offers opportunities for additional research. Instead of using 
a survey, other methods of data collection (for example, interviews or experiments) may 
provide different results. It is expected that two-way communication via an interview 
could produce other meaningful results; however, non-anonymous methods such as 
interviews can be problematic in revealing the truth, especially when questioning 
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respondents regarding tax compliance matters, as failure to appropriately address the 
questions would harm or embarrass respondents.  
 
Future research could be conducted via a longitudinal study in which a comparison of 
more years and might provide different results from this ‘point in time’ study. For 
example a study into how changes in levels of tax knowledge, taxpayers’ financial 
situations and changes to tax laws and regulations potentially affect compliance decisions 
could be beneficial. Using data from the tax administration and comparing this with data 
from questionnaires could also be beneficial as a further data source for a compliance 
study of this kind, although the chances of accessing data from the tax authority are very 
slim.  
 
Finally, other determinants which were not tested in this study such as political affiliation 
(Kim, 2008), cultural influence (Richardson, 2008) and religiosity (Torgler, 2007) could 
also be explored in the future. This study was unable to include these variables because 
these variables require a series of questions in order to be accurately measured (i.e the 
level of religiosity), hence these factors were excluded from this questionnaire but could 
be included in future studies to examine their impact on the explanatory power of the 
models used. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Section 13. General provisions as to employment income. 
 
 
(1) Gross income of an employee in respect of gains or profits from an employment 
includes: 
(a) any wages, salary, remuneration, leave pay, fee, commission, bonus, gratuity, 
perquisite or allowance (whether in money or otherwise) in respect of having or 
exercising the employment; 
 
(b) an amount equal to the value of the use or enjoyment by the employee of any 
benefit or amenity (not being a benefit or amenity convertible into money) 
provided for the employee by or on behalf of his employer, excluding- 
(i) a benefit or amenity consisting of medical or dental treatment or a 
benefit for child care; 
 
(ii) a benefit or amenity consisting of- 
 
 
(A) leave passages for travel within Malaysia not exceeding three 
times in any calendar year; or 
 
(B) one leave passage for travel between Malaysia and any place 
outside Malaysia in any calendar year, limited to a maximum of 
three thousand ringgit: 
 
Provided that the benefit or amenity enjoyed under this 
subparagraph is confined only to the employee and members of his 
immediate family; 
 
 (iii) a benefit or amenity used by the employee solely in connection with 
the performance of his duties; and 
 
(iv) a benefit or amenity falling under paragraph (c); 
(c) an amount in respect of the use or enjoyment by the employee of living 
accommodation in Malaysia (including living accommodation in premises 
occupied by his employer) provided for the employee by or on behalf of the 
employer rent free otherwise; 
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 (d) so much of any amount (other than a pension, annuity or periodical payment 
falling under paragraph 4(e)) received by the employee, whether before or after 
his employment ceases, from a pension or provident fund, scheme or society not 
approved for the purpose of this Act as would not have been so received if his 
employer had not made contributions in respect of the employee to the fund, 
scheme or society or its trustees; and 
 
(e) any amount received by the employee, whether before or after his employment 
ceases, by way of compensation for loss of the employment, including any 
amount in respect of- 
(i) a covenant entered into by the employee restricting his right after 
leaving the employment to engage in employment of a similar kind; or 
 
(ii) any agreement or arrangement having the like effect. 
 
(2) Gross income in respect of gains or profits from an employment- 
(a) for any period during which the employment is exercised in Malaysia; 
 
(b) for any period of leave attributable to the exercise of the employment in 
Malaysia; 
 
(c) for any period during which the employee performs outside Malaysia duties 
incidental to the exercise of the employment in Malaysia; 
 
(d) for any period during which a person is a director of a company and that 
company is resident in Malaysia for the basis year for a year of assessment and 
within that basis year that period or part of that period falls; or 
 
(e) for any period during which the employment is exercised aboard a ship or 
aircraft used in a business operated by a person who is resident in Malaysia for 
the basis year for a year of assessment and within that basis year that period or 
part of that period falls, 
 
shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia. 
 
(3) Gross income in respect of gains or profits from an employment in the public services 
or the service of a statutory authority- 
(a) for any period during which the employment is exercised outside Malaysia; or 
 
(b) for any period of leave attributable to the exercise of the employment outside 
Malaysia, 
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shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia if the employee is a citizen. 
 
(4) For the purposes of subsection (1) a benefit, amenity or living accommodation 
provided for an employee as therein mentioned shall be deemed to be used or enjoyed by 
the employee if it is used or enjoyed by his spouse, family, servants, dependants or 
guests. 
 
(5) Any question whether any gross income is gross income for a period mentioned in 
subsection (2) shall be decided by applying the appropriate provisions of Chapter 3 of 
Part III as if that period were the basis period for a year of assessment. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
 
Section 14. General provisions as to dividend income. 
 
 
(1) Subject to this section, where a company resident for the basis year for a year of 
assessment pays, credits or distributes a dividend in the basis period for that year of 
assessment, the dividend shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia.  
 
(2) Where a company resident for the basis year for a year of assessment was not resident 
for the basis year for the year of assessment immediately preceding that year of 
assessment, only dividends paid, credited, or distributed by the company on or after the 
day on which the management and control of any business of the company (or, in the 
case of a company which does not carry on a business, the management and control of its 
affairs by its directors or other controlling authority) were first exercised in Malaysia in 
that first-mentioned basis year shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia. 
 
(3) Where- 
(a) the management and control of the business of a company (or, if it has more 
than one business, of all its businesses); or 
 
(b) in the case of a company which does not carry on a business, the management 
and control of its affairs by its directors or other controlling authority, 
 
cease to be exercised in Malaysia in the basis year for a year of assessment and the 
company is not resident for the basis year for the year of assessment following that first-
mentioned year of assessment, dividends paid, credited or distributed in that first-
mentioned basis year after the cessation shall not be deemed to be derived from Malaysia. 
 
(4) Where a dividend consists of property other than money, that dividend shall be taken 
to consist of an amount equal to the market value of the property at the time of the 
distribution of the dividend. 
 
Section 15. Derivation of interest and royalty income in certain cases. 
Gross income in respect of interest or royalty shall be deemed to be derived from 
Malaysia- 
(a) if responsibility for payment of the interest or royalty lies with the Government or 
a State Government; or 
 
(b) (i) if responsibility for payment of the interest or royalty in the basis year for a 
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year of assessment (the responsibility of any guarantor being disregarded in the case 
of interest) lies with a person who is resident for that basis year; and 
 
(ii) in the case of interest it is payable in respect of money borrowed by    that      
person and employed in or laid out on assets used in or held for the production of 
any gross income of that person derived from Malaysia or the debt in respect of 
which the interest is paid is secured by any property or asset situated in Malaysia; 
or 
 
if the interest or royalty is charged as an outgoing or expense against any income 
accruing in or derived from Malaysia. 
 
 
 
Section 15A. Derivation of special classes of income in certain cases.  
 
 
Gross income in respect of- 
(a) amounts paid in consideration of services rendered by a person or his 
employee in connection with the use of property or rights belonging to, or the 
installation or operation of any plant, machinery or other apparatus purchased 
from, such person; 
 
(b) amounts paid in consideration of technical advice, assistance or services 
rendered in connection with technical management or administration of any 
scientific, industrial or commercial undertaking, venture, project or scheme; 
 
 (c) rent or other payments made under any agreement or arrangement for the use 
of any moveable property- 
 
shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia- 
(i) if responsibility for payment of the above or other payments lies with the 
Government or a State Government; 
 
 
(ii) if responsibility for the payment of the above or other payments lies with a 
person who is a resident for that basis year; or 
 
 
(iii) if the payment of the above or other payments is charged as an outgoing or 
expense in the accounts of a business carried on in Malaysia. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Section 16. Voluntary pensions, etc. 
 
Where any pension or other periodical payment is paid voluntarily to any person who has 
permanently ceased to exercise an employment (or to his widow, child, relative or 
dependant) by his former employer or the successor of his former employer, there shall 
be deemed to be a source of that person or of his widow, child, relative or dependant, as 
the case may be, in respect of that pension or payment and that pension or payment shall 
be deemed to be gross income from that source chargeable to tax. 
 
 
Section 17. Derivation of pensions, etc. 
 
(1) Gross income in respect of a pension from the Government or a State Government 
shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia. 
 
(2) Where- 
(a) a person has a right to a pension or other like payment- 
(i) from a pension fund or a fund of a similar kind; or 
 
(ii) under a pension scheme or a scheme of a similar kind; or 
 
(iii) by virtue of his membership of a pension society or a society of a 
similar kind; and 
 
(b) the forum of the administration of the fund, scheme or society is in Malaysia 
at any time in the basis year for a year of assessment, 
 
the gross income for the basis period for that year of assessment in respect of the pension 
or other like payment shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia. 
 
(3) The gross income for the basis period for a year of assessment from any source of the 
kind mentioned in section 16 or in respect of a pension or other periodical payment to 
which prargraph 4(e) applies shall be deemed to be derived from Malaysia if the person 
paying that income was resident for the basis year for that year of assessment:  
 
Provided that this subsection shall not apply to a pension or other payment to which 
subsection (1) or (2) applies. 
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APPENDIX 4 
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Name1
CP 4B - Pin. 2007
A7
Postcode Town
State
A10
A12
A8 A9 E
A11
-
1
Date received (1) Date received (2) Date received (3)
CitizenA1 A2
Status as at
31-12-2007A3 A4
A5 A6
2 3
5
76
4
Enter SG or OG
YEAR OF ASSESSMENT Form RETURN FORM OF AN INDIVIDUAL
(RESIDENT WHO DOES NOT CARRY ON BUSINESS)
UNDER SECTION 77 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 1967
LEMBAGA HASIL DALAM NEGERI MALAYSIA
This form is prescribed under section 152 of the Income Tax Act 1967
2007
Tax
Reference
No.
Passport
No.
Police
No.
New
Identity
Card No.
Army No.
Old Identity
Card No.
   PART A: PARTICULARS OF INDIVIDUAL
Date of Marriage/
Divorce/Demise
Sex
Use Country Code
(Enter ‘MY’ if Malaysian Citizen)
Type of
Assessment
1 = Single     2 = Married
3 = Divorcee / Widow / Widower
4 = Deceased
Compliance with
Public Rulings
1 = Male            2 = Female
1 = Yes 2 = No
Correspondence
Address
Bank Account No.
Name of Bank
e-mail
Telephone
No.
Employer 's
No.
Day Month Year
- -
FOR OFFICE USE
BE
B1
B2 B3
B5
B7B6
B4
   PART B: PARTICULARS OF HUSBAND / WIFE
Name of
Husband/Wife
Tax
Reference
No. Enter SG or OG
Passport
No.
Police
No.
New
Identity
Card No.
Army No.
Old Identity
Card No.
(as per identity
card/passport)
(as per identity
card/passport)
1 = Joint in the name of husband
2 = Joint in the name of wife
3 = Separate
4 = Single; Spouse without source of income/
with tax exempt income
for
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ce 
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ly
   PART C : STATUTORY INCOME AND TOTAL INCOME
Name Tax Reference No.
C1
C2
C3
C5
C4
C7
C6
C3
C4
C5
C6
C2
C7
C1 ,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
Employment
Other gains or profits
Pensions, annuities and other periodical payments
Rents, royalties and premiums
Interest and discounts
Dividends
AGGREGATE INCOME ( C1 to C6 )
TOTAL INCOME (SELF)  [ C7 - ( C8 to C15 ) ]
(Enter "0" if value is negative)
C16C16 ,,,
C17
AGGREGATE OF TOTAL INCOME ( C16 + C17 ) C18C18 ,,,
C17 ,,,
* Type of income transferred
  from Husband / Wife
1 = With business income
2 = Without business income
C8
C9
C10
C11
C12
C13
C10
C11
C12
C8
C9
C13
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
,,,
LESS :   Donations and Gifts
Gift of paintings to the National Art Gallery or any state art
gallery
Gift of money or medical equipment to any healthcare facility
approved by the Ministry of Health
Gift of money or contribution in kind for the provision of
facilities in public places for the benefit of disabled persons
Gift of money for the provision of library facilities or to
libraries
Gift of artefacts, manuscripts or paintings to the Government/
State Government
Gift of money to the Government, State Government, local
authorities or approved institutions and organisations
TOTAL INCOME TRANSFERRED FROM HUSBAND /
WIFE * FOR JOINT ASSESSMENT
D4 ,
,
D8A
D8
}
D7
D5
D6
,
,
,
D1
D2
D3
8 0 0,
,
,
0
,
Individual and dependent relatives
Disabled individual
PART D: DEDUCTIONS
RESTRICTED TO 5,000
6,000
RESTRICTED TO 5,000
RESTRICTED TO 5,000
RESTRICTED TO  1,000
RESTRICTED TO  3,000
C14
C15
C14
C15
,,,
,,,
Gift of money or contribution in kind for any project of national
interest approved by the Minister of Finance
(C14 + C15 restricted to 7% of amount in C7)
Gift of money or contribution in kind for any approved sports
activity (C14 + C15 restricted to 7% of amount in C7)
Medical expenses for own parents certified by medical practitioner
Basic supporting equipment for disabled self, spouse, child or parent
Education fees (self) for acquiring law, accounting, Islamic financing,
technical, vocational, industrial, scientific or technological skills or
qualifications
Medical expenses on serious diseases for self,
spouse or child
Complete medical examination for self, spouse or child
(restricted to 500)
Purchase of books/magazines/journals/similar publications (except
newspapers and banned reading materials) for self, spouse or child
Purchase of personal computer for individual (deduction
allowed once in every 3 years)
D8B ,
Net deposit in Skim Simpanan Pendidikan Nasional
(total deposit in 2007 minus total withdrawal in 2007) RESTRICTED TO  3,000
RESTRICTED TO 5,000
2
for
 
re
fer
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ce 
on
ly
3
D11b
D11
D11a
D11c
D12
x 500 = ,
x 2,000 =x 4,000 = ,
x 2,500 =x 5,000 =
x 4,500 =x 9,000 =
D14
D13
D14
x 1,000 =
E3
CHARGEABLE INCOME [ ( C16 - D14 ) or ( C18 - D14 ) ]
(Enter "0" if value is negative)
E1
E2
E2a
E2b
E3
,,,
Total rebate ( E4 to E7 )
(Restricted to amount E3)E8
,
E8 ,,, .
,,, .
,,, .
,,, .,,,
,,,
TOTAL TAX CHARGED ( E3 - E8 ) E9E9 ,,, .
50%100%
x 1,000 =
Eligible Rate
x 500 = ,
,,, .
LESS :
E10
E11
E10
E11 ,,, .
,,, .
TAX PAYABLE [ E9 - ( E10 + E11 + E12 + E13 ) ]
OR : TAX REPAYABLE [ ( E10 + E11 + E12 + E13 ) - E9 ]
E14
E15
E14
E15
E12E12 ,,, .
,,, .
,
,
,,
,
,
,
,
,
,
E13E13 ,,, .
Fees/Levy paid by a holder of an
Employment Pass, Visit Pass
(Temporary Employment) or Work Pass
E4 E6
E7
 350
, .E5  350
,, .
,
,
,
Name Tax Reference No.
Child - Under the
age of 18 years
Child :
Child - 18 years
& above and
studying
Child - Disabled
child
No. No.
Total relief ( D1 to D13 )
Life insurance and provident fund
Education and medical insurance
RESTRICTED TO 6,000
RESTRICTED TO 3,000
   PART E: TAX PAYABLE
Tax on the balance
TOTAL INCOME TAX ( E2a + E2b )
Tax on the first
INCOME TAX COMPUTATION (Refer to the tax rate schedule provided)
At Rate (%)
LESS : Tax Rebates
Zakat or fitrah
Section 110 tax deduction (dividends)
Section 110 tax deduction (others)
Section 132 tax relief
Section 133 tax relief
D9 ,Husband/Wife/Payment of alimony to former wife
3,500D10 Disabled husband/wife ,
Tax rebate for individual
(if E1 does not exceed
RM35,000)
Tax rebate for husband/wife
(if E1 does not exceed
RM35,000 and D9 is claimed)
RESTRICTED TO 3,000
for
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Balance of tax payable ( F1 - F2  )
F1
LESS :
F3
OR : Tax paid in excess ( F2 - F1 ) F4
F1
F2
F3
F4
F2
,,, .
,,, .
,,, .
,,, .
No. Pasport
H3
H5
H1
H2
H6
H4
4
Name Tax Reference No.
   PART F: STATUS OF TAX FOR YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 2007
Tax payable (from E14)
Instalments/Schedular Tax Deductions Paid for 2007 Income  -
SELF and HUSBAND / WIFE if joint assessment
   PART G: INCOME OF PRECEDING YEARS NOT DECLARED
Type of Income Year for
which paid
Provident and Pension
Fund ContributionGross Amount
G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
,,
   PART H: PARTICULARS OF EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED PERSON'S ESTATE
Executor's
Name
New Identity
Card No.
Old Identity
Card No.
Army No.Police No.
I
a
b - c
DECLARATION
hereby declare that the information regarding the income and claim for deductions and reliefs given by me in this return form and in
any document attached is true, correct and complete.
Identity Card No. / Passport No. /
Police No. / Army No. *
* Delete whichever is not relevant
2 = This return form is made on behalf of the above
1 = This return form is made on my own behalf
Day Month Year
- -Date:
Date:
Signature
Signature
Name
of Firm
Telephone
No.
Tax Agent's
Approval No./
Audit Licence No.
   PARTICULARS OF TAX AGENT WHO COMPLETES THIS RETURN FORM
- -
Day Month Year
for
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Identity
Card No
Name of
Bank
Telephone
No.
Cheque No.
and Others
REMITTANCE SLIP
To: DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INLAND REVENUE
Enclosed herewith is the cheque/money order/postal order/bank draft for payment of income tax.
Name and Postal Address
CP501 [Pin. 1/2007]
Amount of Payment
Date :   .........................................................
RM !!!!!!!!!!!!, ,, .
TAX REFERENCE NO. PAYMENT CODE INSTALMENT NO.
  
YEAR OF ASSESSMENT
 2007
Please read the following reminder before signing this return form
 
REMINDER
Please ensure that this return form is completed and in order. Carefully check all information given
before submitting it to Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia.
Check to ensure that the following have been done (Tick “ _/ ” in the relevant box)
Tax computation has been done on the appropriate working sheets (according to the Form
BE Explanatory Notes and Guidebook) and the amounts accurately transferred to this return
form.
All working sheets, records and documents are properly kept for reference by LHDNM.
All information have been clearly filled in the spaces provided.
Name and tax reference number are clearly indicated on every page of this return form and
relevant working sheets.
If there is any balance of tax payable, payment must be made according to the following:-
O Payment can be made as follows:
(a)  Bank - Counters of CIMB Bank Berhad (CIMB) and Public Bank Berhad (PBB)
by using the bank payment slip.
- CIMB and PBB internet banking.
(b)  LHDNM - e-Payment at LHDNM website.
- Payment counters of LHDNM or by mail:
Cheques, money orders and bank drafts must be crossed and made payable
to the Director General of Inland Revenue. Use the Remittance Slip
(CP501) when making payment.
Website: http://www.hasil.org.my
O Write down the name, address, telephone number, tax reference number, year of
assessment and payment code on the reverse side of the financial instrument.
O Payment by CASH / CHEQUE / MONEY ORDER / POSTAL ORDER must be separately
remitted to LHDNM at the above address.
Postal  Address Payment Counter
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
n
 
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
SABAH & FT LABUAN
SARAWAK
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
for
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fer
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MALAYSIAN INCOME TAX
Remittance Slip
1.   Payment can be made as follows:
1.1 Bank - Counters of CIMB Bank Berhad (BCB) and Public Bank Berhad (PBB) by using the bank payment slip.
- CIMB and PBB internet banking.
1.2 LHDNM - e-Payment at LHDNM website.
- Payment counters of LHDNM or by mail:
Cheques, money orders and bank drafts must be crossed and made payable to the Director General of Inland Revenue. Use
the Remittance Slip  when making payment.
2. Write down the name, address, telephone number, tax reference number, year of assessment and payment code on the reverse side of the
financial instrument.
3. Check the receipts/bank payment slips before leaving the payment counter.
Postal Address Payment Counter
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia
SABAH & FT LABUAN
SARAWAK
PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
APPENDIX 5 
 
 
Birmingham Business School,  
  
 
Tel:  
UNIVERSITI  
KEBANGSAAN  
MALAYSIA 
 
 
 
      15 June 2007 
TAXATION SURVEY 
 
Dear valued respondent, 
 
Congratulations for being chosen as part of our national taxation study. 
You have been chosen at random from the local telephone directory as 
one of a large number of respondents to this country wide study of the 
new tax system. 
 
The purpose of this survey is to find out more about how the new self 
assessment system is working – what you think of it and how it 
compares to the old system. We want to see how well you understand 
the operation of the new system. You should choose the answer you 
think is correct according to your understanding of the current tax rules. 
There is no need to look up answers to make sure they are correct – 
we want to know what you know - it is not a test. 
 
Your participation is, of course, voluntary and you do not have to 
answer all the questions asked if you do not want to but it would be 
greatly appreciated if you could answer all questions honestly and 
answer as many as you can so that our research is as complete as 
possible. Your response will be treated confidentially at all times so 
you can be entirely open in your responses.  
 
Completing the survey should not take more than 20 minutes at most. 
The instructions are included in each part of the survey. You can 
answer either in English (Set A) or in Malay (Set B) – the questions are 
the same for each set.   
 
Enclosed is a reply paid envelope for you to return the completed 
survey. If you could return the completed survey as soon as possible, 
and by 7 July 2007 at the latest we would be grateful. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about completing the 
questionnaire or about being in this study, you may contact us.  This 
project has been approved by the Review Board at The University of 
Birmingham, UK.    
 
Thank you for your corporation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
MOHD RIZAL PALIL ( ) 
ANDREW LYMER  ( ) 
 
Researchers 
 
 
 
 
In collaboration with and sponsored by: 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTION. 
 
This survey is divided into four parts. Please answer all questions. 
 
 
SECTION A (TAX COMPLIANCE –HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS) 
 
In this section, you are given various situations in which related with decision making. For each 
situation, please answer honestly. 
 
PART A 1 -PROBABILITY OF BEING AUDITED 
 
 
In the past five years, Miss Carol has declared her income accurately based on her actual income. 
However, because she has not been audited by the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) for the past five years, 
in year assessment 2006, she underreported part of her casual income and over claimed child relief in 
her tax return. By doing she saved RM1,000 in total tax payable. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Miss Carol: 
 
i) Would the probability of being audited affect your decision to underreport and over claim child 
relief?    
 
YES ________ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability of underreport and over claim child relief in year assessment 2006? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
PART A 2 -PERCEPTION ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
 
 
Mr. Sam is a bank manager and until now has always been an honest taxpayer. He pays a significant 
amount of tax every year. Recently, he noticed that the government spends a lot on developing quarters 
and offices for high level government servants, have bought a new private aircraft for the Prime 
Minister and have increased the allowance for the members of Parliament. Meanwhile, the government 
is proposing to impose minimum service charges for hospital treatment and an increase in school fees. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Mr. Sam: 
 
i) Would your perception on government spending will urge you to become dishonest taxpayer?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability of maintaining your honesty? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 6 
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PART A 3 - PERCEPTION ON EQUITY AND FAIRNESS 
 
Mrs. Maria is a school teacher and has been paying tax for more than ten years. Her work colleague, 
Miss Lynn, teaches in the morning, but has been operating a baby care centre at home without a valid 
licence for almost five years and has never paid taxes on this income because the IRB never realised 
the existence of the centre. From Mrs. Maria observation, Miss Lynn is a wealth-off person due to the 
extra non-taxable income from the centre. Mrs. Maria is considering under-declaring her income this 
year because of this situation. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Mrs. Maria: 
 
ii) Would your perception of equity and fairness affect your decision to under report your income?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability you would under report your income? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
PART A 4 - PENALTY  
 
Mr. Mike is a sales executive who receives basic salary and commissions on top of his sales 
performance. The commissions are paid in cash and do not appear on the payslips. He never declares 
his commission income in his tax return every year. His commission was RM5,000 in 2005. In the year 
assessment 2005 the IRB investigated him and penalised him 10% (RM500) on that under reported 
commission. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Mr. Mike: 
 
i) Would the penalty last year will affect your decision to under report the commission next year?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability of under reporting commissions? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
PART A 5 - FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT  
 
Miss Lydia has a very good income and lives in a high-class condominium in city centre. Recently, the 
company where she works is in trouble and cut off 10% salary. This makes Miss Lydia’s financial 
position significantly affected. In the past five years, she easily paid between RM10,000 to RM15,000 
of income tax yearly. However in year assessment 2006, due to money constraint, she had completed 
the tax return inaccurately by under reporting her income and over claiming child deduction so that 
she came up with RM5,000 of income tax liability. By doing this she can compensate the salary 
reduction that she suffered for the whole year by  tax reduction. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Miss Lydia: 
 
i) Would the financial position will affect your decision to deliberately completed tax return 
inaccurately?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
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ii) What is the probability of completing tax return inaccurately? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
PART A 6 - CHANGES ON CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES  
 
Mr. Danny is usually a good taxpayer. He never usually cheats in completing his tax return and pays 
his tax on time. In the past two years, the fuel prices, electricity and water rates, toll charges and 
council taxes have increased. Fortunately income tax rates have remained the same. Due to these 
increases, Mr. Danny is considering ‘altering’ his tax return in year assessment 2006 so that the ‘tax 
saving’ that he would makes could cover the price increase.  
 
If you were in the same situation as Mr Danny: 
 
i) Would the price increases affect your decision to ‘alter’ the tax return?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability of ‘altering’ the tax return? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
 
PART A 7 - REFERRAL GROUP (FRIENDS, RELATIVE ETC.)  
 
Miss Lowe has many friends. Many of her decisions are influenced by her friends and relatives.  In the 
year assessment 2006, her taxable income was RM35,800 which exceeded the RM35,000 tax brackets 
and thus the tax payable was RM2,500. If her taxable income does not exceeds RM35,000, she could 
gets a RM350 tax rebate and therefore has to pay RM2,150 only in tax. She says that most of her office 
colleagues and relatives would just simply alter the tax return so that the taxable income is below 
RM35,000. 
 
If you were in the same situation as Miss Lowe: 
 
i) Would your friends’ and relatives’ action affect your decision to ‘reduce’ your taxable income?    
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
 
ii) What is the probability of reducing taxable income? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
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Will do                   Will not do 
PART A 8 - THE ROLE OF THE INLAND REVENUE BOARD 
 
Mr. Albert is a partner in a business. He has always in the past pays his income tax through monthly 
scheduler tax deduction (STD). In year assessment 2005, he found that he has overpaid RM500. Due to 
financial constraint, he tried to claim back that amount and completed a very long refund forms and 
furnished all supporting documents. Two months later he received a letter from the IRB informing him 
that he could not get the refund. The overpaid amount would instead become a tax credit and will be 
set-off against his income tax in year assessment 2006. He was very frustrated and is considering over 
claiming deductions in his next tax return (in YA 2006) so that the income tax payable and his total 
STD tally.  
 
If you were in the same situation as Mr. Albert; 
 
i) Would you make over claim deductions in year assessment 2006?   
 
YES ______ NO ________ 
 
ii) What is the probability of making over claming deductions? 
 
 
 
Very low probability  1 2 3 4 5 Very high probability  
 
  
SECTION B – TAX KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
This section consists of Part B1 to Part B6. Please read each statement carefully and answer (circle) 
according to your knowledge. 
 
PART B 1-(TAXPAYER GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS) 
 
For each question in this part, please circle: 
 
1 If you think you will DEFINITELY DO 
2 If you think you will PROBABLY DO 
3 If you are NOT SURE either do or not to do 
4 If you think you will PROBABLY NOT DO 
5 If you think you will NEVER DO 
 
The following are my responsibilities and rights as taxpayers: 
 
1 To inform and declare actual income received from all sources to the IRB  1 2 3 4 5 
2 To keep records/documents pertaining to income and expenditure for a period 
of seven years after submission of  the Tax Return 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 To pay taxes due within 30 days from the date of issue  of the Notice of 
Assessment or within the stipulated period 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PART B 2 -(TYPES OF INCOME) 
 
For each question in Part B2 to Part B6, please circle: 
 
1 If you think the statement is DEFINITELY WRONG 
2 If you think the statement is PROBABLY WRONG 
3 If you are NOT SURE about the statement.  
4 If you think the statement is PROBABLY CORRECT 
5 If you think the statement is DEFINITELY CORRECT 
1. Employment income 
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Wrong Correct 
 
The following income MUST BE INCLUDED in taxable income: 
 
4 Basic salaries  1 2 3 4 5 
5 Leave pay 1 2 3 4 5 
6 Commission 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Allowance or perquisite whether in cash or otherwise 1 2 3 4 5 
 
The following income MUST BE EXCLUDED in taxable income: 
 
8 Living accommodation provided by employer  1 2 3 4 5 
9 For government servant, Housing and Civil Servants allowance in year 
assessment 2006 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 Mileage claims/travelling allowances 1 2 3 4 5 
 
2. Dividend & Interest income 
 
The following income MUST BE INCLUDED in taxable income: 
 
11 Dividend received from unit trust managed by Permodalan Nasional Bhd 
(ie. ASN,ASB etc)  
1 2 3 4 5 
12 Dividend received from unit trust managed by private financial institutional 
(i.e. Public Mutual Fund, Sourthen Mutual Fund, etc.)   
1 2 3 4 5 
13 Dividend received from a coorperative society in Malaysia  1 2 3 4 5 
 
The following income MUST BE EXCLUDED in taxable income: 
 
14 A gross dividend paid by a company in Malaysia which is listed in Bursa 
Malaysia.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15  Interest received from banking institution for deposit not exceeding 
RM100,000 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 Interest received from government securities  1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
PART B 3 - (PERSONAL RELIEF) 
 
 In this part you are requested to answer the questions and the limits as well. 
 
 
 
 Type of relief claimed   Limit 
RM 
 
17 Personal relief is granted automatically 1 2 3 4 5 17a 6,000 1 2 3 4 5 
18 In joint assessment, the spouse’s relief is 
granted automatically  
1 2 3 4 5 18a 3,000 1 2 3 4 5 
19 Medical expenses for parents  1 2 3 4 5 19a 5,000 1 2 3 4 5 
20 Purchase of books, journals and magazines 
including newspaper 
1 2 3 4 5 20a 500 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong Correct 
Wrong                         Correct 
Wrong                         Correct 
Wrong                         Correct Wrong                         Correct 
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PART B 4 - (CHILD RELIEF) 
 
Child relief can be claimed for : 
 
21 Married child only  1 2 3 4 5 
22 Restricted for six child only 1 2 3 4 5 
23 Child relief under 18 years old is RM1,000 1 2 3 4 5 
24 Child relief over 18 years old and study in local institution is RM3,500 1 2 3 4 5 
25 Child relief over 18 years old and study in overseas institution is RM1,500 1 2 3 4 5 
26 Life insurance premium and  contribution to Employee Provident Fund 
(EPF) is restricted to maximum RM4,000 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART B 5 - (REBATES) 
 
27 Taxable income less than RM35,000 entitle to get personal rebate RM450 1 2 3 4 5 
28 Zakat rebate is subject to maximum of tax payable. 1 2 3 4 5 
29 If the zakat payment is exceeding the total tax payable, the amount that exceed 
can be carried forward to the following year. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30 Rebate of RM500 for purchase of personal computer for own use. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART B 6 - (AWARENESS ON OFFENCES, PENALTY AND COMPOUND) 
 
For the following questions, please circle according to the scale: 
 
1 If you think you are DEFINITELY UNAWARE 
2 If you think you are PROBABLY UNAWARE 
3 If you are NOT SURE about the statement.  
4 If you  think you are PROBABLY AWARE 
5 If you think you are DEFINITELY AWARE 
 
 
 
31 Failure to notify chargeability – compound 10% of the total tax payable subject 
to minimum of RM300 and maximum of RM5,000 
1 2 3 4 5 
32 Late submission of tax return or fail to declare his/her source of income  after 
making a declaration in the Tax Return – compound minimum RM50 to 
maximum RM3,000  
1 2 3 4 5 
33 Fraud, omissions and understatement – penalty rates imposed is between 15% 
to 60% of tax taxable  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong                         Correct 
Wrong                         Correct 
Unaware                      Aware 
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SECTION C (TAX COMPLIANCE) 
 
 
Please state your opinion for each given statements using the following scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I wish TO COMPLY with tax laws for the following reasons: 
 
34 If I detected not reporting my exact income, I believe that the tax authority 
is tolerant towards my offence and most probably it will escape without 
any punishment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35 I believe the tax authority has limited capability to investigate all income 
reported to them in the year 2006 so I have an opportunity to not report my 
exact income 
1 2 3 4 5 
36 I believe that the probabilities of being detected by the tax authority for not 
declaring the exact income that I receive in the year 2006 are low. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37 The government spends a reasonable amount on welfare 1 2 3 4 5 
38 There are a number of government services, facilities and infrastructure for 
which I am very thankful  
1 2 3 4 5 
39 The government does not wastes too much money 1 2 3 4 5 
40 I pay about the same amount of taxes as others making the same income 1 2 3 4 5 
41 Higher income earners should pay more taxes than lower income earners 1 2 3 4 5 
42 By paying right amount of income tax, I believe that other people 
especially the poor will get the benefit 
1 2 3 4 5 
43 The tax return is easy and simple to complete 1 2 3 4 5 
44 Serious enforcement and penalty by the IRB may result if I do not comply 1 2 3 4 5 
45 Because  IRB is efficient in its dealings with taxpayer correspondence (e.g. 
makes refunds in short time) 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
I wish NOT TO COMPLY with tax laws for the following reasons: 
 
46 The penalty rates are very low and I can afford to pay the penalty 1 2 3 4 5 
47 The enforcement is very weak 1 2 3 4 5 
48 I believe that the penalty is lower than my tax saving due to not comply 
with tax laws. 
1 2 3 4 5 
49 My expenditure always exceeds my income 1 2 3 4 5 
50 The price of basic needs is keep on increasing 1 2 3 4 5 
51 I will pay my debts and basic needs  first rather than income tax 1 2 3 4 5 
52 Significant increase in fuel prices and electricity and water tariff 1 2 3 4 5 
53 Significant increase in toll charges 1 2 3 4 5 
54 My friends do not comply and they have never been penalised 1 2 3 4 5 
55 My parents do not comply and they have never been penalised 1 2 3 4 5 
56 My relatives do not comply and they have never been penalised 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
ETHIC/ ATTITUDE  
 
57 I would not feel guilty if I excluded some of my income when completing 
my tax return 
1 2 3 4 5 
58 Since the supporting documents do not need to be sent to the IRB, I can 
manipulate the figure in the tax return 
1 2 3 4 5 
59 I do not think it is ethically wrong if I excludes small amount of income 
when completing the tax return. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 Strongly disagree 
2 Disagree 
3 Not certain 
4 Agree                  
5 Strongly agree 
   Disagree                              Agree 
   Disagree                              Agree 
   Disagree                              Agree 
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SECTION D – PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
 
 
D1. Gender 
 
Male   Female  
 
D2. Race 
 
Malay  Indian   
Chinese  Others  Specify ____________________ 
  
      D3. Age 
 
20 - 25  41 - 45  
26 - 30  46 - 50  
31 - 35  51 - 55  
36 - 40  56 and above  
 
D4. Marital status 
 
Single  * Go to D6                             Married  
Widow/widower    
 
D5. How many unmarried children do you have? 
 
 No. of 
children 
Below 18  
Over 18 and studying in Malaysia  
Over 18 and studying overseas  
Over 18 and not studying  
 
D6. What is your religion?    ________________________________________ 
 
D7. Highest level of education  
 
 SPM/STPM  Ph.D 
 Certificate/Diploma  Other (specify) ______________________ 
 Degree/Professional   
 Master   
 
D8. Have you ever used ‘E-filing’ to file your tax returns? 
 
Yes   No  
 
D9. Have you attended/passed any formal taxation course organized by IRB or university or other 
professional bodies or any bodies previously? 
 
Yes   No  
 
D10. Who is your current employer? 
 
Government  Self employed  
Private/partner  Others  
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D11. Designation (Grade for government servants) 
 
Clerical (Grade < 41)  Senior manager (Grade 51-54)   
Officer (Grade 41 - 44)  Director (Special grade C)   
Manager (grade 44 - 48)  Higher than director (Higher than 
special grade C )  
 
 
D12. Gross monthly income group (RM) 
 
< 1,000  6,001 – 8,000  
1,001 – 2,000  8,001 – 10,000  
2,001 – 4,000  >10,000  
4,001 – 6,000    
 
D13. Who prepared you tax return? (Please tick) 
 
 Year assessment Me Tax agent Never 
D13 2004    
D14 2005    
D15 2006    
 
D16. Have you ever been audited by IRB 
 
Yes  No  
  
 If Yes, how many times ?____________________ 
 
D17. Have you ever been penalised by the IRB due to the following conditions? 
 
 Yes If Yes, How 
many times? 
No 
Not filing a tax return    
Late filing of tax return    
Under reporting income    
Over reporting income    
Under claiming deductions    
Over claiming deductions    
Late tax payments    
 
D18. Which political party did you vote for the previous general election? 
 
Government parties  Government-opposed parties  Did not vote  
 
D19. Which political party will you vote for the coming general election? 
 
Government parties  Government-opposed parties  Will not vote  
 
 
 
 
- END OF QUESTIONNAIRE – 
 
THANK YOU 
 
 
  
 
 
